Health Care Service Corporation v. Pollitt

Issues

Whether a government contractor who provides insurance coverage to federal employees is entitled to remove a complaint against it to federal court under either the “complete preemption” doctrine with respect to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”) or the federal officer removal statute?

 

In 2007, Juli Pollitt sued Health Care Service Corporation (“HCSC”) in state court for bad-faith insurance practices. HCSC removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed because the court reasoned that the Federal Employees  Benefit  Act preempted the case. Pollitt appealed, and the Seventh Circuit vacated the lower court decision, holding that removal was inappropriate because the claim was not “completely preempted” by federal law. The Seventh Circuit added that whether the federal officer removal statute applied here was a question of fact and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court decision will decide whether a government contractor who provides insurance coverage to federal employees is entitled to remove a suit under either the “complete preemption” doctrine or the federal officer removal statute. This decision is of great importance to all businesses that contract with the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act ("FEHBA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-14, completely preempts -- and therefore makes removable to federal court -- a state court suit challenging enrollment and health benefits determinations that are subject to the exclusively federal remedial scheme established in FEHBA.

2. Whether the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which authorizes federal removal jurisdiction over state court suits brought against persons "acting under" a federal officer when sued for actions "under color of [federal] ... office," encompasses a suit against a government contractor administering a FEHBA plan, where the contractor is sued for actions taken pursuant to the government contract.

Respondent, Juli Pollitt (“Pollitt”), sued her health care insurance carrier, Petitioner, Health Care Service Corporation (“HCSC”), in state court for bad-faith conduct by insurers. See Pollitt v. Health Care Service Corp., 558 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir.

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Additional Resources

• Wex: Law about Jurisdiction

• Wex: Law about Removal

• The National Underwriter: Labor’s Own Benefits Problems Reach Supreme Court

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Haywood v. Drown

Issues

Whether a state may constitutionally withdraw jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil actions filed in state courts against state corrections officers.

 

While Keith Haywood was serving a prison sentence for his second felony conviction, corrections officers filed two separate misbehavior reports against him. After Haywood was found guilty of both offenses, he sued several corrections officers, including the hearing officers who heard his case, in civil lawsuits. Haywood asserted several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The New York Supreme Court dismissed Haywood’s claims on the basis of New York Corrections Law § 24, which prohibits suits against individual state corrections officers rather than against the state itself. The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Haywood is now appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States. His case will determine whether a state has the sovereign authority to withdraw jurisdiction over an area of federal law. The Supreme Court’s decision will also affect New York corrections officers, who, at present, are immune to suits arising in the course of their jobs. In reaching its decision, the Court will have to balance the efficiency concerns the corrections officers raise with the fairness concerns that Haywood and his supporters raise.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state’s withdrawal of jurisdiction over certain damages claims against state corrections employees — from state courts of general jurisdiction — may be constitutionally applied to exclude federal claims under Section 1983, especially when, as here, the state legislature withdrew jurisdiction because it concluded that permitting such lawsuits is  bad  policy?

In 1992, Keith Haywood received a fifteen- to thirty-year sentence in Attica Correctional Facility for his second violent felony. See Haywood v. Drown, 9 N.Y.3d 481, 484 (N.Y. 2007); see also People v.

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Additional Resources

· Workplace Prof Blog

· Oyez

· PrawfsBlawg: A blog post from before the Supreme Court granted cert, arguing that the Court should do so.

· Constitutional Law: Check out more about the Supremacy Clause here.

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Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore

Issues

  1. Do loan guarantors have the same rights and protections that their applicant spouses are given by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?
  2. Does the Federal Reserve Board have the authority to define guarantors as applicants for purposes of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act?

 

The Supreme Court will consider whether protections for applicants in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) also extend to spouses who sign guaranties, and whether the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”), in promulgating Regulation B, permissibly expanded the definition of “applicant” in the ECOA to include such guarantors. See Brief for Petitioners, Hawkins & Patterson at i, 8; Brief for Respondent, Community Bank of Raymore at i. The loan guarantors in this case (Hawkins and Patterson) maintain that ECOA’s protections for applicants extend to guarantors, because the ECOA does not explicitly exclude them, and Regulation B clarifies that the ECOA definition of applicants includes guarantors. See Brief for Petitioners at 16, 56. Accordingly, Hawkins and Patterson assert that they have standing to sue to invalidate the loan agreement as illegal and unenforceable under ECOA.  See id. at 51. Raymore, the creditor here, counters that the plain language of the ECOA protects only applicants, not guarantors. See Brief for Respondent at 17–21. Raymore contends that any attempt by the Fed, through Regulation B, to expand the definition of “applicant” in the ECOA to include guarantors was impermissible. See id. at 46. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  could affect the cost of borrowing and change the underwriting standards and costs for loans to married business owners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether “primarily and unconditionally liable” spousal guarantors are unambiguously excluded from being Equal Credit Opportunity Act applicants because they are not integrally part of “any aspect of a credit transaction”; and
  2. Whether the Federal Reserve Board has authority under the ECOA to include by regulation spousal guarantors as “applicants” to further the purposes of eliminating discrimination against married women.

This case begins with a loan dispute between Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson, as guarantors, and the Community Bank of Raymore, (“Raymore”), as creditor. See Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 939 (8th Cir.

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Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs

Issues

Did the Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17,  1893  Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii cloud the State of Hawaii's title to land ceded to it by the federal government, opening these lands up to ownership challenges by Native Hawaiians and preventing the state from selling or otherwise transfer the land?

 

In 1993, Congress and the President adopted a resolution ("Apology Resolution"), in which the United States apologized for its role in the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893. Shortly thereafter, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA") sought to enjoin a residential development on the Leiali'i land parcel, land owned by the state, but held in trust for Native Hawaiians and the general public. OHA also requested that the state agency in charge of the parcel's development certify that any transfer of the parcel's ownership would not diminish Native Hawaiians' claims to the land. The state agency refused and sent OHA a check for the land, which OHA refused. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the Apology Resolution had changed the legal relationships of the parties involved, and enjoined further development of the land until the state of Hawaii reconciled with Native Hawaiians. In this case, the Supreme Court must determine whether the Apology Resolution changes the legal duties and obligations of the parties involved, or whether it is simply a statement of regret. This case will have far-reaching implications for land in other states which may have competing claims of ownership by native populations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17,  1893  Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Congress acknowledged and apologized for the United States' role in that overthrow. The question here is whether this symbolic resolution strips Hawaii of its sovereign authority to sell, exchange, or transfer 1.2 million acres of state land-29 percent of the total land area of the State and almost all the land owned by the  State-unless  and until it reaches a political settlement with native Hawaiians about the status of that land.

In 1893, the Republic of Hawaii became a territory of the United States, and ceded 1.8 million acres of land to the federal government. See Office of Haw. Affairs v. Housing and Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 177 P.3d 884, 891 (Haw.

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Hartman v. Moore

Issues

If the government chooses to prosecute someone for a crime simply to retaliate for that  individuals  criticisms of the government, can that individual sue the investigating officers for retaliatory prosecution if the government's case, although retaliatory, was supported by probable cause?

 

William Moore was CEO of a company that manufactured optical scanning technology. In an effort to establish a sales contract for that technology with the United States Postal Service, Moore initiated a media and lobbying campaign that criticized the technology and policies the USPS had in place. It was later revealed that individuals involved in Moore's campaign had entered into two illegal payoff schemes, and, at the urging of the USPS, the government prosecuted Moore for involvement in those schemes. The government's case against Moore was quickly dismissed, and Moore brought a civil suit against the prosecutor and postal inspectors claiming they had prosecuted him to retaliate for his criticism of the USPS. After a series of hearings before trial and appellate courts, Moore's claim against the prosecutor has been dismissed and the Supreme Court must now decide whether the postal inspectors are immune from suit because the prosecution, although retaliatory, was supported by probable cause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether law enforcement agents may be liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, for retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment when the prosecution was supported by probable cause.

William Moore was CEO of Recognition Equipment, Inc. (REI), a company that specialized in optical scanning technology. Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 873 (D.C. Cir 2004) (Moore I).

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Harris, et al. v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

Issues

  • Does Arizona’s redistricting plan violate the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by creating unequally populated legislative districts?
  • If so, must Arizona explain the deviation between districts; and, are satisfying partisan political objections or achieving preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act permissible rationales?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether Arizona’s redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by diluting the voting power of its residents. The Court will also consider whether Arizona must justify deviations in population between districts, and what kind of justification Arizona may properly raise. In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”), entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (D. Ariz., 2014). In 2011–2012, the Commission created a new legislative map, which caused population deviation between districts. On April 27,  2012  appellant Wesley W. Harris and others brought suit against the Commission in District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the new legislative map. See Harris, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. Harris argues that the Commission violates the one-person, one-vote principle of Equal Protection Clause by drawing unequal districts that dilute the voting power of citizens depending on where they live. See Brief for Appellants, Wesley W. Harris, et al. at 50. According to Harris, neither advancing partisan goals nor obtaining preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act are legitimate reasons to draw voting districts of unequal population. See id. at 25-26, 36. The Commission contends that where the difference between the most densely and least densely populated districts is less than 10 percent, the Commission does not need to justify why those districts were not drawn to be precisely equal. See Brief for Appellee, Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n at 29-34. Moreover, the Commission argues that the deviations in  population  were the result of a good-faith effort to satisfy section 5 preclearance. See id. at 38–40. The Court’s decision will affect redistricting plans  nationwide,  and could impact the way in which states consider race or ethnicity in the redistricting process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Does the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justify intentionally creating over- populated legislative districts that result in tens of thousands of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, violating the one-person, one-vote principle?
  2. Does the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permit the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle? And, even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified, is this still a legitimate justification after Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)?

In 2000, Arizona voters approved a ballot initiative creating the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, entrusted with redrawing the state’s legislative and congressional districts for future elections. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp.

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Harrington v. Richter

Issues

Whether the California Supreme Court's summary denial of Richter's claim was an adjudication on the merits that qualifies for state court deference under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d), and whether the Court reasonably adjudicated both prongs of Richter's Strickland claim.

 

Joshua Richter, convicted of murder, alleged that he received inadequate assistance from his attorney at trial. Richter argued that his attorney should have presented expert testimony concerning a blood splatter at the crime scene, which could have corroborated his version of the events. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Richter and granted his request for habeas corpus relief. Kelly Harrington, the prison warden, claimed that Richter did not receive inadequate counsel and that the California Supreme Court’s earlier summary disposition denying habeas corpus relief should be upheld. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the level of deference that should be granted to lower court orders, such as summary dispositions, which could discourage lower courts from issuing such orders in the future.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, did the Ninth Circuit deny the state court judgment the deference mandated by 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) and impermissibly enlarge the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel by elevating the value of expert-opinion testimony in a manner that would virtually always require defense counsel to produce such testimony rather than allowing him to rely instead on cross-examination or other methods designed to create reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt?

In addition, the parties were directed to brief the following question: Does AEDPA deference apply to a state court's summary disposition of a claim, including a claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

On December 19, 1995, Respondent Joshua Richter (“Richter”) and his co-worker Christian Branscombe (“Branscombe”) drove to Joshua Johnson’s (“Johnson”) home, to deliver money that Richter owed to his co-worker “Tony” and to buy marijuana from Johnson. See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Wex: AEDPA

· Civil Procedure and Federal Court Blog: SCOTUS Cert Grant of Interest: Harrington v. Richter (Feb. 25, 2010)

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Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance

Issues

Whether ERISA § 502(g)(1) requires a party to be a prevailing party before a court can award attorney fees, and if so, whether Hardt satisfies that standard.

 

Petitioner, Bridget Hardt (“Hardt”), a former employee of Dan River Inc., brought suit against Respondent, Reliance Insurance Co. (“Reliance”), the insurance provider for Dan River Inc., in an attempt to recover attorney’s fees for a previous suit Hardt had brought in the Eastern District of Virginia to recover benefits pursuant to Dan River Inc.’s Group Long-Term Disability Insurance Program Plan (“the Plan”). The Eastern District remanded the case to Reliance, which, under ERISA, not only administers the Plan, but also decides whether an applicant is entitled to benefits. On remand, Reliance provided Hardt with the requested benefits. Hardt now sues seeking attorney’s fees under ERISA § 502(g)(1). Reliance counters that Hardt did succeed on the merits in the lower court and, therefore, cannot satisfy ERISA’s definition of “prevailing party.” Hardt, on the other hand, argues that the text of the statute does not include a prevailing party standard as a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether ERISA § 502(g)(1) requires a party to succeed on the merits before attorney’s fees may be awarded and, if so, whether Hardt satisfies that requirement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that ERISA § 502(g)(1) provides a district court discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees only to a prevailing party? 

2. Whether a party is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to § 502(g)(1) when she persuades a district court that a violation of ERISA has occurred, successfully secures a judicially-ordered remand requiring a redetermination of entitlement to benefits and subsequently receives the benefits sought on remand?

Bridget Hardt, worked as an executive assistant to the president of a textile manufacturer, Dan River Inc.; in 2000, she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”) and had surgery on both wrists to relieve the pain. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 336 Fed. Appx.

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·      Wex: Law about ERISA

·      Department of Labor: Health Plans & ERISA

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Harbison v. Bell

Issues

1. Does a defendant who is appointed a federally funded lawyer for a habeas corpus claim also have a right to use the federally funded lawyer for representation in state clemency hearings?

2. Must a defendant wait until the final judgment of a state court and obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal an order denying assistance of federally funded counsel for a clemency hearing?

 

The Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3599, provides indigent defendants in death penalty cases the assistance of federally funded lawyers. Edward Jerome Harbison was convicted of first degree murder by a Tennessee jury and sentenced to death. Harbison requested the retention of his federally provided lawyer for his state clemency proceedings. This request was denied, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that § 3599 does not apply to strictly state proceedings. Harbison appeals this ruling, arguing that the language of § 3599 indicates it applies to all death penalty proceedings, including state clemency proceedings. Although the respondent, Warden Ricky Bell, takes no position on this issue, amicus United States argues that Congress intended § 3599 to apply exclusively to federal proceedings, and that the legislative history supports this interpretation. With its decision in this case, the Supreme Court may resolve a split of opinion among the federal circuit courts regarding the scope of § 3599.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Every jurisdiction that authorizes the death penalty provides for clemency, which is of vital importance in assuring that the death penalty is carried out justly. But, in this case the District Court held Mr. Harbison's federally-funded lawyers could not present, on his behalf, a clemency request to Tennessee's governor. The denial of clemency counsel contravenes basic principles of justice. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Herrera v. Collins.

Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted. Indeed, the clemency power exists because "the administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt."  Thus, executive clemency is the "fail safe' in our criminal justice system."  A system which includes capital punishment but does not provide a meaningful opportunity for executive clemency is "totally alien to our notions of criminal justice."

Yet, the lower courts arbitrarily denied Mr. Harbison's federally-funded habeas counsel permission to represent him in state clemency proceedings after the State had denied him counsel for that purpose. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit not only defied Congress' explicit directions to provide clemency counsel for the condemned, but denied Mr. Harbison a meaningful opportunity to present compelling facts mitigating his guilt and the punishment of death to the only person presently able to consider them, the Governor of the State of Tennessee.

Equally troubling, the Sixth Circuit barred Harbison from appealing the denial of clemency counsel by refusing to grant a certificate of appealability on the issue. In order to harmonize the law of the circuits and to decide an important issue regarding the appeals court's jurisdiction, this Court should resolve the following questions:

1. Does 18 U.S.C. §3599(a)(2) and (e) (recodifying verbatim former 21 U.S.C.§848(q) (4)(B)and (q) (8)), permit federally-funded habeas counsel to represent a condemned inmate in state clemency proceedings when the state has denied state-funded counsel for that purpose?

2. Is a certificate of appealability required to appeal an order denying a request for federally-funded counsel under 18 U.S.C. §3599(a)(2) and (e)?

In 1983, a Tennessee jury convicted Petitioner Edward Jerome Harbison of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and sentenced him to death. See Harbison v. Bell,503 F.3d 566, 567 (6th Cir.

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Hammon v. Indiana

Issues

Can  a accusation  made to an officer attempting to secure and investigate a scene of an alleged crime scene be entered into evidence without giving the defendant an opportunity to  cross examine  the accuser, or is the accusation a testimonial statement and thus open to cross-examination?

Court below

 

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, the Supreme Court held that a wife’s out of court statement against her husband could only be admitted as testimonial evidence subject to cross-examination.  The instant case presents a similar question, with the added complication of whether statements made at a crime scene during the investigative stage should be admitted as testimonial or non-testimonial statements. Hershel Hammon’s wife made a statement to police officers responding to a domestic disturbance call—there is no question that such a statement is admissible, but the real issue is whether once admitted the statement is a testimonial statement subject to the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If it is not a testimonial statement within the meaning of Crawford, then the defendant does not have a right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine his wife. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an oral accusation made to an investigating officer at the scene of an alleged crime is a testimonial statement within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

On the evening of February 26, 2003, Officers Jason Mooney and Rod Richard of the Peru Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005).

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