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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a criminal punishment, which would implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution upon retroactive application, or a civil remedy. Petitioner Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. was convicted of bank robbery and firearm use during a violent crime in August 1996 and sentenced under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which capped restitution enforcement at twenty years after entry of judgment. However, Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act in April 1996 to extend the restitution enforcement period to twenty years after a defendant’s release from prison. Ellingburg argues that, in designing the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, Congress made a criminal punishment, so retroactively applying it to increase his penalty would violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Court-appointed attorney John F. Bash, invited to support the judgment below, argues that Congress did not clearly design the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act as a criminal punishment, so it is a civil remedy that does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The outcome of this case will have a major impact on the fairness of the restitution process for both criminal defendants and victims of crimes.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to define the contours of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights when subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984’s (“ACCA”) occasions clause in light of the Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States. The ACCA authorizes enhancing a criminal defendant’s sentence when the defendant’s three prior convictions were committed “on occasions different from one another.” Under Wooden, that clause requires determining whether the previous offenses occurred on different occasions or, rather, arose “from a single criminal episode.” Paul Erlinger argues that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment prohibit a sentencing judge from making that determination, rather a jury must decide the factual questions necessary under the ACCA beyond a reasonable doubt.  Nick Harper, court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below, counters that the Constitution does not require the occasions clause to be decided by a jury because history and Supreme Court precedent authorize legislatures to assign recidivism-related determinations to sentencing judges. The outcome of this case has implications for criminal defendants’ rights at sentencing.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether a district court presiding over a revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) may consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) despite their absence from Section 3583(e)’s enumerated list. Section 3553(a)(2)(A)’s sentencing factors include reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, and providing just punishment for the offense. Petitioner argues that Section 3583(e)’s list is exhaustive, and omission of the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors precludes a district court from considering them to determine revocation of supervised release. Respondent counters that the consideration factors set out in Section 3583 are not exhaustive, and the factors in Section 3553 may be relied upon by a district court when determining the modification or revocation of supervised release. This case touches on important questions regarding the purpose of supervised release, a court’s discretion to revoke and reimprison violators, and the impact that judicial discretion has on the carceral system.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether federal judges may reduce a prisoner’s sentence under the compassionate release statute for reasons that may also fall under a post-conviction motion challenging the legality of a sentence. Joe Fernandez, convicted and sentenced to life on October 7, 2014, for participating in a double murder-for-hire conspiracy, sought a sentence reduction after the trial judge expressed doubts regarding the credibility of the government’s witness and the fairness of the verdict based on extraordinary and compelling reasons. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that prisoners must bring arguments regarding innocence or sentencing errors through the habeas process, not via compassionate release. Fernandez argues that Congress designed the compassionate release statute to afford courts broad discretion to reduce sentences in exceptional circumstances. The United States government, meanwhile, argues that the compassionate release statute is limited to four specific categories of circumstances: age, illness, family hardship, or other circumstances the Bureau of Prisons finds compelling. The outcome of this case will have a major impact on how much discretion federal judges have in revisiting sentences they believe are unjust, thereby clarifying the balance between mercy and finality for criminal defendants. 

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This case concerns the scope of the First Step Act’s sentencing reforms regarding defendants who were sentenced before the Act’s passage but have been re-sentenced since. The Hewitt defendants and the United States argue that the First Step Act’s inclusion of sentences “not imposed” before the statute’s enactment should apply to the defendants’ sentences, since the re-evaluation of the defendants’ sentences means that the original judgements were not “imposed sentences.” However, the Hewitt defendants and the United States differ in their reasonings. The Hewitt defendants contend their re-sentencing is covered by the Act because of the general principles that courts must interpret ambiguous criminal laws in favor of defendants and that vacated sentences should be treated as not having occurred. The United States contends that the Hewitt defendants are covered by the Act because of the specific language of the Act referencing currently valid sentences, the larger statutory context, and the larger legislative goals motivating the Act. This case has implications for the application of criminal justice sentencing reforms, as well as for how the Court evaluates Congressional intent.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a formal objection at sentencing is necessary for criminal defendants to receive reasonableness review of the length of their sentence upon appeal. Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 (“Rule 51”) only requires defense counsel to argue prior to sentencing that a certain sentence would be unreasonable, thereby rendering a formal post-sentencing objection unnecessary. The United States agrees and also argues against the Fifth Circuit’s requirement of a formal post-sentence objection. The Court appointed an Amicus to brief the opposing side of the issue. Amicus argues that both Petitioner and Respondent misinterpret Rule 51, and that defendants must clearly state their objection and its grounds to preserve an argument for reasonableness review on appeal. The outcome of this case has implications for how clearly defendants need to articulate their objections to a court’s sentence and for the consistency of court procedure across criminal and civil cases.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Erik Hughes is eligible for a sentence reduction even though he pled guilty with a binding sentence agreement. Hughes pled guilty to drug and firearm charges and received a 180-month sentence, which, at the time, was just below the range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines of between 188 and 235 months. Since his sentencing, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, reducing the sentencing range for Hughes’s crime to between 151 and 188 months. Hughes sought to modify his sentence under 15 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which requires a sentence to be based on the Guidelines. The Eleventh Circuit denied modification based on Freeman v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that sentences from plea deals are not based on the Guidelines, but Hughes contends that the circuit court incorrectly applied the 4-1-4 decision. Hughes also argues that he is eligible for a modification because his sentence is based on the Guidelines under a tort theory of proximate cause. The United States responds that the connection between the Guidelines, the plea agreement, and the sentencing is too tenuous. At stake are an important question of what portions of a plurality decision should bind lower courts, potential inequities regarding parties who may and may not have their sentences reduced, and a shift in power in plea negotiations.

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The Supreme Court will consider whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme is constitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See Brief for Petitioner, Timothy Lee Hurst at 26-27. Convicted murderer Timothy Lee Hurst argues that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional in light of Ring. See id. at 17-18. Hurst contends that the jury’s advisory verdict does not satisfy the requirements of Ring and violates the Constitution because  the it  minimizes the jury’s sense of responsibility and subverts the jury’s deliberative function by assigning the fact-finding role to the trial court judge. See id. at 26-27, 35-36. Florida argues that its sentencing framework is constitutional because it complies with the requirements of Ring and ensures that a judge’s sole determination will not necessitate a sentence of death for a defendant. See Brief of Respondent, Florida at 58. The Court’s decision will determine the constitutionality of Florida’s death sentencing  scheme,  and may impact the individual cases of prisoners who have been sentenced to death in Florida.

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Alphonso James was convicted four times between 1997 and 2003: once for attempted burglary, twice for drug offenses, and the last time for illegal possession of a firearm. At the sentencing for his firearm offense the government argued that under the Armed Career Criminal Act a 15 year mandatory minimum sentence should be applied because James had three prior convictions for a violent felony and serious drug offenses. James is contesting the classification of attempted burglary as a violent felony, and the issue is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. The government argues that attempted burglary presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person and thus fits one of the statutory definitions of a violent felony. James argues that determining whether his attempted burglary presented the specified risk would require the court to conduct impermissible fact-finding in opposition to the Court’s rulings in Taylor v. United States and Shepard v. United States. James also makes a statutory construction argument to support the exclusion of attempted burglary from the definition of a violent felony. Both the District Court for the Middle District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit ruled that attempted burglary was a violent felony. If the Supreme Court upholds those rulings, more felons will be subject to this federal modified “three strikes” rule, thus adding fuel to the national debate about mandatory minimums and increasing prison populations.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether a joint capital-sentencing proceeding between two brothers and a jury instruction that does not affirmatively state mitigating circumstances “need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt” violate the Eighth Amendment. See Brief for Petitioner, the State of Kansas at i. Kansas argues that the circumstances did not require severing the penalty hearings given the jury instruction and interrelated nature of the Carrs’ upbringing, and there is no affirmative duty to instruct juries that mitigating circumstances need not meet any particular burden of proof. See id. at 25, 54. Jonathan and Reginald Carr argue that severance was required because the sentencing proceeding was prejudicial, and the jury instructions were misleading and prevented the jury from properly weighing the mitigating circumstances. See Brief for Respondent, Jonathan D. Carr at 17–18, 43; Brief for Respondent, Reginald Dexter Carr, Jr. at 16, 34. The Court’s ruling will likely affect the severance standard used in multi-defendant capital punishment cases and how jurors are instructed in such cases. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Promise of Justice Initiative (“PJI”), in Support of Respondents at 2; Brief of Amici Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (“CJLF”) et al., in Support of Petitioner at 7.

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