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Minerva Surgical Inc. v. Hologic Inc.

Issues

When a party transfers a patent to a third party and the third party later sues the transferring party for patent infringement, can the transferring party claim the patent is invalid?

This case asks the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of the assignor estoppel doctrine. Under this doctrine, an assignor of a patent may not, in a suit against the assignee, claim that the patent is invalid. Petitioner Minerva Surgical Inc. argues assignor estoppel is not supported in the Patent Act and Court precedent favors the doctrine’s abolition. Respondent Hologic Inc. counters that assignor estoppel is implicit in the Patent Act and that stare decisis dictates that the Court uphold assignor estoppel. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications regarding the proper balance of the public interest in challenging potentially invalid patents and the interest in promoting equity and fair dealing in the assignor–assignee relationship.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, may have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits.

This case involves U.S. Patents Nos. 6,782,183 (“’183 patent”) and 9,095,348 (“’348 patent”). Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical at 1260. Both patents lay claim to various devices and procedures related to endometrial ablation treatment, which are used to treat abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Id. at 1260–61. Csaba Truckai is listed as the inventor of both patents.

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Greer v. United States

Issues

May a circuit court of appeals review matters outside the trial record when applying plain-error review based on an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, Rehaif v. United States?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the proper evidentiary scope of plain-error review under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the bounds of the reviewing court’s discretion to provide the defendant a remedy for such an error. A jury found the petitioner, Gregory Greer, guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon. However, the prosecution did not prove to the jury that Greer knew about his felony status—a fact that the Supreme Court subsequently held is an element that the prosecution must prove. On review, the appellate court found that there was no plain error in Greer’s case because he had stipulated to his felony status before the jury trial. Greer contends that the appellate court could not consider evidence on plain-error review that was not presented to the jury at trial, given the text of Rule 52 and Greer’s constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process. The United States responds that a reviewing court may look to matters outside the trial record in order to determine whether an error at trial meets the requirements that allow the court to exercise its remedial discretion, such as whether the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial or adversely affects the reputation of the judicial proceedings. The outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision will have important implications for matters of fundamental fairness and the balance between judge and jury.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, when applying plain-error review based on an intervening United States Supreme Court decision, Rehaif v. United States, a circuit court of appeals may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.

In August 2017, police officers engaged Petitioner Gregory Greer in conversation outside of a hotel room in Jacksonville, Florida. United States v. Greer, 798 Fed. Appx. 483, 484–85 (2020). After observing Greer touch the right side of his waistband several times, the officers informed Greer that they would conduct a pat-down search.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System

Issues

Can a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of class-wide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements to show that the statements had no impact on the price of the security; and does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether a defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the misstatements and by showing that those misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. argues that courts must consider evidence of the generality of alleged misstatements when determining whether to certify a shareholder class in a securities class action suit. Goldman further argues that defendants only bear the burden of producing some proof that their misstatement did not negatively impact the stock price, while plaintiffs bear the burden of persuading the Court that investors relied on the defendant’s alleged misstatements. The Arkansas Teacher Retirement System counters that the lower courts properly weighed the evidence presented at the class certification stage of the litigation, including the generic nature of the misstatements, when it decided to grant certification of plaintiffs’ shareholder class. ATRS also argues that the defendants implicitly bear both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion when rebutting the presumption because they must make a showing that the particular misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market price. The outcome of this case will have implications on the availability of class-action lawsuits for investors and the risk of class-action litigation for corporate defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether during the certification stage of a securities class action, a defendant may rebut the Basic presumption by arguing that the generic nature of the alleged misstatements is evidence that such misstatements did not affect the price of the defendant’s securities, and whether the defendant bears the burden of persuasion when seeking to rebut the Basic presumption.

Between 2006 and 2010, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”), an investment bank, made public statements regarding its efforts “to address potential conflicts of interest” and its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and spirit” of laws and ethical standards. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. V. Goldman Sachs Grp at 258.

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National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston

Issues

Do the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits” for college athletes violate federal antitrust law under the Sherman Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) eligibility rules, which limit student-athletes from receiving compensation in order to preserve “amateurism,” violate federal antitrust law under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act proscribes restrictions on commerce or trade among the several states. The student-athletes assert that the NCAA’s compensation restrictions, under a “rule of reason” standard of federal antitrust law, are unlawful restraints of trade that generate anticompetitive effects. In response, the NCAA argues that the challenged compensation system passes muster under the “rule of reason” standard because it preserves a clear line of demarcation between amateur college sports and professional sports while promoting socially important non-commercial values. This case has implications for intercollegiate athletics, joint ventures, and antitrust law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erroneously held, in conflict with decisions of other circuits and general antitrust principles, that the National Collegiate Athletic Association eligibility rules regarding compensation of student-athletes violate federal antitrust law.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) governs intercollegiate sports by administering rules related to its member schools’ student

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TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez

Issues

Should a class action lawsuit pursuing statutory damages be allowed under Article III or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 when the majority of the class members did not experience harm as severe as that suffered by the named plaintiff?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Article III or the typicality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“FRCP”) should allow a class action claiming statutory damages when most of the class members did not suffer actual injury, or an injury similar to that of the class representative. Petitioner TransUnion, LLC (“TransUnion”) argues that in order for a class in a statutory damages action to have standing under Article III, each absent class member must show common concrete injury and, if future risk constitutes the injury, must demonstrate that such risk is certainly impending. TransUnion asserts that to achieve typicality under FRCP 23, a class representative’s facts must be substantially shared with those of the rest of the class. Respondent Sergio L. Ramirez (“Ramirez”) counters that a class may show Article III injury by demonstrating that the harm caused by a statutory violation is analogous to that of common law claims. Ramirez also asserts that the typicality requirement is satisfied when a class representative shares the same interest and has suffered injury common to the absent class members. This case involves questions of how the Court should weigh the role of class actions and statutory damages in protecting consumers against the due process rights of litigants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether either Article III or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permits a damages class action when the vast majority of the class suffered no actual injury, let alone an injury anything like what the class representative suffered.

In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez (“Ramirez”) went to a Nissan dealership and decided to buy a new car with his wife. Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC at 1017. After running a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, the dealership informed Ramirez that they could not complete the purchase because his name matched one appearing on a “terrorist” list maintained by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Controls (“OFAC”).

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United States v. Cooley

Issues

Does a tribal police officer have authority to temporarily stop and search a non-Indian on public rights-of-way within tribal territories based on a potential violation of state or federal law?

This case asks the Supreme Court to rule on whether a tribal police officer has authority to temporarily stop and search a non-Indian on public rights-of-way within Indian jurisdiction based on a potential violation of state or federal law. Petitioner United States argues Indian tribes have broad sovereign authority to protect people and property within its borders, which includes the authority to temporarily stop and search non-Indians in Indian jurisdiction for potential state- or federal-law violations. Respondent Cooley counters that Indian tribes have no such authority because they do not have inherent sovereign authority to conduct this type of stop and search; in addition, neither Congress nor the courts have given tribal officers the authority to do so. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications raising concerns of the proper balance between public safety and individual rights on Indian jurisdiction. The case also implicates the scope of tribal sovereignty and the proper role of Congress and the courts in delineating the extent of tribal authority over non-Indians within tribal territory.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the lower courts erred in suppressing evidence on the theory that a police officer of an Indian tribe lacked authority to temporarily detain and search the respondent, Joshua James Cooley, a non-Indian, on a public right-of-way within a reservation based on a potential violation of state or federal law.

On the morning of February 26, 2016, Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe Police Department was driving on a section of U.S. Highway 212 within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana. United States v.

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Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid

Issues

Does an access regulation promulgated by the California Agricultural Relations Board constitute an unconstitutional governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment because it allows union organizers to speak to agricultural workers on their employer’s land at specified times during certain periods of the year?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a state access regulation that requires agricultural employers to allow union organizers to enter their property to speak with their employees during certain parts of the workday constitutes a governmental taking of the employer’s private property without just compensation. Cedar Point Nursery and Fowler Packing Company contend that allowing union organizers on their land is a per se regulatory taking because it is essentially the same as a permanent physical occupation of the employer’s land for a public purpose, and without compensation, this taking is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Victoria Hassid, the Chair of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board that promulgated the regulation at issue, argues that only narrow categories of regulations have been recognized as per se regulatory takings and that if the Court expanded the categories to include this access regulation, it would imperil many existing state and federal regulations. The outcome of this case has serious implications for agricultural workers’ access to information about labor unions, existing state and federal regulations that allow access to private property, and the rights enjoyed by private property owners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment.

In 1975, California passed the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA” or “Act”), which established the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“ALRB” or “Board”). Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma at 526. The ALRB found that there were few opportunities for unions to communicate with agricultural workers, which interfered with the workers’ right to organize.

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Caniglia v. Strom

Issues

Does the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement apply to searches of the home? 

This case asks the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home. The community caretaking exception allows for the warrantless seizure of evidence that police find while fulfilling their community caretaker role, which is unrelated to the “detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence” of criminal activity. Petitioner Edward Caniglia argues that this exception applies only to vehicular searches and seizures, given that the Fourth Amendment affords significantly greater protection to the home over automobiles. Respondents, including the City of Cranston, the police department, and city officials, counter that the community caretaking doctrine applies to the home based on the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis, which permits warrantless searches and seizures when community safety interests outweigh privacy interests. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between privacy concerns and public safety concerns. The outcome will also affect police incentives in exercising their role as community caretakers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home.

On August 20, 2015, Petitioner Edward A. Caniglia (“Caniglia”) was at home with his wife, Kim Caniglia (“Mrs. Caniglia”), at their residence in Cranston, Rhode Island. Caniglia v. Strom at 118–19.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

Issues

Do Arizona’s voting policies that impact minorities and limit otherwise legal in-person and early voting violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the scope of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), which provides relief against voting policies that result in discrimination against minority populations. The state of Arizona enacted two voting policies that limit the scope of both in-person and mail-in voting. Arizona’s laws allowed it to discard any ballots cast in the wrong precinct on Election Day and criminalized collecting ballots for mailing purposes. Petitioners Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich and the state of Arizona  (“Arizona”) argue that these policies are racially neutral and do not discriminate against Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous communities. Respondent Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) contends that these laws disproportionately impacted or—in the case of the prohibition on ballot collection—targeted minority communities, and therefore violated the VRA. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the extent of the protections granted by the VRA against discrimination as well as the validity of state laws seeking to address voter fraud.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy, which does not count provisional ballots cast in person on Election Day outside of the voter’s designated precinct, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and (2) whether Arizona’s ballot-collection law, which permits only certain persons (i.e., family and household members, caregivers, mail carriers and elections officials) to handle another person’s completed early ballot, violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the 15th Amendment.

The state of Arizona permits both in-person voting at designated voting centers or precincts, and “early voting,” in which voters can either mail in a ballot or drop off ballots at designated locations. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.

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