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Following a transaction in which he exchanged illegally-obtained prescription drugs for a firearm, Petitioner Watson was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. In addition to sentences imposed under other federal statutes, Watson received a mandatory consecutive five year sentence, imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D). Watson pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the agreed-upon facts supported his conviction. The Fifth Circuit confirmed his conviction, finding that receiving a firearm constitutes "use" under the statute and under Supreme Court law set forth in Bailey v. United States, which defined "use" as "active employment" of the firearm. Watson argues that receiving a firearm is insufficient to constitute use, while the United States contends that both receiving and offering a firearm constitute "active employment" and therefore "use" under the statute. The Court's decision will set uniform standards of punishment throughout the country. A finding for Watson could reduce crowding in an already overburdened prison system, while a decision for the United States could reduce the strain on a similarly overburdened court system.

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Philip Morris removed a class action tobacco lawsuit from an Arkansas state court to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs Watson and Lawson sought to remand the case to state court, but their motion was denied. The Eighth Circuit held that Philip Morris was a corporation qualifying as a “person acting under a federal officer” and thus entitled to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The Supreme Court takes up the question of whether parties operating in an arena of heavy federal regulation qualify under this federal officer removal statute or, to the contrary, if the statute’s origins and history preclude such interpretation.

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A jury found that defendant Recuenco assaulted his wife using a “deadly weapon,” but the jury was never asked to find whether he used a “firearm.” Afterwards, the trial judge—independent of the jury—found that Recuenco used a “firearm” and increased his sentence by three years. Where the judge’s failure to instruct the jury about a “firearm” did not influence their verdict, may a reviewing court uphold the resulting sentence if it finds the erroneous instruction was harmless? Or must the court vacate the sentence because the error tainted the entire trial? The State of Washington argues that an incomplete jury instruction qualifies as a harmless error. To the contrary, Recuenco argues that the judge's imposition of an enhanced sentence based on facts not found by the jury violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

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The citizens of the State of Washington enacted a “top-two” primary law, Initiative 872, which allows primary voters to vote for any candidate regardless of party affiliation. The top-two candidates from the primary then advance to the general election. The law also permits candidates for some offices to disclose the name of their preferred political party on the ballot. The Republican Party argues that the law violates the right of association protected by the First Amendment. Washington State Grange argues that a candidate’s personal “preference” serves only as information for the voter, while the parties retain the right to nominate and endorse their own candidates. The Court must decide whether top-two primary systems that permit candidates to disclose their party preference on the ballot, without having any formal affiliation with the political party, violate political parties’ associational rights.

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Under Michigan law, individuals may bring personal injury suits against manufacturers of FDA-approved prescription drugs only if the plaintiffs can show that FDA approval depended on fraudulent submission or withholding of information. 27 Michigan residents sued Warner-Lambert Co., claiming personal injury arising from using Rezulin, Warner-Lambert's FDA-approved drug for diabetes treatment. Warner-Lambert argues that Michigan law is preempted by federal law because permitting state courts to second-guess the FDA's product-approval and fraud-detection processes interferes with the agency's essential functions and promotes regulatory uncertainty. The Michigan plaintiffs respond that federal preemption does not apply to traditional state tort claims. The decision in this case will clarify the scope of FDA autonomy in policing the drug-approval process and plaintiffs' freedom to assert state tort claims in areas regulated by federal entities.

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Andre Wallace was tried for and convicted of murder based on a confession obtained by Chicago detectives when he was fifteen years old. After several appeals, Wallace’s conviction was annulled by the Illinois Appellate Court, which held that Wallace was arrested without probable cause and that his unlawfully obtained confession could not be used to convict him of murder because it was not “sufficiently attenuated from his unlawful arrest.”  Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 422 (7th Cir. 2006). Left with no other substantial evidence to convict Wallace, the prosecution dropped all charges against him. Wallace then sued the City of Chicago as well as Detectives Kristen Kato and Eugene Roy, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the detectives and the City of Chicago summary judgment on all of Wallace’s claims for his failure to meet the two-year statute of limitation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and found that “false arrest claims accrue at the time of the arrest,” rather than at the time the claimant’s conviction is overturned, concluding that Wallace’s claim was barred. Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d at 423.  The Seventh Circuit majority and dissent indicate the existence of a conflict between circuit courts as to when the statute of limitations begins to run for damages claims resulting from false arrests.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will reflect its view on the correct balance between state interests, such as efficiency in the trial process, and the rights of individual defendants, such as having the opportunity to recover for damages arising from ? 1983 violations. Whether the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of arrest or at the time a conviction is overturned will influence when a claimant will be able to bring ? 1983 claims and may limit the availability of remedies for ? 1983 claims.

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In December 1993, Khalil Kholi was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Three years later, Kholi filed a motion to reduce his sentence, seeking discretionary leniency in state court. In 2007, Kholi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The federal district court denied Kholi's petition on the grounds that it was not timely filed under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA”). The First Circuit reversed, holding that a discretionary post-conviction motion to reduce a sentence constitutes collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and tolls AEDPA's one-year limitation period. Petitioner A.T. Wall appealed, arguing that a discretionary sentence-reduction motion does not constitute collateral review because it does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. Kholi counters that collateral review includes motions seeking equitable, discretionary relief, and argues that his motion seeking a discretionary reduction of an imposed sentence tolls AEDPA's statute of limitations. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the finality of state court judgments, as well as the state court remedies a prisoner can pursue before filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.

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Charles Martin is serving life imprisonment for the robbery and first-degree murder of Charles Stapleton. After exhausting his direct appeals, Martin filed a petition for habeas corpus in California state court, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The California Supreme Court eventually dismissed the petition under the state’s “timeliness” rule, which bars claims filed after “substantial delay.” Martin then filed a habeas corpus claim in federal court on similar grounds. The federal district court found that the state timeliness grounds were “adequate” for dismissal of the federal case. Under the adequate state grounds doctrine, a federal court will not review the decision of a state court if the federal court’s decision would have no impact on the case. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the state had failed to prove that California’s timeliness rule was sufficiently clear and consistently applied so as to be an adequate state bar. Martin argues that the Ninth Circuit was correct in its ruling, while Petitioner James Walker counters that the rule is indeed consistently applied. If the Supreme Court finds the rule adequate, this will likely increase denials of federal habeas corpus petitions; if the rule is not adequate, however, California may be required to use a more precise standard in determining what constitutes an untimely petition.

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Respondent Betty Dukes and other women have brought a Title VII employment discrimination case against Petitioner Wal-Mart Stores. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California certified a class action comprised of all women employed at any Wal-Mart store since December 26, 1998 who may have been or will be subjected to Wal-Mart’s allegedly discriminatory practices and policies. Wal-Mart appealed, challenging the class certification, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. Wal-Mart now appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that the class certification does not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Wal-Mart also claims that class certification was improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because the employees primarily seek monetary compensation in the form of back pay, and Rule 23(b)(2) does not authorize certification of claims seeking monetary relief. On the other hand, the employees assert that they meet the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) because all female employees face the same Wal-Mart policies and share the common issue of discriminatory treatment under those policies. The employees further argue that class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are not precluded from seeking monetary relief, and deny that back pay is a form of monetary compensation. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect the evidence required to bring an employment discrimination class action suit, the relief available to plaintiffs in a class action, and employers’ willingness to settle to avoid liability in class actions.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a manufacturer may be held liable under maritime law for injuries caused by third-party products that were added to the manufacturer’s product. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. argues that a manufacturer has no duty to warn against the asbestos-related dangers of third-party products. Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee, whose husbands died of asbestos-related illnesses, counter that imposing a duty to warn is reasonable because bare-metal manufacturers should reasonably foresee that their products will be used with asbestos-containing products. Because the injured parties were U.S. Navy sailors, this case also asks the Supreme Court to consider principles of maritime law. The outcome will determine the contours of recovery in the admiralty context.

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