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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether members of the Crow Tribe of Indians retain a right to hunt outside of the Crow Reservation on “unoccupied lands of the United States,” a right which was originally established in an 1868 federal treaty. Clayvin Herrera argues that because Congress has not specifically abrogated this hunting right and because Bighorn National Forest qualifies as unoccupied land which once belonged to the Crow Tribe, the treaty-based hunting right should be upheld. Wyoming, on the other hand, asserts that the establishment of Wyoming as a state and the creation of the Bighorn National Forest extinguished this off-reservation hunting right. The outcome in this case will determine the scope of the 1868 treaty and will clarify the hunting rights afforded to present-day Crow tribal members.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) prior rejection of a drug manufacturer’s proposed warning preempts a state law failure-to-warn claim against the same manufacturer. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (“Merck”), a corporation that manufactures the drug Fosamax, argues that under the Supremacy Clause, a state law claim for failing to warn about a link between a drug and abnormal femoral fractures is precluded by the FDA’s rejection of a proposed warning about the fractures. Doris Albrecht, a consumer who took Fosamax and suffered atypical femoral fractures as a result, counters that the FDA’s rejection of the warning is not dispositive and that evidence showing that the FDA would have approved an alternative warning should be considered by a jury. The Third Circuit ruled that whether the FDA would have approved an alternative warning is a question of fact that should go to the jury. Merck is now appealing that decision in a case that will have implications for drug warnings, FDA reporting, and public health.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the definition of “debt collection” in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) includes non-judicial foreclosure proceedings and whether the Act therefore applies to attorneys carrying out non-judicial foreclosures. Respondent McCarthy & Holthus LLP (“McCarthy”) pursued a non-judicial foreclosure of property owned by Petitioner Dennis Obduskey, who defaulted on a loan secured by the property at issue in the foreclosure. Obduskey subsequently filed suit against McCarthy, challenging the foreclosure and citing the FDCPA. The Tenth Circuit held that the FDCPA did not apply because non-judicial foreclosures do not qualify as a debt collection activity and are instead considered the enforcement of a security interest. Obduskey contends that non-judicial foreclosure proceedings are attempts to collect a debt because they demand that the debtor pay by threatening to take away his home and, if foreclosure is completed, liquidate the debt by selling the home. The outcome of this case has significant implications on how protected borrowers are and how much liability attorneys, creditors, and trustees face.

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The Supreme Court will rule on the separate-sovereigns doctrine, an exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause that permits both state and federal governments to prosecute an individual for offenses arising from the same conduct. Terance Gamble was prosecuted under both state and federal law for possession of a firearm after being convicted of a violent crime. Gamble argues that an exception for successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns is incompatible with the text of the Clause and the Framers’ intent, and that the Court should overrule contrary precedent. The Government counters that the text of the Constitution, historical context, and a long line of affirmative precedent support preservation of the exception. The Court’s decision in this case will have implications for Double Jeopardy protections, state and federal criminal law, and competition in criminal prosecutions between sovereigns.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a vocational expert’s testimony can constitute substantial evidence of job availability when a Social Security disability claimant requests but is not suppled with the data underlying that expert’s testimony. Petitioner Michael J. Biestek contends that the substantial evidence standard requires vocational experts to produce the underlying data upon an applicant’s request; otherwise, the expert’s testimony is unverifiable and allows the expert’s word to be unlawfully substituted for actual substantial evidence. Respondent Nancy A. Berryhill, the acting Commissioner of Social Security, counters that the substantial evidence standard focuses on the contents of the hearing record, not the procedure used to make that record. Additionally, Berryhill responds that plaintiffs already effectively undercut a vocational expert’s testimony on cross-examination and thus do not need to review the expert’s data. The outcome of this case will have large implications on litigation strategy in Social Security disability claims, for both claimants and the government.

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Helsinn Healthcare S.A. (“Helsinn”) sought and received four patents, beginning in 2003, for a drug developed pursuant to a licensing agreement with another pharmaceutical company. Though the drug’s formula remained confidential, the news of the deal was made public. In 2011, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva”) applied to the Food and Drug Administration for approval of a generic version of the drug, and—within that application—certified that Helsinn’s patents were invalid. Helsinn sued for patent infringement, arguing that the on-sale bar provision of the America Invents Act (“AIA”) does not apply to licensing agreements like the one Helsinn entered, because the confidentiality agreement in place meant that the invention was not publicly available. Helsinn then argues that adopting a different interpretation would conflict with the AIA’s two goals of aligning U.S. patent law with international standards and incentivizing prompt filing under the first-to-file standard. On the other hand, Teva asserts that the AIA’s on-sale bar provision does apply based on the plain meaning of “on sale” as illustrated by two-hundred years’ worth of statutory interpretation. Teva additionally counters that Helsinn’s interpretation would invite the secret-commercialization tactics that extend a company’s monopoly over inventions and that the AIA sought to eliminate. The Supreme Court’s decision has vast implications for patent-holders in the United States, may chill biotechnological innovation, and may adversely affect the public by extending monopolies over certain drugs and thus undermine the development of competition in the biotechnical market.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to examine § 11-21-12(c)(6) of the West Virginia Code (“§ 12(c)(6)”), which grants an income tax exemption for the retirement compensation of state retirees, but not of federal retirees. Petitioner James Dawson contends that § 12(c)(6) violates federal law 4 U.S.C. § 111 (“§ 111”), which prohibits discriminatory tax treatment against federal employees by state governments. Under the Supreme Court’s Davis test, according to Dawson, a state law violates § 111 by imposing higher taxes on income from the federal government than income from the state government when there are no significant differences between the two to justify the heavier tax burden placed on federal income. Respondent Dale Steager, the State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia, counters that § 12(c)(6) does not discriminate against federal retirees because § 12(c)(6) applies in very narrow cases. Steager further argues that West Virginia treats federal employees the same as state employees, and Dawson is not similarly situated to state retirees that are eligible for this tax exemption. The outcome of this case will affect state-level taxing policy and tax exemptions afforded only to state employees.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, as well as the extent of liability for securities professionals who play a supportive role in fraudulent-scheme claims. Francis Lorenzo contends that the Supreme Court should apply a narrow definition of primary liability to Rule 10b-5 securities actions. Lorenzo argues that he is not culpable for securities fraud under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) because, in forwarding emails that were written by his superior, he did nothing more than provide “substantial assistance” to those who defrauded investors with misleading financial statements. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) counters that Lorenzo played a primary role in advancing the fraud because he signed the emails as the director of investment banking, and he told the potential investors to contact him for information about the financial health of his brokerage firm’s clients. This case will determine the ease with which the SEC can bring claims against securities professionals accused of fraud.

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In response to the largest beef recall in United States history, California amended its Penal Code to ban the slaughtering of nonambulatory animals and require that slaughterhouses euthanize any such animals on their premises. The National Meat Association filed suit arguing that the Federal Meat Inspection Act expressly preempts California’s ban on the slaughter of nonambulatory animals, and that the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s historical context demonstrates Congress’s intent to exercise exclusive authority over the meatpacking industry. Attorney General of California Kamala Harris and animal protection organizations (including the Humane Society of the United States) propose a narrow understanding of slaughterhouse “operations” and argue that the California ban does not undermine the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s purpose. The outcome of this case will affect the slaughterhouses’ ability to examine animals for disease before euthanizing them and states’ ability to regulate areas where general federal law already exists.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from imposing excessive fines, fees, and forfeitures. Tyson Timbs contends that because the Excessive Fines Clause is deeply rooted in the United States’ history and tradition, it is a fundamental right that the states cannot violate as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State of Indiana argues that the relevant issue is not whether the Excessive Fines Clause, in general, is incorporated against the states, but rather whether there is a proportionality requirement for state forfeitures concerning property, or in rem forfeitures. Indiana maintains that protection from disproportionate in rem forfeitures is not deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition. The outcome of this case will affect how states and localities generate revenue; the degree of financial burden that states and localities may impose on individuals; and state governments’ ability to deter criminal activity and reintegrate people within the criminal justice system into society.

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