Domino's Pizza v. McDonald

Issues

Does 42 U.S.C. § 1981 create a cause of action in one not a party to a contract, but who sustained personal injuries as a result of a breach of that contract, where the breach was motivated by racial discrimination against him?

 

JWM Investments, Inc., a company wholly owned by Respondent John McDonald, entered into a contract with Petitioner Domino’s Pizza under which it the parties agreed that JVM would build and lease to Domino’s four restaurant buildings.  After the relationship began to sour, McDonald, an African-American, demanded that Domino's perform their end of the bargain. Another petitioner Deborah Pear Phillips, employee of Domino's, refused to sign contractually required "estoppel certificates," and the general counsel for Domino's said that it would perform the contracts only if McDonald would agree to amend them, which he refused to do. McDonald claimed that Petitioners' decision to breach the contracts was motivated by racial discrimination and sued under 42 U.S.C § 1981, which protects the right to make and enforce contracts. Petitioners argue that McDonald does not have standing to sue because he was not personally a party to the contract. The Supreme Court will thus decide whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates a cause of action in one who is not a party to a contract, but who sustained personal injuries as a result of a breach of that contract, where the breach was motivated by racial discrimination against him.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the absence of a contractual relationship with the defendant, are allegations of personal injuries alone sufficient to confer standing on a plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981?

Domino's Pizza, Inc. ("Domino's") entered into four contracts with JWM Investments, Inc. ("JWM") under which JWM was to build restaurants and lease them to Domino's. Respondent John McDonald, an African-American, was the sole officer, director, and stockholder of JWM. Under the contract, Domino's was required to execute "estoppel certificates" if necessary for JWM to obtain financing for the restaurants. Deborah Pear Phillips, the real estate negotiator for Domino's and one of the petitioners, refused to sign the certificates.

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Dollar General., et al. v. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al.

Issues

Does an Indian tribal court have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against non-tribal members, including nonmembers who enter into a voluntary relationship with a tribe or the tribe’s members?

 

The Supreme Court’s  ruling in this case  may impact the scope of tribal sovereignty and the economic relationships between tribes and nonmembers. Dollar General argues that Indian tribal courts should not be permitted to decide tort claims involving non-tribal members, while the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians argues that Indian tribal courts should be permitted to decide civil tort claims. See Brief for Petitioner at 44; Brief for Respondent at 25. The parties support their arguments with divergent applications of the exceptions set forth in Montana v. United States. See Brief for Petitioner at 48; Brief for Respondent at 19, 22, 27, 49. The Court, when deciding which application of Montana is proper, will consider whether any type of consent existed between the parties, whether allowing the tribal court to hear tort claims will over-broaden the Montana category exception, and whether the tribe’s inherent sovereign authority permits tribal courts to decide tort claims. See Brief for Petitioner at 48, 49, 55; Brief for Respondent at 19–23, 25, 27, 49. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against nonmembers, including as a means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members.  

Petitioners Dollar General Corp. and Dolgencorp, LLC (collectively, “Dollar General”) operate a retail store on the Choctaw reservation in Mississippi, pursuant to a lease agreement and a business license with the tribe. See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir.

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Dolan v. United States Postal Service

Issues

Does the Federal Tort Claims Act's exception for "negligent transmission" of mail by employees of the United States Postal Service apply to claims of physical harm to individuals due to employee negligence in delivering mail, or is it limited to claims of mail damaged by employee negligence?

 

Petitioner Barbara Dolan sustained serious injuries when she tripped over a stack of letters, packages, and other mail that an employee of the United States Postal Service left on her porch. She sued the United States Postal Service and the United States in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the United States Postal Service employee's negligence that led to her fall made them responsible for her injuries. The district court dismissed Dolan's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that the "negligent transmission" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act barred claims for physical injury, as well as those for damaged or delayed mail. In granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court must determine the scope of the statutory exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and whether it truly extends to "any claim" arising out of negligent transmission, including those for physical injury to individuals, or whether it is limited to claims for damaged mail.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does not this case – which involved a determination of whether the district court had jurisdiction over the claim of plaintiff when her injury was caused by the negligent placement of mail at the place of delivery – call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power where there is a dispute between the circuits of the Court of Appeals as to whether the exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. ? 2680(b) barred this lawsuit and where the Third Circuit narrowly construed the Act?

Barbara Dolan ("Dolan") was injured when she tripped over a stack of mail that a United States Postal Service ("USPS") employee had left in front of her house. Brief for the Respondents at 2.

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Dolan v. United States

Issues

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), does a district court have the authority to impose a restitution order more than 90 days after sentencing?

 

In 2007 petitioner, Brian Russell  Dolan,  pled guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced Dolan to 21 months in prison. At sentencing, the district court recognized that restitution was required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, but declined to issue a specific restitution order without first receiving more information regarding payments owed. Two hundred and nine days after sentencing, the district court issued a restitution order requiring Dolan to pay $104,649.78. Dolan, claiming that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) precludes ordering restitution more than 90 days after sentencing, argued that the district court lacked the authority to order restitution. The United States, on the other hand, insists that a district court’s failure to meet the 90-day deadline does not extinguish its authority to order restitution. Both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected Dolan’s claim, holding instead that district courts retain permanent authority to impose restitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether a district court may enter a restitution order beyond the time limit prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court may enter a restitution order beyond the time prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).

In September 2006, Brian Russell Dolan and Evan Ray Tissnolthtos, members of the Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe, engaged in a brutal physical altercation. See Brief for Petitioner, Brian Russell Dolan at 5.

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Doe # 1 v. Reed

Issues

Whether Washington’s Public Records Act (“PRA”), which makes signatures on referendum petitions part of public records, violates the First Amendment.

 

The dispute in this case centers on Washington's Public Records Act ("PRA"), which requires state and local governments to make public the identities of referendum petition signers. Petition signers challenged the constitutionality of this disclosure, but the Ninth Circuit held that disclosure of petition signers’ identities serves an important government interest and promotes government accountability. Specifically, petitioners, John Doe #1, et al. ("Doe #1"), argue that petition signing is core political speech and, therefore, is subject to First Amendment protections. Respondents, Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, et al. ("Reed"), contend that petition signing, especially the signing of referendum petitions, is not political speech. Rather, Reed asserts that signing a referendum is a legislative act and a "quintessentially public" exercise. Thus, in Doe #1 v. Reed the Supreme Court must decide 1) whether petition signers’ First Amendment rights to privacy in political speech, association, and belief requires strict scrutiny when a state compels public release of identifying information and 2) whether compelled disclosure of petition signers’ identities is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The district court granted a preliminary injunction protecting against public disclosure, as opposed to private disclosure to the government only, of those signing a petition to put a referendum on the ballot ("petition signers"). The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court based its decision on an incorrect conclusion of law when it determined that public disclosure of petition signers is subject to, and failed, strict scrutiny. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the First Amendment right to privacy in political speech, association, and belief requires strict scrutiny when a state compels public release of identifying information about petition signers.

2. Whether compelled public disclosure of identifying information about petition signers is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, and whether Petitioners met all the elements required for a preliminary injunction.

On May 18, 2009, the Governor of Washington signed SB 5688. See Doe #1 v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 674-75 (9th Cir.

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District of Columbia v. Heller

Issues

Does the Second Amendment give individuals not affiliated with any state-regulated militia the right to "keep and bear" arms?

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The  District of Columbia bans possession of handguns, and bans anyone from carrying a handgun or other deadly or dangerous weapon without a license within its borders (the "Gun Ban"). It also requires that any firearms which may be kept within the District, such as rifles, be kept either disassembled or with a trigger lock. These are some of the most restrictive gun laws in the nation. Mr. Heller claims these laws violate his Second Amendment right to "keep and bear Arms." The Supreme Court has not taken a Second Amendment case since 1939, and has never decided whether the Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms upon individuals or only upon the militias it refers to in its opening clause. In the intervening 69 years, the federal and state governments have passed many laws regulating and restricting the ownership and use of guns. Should the Supreme Court uphold the D.C. Circuit's invalidation of the Gun Ban, it could have a substantial impact on these gun laws and will almost certainly lead to more litigation as gun rights advocates challenge those laws as violating the Second Amendment. If the Court finds that the Gun Ban is constitutional, it will strengthen the ability of government to regulate gun ownership, and may result in more restrictive gun laws across the country.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the following provisions - D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02 - violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes?

In 1976, the District of Columbia ("D.C." or the "District") City Council enacted three of the strictest gun control ordinances in the United States . The ordinances entirely ban the possession of handguns within the District and, while allowing residents to keep rifles and shotguns in their homes, require those guns be kept disassembled or bound by a trigger lock (hereinafter referred to as the "Gun Ban"). See D.C.

Additional Resources

· Justice Talking : The Right to Bear Arms - A Surprising Split Among Liberals

· Brief for Violence Policy Center and the Police Chiefs for the Cities of Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Seattle in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for Jack N. Rakove, Saul Cornell, David T. Konig, William J. Novak, Lois G. Schwoerer et al. in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler, as in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for Former Department of Justice Officials in Support of Petitoner

· Brief for Professors of Criminal Justice in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for the City of Chicago and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago in Support of Petitioner (reprint)

· Brief for DC Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, D.C. Chamber of Commerce, D.C. for Democracy, D.C. League of Women Voters, Federal City Council of Lawyers in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Society for Adolescent Medicine, the Childrens Defense Fund, Women Against Gun Violence, and Youth Alive! in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for New York, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron, Ph. D, Richard W. Bailey, Ph. D, and Jeffrey P. Kaplan in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae

· Brief for the the American Jewish Committee et al. in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. in Support of Petitioner

· Brief for American Legislative Exchange in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Buckeye Firearms Foundation LLC, et al. in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Disabled Veterans for Self-Defense and Kestra Childers in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Criminologists, Social Scientists, Other Distinguished Scholars, and the Claremont Institute in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Foundation for Free Expression in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Rutherford Institute in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Pink Pistols and Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Alaska Outdoor Council, et al. in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr. et al. in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Grass Roots of South Carolina, Inc. in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Libertarian National Committee in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Second Amendment Foundation in Support of Respondent

· Brief for 55 Members of the United States Senate, the President of the U.S. Senate, and 250 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives in Support of Respondent

· Brief for 126 Women State Legislatures and Academics in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Virginia1774.org in Support of Respondent (reprint)

· Brief for Paragon Foundation in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the CATO Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the States of Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Organizations and Scholars Correcting Myths and Misrepresentations Commonly Deployed by Opponents of an Individual-Right-Based Interpretation of the Second Amendment in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the President Pro Tempore of the Senate of Pennsylvania Joseph B. Scarnati, III in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the American Center for Law and Justice in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Institute for Justice in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Former Senior Officials of the Department of Justice in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Foundation for Moral Law in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Gun Owners of America, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondent

· Brief for State Firearm Associations in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Dr. Suzanna Gratia Hupp, D.C. and the Liberty Legal Institute in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Academics in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Academics for the Second Amendment in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Center for Individual Freedom in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Retired Military Officers in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Heartland Institute in Support of Respondent

· Brief for National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Goldwater Institute in Support of Respondent

· Brief for American Civil Rights Union in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Maricopa County Attorney's Office in Support of Respondent

· Brief for the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Jeanette M. Moll et al. in Support of Respondent

· Brief for Members of Congress in Support of Reversal

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DIRECTV, Inc. v. Amy Imburgia et al.

Issues

Can parties to a consumer arbitration agreement incorporate otherwise preempted state law into their agreement, or does the Federal Arbitration Act preempt that law in all cases?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether an arbitration provision in a Customer Agreement purportedly governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires the application of state law preempted by, or independent from, the FAA. See Brief for Petitioner, DIRECTV, Inc. at 1.  DIRECTV argues that the parties intended to arbitrate all disputes, that state law is always subject to the preemptive force of federal law, and that in any  event  the FAA requires courts to resolve ambiguities in favor of arbitration. See id. at 18-19. Imburgia counters that the FAA requires agreements to be interpreted according to their express terms and that courts should interpret the express reference to state law in the agreement as California state contract law, independent from the preemptive force of federal law. See Brief for Respondent, Amy Imburgia et al. at 15. The Court’s decision may affect the enforcement of arbitration agreements in other contexts, as well as impact the way in which state courts interpret arbitration agreements. See Brief of Equal Employment Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Petitioner at 21–25.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the California Court of Appeal err by holding, in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act?

In September 2008, Amy Imburgia and a class of litigants filed a class action complaint against DIRECTV in California Superior Court, alleging violations of state contract law after receiving a series of early termination fees following the cancellation of their accounts with the company. See Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App.

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Dillon v. United States

Issues

After Booker, are federal courts allowed to deviate from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when resentencing prisoners based on retroactively applicable Guideline modifications? Or are they still bound to follow the (albeit modified) Guidelines?

Pursuant to a statutory sentence-reduction proceeding, are courts permitted to recalculate the underlying Guideline range, or must they adhere to their initial calculation?

 

In 1993, Petitioner Percy Dillon was tried and convicted in federal court for possession of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 322 months in prison under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined in United States v. Booker that the Guidelines were only advisory, not mandatory, and Congress retroactively reduced the Guideline range for crack cocaine offenses. Dillon filed a motion to have his sentence retroactively reduced, and argued that under Booker the Guidelines are not binding on his resentencing. The district court rejected this view, and reduced Dillon’s sentence to 277 under the new Guidelines. The Third Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are binding or merely advisory on retroactive sentence reductions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

I. Whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are binding when a district court imposes a new sentence pursuant to a revised guideline range under 18 U.S.C. § 3582.

II. Whether during a § 3582(c)(2) sentencing, a district court is required to impose sentence based on an admittedly incorrectly calculated guideline range.

In 1993, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania convicted Percy Dillon of a number of federal crimes relating to his possession of crack cocaine. See US v. Dillon, 572 F.3d 146, 147 (3d Cir.

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Wex: Law about Federal Sentencing

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Dietz v. Bouldin

Issues

Can a federal court, after discharging a jury, recall the jurors and direct them to deliberate further in order to correct an invalid verdict?

 

This case stems from a vehicle collision lawsuit and comes to the Supreme Court on appeal from the Ninth Circuit. Respondent Hillary Bouldin collided with petitioner Rocky Dietz who subsequently sued Bouldin in Montana state court for injuries sustained during the accident. Bouldin removed the case to federal court and the jury found in favor of Dietz but erroneously awarded $0 in damages, which was legally impossible because Bouldin had admitted to causing at least $10,000 in medical expenses. The Supreme Court will clarify under which  circumstances,  if any, federal courts may recall jurors dismissed after having rendered a final verdict. Dietz contends that the Court should establish a bright-line rule clearly forbidding such re-empaneling of jurors, asserting instead that the appropriate remedy for an invalid verdict is a new trial. Bouldin counters that federal courts should be allowed to exercise discretion to determine when it is appropriate to recall a jury after its dismissal. This case will affect how federal courts interpret rules and procedures for recalling jurors and will also impact the fairness and finality of jury verdicts and judicial efficiency in federal court proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

After a judge has discharged a jury from service in a case and the jurors have left the judge’s presence, may the judge recall the jurors for further service in the same case?

In August 2009, respondent Hillary Bouldin, while driving his car, struck petitioner Rocky Dietz’s car. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.

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Devenpeck v. Alford

Issues

Whether a police officer can arrest a person for one offense, but later charge that person with another offense even if the charged offense is wholly unrelated to the arresting offense?
Whether a law or doctrine is "clearly established" when several courts have differing opinions?

 

In Devenpeck v. Alford, the Supreme Court will consider two issues. First, the Court will settle a conflict among the circuit courts in determining how precise an officer's stated reasons for probable cause must be to the actual arresting offense. Two judicial circuits find an arrest reasonable if, based on an objective assessment by a reasonable officer, there is probable cause to arrest for any offense. On the other hand, at least five judicial circuits find an arrest to be reasonable only if there is probable cause to arrest for crimes "closely related" to the crime or crimes articulated by the arresting officer. The Court will likely find the narrow approach more appealing and allow arrests for only "closely related" offenses. Second, the Court will decide if the law regarding arrests for "closely related" offenses was clearly established at the time of Alford's arrest. The Court will likely find the law was not settled, and thereby overrule the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alford v. Haner, et al. 333 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2003).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest?
 
For the purpose of qualified immunity, was the law clearly established when there was a split in the circuits regarding the application of the "closely related offense doctrine," the Ninth Circuit had no controlling authority applying the doctrine, and Washington state law did not apply the doctrine?
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