DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno; Wilkins v. Cuno

Issues

Does either the investment tax credit or the property tax exemption at issue violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States or Ohio State Constitutions by discriminating in favor of businesses locating new investments in Ohio and against incumbent businesses or those locating elsewhere?

Do the Respondents here (and plaintiffs below) have standing as the state and municipal taxpayers to challenge the tax incentive programs at issue?

 

The Ohio State investment tax credit (Ohio Revised Code ? 5733.33) encourages development in economically depressed areas by providing tax breaks to companies or individuals that choose to locate in such areas and to install new manufacturing machinery and equipment. The personal property tax incentive, under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ?? 5709.62 and 5709.631, permits municipalities to grant property tax exemptions to corporations that develop in economically depressed areas and meet certain employment and investment levels. Together, these two statutes create incentives for corporate development in Ohio in otherwise unfavorable locations. Respondents, state and non-state taxpayers and one Ohio business forced to relocate upon the construction of a DaimlerChrysler plant, argue that this tax-incentive scheme is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits state taxes from discriminating against interstate commerce. Petitioners assert that (1) the Respondents lack standing to bring the suit, and (2) the dormant Commerce Clause prevents only state taxes which discourage companies from doing businesses in other states and not incentives that encourage companies to locate within the state.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (04-1704):

Whether Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Revised Code ? 5733.33, which seeks to encourage economic development by providing a credit to taxpayers who install new manufacturing machinery and equipment in the State, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

Whether Respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ? 5733.33.

Wilkins v. Cuno (04-1724):

Does the dormant Commerce Clause allow a State to attempt to attract new business investment in the State by offering credits against the State's general corporate franchise or income tax, where the amount of the credit is based on the amount of a business's new investment in the State?

Whether Respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ? 5733.33.

​

Factual Background

DaimlerChrysler contracted with the City of Toledo, Ohio in 1998, to construct a new vehicle-assembly plant in exchange for tax incentives. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741. DaimlerChrysler forecasted its total investment in the project to be about $1.2 billion, which would result in tax incentives totaling an estimated $280 mil

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Dada v. Mukasey

Issues

Whether the time allotted for departure under a voluntary departure order is suspended when an alien files a motion to reopen removal proceedings.

 

Samson Taiwo Dada, a citizen of Nigeria, overstayed a temporary visitor's visa. After removal proceedings, Dada was granted voluntary departure. Dada failed to leave the United States within the voluntary departure period and instead moved before the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his removal proceedings. Dada argued that the voluntary departure period should be tolled pending the outcome of his motion. Dada contended that otherwise, he and similarly situated aliens would be forced either to abandon their motions to reopen or illegally remain in the United States beyond the voluntary departure period. The Board denied Dada's motion and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The outcome of this case will settle a circuit split concerning the legal effect of motions to reopen and will influence aliens' decisions to seek to reopen removal proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the filing of a motion to reopen removal proceedings automatically tolls the period within which an alien must depart the United States under an order granting voluntary departure.

Samson Taiwo Dada, a citizen of Nigeria, was legally admitted into the United States on a nonimmigrant visa in 1998. Brief for Petitioner at 9. After Dada's visa expired, he married an American citizen who filed a Petition for Alien Relative, Form I-130, on Dada's behalf in 1999. Id. The I-130 petition was subsequently denied for failure to present documents requested by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.

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Cutter v. Wilkinson

 

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act contains provisions that are applicable to institutionalized persons which prohibit the government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoner's exercise of religion. The issue, in this case, is whether or not such provisions violate the Constitution's Establishment Clause, Spending Clause, or Commerce Clause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Congress violated the Establishment Clause by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 through § 2000cc-5, which requires state officials to lift unnecessary governmental burdens imposed on the religious exercise of institutionalized persons under their control.

Factual Summary
 
In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act  ("RLUIPA"), which, in relevant part required that no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution unless the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
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Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee

Issues

May the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) in an inter partes review (“IPR”) use a  broadest-reasonable  interpretation when construing the claims of a patent, or is the PTAB required to construe claims to their plain and ordinary meaning? May courts review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR proceeding?

The Supreme Court will decide the standard that the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) should use when construing claims in an issued patent and whether the PTAB’s decision to institute an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding is judicially reviewable. Cuozzo Speed Technologies argues that claims should be given their ordinary meaning and that the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR should be judicially reviewable. Meanwhile, the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) argues that when the PTAB institutes an IPR, the PTAB should construe claims with their broadest-reasonable construction standard. Furthermore, the PTO argues that the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR is final and non-reviewable by the courts. The Supreme Court’s decision may help resolve inconsistent standards used between district courts and IPR proceedings while affecting innovator’s rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Did the court of appeals err in holding that, in IPR proceedings, the Board may construe claims in an issued patent according to their broadest reasonable interpretation rather than their plain and ordinary meaning?
  2. Did the court of appeals err in holding that, even if the Board exceeds its statutory authority in instituting an IPR proceeding, the Board’s decision whether to institute an IPR proceeding is judicially unreviewable?

On August 17, 2004, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (“Cuozzo”) was issued U.S. Patent No.

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Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C.

Issues

Whether the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's regulation 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000, which interprets 12 U.S.C. §484(a) of the National Bank Act to preempt state enforcement of state laws against national banks even when the state laws are not substantively preempted, is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and/or whether the regulation is invalid because of the construction of the National Bank Act, as announced in First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).

 

Suspecting racially discriminatory lending practices, the Attorney General of New York State sent letters of inquiry to numerous national banks requesting information about their lending practices and warning them of the potential illegality of their acts. The Office of the Controller of the Currency ("OCC") and the Clearing House Association L.C.C., which consists of several national banks, maintained that the National Bank Act's "visitorial powers" provisions, interpreted by the OCC in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000, bar states from enforcing state laws against national banks. The Attorney General argues that the OCC's interpretation of § 7.4000 violates the Administrative Procedures Act, and that the National Bank Act's "visitorial powers" provisions do not interfere with state enforcement of their generally applicable laws. The decision in this case may affect lending practices and the balance of power between the federal government and state governments.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

12 U.S.C. § 484(a), a provision of the National Bank Act, prohibits the exercise of "visitorial powers" as to national banks, except where those powers are authorized by federal law, vested in the courts of justice, or exercised by Congress or a House or committee thereof. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has issued a regulation (12 C.F.R. § 7.4000) interpreting § 484(a) to preempt state enforcement of state laws against national banks, even when the state laws are not substantively preempted.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 is entitled to judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

2. Whether 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 is invalid because it is inconsistent with the authoritative construction of the National Bank Act by this Court in First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).

In 2005, Eliot Spitzer, in his official capacity as the New York State Attorney General, began investigating several national banks and their residential real estate lending practices for evidence of racial discrimination. See Clearing House Ass'n L.L.C. v.

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MONEY LAUNDERING, FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING STATUTE, SENTENCING, CRIMINAL FINANCE, DRUG TRAFFICKING, PATRIOT ACT

Issues

After the jury has convicted a criminal defendant, should judges be able to increase or decrease the defendant’s sentence on the basis of facts not determined by the jury

 

A California state court convicted John Cunningham of sexual abuse of his  son,  and sentenced Cunningham to the maximum possible term under California’s Determinate Sentencing Law. Cunningham asserts that the judicial discretion exercised in his sentencing violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to trial by jury. California contends that its sentencing law comports with the requirements for sentencing statutes laid out by the Supreme Court in recent years. A decision for either side has the potential to change the amount of discretion that judges exercise when sentencing defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether California's Determinate Sentencing Law, by permitting judges to impose enhanced sentences based on their determination of facts not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, violates the 6th and 14th amendments.

In 2001, a California jury convicted John Cunningham, a former police officer, of continuous sexual abuse of his minor son. People v. Cunningham, 2005 WL 880983 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2005).

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Cuellar v. United States

 

Humberto Cuellar was convicted of international money laundering after officers found large sums of illegal money hidden in a vehicle Cuellar intended to drive across the U.S. border into Mexico. A jury found Cuellar guilty under 18 U.S.C. � 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes money laundering a federal crime. An en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed Cuellar's conviction and Cuellar appealed. In this case, U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether an attempt to create the appearance of legitimate wealth is necessary to support a money laundering conviction. Cuellar argues that his conviction cannot stand because he did not attempt to create the appearance of legitimate funds. The United States argues that a money laundering conviction is appropriate if a criminal defendant physically concealed illegal funds during cross-border transportation. The Court's decision will resolve the current circuit split and clarify the scope of the federal money laundering statute.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether merely hiding funds with no design to create the appearance of legitimate wealth is sufficient to support a money laundering conviction.

On July 14, 2004, Humerto Fidel Regalado Cuellar was driving south along Texas State Highway 77 towards the Mexican border when he was stopped by Deputy Kevin Herbert from the Schleicher County Sheriff's office for suspected intoxication. Cuellar v. United States, 478 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 2007). Realizing Cuellar did not speak English, Deputy Herbert called for a bilingual state trooper. Id. Upon arrival, Trooper Danny Nunez questioned Cuellar. Id. at 285.
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CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization

Issues

Whether 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1), the federal statute that prohibits states from overtaxing railroads as compared with other commercial and industrial property within the same assessment jurisdiction, permits a railroad to challenge the method by which a  states  assesses the market value of its rail property, when that method is not irrational or intentionally discriminatory.

 

After finding that states consistently overtax railroads when compared with similar commercial and industrial property, Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("the 4-R Act" or "the Act"), 49 U.S.C. § 11501. The 4-R Act permits railroads to challenge a state’s tax assessment as discriminatory in federal court. CSX Transportation, Inc. challenged Georgia’s 2002 tax assessment, claiming it violated the anti-discrimination provision of the Act. The Northern District of Georgia ruled that while the Act permitted CSX Transportation, Inc. to challenge the assessment, it did not permit the railroad to challenge the methods the state used unless it could show that they were irrational or intentionally discriminatory. Agreeing with one other Circuit and affirming the District Court’s decision, the Eleventh Circuit is the fourth Court of Appeals to address the issue. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether a railroad may challenge a state’s methods in assessing its property value under the 4-R Act.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether, under the federal statute prohibiting state tax discrimination against railroads, 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)(1), a federal district court determining the “true market value” of railroad property must accept the valuation method chosen by the State.

    The following facts are generally derived from the Circuit Court decision in this case. CSX Transportation v. State Bd. of Equalization, 472 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2006).

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    CSX Transportation v. McBride

    Issues

    Whether the Federal Employers’ Liability Act requires proof of proximate causation in order for a railroad employee to recover for a workplace injury, or whether the employee is only required to show that the employer played some role in causing the injury.

     

    Respondent Robert McBride, a railroad engineer for Petitioner CSX Transportation Inc. (“CSX”), sued CSX under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), claiming that CSX was responsible for a hand injury that McBride suffered while operating the brakes of a train. In its appeal of the jury’s verdict in favor of McBride, CSX alleges that proximate causation is required for recovery under FELA. McBride contends that proximate causation is not the proper standard of causation, based on recent rulings made by the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. CSX also argues that public policy supports use of a proximate cause standard, while McBride argues that requiring proximate causation actually discourages employers from maintaining safe workplaces. The Supreme Court’s ruling will elucidate the proper standard of causation required under FELA.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, requires proof of proximate causation.

    Petitioner CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”) is a railroad company. See McBride v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 598 F.3d 388, 389 (7th Cir.

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    Bloomberg, Greg Stohr: Railroad Worker Injury Clash Draws U.S. Supreme Court Review (Nov. 29, 2010)

    The Daily Record, Kimberly Atkins: Justices Take CSX Case on Causation Standard (Nov. 29, 2010)

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    CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

    Issues

    Can the basis for awarding attorney’s fees to a defendant arise from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s failure to comply with pre-suit obligations pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

     

    The Supreme Court will decide whether the basis for awarding attorney’s fees to a defendant can arise from EEOC’s failure to comply with pre-suit obligations pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. CRST asserts that Title VII and Court precedent do not require defendants to “prevail on the merits” to be awarded attorney’s fees, and that, even if they do, CRST prevailed on the merits in this case. On the other hand, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) contends that both Title VII and Court precedent require the party to have prevailed on the merits to receive attorney’s fees, meaning that the judgment must bar further litigation on the matter. The outcome of this case implicates the incentives for EEOC to comply with its obligations in pre-suit investigations in Title VII actions.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Can a dismissal of a Title VII case, based on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s total failure to satisfy its pre-suit investigation, reasonable cause, and conciliation obligations, form the basis of an attorney’s fee award to the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)?

    On December 1, 2005, Monika Starke filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against her former employer CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”), a transit and logistics company. See EE

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