Domestic Violence Act, Cap. 84, Grenada
The Domestic Violence Act (the “DVA”) serves to combat the prevalence of domestic violence in Grenada.
The Domestic Violence Act (the “DVA”) serves to combat the prevalence of domestic violence in Grenada.
The Family Law Act provides that children of a marriage have the same legal status as children born of a “union other than marriage” which is defined as a relationship that is established when a man and woman who have cohabited continuously for 5 years or more and are not married. This excludes children of single parents, parents who did not live together for 5 years or more, same-sex couples, or persons caring for children via informal childcare arrangements.
The Status of Children Reform Act was enacted to eliminate the common law discrimination of “illegitimate” children from January 1st, 1980, and serves to equate the rights of children born out of wedlock with the rights of children who are born in wedlock.
The Marriage Act 1978-40, as amended by 1979-13, 1979-32, 1980-55, 1982-27, 1983-2, 1994-11 and 1994-22, prohibits marriages between family members, according to Schedule 1. The Act does not expressly include or prohibit marriage between same-sex couples; however, same sex marriage is not recognized. Although the concept of “marriage” is not defined, the Act prohibits marriage between persons under 16 in section 4 (Marriage between persons under 16 years void).
The Employment of Women (Maternity Leave) Act of Barbados provides all employees who can become pregnant the right to maternity leave and the protection of their employment during such leave.
Is 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1) a jurisdictional statute that requires filing for appeal within 30 days; and, does it allow a person to appeal a Board of Immigration Appeals decision by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision?
The case asks the Court to determine if 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1), which creates a 30-day deadline to appeal a final order for removal, is a jurisdictional barrier that must be met for an appeal to be heard, or if it is simply one of many factors the Court can consider. Additionally, the case asks the Court to determine if § 1252(b)(1) is satisfied if the petitioner appeals the case after a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals within 30 days of its decision. Petitioner argues that § 1252(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional rule and even if it was, § 1252(b)(1) was satisfied. Respondent argues that § 1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional rule which was not satisfied. The case decision will affect both the noncitizen’s ability to access immigration proceedings and the courts’ administrative burden in handling them.
(1) Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited; and (2) whether a person can obtain review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision.
Under 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(1), to review an order of removal, the “petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
Is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit the only venue that can hear challenges to a final EPA action under the Clean Air Act for a single state if the agency published it alongside other states?
This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether states are permitted to challenge final actions of the EPA in regional circuit courts; or, if publishing a state-specific final action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states forces challenges to be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Oklahoma contends that the final action as it pertains to it is local in nature and should, therefore, be presented in the regional circuit court. The EPA argues that the disapproval action applies nationally, making it reviewable only by the D.C. Circuit. The outcome of this case raises concerns about federalism and forum shopping as well as impacting the effectiveness of the EPA.
Whether a final action by the Environmental Protection Agency taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because the agency published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states.
The Clean Air Act (“Act”) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to create and regularly update the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”). Oklahoma v.
Did the Louisiana State Legislature violate the Equal Protection Clause by implementing congressional district map proposal SB8?
This case asks whether the Louisiana State Legislature primarily considered race when drawing congressional district map SB8, and whether SB8 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Louisiana asserts that the creation of the second majority-Black district was not motivated by race but was instead a response to a court order. Louisiana maintains that SB8 was necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which Louisiana asserts is a compelling interest, and that therefore Louisiana did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Louisiana also argues that Respondent Phillip Callais and other Louisiana residents who joined him in the litigation lack standing because they have not been personally harmed by racial discrimination in redistricting. Callais, on the other hand, argues that SB8 goes beyond what is necessary to comply with the VRA and fails to follow traditional districting principles, as SB8 combines geographically dispersed Black communities into an irregularly shaped district. This case raises significant issues about racial discrimination in redistricting, the responsibilities of elected officials to their constituents, and the relationship between the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause.
(1) Whether the majority of the three-judge district court in this case erred in finding that race predominated in the Louisiana legislature’s enactment of SB8; (2) whether the majority erred in finding that SB8 fails strict scrutiny; (3) whether the majority erred in subjecting SB8 to the preconditions specified in Thornburg v. Gingles; and (4) whether this action is non-justiciable.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“the VRA”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“the Equal Protection Clause”) both address discrimina
Did Congress violate the nondelegation clause when it authorized the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to regulate revenue for the Universal Service Fund, which exists to subsidize access to telecommunications; and, did the FCC unconstitutionally delegate authority to a private entity in the implementation of the Universal Service Fund?
This case asks the Court to determine if Congress’ delegation of authority to the FCC under 47 U.S.C. § 254 was unconstitutional, and whether the FCC’s delegation to a private entity to implement some § 254 provisions was unconstitutional. The FCC argues that the delegation was not unconstitutional because Congress gave the FCC an “intelligible principle” with which to execute the statute. The FCC further contends that it only used a private entity for advice and maintained ultimate authority when it came to the implementation of the statute. Consumers’ Research argues that the statute only announces vague aspirational policy goals and gives too much legislative power to the FCC. Additionally, Consumers’ Research posits that the private entity’s involvement in the implementation of the statute went beyond advice and amounted to private creation of federal law. This case involves questions regarding the separation of powers and how much leeway agencies have in implementing policy.
(1) Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Federal Communications Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Universal Service Fund; (2) whether the FCC violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the financial projections of the private company appointed as the fund's administrator in computing universal service contribution rates; (3) whether the combination of Congress’s conferral of authority on the FCC and the FCC’s delegation of administrative responsibilities to the administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine; and (4) whether this case is moot in light of the challengers' failure to seek preliminary relief before the 5th Circuit.
It has been a longstanding congressional policy to ensure that all Americans have access to telecommunications services. Consumers’ Research v. FCC at 2. For many years, Congress achieved this policy by allowing AT&T, which once held a regulated monopoly over the telecommunications industry, to charge urban customers high rates.
Does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have exclusive venue over litigation involving the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program because the Environmental Protection Agency’s determinations are “nationally applicable” or, alternatively, “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect?”
This case concerns the proper venue for litigating the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standards. The EPA argues that its actions pursuant to these standards must go to the D.C. Appeals circuit. This is because the EPA contends that its actions were either nationally applicable, since they affect refineries in multiple circuits, or based on a determination of nationwide scope, since they stem from agency determinations about the Renewable Fuel Standard’s scope. Calumet Shreveport Refinery counters that the actions should not exclusively be litigated in the D.C. Circuit but rather in the applicable appeals circuits across the country, since the EPA’s determinations are not nationally applicable, but rather individualized adjudications on the petitions of hundreds of small, local refineries based on particular local circumstances. This case has important implications for the direction of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation, as well as shaping the direction of administrative law and the power allotted to executive agencies.
Whether venue for challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program lies exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because the agency’s denial actions are “nationally applicable” or, alternatively, are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
The Clean Air Act contains a provision regarding Renewable Fuel Standards ("RFS"), which requires that each year, producers across the energy sector must blend certain volumes of renewable fuel with nonrenewable fuel.