Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

Issues

Whether a state motor fuels tax that is "imposed on the use, sale, or delivery" of motor fuel may be imposed on motor fuel that a non-Indian, off-reservation distributor delivers and sells directly to an Indian Tribe at its on-reservation service station.

 

The 1995 amendment to the Kansas Motor Fuel Tax Act allowed the Kansas Department of Revenue to collect a tax on motor fuel distributed to Indian lands. The Prairie Band of the Potawatomi Nation sought to enjoin the State from collecting the tax, claiming that the tax was pre-empted by federal law and that it impermissibly infringed on the Potawatomi Nation's rights of self-government. As prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, either claim can be resolved by an interest-balancing test that considers (1) whether the tax revenue derives from value generated on- or off-reservation, and (2) whether the taxpayer benefits from tribal or state services. The Court will determine whether states can impose a tax which indirectly, but almost certainly, affects enterprises that take place on Indian reservations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. When a State taxes the receipt of fuel by non-tribal distributors, manufacturers and importers, and such receipt occurs off-reservation, does the interest-balancing test in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), apply because the fuel is later sold by a tribe to final consumers?
  2. Should the Court abandon the White Mountain Apache interest-balancing test in favor of a preemption analysis based on the principle that Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional intent?
  3. Did the court of appeals err in applying the White Mountain Apache interest balancing test by, inter alia, placing dispositive weight on the fact that a tribally-owned gas station derives income from largely non-tribal patrons of the tribe's nearby casino?

The Prairie Band of the Potawatomi Nation ("the Nation") is a federally-recognized Indian tribe located on United States trust land in Jackson County, Kansas. Prairie Band Potawatomi v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 981 (10th Cir. 2004) (" Potawatomi II ").

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Waddington v. Sarausad

Issues

When reviewing a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is a federal court required to accept a state court determination of the constitutionality of jury instructions?

 

In 1994, respondent Cesar Sarausad was convicted of second degree murder in Washington State Court for his role as a driver in a gang-related shooting. At trial, the prosecution argued in its closing that Sarausad could be found guilty of murder under the Washington accomplice liability statute because, even though he only drove the car, if he was "in for a dime," he was "in for a dollar." After repeated requests for clarification on the accomplice liability rule, which the trial judge answered only by referring the jurors back to the Washington accomplice liability statute, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Sarausad was convicted; he argued unsuccessfully on direct appeal that the instruction relieved the state of its burden to prove each element of the offense charged. Sarausad eventually sought federal habeas corpus relief, which the Ninth Circuit granted. The State of Washington, seeking to reinstate Sarausad's conviction, petitioned for certiorari from the Supreme Court. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court may determine if a federal court is required to defer to state court determination of state law when interpreting the constitutionality of jury instructions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly approved of the pattern accomplice liability jury instructions given in Sarausad’s trial, which mirror the statutory language on accomplice liability under state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found a violation of due process based its independent conclusion that the instructions were ambiguous, and that there was a reasonable likelihood a jury could misapply the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. In reviewing a due process challenge to jury instructions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, must the federal courts accept the state court determination that the instructions fully and correctly set out state law governing accomplice liability?

2. Where the accomplice liability instructions correctly set forth state law, is it an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law to conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the instructions so as to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving all the elements of the crime?

In 1994, respondent Cesar Sarausad and other 23rd Street Diablos gang members drove to a Seattle high school to confront a rival gang. See Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his assistance in understanding federal habeas corpus.

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Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt

Issues

1. If an organization has branches in states other than where it is headquartered, is it considered a citizen of all those states for purposes of litigating in federal courts?

2. Where a word used in a federal statute has an ordinary meaning but may be interpreted in different ways in the context of the lengthy and complicated statute, how should courts interpret the term?

 

Daniel Schmidt, a former Wachovia customer, sued the bank in state court after the IRS determined that the investment strategy Wachovia had recommended was illegal. Wachovia, which is headquartered in Charlotte, NC, successfully sought to remove the case to federal court because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties. After an adverse decision on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Rather than address the decision on the merits, however, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case altogether. It determined that the federal system never had jurisdiction to hear the case because Wachovia had branches in South Carolina, and therefore there was no diversity of citizenship between the parties. Wachovia appealed to the Supreme Court because it hopes to keep the case from being retried in state court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. For the purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction, is a national banking association a citizen of every state in which it maintains a branch, or is its citizenship more limited?

2. Is the word "located" as used in 28 U.S.C. ? 1348, the statute governing the citizenship of national banks for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, ambiguous?

Petitioner Wachovia Bank National Association ("Wachovia") is a national banking association with its main office in Charlotte, North Carolina. Respondent Daniel Schmidt is a citizen of South Carolina who used Wachovia as his personal and business banker. Brief for Respondents at 1.

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Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.

Issues

Does a company violate the Robinson-Patman Act when they offer different prices to buyers, but the injured buyer does not make an actual purchase?

 

In 1995, Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. and Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. entered into a five-year franchise agreement authorizing Reeder as an official Volvo heavy truck dealer. Volvo manufacturers its heavy trucks only after a retail customer solicits bids from several Volvo dealers and accepts a bid. This sort of "competitive bidding" process is an industry-wide practice, and Volvo offers price concessions throughout the process. Reeder claims that Volvo discriminated against the dealership by offering it smaller price concessions. Reeder claims this not only resulted in a loss of business for Reeder, but also violated the Robinson Patman Act. A jury trial resulted in a victory for Reeder, and a divided Eigth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Reeder's claims. Volvo appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In its decision, the Supreme Court will help define who receives protection under the Robinson-Patman Act, as well as the amount and kind of evidence a plaintiff will need to produce for this type of claim.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether an unaccepted offer that does not lead to a purchase-so that there is not "discrimination between different purchasers" as the statutory language contemplates-may be the basis for liability under the Robinson-Patman Act.

2. Whether the Robinson-Patman Act permits recovery of damages by a disfavored purchaser that loses sales or profits to a competitor that does not purchase from the defendant, but does not lose sales or profits to any purchaser that "receives the benefit of" the defendant's price discrimination.

In 1995, Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. ("Volvo") and Reeder-Simco, Inc. ("Reeder") entered into a five-year franchise agreement making Reeder an authorized Volvo heavy truck dealer. Brief for Petitioner at 4.

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Voisine v. United States

Issues

Is reckless misdemeanor assault a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under the Gun Control Act?

 

Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“section 922”), to prohibit domestic abusers from obtaining firearms. Section 922 covers individuals convicted for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” which includes state misdemeanors that constitute “the use of physical force.” The Supreme Court will consider whether convictions under Maine’s domestic assault law satisfy this predicate offense requirement. Stephen Voisine was convicted under Maine’s domestic assault statute, which criminalizes “the intentional, knowing, or reckless causation of bodily injury or offensive physical contract to another person.” Voisine was then convicted under section 922. But Voisine asserts that common law battery requires a mens rea greater than recklessness and that the “use of physical force” implies intentional conduct. The United States argues that recklessness meets the standard for common law battery, and contends that section 922 would be pointless if it did not cover misdemeanors like Maine’s domestic assault statute. The Court’s decision will affect the ability of misdemeanants to possess firearms and the health and safety of domestic violence victims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a misdemeanor crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9)?

In 1996, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“section 922”). Section 922 prohibits individuals previously convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing firearms or ammunition. See United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176, 177 (1st Cir.

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Additional Resources

Jess Bravin, Death of an Eagle Hatches Supreme Court Firearms Case, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 30, 2015).

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Virginia v. Moore

 

In 2003, Virginia police stopped David Moore for driving on a suspended license. The officers then violated Virginia law by arresting Moore instead of issuing a summons. A follow-up search revealed cash and cocaine in Moore's pockets. Moore moved to suppress this evidence on grounds that the illegal arrest made the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Virginia responded that while Moore's arrest violated state law, the search was reasonable under the U.S. Constitution because it was incident to an arrest based on probable cause that he committed a crime. The trial court found the search constitutional and convicted Moore on drug charges. The Virginia Court of Appeals initially reversed but reinstated the conviction after hearing the case en banc. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, and Virginia appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. This case could affect many state laws concerning civil liberties and the way in which police think about illegal arrests.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence obtained incident to an arrest that is based upon probable cause, where the arrest violates a provision of state law?

In 2003, police in Virginia were discussing over the radio that someone nicknamed "Chubs" (David Lee Moore) was driving in the area. Moore v. Commonwealth, 622 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Va. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 636 S.E.2d 395 ( Va. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 28 ( U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (No.

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United States v. Stitt

Issues

Does the definition of "burglary" under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 include the burglary of tents or vehicles used for overnight accommodation?

This case asks whether the definition of burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) of 1984 includes nonpermanent or mobile structures used for overnight lodging. The ACCA’s definition of burglary was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, which defined burglary as any crime involving unlawful entry or unlawfully remaining in a structure or building with the intent to commit a crime. Respondents Victor Stitt and Jason Sims were previously convicted of burglary under their respective state statutes, which both defined burglary to include acts against mobile homes, trailers, tents, and other nonpermanent structures used for overnight accommodations. Now, the State contends Congress intended nonpermanent and mobile structures to be included within the ACCA’s definition of burglary, despite not being explicitly included in Taylor. On the other hand, Stitt and Sims contend that the Supreme Court in Taylor had the option of including language referencing nonpermanent and mobile structures and, by excluding it, established a line of case precedent that understands burglary to exclude such structures. The Court's decision in this case has implications on the rights of criminal defendants, as well as on existing protections for homeowners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

This case involves two Respondents, Victor Stitt and Jason Sims, from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, respectively.

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Stokeling v. United States

Issues

Does a conviction under the Florida robbery statute, which includes as an element the requirement of overcoming victim resistance, constitute a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, when the Florida statute has been interpreted to only require slight force to meet the requirement of overcoming victim resistance?

The Supreme Court will determine whether a conviction under the Florida robbery statute, which contains as an element “overcoming victim resistance,” constitutes a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), thereby triggering enhanced sentencing under the ACCA. Petitioner Denard Stokeling (“Stokeling”) argues that under the ACCA, a “violent felony” involves the use of “violent force.” Stokeling maintains that Florida robbery is not a “violent felony” because only a slight amount of force suffices to meet its “overcoming victim resistance” element, which does not constitute “violent force.” Respondent United States (“Government”) contends that a “violent felony” under the ACCA is a felony “capable of causing pain or physical injury.” The Government asserts that Florida robbery is a “violent felony” because any act that violates the Florida robbery statute is by definition “capable of causing pain or physical injury.” From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will determine which criminals will be subjected to enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), when the offense has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight force to overcome resistance.

In 2016, Petitioner Denard Stokeling, a convicted felon, pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart

Issues

Whether the Eleventh Amendment’s notion of state sovereign immunity prevents a state-created agency from suing state officials in federal court to seek conformity with federal law.

 

The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), an independent state agency, advocates for individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. In accordance with federal funding requirements, Virginia law authorizes VOPA to access an individual's records if VOPA believes an individual was abused. During an investigation, a state facility denied VOPA access to the records of three individuals, and VOPA sued three state officials alleging that they violated federal law. The Eleventh Amendment provides that states cannot be sued in federal court by residents of one of the United States or of a foreign state. However, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Young, recognized an exception to the Eleventh Amendment allowing a party to sue state officials for injunctive or declaratory relief to correct an ongoing violation of federal law. The Fourth Circuit held that, because the plaintiff in this suit was a state-created agency rather than a private individual, the suit could not proceed under the Ex parte Young exception and that allowing it to proceed in federal court would be a violation of Virginia’s sovereign immunity. This decision may affect the ability of independent agencies to protect vulnerable individuals from neglect and has the potential to increase legal conflict between state agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Eleventh Amendment categorically precludes an independent state agency from bringing an action in federal court against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to remedy a violation of federal law under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.

The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA") is an independent state agency that advocates for individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. See Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 113 (4th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Annotated U.S. Constitution: Eleventh Amendment

· Richmond Times, Michael Martz: Watchdog Group Faults Lynchburg Facility for Mentally Retarded (Jan. 6, 2006)

· Constitutional Law Prof Blog, Steve Vladeck: VOPA v. Reinhard and Ex parte Young: Why Cert. Should (and Will) Be Granted (May 20, 2010)

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Vermont v. Brillon

Issues

Can a defendant have his case dismissed, on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, when his own public defender has requested or otherwise caused all of the delays?

Court below

 

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides defendants with the right to a speedy trial. In July of 2001, Michael Brillon was charged with aggravated domestic violence, and was ultimately sentenced to twelve-to-twenty years confinement. However, due to excessive delays before his trial caused solely by his public defenders, the Supreme Court of Vermont vacated his conviction and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The questions the United States Supreme Court will have to decide is whether delays caused by an indigent's public defenders' lack of preparedness can be the basis for a sixth amendment right to a speedy trial violation, on the theory that the state is responsible for providing adequate public defenders to indigents; and if so, does this give greater rights to indigent defendants than defendants with private attorneys?

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether continuances and delays caused solely by an indigent defendant's public defender can arise to a speedy trial right violation, and be charged against the State pursuant to the test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), on the theory that public defenders are paid by the state.

2. Whether the right to counsel, as established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), should result in broader speedy trial rights to indigent defendants than defendants who are able to retain private counsel, such that only delays by private counsel get charged against the defendant under the Barker v. Wingo test.

In July of 2001, Michael Brillon was arrested and charged with domestic violence for hitting his girlfriend in the face during an altercation. Vermont v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Sup. Ct. of VT, March 14, 2008). Although domestic violence is normally a misdemeanor in Vermont, Brillon was charged with an enhanced felony domestic assault and as an habitual offender; he had three prior felony convictions, and this incident was a violation of his the pretrial conditions of release.

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