criminal law

Issues

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit split on the question of whether the 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (“§ 875(c)”) requires a showing of subjective intent in order to convict and, if not, whether conviction based only on a showing that a reasonable person would regard the statement as threatening violates the First Amendment. In this case, Anthony D. Elonis was convicted for publishing a series of Facebook posts describing committing acts of violence towards various people in violation of § 875(c). Elonis contends that the government must offer proof of a subjective intent to threaten, and that his speech is protected by the First Amendment. The United States, however, argues that § 875(c) requires only proof of general intent and that threats as defined in § 875(c) should not receive First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case could affect free speech rights as well as the rights of those who are victims of threats.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether federal judges may reduce a prisoner’s sentence under the compassionate release statute for reasons that may also fall under a post-conviction motion challenging the legality of a sentence. Joe Fernandez, convicted and sentenced to life on October 7, 2014, for participating in a double murder-for-hire conspiracy, sought a sentence reduction after the trial judge expressed doubts regarding the credibility of the government’s witness and the fairness of the verdict based on extraordinary and compelling reasons. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that prisoners must bring arguments regarding innocence or sentencing errors through the habeas process, not via compassionate release. Fernandez argues that Congress designed the compassionate release statute to afford courts broad discretion to reduce sentences in exceptional circumstances. The United States government, meanwhile, argues that the compassionate release statute is limited to four specific categories of circumstances: age, illness, family hardship, or other circumstances the Bureau of Prisons finds compelling. The outcome of this case will have a major impact on how much discretion federal judges have in revisiting sentences they believe are unjust, thereby clarifying the balance between mercy and finality for criminal defendants. 

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This case asks the Court to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act covers obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that are unrelated to investigations and evidence. Petitioner argues that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as only covering obstructive conduct interfering in official proceedings that involve investigations and evidence, and points to textual analysis, principles of statutory construction, and the Court’s interpretations of similar statutes in Yates v. United States and Begay v. United States for support. Respondent counters that the Court should interpret § 1512(c)(2) as a catch-all provision covering all obstructive conduct and rejects the textual analysis and principles of statutory construction argued by the petitioner while pointing to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for support. This case touches on important questions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the usage of § 1512(c)(2) to cover rioters’ conduct during the January 6 Capitol Building storming, such as sentencing fairness and providing notice to parties.

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Petitioner Charles Fowler murdered a local police officer after the officer approached him and his associates, who were preparing to rob a bank. Fowler was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which makes it a federal crime to murder a witness to a federal crime with the intent of preventing that witness from communicating with federal law enforcement officials. Fowler challenged his conviction, arguing that the government did not show with sufficient certainty that the officer he murdered was reasonably likely to communicate with federal authorities, had he not been killed. Fowler asserts that failing to require the government to show at least a reasonable likelihood of such communication is inconsistent with the statutory language, and would disrupt the balance between state and federal criminal jurisdiction. The United States responds that requiring such a standard would undermine the statute’s purpose of maintaining the integrity of the federal justice system, and that allowing a lower standard will not disrupt the state-federal balance. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the standard the government must meet in prosecuting Section 1512(a)(1)(C) violations, and resolve uncertainty among the circuit courts on this point.

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Petitioner Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated when he was charged with murder ten years after an alleged shooting occurred. Although Gonzalez did not appeal his case to the Texas state court of last resort, he later petitioned for federal habeas review. The district court held that Gonzalez’s petition was time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it was filed more than one year after the period to appeal to the highest Texas state court expired. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability, but did not indicate which underlying constitutional claim was at issue in the certificate of appealability. The parties now disagree on whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s case after issuing the certificate of appealability, and which event starts the one-year clock for federal habeas review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect petitioners’ ability to seek federal habeas review; it will also affect the allocation of judicial resources in reviewing certificates of appealability and federal habeas claims.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting test about unconstitutional motives for government actions applies, or whether the Nieves bar to retaliatory arrest claims resulting from an arrest supported by probable cause applies in this case. Gonzalez maintains the Mt. Healthy holding covers all arrests except for retaliatory prosecutions and on-the-spot police arrests, while Trevino argues the Nieves exception applies to all First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims. Furthermore, in the event the Nieves bar does apply, the Supreme Court is asked to determine what kind of evidence is sufficient to rebut the probable cause presumption. Gonzalez maintains she is only required to show objective evidence, while Trevino maintains she needs to show “comparator evidence,” which is evidence of non-arrested people who engaged in similar conduct but not the same kind of protected speech. This case touches upon important questions of whether causes of action for retaliatory arrests deter police abuse or unfairly burden law enforcement, and how best to encourage First Amendment protected speech.

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