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Carpenter v. Murphy

Issues

Do the reservation borders of the Creek Nation Indian Tribe drawn in Oklahoma in 1866 constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)?

After was Convicted of a murder that occurred on disputed tribal land, Patrick Murphy asks the Supreme Court to determine if the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation tribal land are still in effect today. If the boundaries are in effect, Murphy asserts that his murder conviction must be overturned because it was committed within the Creek Nation boundaries, meaning the Oklahoma state court that convicted him did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.  Oklahoma State Penitentiary Interim Warden Mark Carpenter counters that the Creek Nation reservation has been disestablished and is no longer in effect, arguing that Oklahoma state courts indeed had jurisdiction to prosecute Murphy for the murder. Carpenter contends that giving effect to the territorial boundaries would create taxation and regulatory problems, while Murphy counters that acknowledging the tribal land boundaries would lead to mutually profitable tax agreements and other community benefits such as increased job opportunities and more effective law enforcement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).

Respondent Patrick Dwayne Murphy is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Indian tribe. Carpenter v. Murphy (“Carpenter”) at 7. In August 1999, Murphy murdered an acquaintance on disputed tribal land. Id. He was arrested and tried in Oklahoma state’s trial court.

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Ciminelli v. United States

Issues

Are schemes that deprive a person of information regarding an economic decision punishable under the federal wire fraud statute?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the “right to control” theory of fraud creates a cause of action under the federal wire fraud statute. Under the “right to control” theory, the federal wire fraud statute may be used to punish schemes which intend to deprive a victim of valuable information regarding an economic decision. Ciminelli claims that the “right to control” theory improperly expands rights considered in the fraud statutes and improperly eases the government’s burden of proof. United States maintains that the “right to control” is properly limited to specifically target information deprivation schemes with tangible economic harms and that Ciminelli’s conviction holds even without the “right to control” theory. This case has significant implications for the construction industry, concerns of overcriminalization, and the limit of federal jurisdiction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the US. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit’s “right to control” theory of fraud ­­– which treats the deprivation of complete and accurate information bearing on a person’s economic decision as a species of property fraud – states a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute.

In 2012, Andrew Cuomo, New York Governor at the time, launched the “Buffalo Billion” initiative to develop the Buffalo area with $1 billion in taxpayer funds. United States v.

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Clark v. Arizona

Issues

Whether Arizona's insanity law, as set forth in A.R.S. § 13-502 (1996) and applied in this case, violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether Arizona's blanket exclusion of evidence and refusal to consider mental disease or defect to rebut the state's evidence on the element of mens rea violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

 

 

On June 21, 2000, 17-year-old Eric Clark shot and killed Flagstaff, Arizona Police Officer Jeffrey Moritz. Brief for Petitioner at 2. At the time, Clark had been suffering from delusions and hallucinations and had been diagnosed as suffering schizophrenia and psychosis. Id. At trial, he attempted to present evidence of his mental illness in order to negate the mens rea knowledge and intent elements of first degree murder. The government, however, argued successfully that under Arizona's definition of insanity (A.R.S. § 13-502(A)) and State v. Mott, evidence of Clark's mental illness was impermissible to negate the mens rea of the crime. Clark was subsequently convicted of first degree murder. He appeals the conviction, arguing that preventing him from using evidence of his mental disease to negate the mens rea of the crime violates his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Arizona's insanity law, as set forth in A.R.S. § 13-502 (1996) and applied in this case, violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

Whether Arizona's blanket exclusion of evidence and refusal to consider mental disease or defect to rebut the state's evidence on the element of mens rea violated Petitioner's right to due process under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment?

 

In the early morning on June 21, 2000, in Flagstaff, Arizona, 17-year-old Eric Clark borrowed the keys to his brother's truck while his brother was sleeping.

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Class v. United States

Issues

Does a guilty plea inherently waive a defendant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute underlying his conviction unless that right is explicitly preserved in the plea agreement?

This case will allow the Supreme Court to clarify the appellate rights of criminal defendants who have pled guilty and subsequently want to challenge the constitutionality of their statute of conviction. Circuit courts have been divided on the subject. Petitioner, Class, argues that the Court should apply the precedent set in Blackledge v. Perry and Menna v. New York to his case by holding that constitutional challenge claims do not challenge a defendant’s factual guilt or dispute whether the government met every burden of proving each element of the crime, and therefore are not precluded by pleading guilty. Respondent, the United States, argues that a constitutional challenge to a defendant’s statute of conviction is inherently waived in a guilty plea as an aspect of his factual guilt unless it is expressly preserved in his plea agreement. With this decision, the Supreme Court will determine the constitutional rights of all criminal defendants who plead guilty and likely impact the role guilty pleas play in United States jurisprudence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a guilty plea inherently waives defendant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of his statute of conviction.

On May 30, 2013, Petitioner Rodney Class (“Class”) parked his Jeep, which contained guns and ammunition, in a parking lot located on the Capitol grounds on the 200 block of Maryland Avenue, SW in Washington D.C. See Brief for Petitioner, Rodney Class at 4–5. While Class visited the Capitol buildings, a police officer noticed a Jeep without the permit required to park in the lot and saw a blade and gun holster inside.

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Corley v. United States

Issues

Whether federal law requires that a confession  taken  more than six hours after a defendant's arrest, and before the defendant appears before the magistrate judge, must be suppressed if there was unreasonable delay in bringing the defendant before the judge.

 

When Johnnie Corley was arrested for assaulting an officer and interrogated about the robbery of a credit union, he did not confess to a role in the robbery until more than six hours after his arrest. Moreover, Corley did not appear before a magistrate judge until the next day. After the District Court found Corley guilty, the Third Circuit affirmed. Corley is now appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States. His case will determine whether, if there was unreasonable delay in bringing a suspect before a magistrate judge, the suspect's confession is still valid. The Supreme Court's decision will affect suspects' rights and the procedure that police must follow during a confession.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 - read together with Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 5(a), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) - requires that a confession taken more than six hours after arrest and before presentment be suppressed if there was unreasonable or unnecessary delay in bringing the defendant before the magistrate judge.

    Federal law enforcement officials identified Johnnie Corley as one of three men who robbed the Norsco Federal Credit Union in Norristown, Pennsylvania, on June 16, 2003. See U.S. v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 212 (3d Cir.

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    Cruz v. Arizona

    Issues

    Does Arizona’s requirement of a “significant change in law” before filing a petition for postconviction relief prevent the United States Supreme Court from reviewing the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law?

    Court below

    This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure, which only allows postconviction relief if there has been a significant change in law to make it an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment, prevents federal review. Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz claims that the rule cannot apply because it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent requiring the application of settled rules of constitutional law on postconviction review. Cruz also asserts that the rule requires consideration of federal law, and thus that the Supreme Court may review determinations made under it for consistency with federal law. Respondent, the state of Arizona, argues that its Rule prevents federal review because it is premised on a matter of state law, rather than federal law. Arizona asserts that its rule only regulates when a claim may be brought, not the rule to be applied when evaluating the claim.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (g) precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.

    In 2005, John Montenegro Cruz was convicted of first degree murder for killing a police officer and was sentenced to death in a jury trial. State v. Cruz at 992.

    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professors John Blume and Keir Weyble for their guidance and insights into this case.

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    Currier v. Virginia

    Issues

    Whether a criminal defendant with multiple charges on the same set of facts may be found guilty of a second charge when the second charge is severed from the first and the defendant is acquitted on the first charge?

    Petitioner Michael Currier was charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Currier and the prosecution agreed to sever the charges. At the first trial, a jury acquitted Currier of burglary and grand larceny. At the second trial, in which the prosecution introduced many of the same facts, the jury convicted Currier of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Michael Currier argues that issue preclusion bars the state from re-litigating an issue upon which the jury acquitted him in the first trial. Virginia contends that the defendant waived his right to issue preclusion when he consented to severing the criminal charges into successive trials. The Court’s determination on the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause will have significant consequences for defendants charged with counts requiring evidence of prior criminal records and, more broadly, for national criminal procedure.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a defendant who consents to severance of multiple charges into sequential trials loses his right under the Double Jeopardy Clause to the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal.

    In March 2012, a large gun safe, containing cash, personal papers, and twenty firearms, was stolen from a home in Virginia. Currier v. Commonwealth at 1. A neighbor reported hearing loud noises coming from inside the home, and seeing an old, white pickup truck with an orange strip and at least two individuals inside leaving the driveway. Id. at 2. The neighbor identified one of these individuals as the Petitioner, Michael Currier.

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