Issues

This case asks the Court to resolve whether the prudential bankruptcy doctrine of “insurance neutrality” may be applied to exclude an insurance company from Section 1109(b)’s “party in interest” requirement. The insurance neutrality doctrine prohibits an insurance company from challenging a bankruptcy plan as a “party in interest” when that plan does not increase its liability exposure from pre-bankruptcy levels. This case arises from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Hanson Permanente Cement, who negotiated a plan to settle claims with asbestos tort claimants either through the tort system or via application to a special trust. The companies’ liability insurer, Truck Insurance Exchange, objected on the grounds that only the trust application process––not the tort-claim alternative––required significant disclosures from claimants to prevent duplicate or frivolous claims. Truck Insurance Exchange contends that “party in interest” encompasses any person materially affected by the bankruptcy plan. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. and other co-respondents dispute that the fact that an insurer might have been better off under another plan constitutes an “interest” in the proceedings. The case has major implications for settlement of mass tort claims and fairness to creditors. The Court must balance interests in the speedy and consensual settlement of legitimate claims, a core function of bankruptcy proceedings, with the legitimate desire of creditors to prevent collusive suits between debtors and claimant parties.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a dispute between Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding apportionment of the Rio Grande’s waters without the consent of the United States. Petitioner Texas and Respondents New Mexico and Colorado do not take any exceptions to the Special Master’s Third Interim Report, which purports to resolve the dispute by imposing a water monitoring system through a consent decree. The United States argues that the proposed consent decree cannot be implemented without its consent, that the proposed decree should be rejected because it unlawfully imposes obligations on the United States, and because the consent decree would run counter to the Rio Grande Compact. The outcome of this case could have an impact on water management in the Southwestern United States and may also impact the relationship between states and the federal government.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits expert testimony about the mental states of a group that the defendant is a member of. Diaz was convicted of knowingly importing drugs into the United States after a government expert testified that “in most circumstances, the driver knows they are hired . . . to take the drugs from point A to point B.” Diaz argues that such testimony is impermissible under Rule 704(b) because it is functionally equivalent to stating an opinion that she had a certain mental state. The United States counters that the rule only restricts an expert from explicitly concluding or directly opining on whether a defendant had a certain mental state. The outcome of this case will affect how the government goes about proving its criminal cases, how effectively parties can rebut expert testimony, and how juries make decisions about mental states.

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This case addresses whether Texas House Bill 20, which prohibits social media platforms from censoring users’ expressions, violates the First Amendment. NetChoice, the petitioner, argues that social media platforms need not display all user-submitted content because they are not common carriers that may not selectively disseminate speech. NetChoice further contends that the bill is a content-based regulation of speech that interferes with social media platforms’ editorial discretion, without achieving any compelling state interest. Texas counters that social media platforms are common carriers that must host all users’ speech because they provide equal and open-access services to users. Texas also contends that the bill preserves social media platforms’ right to express their views on posted content, and neutrally applies to all user expressions irrespective of their content because it only permits removing content outside of First Amendment protection. This case will significantly impact social media corporations and state governments because it determines the extent of latitude big social media corporations have in implementing content mediation policy. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the First Amendment is violated when states impose content-moderation restrictions and require individualized explanations for social media companies to censure posts or users. Florida Attorney General Moody argues that the content-moderation laws only regulate content and not speech and that intermediate scrutiny applies. Moody also argues that social media companies are analogous to common carriers which are subject to regulations, and providing individualized explanations are not unduly burdensome to the well-funded social media companies. NetChoice counters that the content-moderation laws restrict editorial discretion, that its members are not common carriers, strict scrutiny applies to the content-moderation laws, and that the individual-explanation requirements are too burdensome. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the ability of social media companies to monitor posts on their platforms.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with the question of whether a federal district court can order a criminal forfeiture of property when it failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture in the time frame required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B). Petitioner Louis McIntosh argues that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s timing requirement is a mandatory claims processing rule. The United States, as respondent, argues that failure to enter the preliminary forfeiture order should not deprive a district court of its authority to order forfeiture at sentencing. The Court's decision in this matter will affect the ability of criminal defendants to suggest changes to forfeiture orders and prosecutors’ discretion in filing such orders.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a semi-automatic rifle equipped with a bump stock device is considered a “machinegun” under the National Firearms Act of 1934. A bump stock device is a rifle attachment that increases a semi-automatic rifle’s rate of fire. In 2018, in response to a mass shooting in Las Vegas, the government issued a new regulation interpreting the National Firearms Act, which prohibits machineguns, to also prohibit bump stock devices. Michael Cargill, who was forced to surrender several bump stock devices to the government, argues that a bump stock is not a machinegun, because a bump stock does not allow a semi-automatic rifle to fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger” or allow such a weapon to fire “automatically.” The government contends that a bump stock is a machinegun, and that legislative history and congressional intent support its interpretation of the statute. The outcome of this case has important ramifications on the risk of mass shootings and deaths in crowded areas, Second Amendment rights, and the ability of federal agencies to interpret federal statutes.

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Petitioner Coinbase seeks to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that a subsequent contract regarding the terms for a contest with the contest platform’s registered users limits the scope of the platform’s general user agreement on arbitration and how that scope is determined. The parties dispute whether original agreement’s text forecloses subsequent modification and whether the Federal Arbitration Act and California contract law govern that determination. The outcome of this case carries implications for contract predictability, the authority of arbitrators, and the power of the Federal Arbitration Act.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider to what extent nationally-chartered banks should be shielded from state banking regulations on mortgage escrow accounts. Alex Cantero argues that the Second Circuit’s standard for preemption based on control is improper, and that the Court must evaluate the actual impact the interest-on-escrow law has on bank operations. Bank of America maintains that the state law is preempted because it both impermissibly exerts control over bank operations and also significantly hinders national banks’ exercise of their federally-granted powers. This case has significant implications not only for mortgage escrow accounts but also for states’ capacity to regulate other practices and products of federally-chartered banks.

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This challenge to administrative action by numerous states, including Ohio (“Ohio et al.”) asks the Court to determine whether a stay of enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) default emissions regulations, named the “Good Neighbor Provision,” is appropriate, pending review of the legality of the EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Ohio et al. maintain that they are requesting a stay, which should be approved when considering the irreparable harm to state parties as a result of the implementation of the federal-default rule. Meanwhile, the EPA claims Ohio et al. are actually requesting an injunction, which should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Ohio et al. further argue that the agency’s disapproval of their state-level implementation plans was an “arbitrary and capricious” action because the EPA failed to consider that state courts would limit the applicability of the federal-implementation plan, leading to a less effective rule. The EPA counters that its consideration of the “reasonableness” of the plan was adequate at the time of its initial promulgation and that it was not required to consider subsequent legal action. The outcome of this case has significant implications regarding the transition to greener energy, specifically related to economic costs, and the success of environmental goals.

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