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The Speedy Trial Act requires that criminal defendants be brought to trial within 70 days of being charged, otherwise the accused is entitled to a mandatory dismissal of the charges. The Act also enumerates certain circumstances that allow the courts to delay the time of trial without need for dismissal. In this case, the Court of Appeals held that Jacob Zedner waived his right to speedy trial and caused much of the delay. Thus, even though the trial court’s reasons for delay did not exactly fall within the Speedy Trial Act’s list of exceptions, those reasons for delay were too negligible to justify dismissal. The Supreme Court must decide if the Second Circuit properly refused to dismiss on the basis of Zedner’s alleged waiver, or if that waiver and the Second Circuit’s holding are inconsistent with the language and purpose of the Speedy Trial Act. Hopefully, this case will provide a much-needed, uniform interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act, giving the federal courts a more predictable and consistent basis to judge this persistently troublesome right.

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In 2003, the Idaho state legislature passed the Voluntary Contributions Act, which prevents state political subdivisions from making payroll deductions for political activities. The Pocatello Education Association and other organizations challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that it impermissibly burdens free speech. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the state does not exercise sufficient control of local governments to allow it to regulate speech through its systems. It therefore found the statute unconstitutional. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a state exercises sufficient control over local governments to allow it to regulate speech through their systems. This decision will impact whether the Court evaluates state government regulations of local governments using strict scrutiny or a “reasonableness” standard of review.

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The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents two parties from re-litigating an issue of fact determined in a prior proceeding. In criminal law, this doctrine is incorporated into the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the government from prosecuting an individual twice for substantially the same crime. In 2004, the United States charged three senior executives of Enron Corporation with multiple counts of money laundering, securities fraud, wire fraud, and insider trading. At trial, the jury acquitted the defendants on several charges, but could not agree on a verdict for the rest. The United States then recharged the defendants with several of the crimes on which the jury in the previous trial failed to reach a verdict. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that collateral estoppel prevented the government from retrying them. The defendants based their motion on the fact that the jury acquitted the defendants on counts that shared common factual elements with the charges the jury failed to reach a verdict on. The district court denied the defendants’ motion, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision. In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States will decide whether, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the government may retry defendants acquitted of some charges on factually related counts on which the jury failed to reach a verdict on at a preceding trial. 

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In 2000, Diana Levine was treated with Phenergan to relieve nausea caused by a migraine headache.  The drug was incorrectly administered into Levine’s vein, causing gangrene that ultimately led to the amputation of part of her arm. Levine sued Wyeth, Phenergan’s manufacturer, in Vermont Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Vermont on claims of negligence and products liability, arguing that Phenergan’s label was inadequate in warning consumers about its possible risks. Wyeth, on the other hand, argued that federal law preempted Levine’s state law claims, as state law directly conflicted with the requirements of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. With both lower courts ruling in favor of Levine, this case gives the Supreme Court an opportunity to further define the federal preemption doctrine by clarifying whether a drug manufacturer can be liable under state law after complying with the labeling requirements of the Food and Drug Administration. Stakeholders on both sides argue that the outcome of this case will have a direct impact on the kind of information included on drug labels and as such, has serious implications for patient safety and public health.

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In 2000, California state prisoner Viet Mike Ngo was placed in administrative segregation for alleged misconduct. Following his release, he was prevented from taking part in certain programs deemed critical for parole eligibility. Ngo submitted a formal grievance that was time-barred by the Appeals Coordinator because it was not filed within the requisite 15 working days after the event. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners are prevented from filing suit until administrative remedies are exhausted. The District Court ruled that Ngo failed to exhaust his remedies under PLRA and was therefore precluded from seeking federal relief. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that Ngo exhausted all remedies as required by the PLRA. The Supreme Court will address whether an untimely administrative appeal satisfies this exhaustion requirement under PLRA.

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Petitioner Patrick Wood filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 25, 2008, in order to challenge his murder conviction. On appeal, the appellate court raised, sua sponte, a 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) statute of limitations defense that barred Wood’s claims. Wood argues that appellate courts lack authority to raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte, because an affirmative defense is forfeited if not raised, and because the government waived its statute of limitations defense at the district court level. In opposition, Kevin Milyard argues that appellate courts do have authority to raise a statute of limitations defense sua sponte, assuming the state did not intelligently waive the defense in the district court. In determining appellate court capacity to independently raise statute of limitations defenses, this decision will impact the finality of lower court decisions.

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In 1994, Petitioner Holly Wood was convicted of capital murder for sneaking into his ex-girlfriend’s bedroom and shooting her in the head with a shotgun. The judge imposed the death penalty, as recommended by the jury. Wood claims that, during sentencing, he did not receive effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. He argues that defense counsel failed to further investigate or present evidence of his mental disabilities. According to Wood, the state court’s rejection of this argument was an unreasonable application of federal law. He also argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard of review in habeas corpus proceedings abdicates the court’s judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The State of Alabama counters that the Eleventh Circuit properly deferred to the reasonable determinations of the state courts as required by the AEDPA. This decision will better define the appropriate level of deference due to state court factual determinations during federal habeas corpus proceedings.

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In 2012, Virginia’s congressional redistricting plan increased the Third Congressional District’s black voting-age population from 53.1 percent to 56.3 percent. The Supreme Court will consider whether the Virginia’s redistricting plan impermissibly relied on race in drawing congressional districts, and whether Republican congressmen have standing to appeal the lower court’s ruling, which struck down the original plan. The appellants in this case including Congressman Wittman contend that political considerations, not race, predominated the redistricting plan. They also argue that the Republican congressmen were injured because the redistricting plan affected their reelection chances. But several voters including Gloria Personhuballah argue that the Third District was drawn with race as the predominant factor. Personhuballah maintains that the Republican congressmen lack standing because they have not suffered any injury as a result of redistricting. This case could change who can challenge potentially discriminatory redistricting plans, and what constitutes racial gerrymandering. 

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Plaintiff Wisconsin Right to Life broadcasted three advertisements condemning the Senate for filibustering President Bush’s judicial nominees and urging viewers to contact Senator Feingold who was campaigning for reelection at the time. Wisconsin Right to Life believed that continued broadcasting of the ads would violate the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s prohibition on electioneering communications. Accordingly, Wisconsin Right to Life filed suit to request an injunction against the Federal Election Commission for possible enforcement of the restrictions on electioneering against Wisconsin Right to Life, and a judgment that the definition of electioneering, as applied to Wisconsin Right to Life’s ads, violated the Constitution. The court relied on a prior Supreme Court case, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, to dismiss Wisconsin Right to Life’s “as-applied” challenge. Wisconsin Right to Life now argues that McConnell did not, indeed could not, preclude as-applied challenges and that the ads were a permitted form of grassroots lobbying, not electioneering. The Federal Election Commission argues that McConnell squarely precluded as-applied challenges and that Wisconsin Right to Life’s distinction between grassroots lobbying and electioneering is a line drawn in the sand on a windy day.

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On March 22, 2007, the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") sued the United States Navy in the District Court for the Central District of California to enjoin the Navy from conducting training exercises off the coast of southern California. Specifically, the NRDC sought to prevent the Navy from using mid-frequency active ("MFA") sonar during these exercises because such use harmed whales and other marine mammals, in violation of several environmental laws. The District Court concluded in January 2008 that NRDC had proven that allowing the exercises to continue would cause near certain harm to the environment and issued a preliminary injunction. In response to the injunction, both the President and the Council for Environmental Quality ("CEQ") exempted the Navy from two environmental statutes, finding that emergency circumstances existed which allowed the training to continue. The District Court, however, found the exemptions were improper and upheld its preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Navy challenges this decision by arguing that courts below used too lax of a standard when deciding that a preliminary injunction was justified and that the judiciary improperly interfered with the executive branch’s authority to control the military. How the Supreme Court decides this case will not only reflect its view on balancing environmental protection and national security, but also clarify the roles each Federal branch has in these matters.

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