Flores-Figueroa v. United States

Issues

Whether the Government can convict a person for aggravated identity theft, which requires proof that he "knowingly transfer[red], possesse[d], or use[d] . . . a means of identification of another person[,]" even if he did not know that the identification he used for employment belonged to another person.

 

Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, a Mexican immigrant used a false name, social security number, and resident alien card to obtain employment. Unbeknownst to him, these documents belonged to another person. When the government discovered this, it charged him with aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(1)(a), and he was found guilty. Flores-Figueroa contends that under the statute, he committed mere identity fraud rather than aggravated identity theft because he did not know that the identity information in fact belonged to a real person. The government argues that the statute should apply to all defendants who use another's identity information, regardless of their mens rea, or intent. The outcome of this case will impact how identity theft cases are prosecuted as well as the rights of immigrants who have used falsified identity documents.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether, to prove aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), the Government must show that the defendant knew that the means of identification he used belonged to another person.

    Petitioner Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, an immigrant from Mexico, secured false identification documents in order to gain employment at L&M Steel Services. See Brief for Petitioner, Ignacio Flores-Figueroa at 2; Brief for Respondent, United States at 2. He used a false name, social security number and resident alien card. See 

    Written by

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders

    Issues

    Can a prison perform a strip search of each detainee regardless of the reason for the arrest?

     

    Petitioner Albert Florence was arrested on an outdated bench warrant for a non-indictable offense and was subjected to “strip searches” in two separate prison facilities. Florence sued both facilities, alleging that their blanket policies of strip searching all detainees, regardless of their offense, violates the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a District Court opinion, holding that the policies in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Florence argues that the Fourth Amendment protects detainees from suspicionless strip searches when less intrusive alternatives better serve penological interests. The Respondents contend that the prison context diminishes the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation, and that the privacy expectation is outweighed by the security interest promoted by blanket strip searches. The decision in this case could affect prison security, the psychological wellbeing of detainees, and the future volume of prison litigation.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a jail to conduct a suspicionless strip search of every individual arrested for any minor offense no matter what the circumstances.

    On March 3, 2005, police arrested Petitioner Albert Florence in New Jersey on an Essex County bench warrant while he was a passenger in his sport utility vehicle. See Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 595 F.Supp.2d 492, 496 (D.N.J.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Submit for publication
    0

    Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee

    Issues

    Does Title IX’s implied right of action provide an exclusive remedy for claims of gender discrimination in federally-funded academic institutions, therefore limiting the right to bring a separate claim for a violation of constitutional right to Equal Protection?

     

    Lisa and Robert Fitzgerald brought suit against the Barnstable School Committee (“Barnstable”) under both § 1983 and Title IX, claiming the district was deliberately indifferent to their daughter’s claims of sexual harassment by an older student on her school bus. Neither the police nor the school’s own investigation found enough evidence to charge or punish the alleged perpetrator. The federal district court dismissed the Fitzgeralds’ Title IX sexual discrimination claim on summary judgment. The court indicated that because Title IX prescribed the remedy for allegations of sexual discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, it foreclosed a separate § 1983 claim alleging a violation of a constitutional right to Equal Protection. The Fitzgeralds claim there are fundamental differences between the rights of action in § 1983 and Title IX, and that a statute intended to expand rights would never limit a constitutional right of action. Barnstable, however, maintains that Congress’s efforts to pass Title IX represented an entirely separate standard to govern sex discrimination in schools. Women’s rights groups claim that a decision to foreclose liability under § 1983 will make it more difficult to bring claims of sexual discrimination in educational institutions, while Barnstable claims that maintaining both causes of action would overexpose educational institutions to suits for violations committed by individuals, rather than just the institution itself.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), has been interpreted to provide an implied private right of action for sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates an express remedy for violations of the U.S. Constitution. Three courts of appeals have held that Title IX’s implied remedy does not foreclose Section 1983 claims to enforce the Constitution’s prohibition against invidious sex discrimination. In contrast, four circuits, including the First Circuit in this case, have held that Title IX’s implied right of action is the exclusive remedy for sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions.

    The question presented is:

    Whether Title IX’s implied right of action precludes Section 1983 constitutional claims to remedy sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions.

    After several months of displaying atypical behavior, kindergartner Jacqueline Fitzgerald reported to her parents (the “Fitzgeralds”) in February 2001 that an older student on her school bus was harassing her by forcing her to lift her skirt when she wore dresses. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 504 F.3d 165, 169 (1st Cir.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    · U.S. Department of Education—Title IX and Sexual Discrimination http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html

    · Workplace Prof Blog: Another Right Without a Remedy on the Way: Court Grants Cert in the Title IX Preclusion/Peer Sex Harassment Case (June 9, 2008)

    · Comment from Lisa and Robert Fitzgerald in The Flat Hat, student newspaper at The College of William & Mary http://flathatnews.com/content/68983/supreme-court-will-hear-title-ix-case

    · Criticism of U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee: http://www.openmarket.org/2008/07/22/fitzgerald-v-barnstable-school-committee-a-stealth-assault-on-the-state-action-doctrine/

    Submit for publication
    0

    Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, et al.

    Issues

    Does the University of Texas at Austin’s use of racial preferences in its admissions process violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

     

    In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”)’s admissions policy, which considers race, is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Abigail Fisher applied to UT for admission to its 2008 freshman class. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, et al., 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014). As part of its admission process, UT  computes  and considers Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”) Scores, which include various personal characteristics of applicants, including their race. UT does not assign a numerical score or value to the elements of an applicant’s PAI. See id. at 638. Ultimately, UT denied Fisher admission based on her PAI scores, and Fisher would not have received a seat in the 2008 class, even with a perfect PAI score, regardless of race. See id. at 639. In Fisher I, Fisher alleged that UT’s admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded that case to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, so the appeals court could consider whether UT’s admission policy survives strict scrutiny under Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). The Fifth Circuit held that the policy did survive strict scrutiny. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Fisher argues that UT’s pursuit of intra-racial diversity is not a clearly articulated compelling government interest, and its admissions scheme is not narrowly tailored to achieving that interest. See Brief for Petitioner, Abigail Noel Fisher at 25, 30, 38. UT argues that the Court has already held that a university’s interest in diversity is  compelling,  and that UT’s admissions policy is narrowly  tailored,  because race-neutral approaches are insufficient to achieve its interest. See Brief for Respondents, University of Texas at Austin, et al. at 25, 40, 42. The outcome of this case will affect the admissions schemes and racial demographics of universities. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Can the Fifth Circuit’s re-endorsement of the University of Texas at Austin’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions be sustained under this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher  v.   University  of Texas at Austin?

    Abigail Fisher applied to the University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) for admission to its fall 2008 class. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, et al., 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin

    Issues

    Does a public university violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it considers race in admissions decisions?

     

     

    Petitioner Abigail Fisher, a white Texan, was denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the Fall 2008 entering class. Fisher sued the university, arguing that the denial violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because she was denied admission to the public university in favor of minority applicants with lesser credentials. Fisher contends that the university’s admission policy cannot survive strict scrutiny as required by Grutter v. Bollinger. The university argues that its admissions policy is essentially identical to the policy upheld in Grutter. It asserts that its use of a holistic admissions process, considering race as one factor for admission, creates a diverse student body that benefits the entire university. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine Grutter, and it will have far-reaching implications for university admissions policies and racial demographics in schools throughout the United States.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    May the University of Texas at Austin consider race in undergraduate admissions decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment?

    The University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) is a public education institution, authorized by the Texas Constitution and backed by state and federal funding. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 226 (5th Cir.

    Written by

    Edited by

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards

    Issues

    Whether a plaintiff who identifies a violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act has standing under Article III when the plaintiff is among the category of victims that Congress sought to protect but does not allege a particular, concrete harm arising from the cause of action.

     

    In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a plaintiff has Article III standing to sue under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) when the plaintiff alleges no injury-in-fact. Respondent Denise Edwards contends that she has standing because, through RESPA, Congress identified a specific harm resulting from a conflict of interest between title insurance service firms and title agents who enter exclusive agreements to exchange referrals for kickbacks. Edwards argues that Congress tethered that harm to a certain class of plaintiffs, which includes Edwards. Respondent First American Financial Corporation rejoins that a plaintiff must allege a personal and concrete harm to gain Constitutional standing. Under this standard, First American asserts that Edwards alleged no such harm and thus lacks standing to sue. The Court’s decision here has the potential to greatly enhance plaintiffs’ ability to organize class actions and obtain relief for statutory violations in various industries and differing legal frameworks.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Section 8(a) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 ("RESPA" or "the Act") provides that "[n]o person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any agreement or understanding ... that business incident to or a part of a real estate settlement service involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any person." 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a). Section 8(d)(2) of the Act provides that any person "who violate[s]," inter alia, § 8(a) shall be liable "to the person or persons charged for the settlement service involved in the violation in an amount equal to three times the amount of any charge paid for such settlement service." Id. § 2607(d)(2). The questions presented are:

    1. Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding that a private purchaser of real estate settlement services has standing under RESPA to maintain an action in federal court in the absence of any claim that the alleged violation affected the price, quality, or other characteristics of the settlement services provided?

    2. Does such a purchaser have standing to sue under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides that the federal judicial power is limited to "Cases" and "Controversies" and which this Court has interpreted to require the plaintiff to "have suffered an 'injury in fact,'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)?

    LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.

    To buy a house, an individual typically must obtain certain settlement services, such as title insurance. See 12 U.S.C.

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    Filarsky v. Delia

    Issues

    Whether a private attorney retained by the government is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity when the attorney is working with government employees in an internal affairs investigation.

     

    After petitioner Steve Filarsky, a private attorney retained by the City of Rialto to conduct an internal affairs investigation, prompted City officials to order respondent Nicholas Delia, a local firefighter, to consent to a warrantless search of his home, Delia brought a civil rights claim against both Filarsky and the City, alleging, among other things, a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The district court granted a motion by Filarsky and the officials to dismiss the case on qualified immunity grounds, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that Filarsky, as a private attorney, could not enjoy immunity. Other circuit courts, however, have granted qualified immunity to private lawyers retained by the government. The Supreme Court must resolve the circuit split.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a lawyer retained to work with government employees in conducting an internal affairs investigation is precluded from asserting qualified immunity solely because of his status as a “private” lawyer rather than a government employee.

    Firefighter Delia claimed to feel sick after helping to clean up a toxic spill. See Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir.

    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

    Submit for publication
    0

    Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez

    Issues

    Where Congress has passed a law that bars individuals from adjusting their immigration status if they have been deported and then illegally reentered the country, should the law apply retroactively to an individual who illegally reentered the country before that law was passed?

     

    Humberto Fernandez-Vargas is a Mexican citizen who has been deported from and illegally reentered the United States numerous times. In January of 1982, Fernandez-Vargas illegally reentered the United States, where he remained, living and working in Utah, until his most recent deportation in 2004. During those twenty years, Fernandez-Vargas began a relationship and had a child with an American woman whom he married in 2001. After marrying, Mr. and Mrs. Fernandez-Vargas applied to adjust his immigrant status so Fernandez-Vargas could legally remain in the United States. However, in 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which revised an earlier provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act and, consequently, might have eliminated Fernandez-Vargas’ ability to adjust his status. The Supreme Court must decide whether the revised law should apply to and eliminate relief for Fernandez-Vargas, who illegally reentered the country prior to the legislation’s enactment.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether and under what circumstances INA § 241(a)(5) (a.k.a. § 1231(5)) applies to an alien who reentered the United States illegally before the effective date of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, April 1, 1997.

    Over the last thirty years, Hernando Fernandez-Vargas, a native and citizen of Mexico, has illegally entered and been deported from the United States several times. Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez, U.S. (No. 04–1376).

    Submit for publication
    0

    FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association

    Issues

    May the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) pay retail customers to consume less electricity in order to balance supply and demand in the wholesale-market electricity grid?

     

    The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) empowers the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to regulate the transmission and sale of electric power in interstate commerce. See Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 2014). FERC issued Order 745 to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when economically efficient. See Electric Power Supply, 753 F.3d at 219. Under the new order, the cost of incentive payments to retail customers to encourage reduced energy consumption is subsidized by entities participating in the wholesale electricity market. See id. The Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”), along with four energy industry associations, brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act alleging that the FERC’s Order 745 violates the  FPA,  because it invades the states’ exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the retail market. See id. at 218. The Supreme Court will consider whether (1) the FPA extends authority to the FERC to create a methodology that  wholesale-market  operators must use to calculate the compensation payments in the demand response scheme, and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Order 745 is arbitrary and capricious. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n et al. at 35–36. The Court’s resolution of this case will impact the regulatory balance in the energy sector between federal and state governments. See Brief of Amici Curiae CES and Dr. Silkman, in Support of Respondent at 4.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Did the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission reasonably conclude that it has authority under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq., to regulate the rules used by operators of wholesale electricity markets to pay for reductions in electricity consumption and to recoup those payments through adjustments to wholesale rates?
    2. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the rule issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is arbitrary and capricious?

    Under the The Federal Power Act (“FPA”), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) is charged with regulating the transmission and sale of electric power in interstate commerce. See Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir.

    Written by

    Additional Resources

    Submit for publication
    0

    Federal Express Corporation v. Holowecki

    Issues

    Whether filing an “Intake Questionnaire” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging illegal age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act has the same legal effect as filing the EEOC’s form titled “Charge of Discrimination.”

     

    In 2001, Patricia Kennedy filed an “intake questionnaire” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging age discrimination by her employer, Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”), against her and other couriers. Because she did not file a formal “charge” document, the EEOC did not notify FedEx, investigate the claims, or begin conciliation efforts. Five months later, Kennedy, along with thirteen other past and present FedEx couriers over the age of forty, filed suit over this issue in federal court. The trial court granted FedEx’s motion to dismiss, ruling (among other things) that Kennedy could not sue because she never filed a timely charge with the EEOC as required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Kennedy’s intake questionnaire is a “charge” for the ADEA’s purpose because it manifests her intent to activate the EEOC’s investigation and conciliation process.

     

      Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

      Whether the Second Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to the law of several other circuits and implicating an issue this Court has examined but not yet decided, that an "intake questionnaire" submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") may suffice for the charge of discrimination that must be submitted pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), even in the absence of evidence that the EEOC treated the form as a charge or the employee submitting the questionnaire reasonably believed it constituted a charge.

      The Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”) engages in the business of package transportation and delivery. Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1. FedEx implemented new employee policies in 1994 and 1995. Holowecki v. Federal Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 562 (2d Cir. 2006). One of the policies required supervisors and couriers to set goals for the number of deliveries on each route. Id. Initially, couriers who met the goals received bonuses. Id.
      Submit for publication
      0
      Subscribe to