A mistake of fact is a mistake about a material factual element or mistaken belief other than a mistake of law. Examples include erroneous beliefs about the meaning of a legal term or about the identity of some person.
If an individual on supervised release commits another crime and is detained while awaiting trial, should that detention period be credited toward his term of supervised release?
This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (“Section 3624(e)”), which provides that a defendant’s term of supervised release is tolled when the defendant is convicted of a crime. Jason Mont contends that his pretrial detention from an unrelated crime did not toll his supervised release. Instead, he claims that his supervised release expired during his pretrial detention period, and thus that the district court did not have proper jurisdiction over his case. The United States, on the other hand, argues that confinement in the form of pretrial detention is equivalent to a conviction for purposes of Section 3624(e), and that the statute tolls a defendant’s term of supervised release to avoid allowing a defendant to serve his term of supervised release while imprisoned. The outcome of this case has implications for understanding the connection between conviction, pretrial detention, and when a defendant’s supervised release is tolled.
Whether a statute directed to the administration of imprisoned individuals serves as authority to alter or suspend the running of a criminal sentence of supervised release, when such "tolling'' is without judicial action, and requires the term "imprisonment" as used in the administrative statute, to include pretrial detention prior to an adjudication of guilt. Is a district court required to exercise its jurisdiction in order to suspend the running of a supervised release sentence as directed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) prior to expiration of the term of supervised release, when a supervised releasee is in pretrial detention, or does 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) toll the running of supervised release while in pretrial detention?
In December 2005, Jason Mont was convicted for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Mont at 1.
Can a state require the use of outdated medical standards in determining whether an individual is ineligible for execution due to intellectual disability?
After the Supreme Court prohibited the execution of the intellectually disabled in Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Bobby James Moore petitioned for habeas relief from his death sentence on the grounds of intellectual disability. A Texas habeas court found that Moore was intellectually disabled under the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities’ current definition of intellectual disability. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected Moore’s claim and held that Texas courts must apply AAIDD’s 1992 intellectual disability definition, which was adopted in a 2004 Texas case. Moore claims that mandating the use of outdated and non-clinical criteria violates the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent. Texas maintains that its definition of intellectual disability is within the national consensus and, therefore, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court will determine the breadth of the Eighth Amendment’s protections for intellectually disabled defendants, and the case will have significant consequences for all defendants with intellectual disabilities that are on death row or facing the death penalty in Texas and may have wider effects across the country.
Does it violate the Eighth Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability and require the use of outdated medical standards in determining whether an individual may be executed?
In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of murder in Texas and sentenced to death. See Ex parte Moore, No. WR-13,374-05, 1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2015). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Moore’s conviction and sentence and denied his state habeas corpus petition.
Murder is when a person unlawfully kills another person. Murder is not the same as homicide because not all homicide is unlawful. Instead, murder is a category of homicide. The precise legal definition of murder varies by jurisdiction. Most states distinguish between different degrees of murder (first, second, and third).
Can a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when there is probable cause for the arrest?
The Supreme Court will determine whether probable cause can function as a defense for police officers facing a retaliatory arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioners Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight (“Nieves”) contend that Supreme Court precedent requires plaintiffs to plead and prove the absence of probable cause in order to bring a retaliatory arrest claim. Additionally, Nieves argues that a probable cause requirement conforms with common law authority and accords with the First Amendment’s purposes and values. Respondent Russell Bartlett (“Bartlett”) counters that Supreme Court precedent and the common law actually do not support a probable cause requirement for retaliatory arrest claims. Further, Bartlett asserts that the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself cannot support a probable cause requirement. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it asks the Court to balance a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech with the ability of police officers to make arrests without fear of a lawsuit.
Whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Respondent Russell Bartlett attended Arctic Man 2014, an extreme ski event held in Alaska’s Hoodoo Mountains. Bartlett v. Nieves et al., 2016 WL 3702952 at *1 (D. Ala. 2016). The event brings people to Alaska for several days of partying. Id. During the last night of the event, Petitioners, Alaska State Troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight, were investigating a party for underage drinking.
Nolo contendere means "no contest." This phrase translates from the Latin as "I do not wish to contend."
Nullum crimen sine lege is Latin for "no crime without law." The phrase reflects the principle in criminal law and international criminal law that a person cannot or should not face criminal punishment except for an act that was criminalized by law before they performed the act.
May a defendant, in the sentencing phase of a capital crime trial, present mitigating evidence regarding his culpability to the jury that is deciding whether to impose the death penalty, when that evidence also tends to cast doubt on the defendant’s guilt?
Randy Lee Guzek, along with his friends Mark Wilson and Ross Cathey, murdered an Oregon couple in the summer of 1987. After eighteen years of litigation, involving three different appeals, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the alibi testimony Guzek attempted to introduce during the sentencing phase of his trial—statements from his grandfather and his mother placing him at home during the time of the crime—could be introduced as “mitigating evidence” tending to show that Guzek should not receive the death penalty. The State of Oregon took issue with this ruling, and appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that such evidence cannot be admitted because the so-called “residual doubt” evidence is no longer relevant at the sentencing phase of a defendant’s capital trial. Guzek, on the other hand, argues that the Constitution requires admittance of such evidence at his sentencing phase—he claims that the jury will not improperly use this evidence and that in order to meet the state’s case and refute the state’s evidence, he must be able to introduce the so-called “residual doubt” evidence. The Supreme Court will decide whether Guzek is correct, and whether the trial court is Constitutionally required to admit this “residual doubt” evidence, despite the fact that it might introduce doubt about Guzek’s previously determined and settled guilt.
Randy Lee Guzek has been before the Oregon Supreme Court on three occasions between 1990 and 2004, all regarding the sentencing phase of a capital trial in which he was convicted for the murders of Rod and Lois Houser. Because of the errors in the lower court and intervening new law instituted during the more than fifteen years of Guzek’s trial, the state’s highest court has repeatedly affirmed Guzek’s guilt in the murders, but vacated the jury’s sentence of death.
What causal relationship must exist between a defendant's conduct and a victim's harm for the victim to recover restitution in a child pornography case under 18 U.S.C § 2259?
Doyle Paroline was convicted of possessing 150 to 300 images of minors being sexually abused, including two images of Respondent “Amy” being abused by her uncle at the age of eight or nine years old. The Supreme Court will settle a circuit split over the required causal relationship between a defendant’s possession and a victim’s harm in order for the victim to recover full restitution under 18 U.S.C § 2259. Paroline argues that a victim’s damages must be proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct because any other result would turn child exploitation restitution proceedings into a procedural nightmare. Amy argues that § 2259 does not require proximate causation for a victim to be entitled to full damages; otherwise, the victims of child abuse would bear the burden of collecting tiny shares of restitution from several defendants and might never receive full recovery. The Court’s ruling will impact the rights of exploited children and the procedural rights afforded to those charged with possessing child pornography.
The Fifth Circuit held, contrary to the holdings of every other circuit considering the question, that there was no requirement that restitution be limited to losses proximately caused by the defendant's criminal acts and that the defendant is responsible for restitution for all losses suffered by the victim regardless of whether the defendant's criminal acts proximately caused the loss and the victim's losses occurred prior to the defendant's indictment and arrest.
Respondent, a young adult under the pseudonym “Amy,” was sexually abused by her uncle when she was eight or nine years old. See In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2009). Amy’s uncle took a number of photographs depicting her in sexually abusive poses, captured his acts on film, and distributed the materials over the Internet.
The term penitentiary is derived from the Latin term paenitentia, meaning repentance.
