Carpenter v. Murphy

Issues

Do the reservation borders of the Creek Nation Indian Tribe drawn in Oklahoma in 1866 constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)?

After was Convicted of a murder that occurred on disputed tribal land, Patrick Murphy asks the Supreme Court to determine if the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation tribal land are still in effect today. If the boundaries are in effect, Murphy asserts that his murder conviction must be overturned because it was committed within the Creek Nation boundaries, meaning the Oklahoma state court that convicted him did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.  Oklahoma State Penitentiary Interim Warden Mark Carpenter counters that the Creek Nation reservation has been disestablished and is no longer in effect, arguing that Oklahoma state courts indeed had jurisdiction to prosecute Murphy for the murder. Carpenter contends that giving effect to the territorial boundaries would create taxation and regulatory problems, while Murphy counters that acknowledging the tribal land boundaries would lead to mutually profitable tax agreements and other community benefits such as increased job opportunities and more effective law enforcement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).

Respondent Patrick Dwayne Murphy is a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Indian tribe. Carpenter v. Murphy (“Carpenter”) at 7. In August 1999, Murphy murdered an acquaintance on disputed tribal land. Id. He was arrested and tried in Oklahoma state’s trial court.

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Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert

Issues

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)’s 14-day deadline to petition for permission to appeal is subject to equitable exceptions.

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether courts may apply equitable exceptions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)’s 14-day deadline to petition for permission to appeal. After the district court decertified the consumer class suing Nutraceutical and denied Lambert’s motion for reconsideration, Lambert filed a petition for permission to appeal under Rule 23(f) in June 2015. The Ninth Circuit held that the petition was proper because equitable exceptions applied. Nutraceutical now argues that the petition was not timely because it was filed well beyond the 14-day deadline and that equitable exceptions do not apply to Rule 23(f). Lambert contends that the petition was filed in a timely manner and that equitable exceptions make the petition proper even if the filing was not timely. This case will have implications for protecting unsophisticated litigants in class action suits as well as for judicial economy and resources.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred when it held that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules—such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which establishes a 14-day deadline to file a petition for permission to appeal an order granting or denying class-action certification—and can excuse a party’s failure to file timely within the deadline specified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), in conflict with the decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th and 11th Circuits.

Respondent Troy Lambert (“Lambert”) brought a consumer class action in federal district court against Petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation (“Nutraceutical”), alleging that their dietary supplement product was illegally misbranded and violated numerous provisions of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulation

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Nieves v. Bartlett

Issues

Can a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when there is probable cause for the arrest?

The Supreme Court will determine whether probable cause can function as a defense for police officers facing a retaliatory arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioners Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight (“Nieves”) contend that Supreme Court precedent requires plaintiffs to plead and prove the absence of probable cause in order to bring a retaliatory arrest claim. Additionally, Nieves argues that a probable cause requirement conforms with common law authority and accords with the First Amendment’s purposes and values. Respondent Russell Bartlett (“Bartlett”) counters that Supreme Court precedent and the common law actually do not support a probable cause requirement for retaliatory arrest claims.  Further, Bartlett asserts that the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself cannot support a probable cause requirement. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it asks the Court to balance a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech with the ability of police officers to make arrests without fear of a lawsuit.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Respondent Russell Bartlett attended Arctic Man 2014, an extreme ski event held in Alaska’s Hoodoo Mountains. Bartlett v. Nieves et al., 2016 WL 3702952 at *1 (D. Ala. 2016). The event brings people to Alaska for several days of partying. Id. During the last night of the event, Petitioners, Alaska State Troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight, were investigating a party for underage drinking.

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Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America

Issues

If a manufacturer has installed one of two seatbelt options permitted under federal motor vehicle safety standards, can a citizen sue the manufacturer in state court for damages resulting from failure to install the other restraint option, or is the claim preempted by the federal law?

 

Delbert Williamson sued Mazda Motor of America after his wife died in a car accident while she was riding in their Mazda MPV minivan. Williamson claimed that Mazda was liable under state tort law for installing lap-only seatbelts, as opposed to lap-and-shoulder seatbelts, in the rear aisle seat where his wife sat during the crash. Mazda argues that Williamson’s state law claim is preempted by a federal regulation granting manufacturers the choice between lap-only and lap-and-shoulder seatbelts in rear aisle seats. The California Court of Appeal sided with Mazda and held that federal vehicle safety regulations preempted Williamson’s claim because the regulations conflicted with his state law claim. Williamson, however, contends that the Court should allow his state claim because it does not conflict with federal regulations, but rather furthers federal objectives of vehicle safety. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address the extent of preemption of state law claims by on-point federal regulations and in turn affect manufacturer liability under state tort claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Where Congress has provided that compliance with a federal motor vehicle safety standard "does not exempt a person from liability at common law," 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e), does a federal minimum safety standard allowing vehicle manufacturers to install either lap-only or lap/shoulder seatbelts in certain seating positions impliedly preempt a state common-law claim alleging that the manufacturer should have installed a lap/shoulder belt in one of those seating positions?

On August 14, 2002 the Williamsons were driving in a 1993 Mazda MPV minivan through Utah. See Brief for Petitioners, Delbert Williamson, et al.

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· Bloomberg Businessweek, Greg Stohr: Mazda Passenger Seatbelt Suit Gets U.S. Supreme Court Review (May 24, 2010)

· Torts Prof Blog, Catherine Sharkey: The Politics of Preemption: NHTSA, State Tort Law & Automobile Safety (Oct. 4, 2010)

· University of Denver Law Review, Andrea Ahn: Wyeth v. Levine: Moving Away from the Geier Trend

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U.S., Ex Rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York

Issues

If the United States decides not to intervene when a party files a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, should the party be allowed a 60-day time limit to file its notice of appeal because the United States is technically a party, or should they be subject to the standard 30-day time limit?

 

Fifty-four days after the Southern District of New York dismissed Irwin Eisenstein's qui tam action against the City of New York, Eisenstein filed a notice of appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit asked the parties to brief whether the notice of appeal was timely filed. According to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, parties only have 30 days to file a notice of appeal, and this will be extended to 60 days when the United States is a party.  Eisenstein claimed that, even though the United States declined to intervene, it was a "real party of interest" and therefore he was entitled to the 60 day limit. The City of New York conceded that, while the United States was a "party of interest", they were not a party for the purpose of measuring the timeline on appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the relator in a qui tam action is entitled to the extended 60 day time limit for appeal when the United States chooses not to intervene in the action.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the 30-day time limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) for filing a notice of appeal, or the 60-day time limit in Rule 4(a)(1)(B), applies to a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, where the United States has declined to intervene in that action.

    Eisenstein's Underlying Complaint

    Irwin Eisenstein was an employee of the City of New York ("the City"), and during his employment he lived in both New Jersey and the City. See U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v.

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    U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co.

    Issues

    Under the Administrative Procedure Act, are jurisdictional determinations by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that property contains “waters of the United States” (as defined by the Clean Water Act) subject to immediate judicial review?

     

    Peat miner Hawkes Co., Inc. owns property in Minnesota that contains wetlands. Hawkes requested a jurisdictional determination (“JD”) from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) to determine if Hawkes could mine on new land. Under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), the Corps can issue JDs to inform landowners if their land contains “waters of the United States” and are thus subject to certain licensure requirements. The Corps surveyed the property and issued an affirmative JD. The Supreme Court will decide whether JDs are final agency actions subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). To appeal an administrative decision under the APA, the decision must be final and impose legal obligations. The Corps asserts that JDs are not final agency actions because they are merely informational, and argues there are other options for landowners to obtain judicial review. Hawkes argues that other methods of review are prohibitively costly, and that JDs practically impose legal obligations on landowners. The Court’s decision could affect how often agencies defend their actions in court.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that the property at issue contains “waters of the United States” protected by the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1362(7); see 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., constitute “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. 704, and is therefore subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.?

    Hawkes Co., Inc., is a mining company that excavates peat from wetland areas in Minnesota. Hawkes wanted to expand its operations to wetlands near its current operations. See Hawkes v. United States Army of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2015). After purchasing an option on the new property, Hawkes met with the U.S.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Jed Stiglitz, assistant professor of law and Jia Jonathan Zhu and Ruyin Ruby Ye Sesquicentennial Fellow, for his valuable insights about this case.

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    BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos

    Issues

    Are damages for lost wages in a personal injury suit brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act taxable as “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act?

    In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether time lost awards are taxable as “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act. BNSF Railway Company argues that such awards are taxable because they fall within the employer-employee relationship, especially when the Railroad Retirement Tax Act is read in conjunction with the Railroad Retirement Act. Michael Loos counters that the plain text of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act does not include time lost awards in its definition of “compensation” and that regardless, Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 104(a)(2) excludes personal injury awards from taxation. The outcome of this case will determine the contours of the definition of “compensation” in the Railroad Retirement Tax Act as well as the extent to which the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and the Railroad Retirement Act should be interpreted as a unified statutory scheme.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a railroad’s payment to an employee for time lost from work is subject to employment taxes under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act.

    Respondent Michael Loos (“Loos”) is a former employee of Petitioner, BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”). Loos v. BNSF Railway Company at 3. During his employment with BNSF, Loos incurred a number of attendance policy violations, some of which Loos attributed to “flare-ups” of a workplace injury. Id. at 4–6. Due to repeated attendance policy violations, BNSF terminated Loos’s employment on November 29, 2012. Id.

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    Bucklew v. Precythe

    Issues

    When an inmate with a rare and severe medical condition brings an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution, should the court assume that the execution will go as planned? And is the inmate constitutionally required to prove an alternative method of execution? Here, did Russell Bucklew meet his burden to prove the procedures of his proposed alternative method and the degree of pain he would likely suffer, and did he show how they compare to the method he challenges?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a death row inmate challenging an execution method must prove a feasible alternative execution method when the challenged method will allegedly inflict an unconstitutional level of pain as applied to the inmate’s medical condition. Russell Bucklew argues that the state should bear the burden of proving an alternative method in such an “as-applied” challenge. He reasons that because there is no risk that the challenged execution method will be outlawed in its entirety and because the state is in the best position to evaluate the effect of existing execution methods on the inmate’s medical condition, the Court should place the burden on the state. The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) argues that the inmate in an “as-applied” challenge case should bear this burden. The DOC notes that the inmate would be able to obtain an exemption from capital punishment and needlessly delay their execution by bringing meritless claims if the Court placed the burden on the state rather than on the inmate. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the ability of inmates to challenge execution methods, the administrability of common execution methods such as lethal injection, and the effect of the capital punishment process on drug regulators, physicians, and state corrections officers.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Whether a court evaluating an as-applied challenge to a state’s method of execution based on an inmate’s rare and severe medical condition should assume that medical personnel are competent to manage his condition and that the procedure will go as intended;
    2. Whether evidence comparing a state’s method of execution with an alternative proposed by an inmate must be offered via a single witness, or whether a court at summary judgment must look to the record as a whole to determine whether a factfinder could conclude that the two methods significantly differ in the risks they pose to the inmate;
    3. Whether the Eighth Amendment requires an inmate to prove an adequate alternative method of execution when raising an as-applied challenge to the state’s proposed method of execution based on his rare and severe medical condition; and
    4. Whether petitioner Russell Bucklew met his burden under Glossip v. Gross to prove what procedures would be used to administer his proposed alternative method of execution, the severity and duration of pain likely to be produced, and how they compare to the state’s method of execution.

    In March 1996, Russell Bucklew followed his former girlfriend, Stephanie Ray, to the trailer home of Michael Sanders, where she was living. Bucklew v. Precythe (“Precythe”) at 1–2. Bucklew entered the trailer and shot Sanders. Id. While Sanders bled to death, Bucklew handcuffed Ray, dragged her into his car, and drove away.

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    Republic of Sudan v. Harrison

    Issues

    Can a plaintiff suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act properly serve that foreign state by mailing the service package to the head of the foreign state’s ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can serve a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) by addressing the service of process package to the state’s foreign minister and sending it to the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States. The plaintiff, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”), maintains that, under the FSIA, plaintiffs must serve a foreign state by sending the service of process package to the foreign minister at the ministry of foreign affairs located in that foreign state’s capital. Sudan contends that Article 22 of the Vienna Convention supports this interpretation because it precludes service “via” or “through” a diplomatic mission. However, the respondents—a group of victims of an al-Qaeda attack including named party Rick Harrison (“Harrison”)—contend that, although the FSIA requires plaintiffs to address and send their service of process mail to a state’s foreign minister, it does not direct plaintiffs to send the package to a particular location. Harrison asserts that, because the FSIA’s text unambiguously allows service through an embassy, the Vienna Convention does not apply in this case. This case has large implications for foreign relations, especially as regards to terrorism. A decision for Harrison may better compensate victims of terrorist attacks and restrict state-sponsored terrorism, whereas a decision for Sudan may better protect the United States as a foreign litigant and aid the effective function of embassies.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Second Circuit erred by holding – in direct conflict with the D.C., Fifth, and Seventh Circuits and in the face of an amicus brief from the United States – that plaintiffs suing a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may serve the foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) by mail addressed and dispatched to the head of the foreign state’s ministry of foreign affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s diplomatic mission in the United States, despite U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to preserve mission inviolability.

    On October 12, 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was refueling in Aden, Yemen when it was bombed by members of al-Qaeda. Harrison v. Republic of Sudan (“Harrison II”), at 4. In 2010, the Respondents, Rick Harrison, other victims of the attack, and their families (“Harrison”) sued the Petitioner, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C.

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    Richard Culbertson v. Nancy Berryhill

    Issues

    Does 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) limit attorney’s fees to 25 percent for fees incurred in representing a claimant before a court and before the Social Security agency; or, does the 25-percent limit only apply to fees related to representation before the agency?

    This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how to calculate attorney’s fees for representation in court and before the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Richard Culbertson sought an attorney’s fee of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the Social Security claimants whom he represented in court. Culbertson contends that § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap applies only to his representation before a court. The Court of Appeals applied § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap to the sum of attorney’s fees under § 406(a) and § 406(b). Berryhill agrees with Culbertson’s position, while the Supreme Court-appointed amicus curiae supports the Court of Appeals. This case will impact Social Security claimants’ protections from overbilling and the financial incentives allowing claimants to access competent legal representation.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether fees subject to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap related to the representation of individuals claiming Social Security benefits include, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits hold, only fees for representation in court or, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 5th, and 11th Circuits hold, also fees for representation before the agency.

    This case consolidated four actions brought by Richard Culbertson, who represented claimants Katrina Wood, Celalettin Akarcay, Bill Westfall, and Darleen Schuster, each of whom was denied disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). Wood v.

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