criminal law

Moore v. Texas

Issues

Can a state require the use of outdated medical standards in determining whether an individual is ineligible for execution due to intellectual disability?

After the Supreme Court prohibited the execution of the intellectually disabled in Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Bobby James Moore petitioned for habeas relief from his death sentence on the grounds of intellectual disability. A Texas habeas court found that Moore was intellectually disabled under the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities’ current definition of intellectual disability. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected Moore’s claim and held that Texas courts must apply AAIDD’s 1992 intellectual disability definition, which was adopted in a 2004 Texas case. Moore claims that mandating the use of outdated and non-clinical criteria violates the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent. Texas maintains that its definition of intellectual disability is within the national consensus and, therefore, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court will determine the breadth of the Eighth Amendment’s protections for intellectually disabled defendants, and the case will have significant consequences for all defendants with intellectual disabilities that are on death row or facing the death penalty in Texas and may have wider effects across the country.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does it violate the Eighth Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability and require the use of outdated medical standards in determining whether an individual may be executed?

In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of murder in Texas and sentenced to death. See Ex parte Moore, No. WR-13,374-05, 1 (Tex. Crim. App.  Sept. 16, 2015). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Moore’s conviction and sentence and denied his state habeas corpus petition.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Cornell Law School Professors Blume and Johnson for their insights into this case.

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murder

Murder is when a person unlawfully kills another person. Murder is not the same as homicide because not all homicide is unlawful. Instead, murder is a category of homicide. The precise legal definition of murder varies by jurisdiction. Most states distinguish between different degrees of murder (first, second, and third).

Nieves v. Bartlett

Issues

Can a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when there is probable cause for the arrest?

The Supreme Court will determine whether probable cause can function as a defense for police officers facing a retaliatory arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioners Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight (“Nieves”) contend that Supreme Court precedent requires plaintiffs to plead and prove the absence of probable cause in order to bring a retaliatory arrest claim. Additionally, Nieves argues that a probable cause requirement conforms with common law authority and accords with the First Amendment’s purposes and values. Respondent Russell Bartlett (“Bartlett”) counters that Supreme Court precedent and the common law actually do not support a probable cause requirement for retaliatory arrest claims.  Further, Bartlett asserts that the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself cannot support a probable cause requirement. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it asks the Court to balance a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech with the ability of police officers to make arrests without fear of a lawsuit.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Respondent Russell Bartlett attended Arctic Man 2014, an extreme ski event held in Alaska’s Hoodoo Mountains. Bartlett v. Nieves et al., 2016 WL 3702952 at *1 (D. Ala. 2016). The event brings people to Alaska for several days of partying. Id. During the last night of the event, Petitioners, Alaska State Troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight, were investigating a party for underage drinking.

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nullum crimen sine lege

Nullum crimen sine lege is Latin for "no crime without law." The phrase reflects the principle in criminal law and international criminal law that a person cannot or should not face criminal punishment except for an act that was criminalized by law before they performed the act.

Oregon v. Guzek

Issues

May a defendant, in the sentencing phase of a capital crime trial, present mitigating evidence regarding his culpability to the jury that is deciding whether to impose the death penalty, when that evidence also tends to cast doubt on the defendant’s guilt?

Court below

 

Randy Lee Guzek, along with his friends Mark Wilson and Ross Cathey, murdered an Oregon couple in the summer of 1987. After eighteen years of litigation, involving three different appeals, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the alibi testimony Guzek attempted to introduce during the sentencing phase of his trial—statements from his grandfather and his mother placing him at home during the time of the crime—could be introduced as “mitigating evidence” tending to show that Guzek should not receive the death penalty. The State of Oregon took issue with this ruling, and appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that such evidence cannot be admitted because the so-called “residual doubt” evidence is no longer relevant at the sentencing phase of a defendant’s capital trial. Guzek, on the other hand, argues that the Constitution requires admittance of such evidence at his sentencing phase—he claims that the jury will not improperly use this evidence and that in order to meet the state’s case and refute the state’s evidence, he must be able to introduce the so-called “residual doubt” evidence. The Supreme Court will decide whether Guzek is correct, and whether the trial court is Constitutionally required to admit this “residual doubt” evidence, despite the fact that it might introduce doubt about Guzek’s previously determined and settled guilt.

Randy Lee Guzek has been before the Oregon Supreme Court on three occasions between 1990 and 2004, all regarding the sentencing phase of a capital trial in which he was convicted for the murders of Rod and Lois Houser. Because of the errors in the lower court and intervening new law instituted during the more than fifteen years of Guzek’s trial, the state’s highest court has repeatedly affirmed Guzek’s guilt in the murders, but vacated the jury’s sentence of death.

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Paroline v. United States

Issues

What causal relationship must exist between a defendant's conduct and a victim's harm for the victim to recover restitution in a child pornography case under 18 U.S.C § 2259?

Doyle Paroline was convicted of possessing 150 to 300 images of minors being sexually abused, including two images of Respondent “Amy” being abused by her uncle at the age of eight or nine years old. The Supreme Court will settle a circuit split over the required causal relationship between a defendant’s possession and a victim’s harm in order for the victim to recover full restitution under 18 U.S.C § 2259. Paroline argues that a victim’s damages must be proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct because any other result would turn child exploitation restitution proceedings into a procedural nightmare. Amy argues that § 2259 does not require proximate causation for a victim to be entitled to full damages; otherwise, the victims of child abuse would bear the burden of collecting tiny shares of restitution from several defendants and might never receive full recovery. The Court’s ruling will impact the rights of exploited children and the procedural rights afforded to those charged with possessing child pornography.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Fifth Circuit held, contrary to the holdings of every other circuit considering the question, that there was no requirement that restitution be limited to losses proximately caused by the defendant's criminal acts and that the defendant is responsible for restitution for all losses suffered by the victim regardless of whether the defendant's criminal acts proximately caused the loss and the victim's losses occurred prior to the defendant's indictment and arrest. 

  1. In determining restitution in child pornography cases pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3), is the award of restitution limited to losses proximately caused by the defendant's criminal actions or may a defendant be required to pay restitution for all losses, regardless of whether his criminal acts proximately caused the loss?
  2. Whether the Government is correct in its argument that authorizing $3.4 million in restitution against a defendant to a victim of child pornography who has never had contact with the defendant may violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on excessive fines in the absence of a proximate cause requirement in the setting of the amount of restitution assessed against that defendant.

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Facts

Respondent, a young adult under the pseudonym “Amy,” was sexually abused by her uncle when she was eight or nine years old. See In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2009). Amy’s uncle took a number of photographs depicting her in sexually abusive poses, captured his acts on film, and distributed the materials over the Internet.

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Percoco v. United States

Issues

Does an individual owe a fiduciary duty to the public that can serve as the basis of an honest-services fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, notwithstanding the fact that the individual does not have an official government position but only informal influence over government decisionmaking?

This case asks the Court to analyze 18 U.S.C. § 1346, the honest-services fraud statute, and determine if an individual with informal power but no official governmental position can violate the statute. Joseph Percoco and Steven Aiello argue that private individuals lacking formal governmental power cannot commit honest-services fraud because they do not owe the public a duty of honest services. Percoco and Aiello further argue that including private individuals within § 1346 would render the statue unconstitutionally vague, violate the First Amendment, and entrench upon state sovereignty. The United States contends that private individuals can commit honest-services fraud when they have been selected for public office and when they are de facto officeholders in all but name. The United States also argues that § 1346 clearly defines improper behavior and does not limit First Amendment activity. This case touches on important questions regarding lobbying, free speech, and the interaction of state and federal bribery laws.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a private citizen who holds no elected office or government employment, but has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking, owes a fiduciary duty to the general public such that he can be convicted of honest-services fraud.

Petitioner Joseph Percoco served as Executive Deputy Secretary under former Governor Andrew Cuomo from 2011 until 2016, except for eight months in 2014 while Percoco ran the Governor’s reelection campaign. United States v. Percoco at 5. This position required managing both intergovernmental and legislative matters.

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Pinkerton liability

Pinkerton liability allows an actor to be held liable for substantive crimes committed by his coconspirators in certain circumstances. A defendant can be held vicariously liable for a substantive offense committed by another member of a conspiracy if: (1) the defendant was a party to the conspiracy; (2) the offense was “within the scope of the unlawful project“; (3) the offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) the defendant could have reasonable foreseen the offense as a “necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.”

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