Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine which standard to apply to claims of disability discrimination against students in K-12 schools under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Currently, multiple federal circuit courts apply the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard, which is a higher standard than the “deliberate indifference” standard. A.T. and G.T., on behalf of their minor daughter A.J.T., argue that the “deliberate indifference” standard is more consistent with the text of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and with the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, and Osseo School Board counter that the precedential case that applied the “bad faith or gross misconduct” standard is still good law, and the standard does not rely on IDEA but instead a proper reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The outcome of this case has implications for the protection of students with disabilities against discrimination while in K-12 public schools.

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Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow courts to certify a class in a class action where some members lack Article III standing. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require commonality of questions and predominance of similar injuries to allow certification, and lower courts certified Davis and other blind plaintiffs as a class of all legally blind individuals unable to use Labcorp self-check-in kiosks due to their disability. Labcorp contends that was error because the class contains some members who never experienced any harm from Labcorp and therefore lack Article III standing. Davis counters that all class members within the certified class suffered an injury; but, even if they did not, Article III does not require an injury for all unnamed class members at the class-certification stage. The outcome of this case has implications for settlement frequency and cost and the accuracy of certified classes. 

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The Federal Tort Claims Act allows people to sue the United States government for wrongful acts by law enforcement officers in situations where a private person could be liable under the same circumstances. However, there are two key exceptions. The “discretionary-function exception” shields the government from lawsuits when federal employees are performing government functions. The “intentional-torts exception” also protects the government from lawsuits involving intentional torts committed by federal employees. Nevertheless, the “law enforcement proviso” within the intentional-torts exception allows people to sue for certain wrongful acts when committed by law enforcement officers specifically as opposed to other government employees. Curtrina Martin and other petitioners argue that the law enforcement proviso allows them to recover monetary damages when the FBI raided their house because their house was not the correct target. Martin also argues that the Supremacy Clause does not shield the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The United States, on the other hand, argues that the discretionary-function exception is a separate exception from the law enforcement provision and shields the government from Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuits. The court-appointed amici curiae also counters that the United States can raise the Supremacy Clause as a defense against liability since the government can raise any defense that a private individual could have in the case. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the legal remedies that civilians have when mistakenly identified as suspects and harmed by law enforcement officers along with the ability of law enforcement to effectively perform their duties. 

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Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if a state can exclude religious schools from participating in its charter school program. The state of Oklahoma operates a charter school program to which St. Isidore, a Catholic institution, applied. The Oklahoma Virtual Charter School Board (the “Board”) granted St. Isidore’s application. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the state to revoke St. Isidore’s charter school contract because it is a religious school, and charter schools are public entities that must be nonsectarian under Oklahoma law. The Board contends that Oklahoma charter schools are not public entities engaged in state action, and thus the prohibition on sectarian charter schools violates its Free Exercise rights. Drummond contends that charter schools are public entities engaging in state action that a state can require to be nonsectarian without violating the Free Exercise Clause. This case touches upon important questions regarding the increasing prevalence of charter schools and their impact on equitable student achievement outcomes, as well as on protecting parental choice. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify the procedures used when granting combat-related special compensation (“CRSC”)—specifically, whether the statute enacting CRSC also provides a settlement mechanism. Generally, military-related claims are governed by the Barring Act, which has a six-year statute of limitations. Soto argues that the Barring Act does not apply here because the CRSC-enacting statute provides its own mechanism for settling claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act. The United States instead asserts that the Barring Act is only displaced when a statute explicitly grants settlement authority, which is not granted in the CRSC statute, and that applying a different rule would be contrary to prior decisions. This case raises important questions regarding combat-wounded veterans’ access to compensation and the administrative and legal burden on the government. 

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Committee Notes on Rules—2024

Rule 8023.1 is derived from Fed. R. App. P. 43 and governs substitution of parties upon death or for any other reason in appeals to the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel from a judgment, order[,] or decree of a bankruptcy court.

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a proceeding about an IRS proposed levy to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a dispute regarding the proposed levy. Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no longer a live dispute and the petitioner lacked any cognizable interest in the case. Zuch argues that the Tax Court retained jurisdiction because the parties continued to have an interest in the case since the Tax Court could determine petitioner’s right to a refund. The outcome of this case affects the scope of Tax Court proceedings under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 and impacts taxpayers. 

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This case asks the Court to determine whether fuel producers, like Diamond Alternative Energy, have standing to sue the EPA for its decision to allow California to impose stricter emissions standards than those in the federal Clean Air Act. Diamond argues that, while the decision affects only car manufacturers directly, and fuel producers only indirectly, the decision’s negative consequences for conventional fuel producers are so predictable that they should be able to sue to block the decision. Petitioners further argue that not allowing those who are indirectly regulated to sue would leave them dependent on third parties who may not share their interests and give the government an incentive to impose burdensome regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency, on the other hand, contends that allowing this type of standing would undermine the purpose of the Court’s standing requirements, which is to ensure that the Court resolves real, not hypothetical disputes and that a favorable court decision for a plaintiff remedies the harm they allege. This case touches on important questions about how regulations affect a variety of parties and who can bring suit when they believe the government has harmed them.

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This case concerns whether certain government task forces can issue binding recommendations without violating the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Department Preventative Services Task Force (“Task Force”), currently appointed by the HHS Secretary without the confirmation of the Senate, offers binding recommendations concerning mandatory coverage by employer insurance for certain preventative treatments under the Affordable Care Act. Braidwood Management contends that these recommendations by the Task Force are illegitimate because the members were not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as principal officers. HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. argues that the current appointment procedures suffice since the Task Force is composed of inferior officers who can be reviewed and fired at-will by the HHS Secretary. This case has wide-ranging implications, from potentially altering the structure of mandated healthcare under the ACA’s insurance to affecting the long-established method by which task forces, advisory bodies, and administrative panels must be appointed.

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