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This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the definition of an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) as set forth under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”). The statute defines an ATDS as equipment that “has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Employing a grammatical analysis, Respondent Facebook contends that a system is an ATDS only when it can automatically call phone numbers that were produced or stored using a random number generator. Also using a grammatical analysis, Petitioner Noah Duguid counters that an ATDS encompasses a system that can store and automatically call phone numbers, irrespective of whether the system uses a random number generator. The outcome of this case has significant implications in determining the type of devices and systems that could qualify as an ATDS and what callers could be subject to the $1,500-per-call statutory liability under the TCPA. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether foreign sovereign immunity and international comity prevent United States courts from asserting jurisdiction over a claim that a foreign nation unlawfully took the property of its own citizens during the Holocaust. The expropriation exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) grants the United States jurisdiction when property was “taken in violation of international law.” Petitioner Germany argues that the exception applies only to property taken in violation of the international law of expropriation and, even if jurisdiction exists, the Court should still dismiss the case based on international comity so it can be resolved in Germany. Respondents Alan Philipp and other heirs of German Jews who sold art to Nazis counter that any violation of international law, including genocide, is sufficient to grant jurisdiction under the FSIA, and the FSIA has already extended the required comity to Germany. The outcome of this case will determine whether United States courts can abstain from exercising jurisdiction over claims against foreign sovereigns and thus will affect American international relations and access to justice in United States courts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an arbitration agreement that incorporates the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) rules delegates the question of arbitrability to the arbitrators, in light of an express exclusion clause for injunctive relief, where the plaintiff sought both damages and injunctive relief. The arbitration agreement at issue in this case includes a “carve-out” provision excluding from arbitration any claims seeking injunctive relief. Rule 7(A) of the AAA’s rules states that the arbitrator has the power to rule on the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. Petitioner Henry Schein, Inc. argues that the incorporation of the AAA rules “clearly and unmistakably” delegates all questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that, because some issues are delegated to the arbitrator, the presumption of arbitrability should be read to delegate to the arbitrator the question of the application of the exclusion clause. On the other hand, Respondent Archer and White Sales, Inc. contends that the question of arbitrability should remain for the court to decide because of the explicit carve-out exemption. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the efficiency and fairness of dispute resolution.

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 This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the common-law doctrine of international comity provides federal courts with the discretion to dismiss claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Respondent the Republic of Hungary argues that the FSIA must be construed in light of international comity doctrine, and that the federal court should defer to Hungary as Hungary’s interests in hearing this case outweigh those of the United States. Petitioners Rosalie Simon and other Hungarian Holocaust survivors argue that the FSIA has displaced common law and that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction in cases such as this one, where a sovereign state has failed to provide an adequate alternate forum. The outcome of this case will have implications on foreign policy, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, and the remedies available to the victims of Holocaust.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of the “exceeds authorized access” clause of the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). A person violates the CFAA when the person “accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information” from the computer. Petitioner Van Buren was a policeman who was authorized to access a law enforcement database. For reasons unrelated to his job, he used that access to search a license plate for financial gain. Respondent United States contends that when Van Buren accessed the database for a reason unrelated to his job, he exceeded his authorized access and violated the CFAA. Van Buren argues that he did not exceed his authorized access because the “exceeds authorized access” provision does not punish individuals who misuse information they are otherwise authorized to access. The outcome of this case will have broad implications on how employers protect sensitive data and how prosecutors can pursue hacking and computer fraud. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the president may exclude undocumented immigrants when apportioning congressional seats by population. On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump issued a memorandum declaring that the United States would exclude undocumented immigrants from the congressional apportionment base. Trump argues that New York lacks standing to bring this case since 2020 census questionnaires are no longer being collected and it cannot point to how much federal funding or congressional representation certain states stand to lose. Trump further contends that even if New York has standing, Trump has discretion not to count undocumented immigrants for apportionment purposes. New York asserts that it has standing because it has demonstrated that the memorandum will deter undocumented immigrants from participating in the 2020 decennial census. Moreover, New York asserts that federal statutes require the government to make funding decisions based on the total population count and that certain states could lose congressional representation if the memorandum is implemented. Finally, New York argues that the Census Act, Reapportionment Act, and the Constitution prevent the president from exercising discretion to exclude undocumented immigrants from the census. The outcome of this case has implications for the apportionment of representatives from states with large undocumented populations and the participation of undocumented immigrants in the decennial census.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether domestic corporations may be held liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations committed in foreign countries. Petitioners Nestlé and Cargill contracted for exclusive buyer-seller contracts with cocoa plantations on the Ivory Coast; Respondents John Doe et. al. were child slaves on those farms. John Doe alleges that Nestlé and Cargill aided and abetted the farmers from headquarters in the United States by providing monetary support while aware of the widespread use of child slavery on those farms, thus making them liable under the Alien Tort Statute. Nestlé and Cargill counter that the harm inflicted upon John Doe occurred exclusively on foreign soil, making the case impermissibly extraterritorial; furthermore, they argue recent Court cases determined that corporations were immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute. The Court’s decision in this case will implicate political questions of foreign policy and foreign affairs, corporate incentives to invest in developing countries, and the United States’ support for human rights.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Ramos v. Louisiana, which held that a criminal defendant charged in state court can only be convicted by a unanimous jury, applies retroactively to cases that were finalized before Ramos was decided. Petitioner Thedrick Edwards was convicted under Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury rule and contends that Ramos recognized an ancient guarantee of criminal procedure that should be given retroactive effect under Teague v. Lane. Alternatively, Edwards asserts that Ramos enunciated a new watershed rule that must be applied retroactively because of the importance of juror unanimity to ensure accurate convictions. In response, Respondent Darrel Vannoy, the Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, argues that Ramos overruled Apodaca v. Oregon and announced a new rule that significantly changes criminal proceedings in states that allowed conviction by nonunanimous juries. Additionally, Vannoy claims that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 independently bars the retroactive application of Ramos. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for individuals seeking retrial for guilty verdicts decided by nonunanimous juries.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an impeachment trial before a legislative body qualifies as a “judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Department of Justice (DOJ) argues that an impeachment inquiry is not a judicial proceeding, and therefore, President Trump’s impeachment trial is not subject to the exception to grand-jury secrecy for judicial proceedings and can remain redacted. The House Committee on the Judiciary counters that the Committee plays the same role during its impeachment inquiry as an ordinary court that oversees litigation between parties, and therefore, the impeachment inquiry is a judicial proceeding. As such, the House Committee demands access to unredacted transcripts and all other documents that special counsel Robert Mueller’s grand jury considered. The outcome of this case determines whether House Democrats can gain access to Mueller’s report on President Trump’s alleged interference with Mueller’s investigation as part of their ongoing impeachment inquiry and the extent of the House Committees’ access to information in future impeachment inquiries. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act and to determine whether it bars pre-enforcement legal challenges to agency guidelines and regulations that incorporate a tax-penalty enforcement mechanism into the framework. CIC Services argues that the Supreme Court should construe the Administrative Procedure Act’s review provisions broadly enough and the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibitory provisions narrowly enough to provide material tax advisors relief from the Internal Revenue Service’s new interpretative guidelines concerning reportable transactions. The Internal Revenue Service counters that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to CIC’s challenge so the lawsuit is barred and that none of the available exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act’s provisions apply to CIC’s sought injunction. This case has important implications for corporations whose business involves reporting earnings to the Internal Revenue Service, as well as for federal agencies’ abilities to avoid lawsuits by tying in certain tax-penalty provisions.

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