criminal law

Hemphill v. New York

Issues

Does a criminal defendant’s introduction of evidence at trial “open the door” to the government’s admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the Confrontation Clause?

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance state criminal evidence rules and Sixth Amendment rights. New York’s opening-the-door rule allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence if a party has given an incomplete and misleading impression of the issue. Under this rule, if a criminal defendant “opens the door” to responsive evidence, the defendant also forfeits their right to exclude that evidence on the grounds that it is barred by the Confrontation Clause. Darrell Hemphill contends that New York violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser by ruling that the state’s opening-the-door rule superseded the Confrontation Clause. New York argues that the opening-the-door rule does not infringe on Hemphill’s constitutional rights. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment and the states’ trial procedures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant, whose argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial “opens the door” to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence, also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the confrontation clause.

On April 6, 2006, Ronell Gilliam and a black man wearing a blue top got into a physical fight with others in the Bronx. People v. Hemphill at 472. Shortly after that fight, this other man pulled a gun and opened fire. Id. This shooting caused a stray 9mm bullet to enter a passing minivan, striking and killing a two-year-old child inside.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

Holguin-Hernandez v. United States

Issues

Is a criminal defendant required to formally object after being sentenced in order to receive reasonableness review on appeal?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a formal objection at sentencing is necessary for criminal defendants to receive reasonableness review of the length of their sentence upon appeal. Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 (“Rule 51”) only requires defense counsel to argue prior to sentencing that a certain sentence would be unreasonable, thereby rendering a formal post-sentencing objection unnecessary. The United States agrees and also argues against the Fifth Circuit’s requirement of a formal post-sentence objection. The Court appointed an Amicus to brief the opposing side of the issue. Amicus argues that both Petitioner and Respondent misinterpret Rule 51, and that defendants must clearly state their objection and its grounds to preserve an argument for reasonableness review on appeal. The outcome of this case has implications for how clearly defendants need to articulate their objections to a court’s sentence and for the consistency of court procedure across criminal and civil cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a formal objection after pronouncement of sentence is necessary to invoke appellate reasonableness review of the length of a defendant’s sentence.

In June 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (the “District Court”) convicted Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, which would be followed by two years of supervised release.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

House v. Bell

Issues

Under Schlup v. Delo and Herrera v. Collins, how much evidence must an individual present in order to prove his actual innocence to obtain habeas corpus relief and review of procedurally defaulted claims?

 

 

Carloyn Muncey was murdered on July 13, 1985 in Union County, Tennessee. Her badly beaten body was found the next day in a brush pile about one hundred yards from her house, and it appeared as though a strong blow to her head had killed her after a long struggle. That same day, two witnesses saw Paul House emerging from the area where Muncey’s body was discovered wiping his hands with a dark rag. Several witnesses, as well as House, gave conflicting statements as to where he was the night of the crime. Over the course of the investigation of the murder, FBI officials found blood on House’s jeans that they determined was Muncey’s blood, as well as semen on Muncey’s clothes that they determined was likely House’s. Based on this circumstantial evidence, a jury in Union County convicted House of first-degree murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on three aggravating circumstances. During post-conviction relief proceedings in state and federal courts, House presented evidence that he was actually innocent of the crime. This new evidence included a confession from Muncey’s husband that he had murdered her, DNA evidence that it was not House’s semen on Muncey’s clothes, and evidence that the blood on his jeans was spilled onto his jeans after the autopsy on Muncey. None of the courts reviewing House’s case found his evidence sufficient to establish his actual innocence, however, and did not allow for review of his procedurally defaulted claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, or to obtain relief from his conviction. The United States Supreme Court must now determine how much evidence an individual such as House must present to prove his actual innocence and overturn a jury’s conviction and death sentence, as well as how much evidence is necessary to establish House’s innocence so that a court can review his procedurally defaulted claims.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1.  Did the majority below err in applying this Court’s decision in Schlup v. Delo to hold that Petitioner’s compelling new evidence, though presenting at the very least a colorable claim of actual innocence, was as a matter of law insufficient to excuse his failure to present that evidence before the state courts – merely because he had failed to negate each and every item of circumstantial evidence that had been offered against him at the original trial?

2.  What constitutes a “truly persuasive showing of actual innocence” pursuant to Herrera v. Collins sufficient to warrant freestanding habeas relief?

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

invidious discrimination

Invidious discrimination is a legal term used to describe the act of treating a class of persons unequally in a manner that is malicious, hostile, or damaging. It refers to discrimination that is motivated by animus or ill will towards a particular group, rather than based on a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.

Taxonomy upgrade extras

Johnson v. Williams

Issues

Whether an issue not addressed in a state court opinion has been “adjudicated on the merits” for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review when the state court gave a detailed opinion mentioning other claims but apparently ignored the constitutional grounds for relief.

 

Tara Williams was on trial in California state court for special circumstances murder and firearm enhancement. During the trial, over Williams’s objections, the court dismissed a juror on the grounds that he was biased against the prosecution. After an alternate replaced the dismissed juror, the jury convicted Williams on both counts. Williams appealed, claiming that the juror’s dismissal had violated California state law as well as her Sixth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeals affirmed Williams’ conviction, but only did so by addressing her state law claims, ultimately failing to explicitly discuss the Sixth Amendment issues raised. Williams then filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging a violation of her Sixth Amendment rights. Though the federal district court denied her petition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Williams’ Sixth Amendment claim had not yet been “adjudicated on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Warden Deborah K. Johnson appealed, claiming that the California Court of Appeals’ prior ruling was an adjudication on the merits and therefore precluded the subsequent habeas petition.  How the Supreme Court decides the case will determine the degree of deference a federal court hearing a petition for habeas corpus will give a state court decision that does not explicitly address the federal grounds for relief.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a habeas petitioner's claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the state court denied relief in an explained decision but did not expressly acknowledge a federal-law basis for the claim.

In October 1993, Petitioner Tara Williams, drove two friends to various stores in preparation for a robbery that they had planned to commit that evening. See Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir.

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

• Michael O'Hear, A Test for Richter’s Reach (Jan. 31, 2012)

Submit for publication
0

Jones v. Hendrix

Issues

Does a prisoner who did not initially challenge certain aspects of their conviction have the right to challenge their conviction later via habeas corpus after the Supreme Court changed the standard of conviction for the related crime?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the extent to which habeas relief is available to a prisoner after a Supreme Court case heightens the standard of conviction for the crime they were convicted of. The relevant statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)’s saving clause, allows a prisoner to move for habeas relief if alternative remedies available under other subsections of § 2255 are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention.” Petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones argues that because the lower court applied the wrong substantive law, the alternative remedies were ineffective in testing the legality of his detention, and that he is therefore entitled to habeas relief under § 2255(e). Jones further argues that the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute renders § 2255(e) superfluous and violates many of Jones’s constitutional rights. Respondent Dewayne Hendrix counters that the § 2255(e) requires a showing of actual innocence, which he argues Jones cannot make, in order to trigger habeas relief, and that Jones’ constitutional concerns are misguided. The outcome of this case will determine the availability of post-conviction relief to prisoners following changes in relevant substantive law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether federal inmates who did not — because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them — challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C § 2241 after the Supreme Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction.

In December 1999, Marcus DeAngelo Jones was arrested at a convenience store in Columbia, Missouri as part of an undercover operation related to drug dealing. U.S. v. Jones at 808. At trial, the government introduced evidence showing that Jones had been in possession of a firearm on multiple occasions. Id. Jones possessed this firearm despite his several prior felony convictions.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0

juvenile justice

Juvenile justice is the area of criminal law applicable to persons not old enough to be held fully responsible for criminal acts. In most states, the age for adult criminal culpability is set at 18. In cases of extreme violence or other anti-social behavior, the age a child can be charged as an adult is lowered.

Kahler v. Kansas

Issues

Does abolishing the insanity defense violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments?

Court below

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance states’ rights to write their own criminal code with individual rights under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. The statute at issue, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220, abolished the traditional right-and-wrong test for the insanity defense in favor of a mens rea approach to insanity. Kahler argues that history and tradition demonstrate that the right-and-wrong test for insanity is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. He also contends that disallowing this test essentially abolishes the insanity defense, which is cruel and unusual because it punishes individuals who lack moral culpability for their crimes. Kansas counters that the right-and-wrong test for insanity is not a fundamental right because it is not deeply entrenched in tradition, and that disallowing the defense would not have been deemed cruel and unusual when the Eighth Amendment was adopted. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for states’ authority over their own criminal code, just punishment, and protecting individuals who lack moral culpability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.

James Kahler and his wife, Karen, had two daughters and one son. State v. Kahler at 113. During the summer of 2008, Karen began a sexual relationship with another female, and their marriage soon began to fall apart. Id. Ultimately, Karen filed for divorce in January 2009 and moved out with their kids that Spring. Id. Kahler did not handle the divorce well, and it affected his life, both professionally and personally.

Written by

Edited by

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his guidance and insights into this case.

Additional Resources

Submit for publication
0
Subscribe to criminal law