Will v. Hallock

Issues

(1) When an individual's suit against the government, brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, is dismissed due to an exception to the government waiver of sovereign immunity, may a second suit on the same grounds be brought against government employees?

(2) Was the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the proper forum for an interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss the second suit against the government employees?

 

Under the Federal Tort Claims ACT ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. ? 1346(b), the federal government must waive its sovereign immunity from suit to allow private parties to sue the United States for torts committed by federal employees during the scope of their employment. The FTCA also has a judgment bar provision, 28 U.S.C. ? 2676, which prevents a plaintiff from suing multiple times on the same FTCA claim. This case originated when Respondent Susan Hallock brought a claim under the FTCA against the United States after the federal government improperly seized and damaged her property. Her suit was subsequently dismissed because the claim fell within one of the exceptions to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA. Petitioners Richard Will and his fellow Customs Services agents now argue that the dismissal of Susan Hallock's FTCA claim should bar Hallock from bringing the same claim under the FTCA against the federal employees involved in the seizure of her property. Ultimately, the Court must decide whether general res judicata principles should apply to bar Hallock's suit. The Court's decision may have large implications for The Court's decision may have large implications for judgment finality, and it may also have substantive implications for federal employees' amenability to suit under the FTCA.

As an initial matter, however, the Court must decide whether Will's interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit was premature because the district court litigation did not formally conclude. Consequently, the Court may not even address the issue of the judgment bar provision's applicability, and the significance of the Court's decision will rest solely on its analysis of the collateral order doctrine.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a final judgment in an action brought under 28 U.S.C. ? 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, dismissing the claim on the ground that relief is precluded by one of the FTCA's exceptions to liability, 28 U.S.C. ? 2680, bars a subsequent action by the claimant against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the FTCA claim?

(2) Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of the District Court's order denying a motion to dismiss under the FTCA's judgment bar, 28 U.S.C. ? 2676?

Plaintiff Susan Hallock and her husband Richard Hallock operated a computer software business out of their home in Mohawk, New York. See Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2004).

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Whorton v. Bockting

Issues

1. Does the new ruling in Crawford v. Washington, that a witness must have been cross–examined in order for their hearsay testimony to be admitted as evidence, “significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures” and “implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial,” allowing it to apply retroactively?

2. Does 28 U.S.C. § 2254 incorporate the analysis from Teague v. Lane to allow federal courts to review cases decided correctly under then-current law, but rendered incorrect by subsequent Supreme Court decisions?

 

Marvin Bockting, a criminal defendant, was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison by a Nevada Court. He challenges the constitutionality of the court’s admitting hearsay testimony of his victim without opportunity for cross-examination. While no such requirement was in place at the time of his conviction, the Supreme Court has since decided that such cross-examination is necessary for the admission of hearsay testimony. The Supreme Court is now asked to determine whether this new rule must be retroactively applied. This case will represent another data point in the set defining the scope of retroactivity of criminal procedure rules. Moreover, it will clarify federal courts’ powers to hear cases on writs of habeas corpus when the issue at hand is the retroactive application of a criminal procedure rule.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether, in direct conflict with the published opinions of the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) regarding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay evidence under the Sixth Amendment, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Crawford applies retroactively to cases on collateral review violates this court's ruling in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

3. Whether, in direct conflict with the published decisions of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) (1) and (2) adopted the Teague exceptions for private conduct which is beyond criminal proscription and watershed rules.

Autumn, a six year old girl, lived with her mother, Laura, and step-father, Marvin Bockting, in a one room motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1013 (2005). One evening Autumn awoke upset.

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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt

Issues

Can a state enforce laws that significantly reduce the availability of abortion services while failing to advance any valid interest, including the state’s interest in promoting health?

 

In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”), which imposed new requirements on abortion clinics. For example, H.B. 2 required a physician performing an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the abortion clinic. Whole Woman’s Health, a private abortion clinic, sued the state of Texas to lift the new restrictions. The Supreme Court will determine whether a state can enforce laws that significantly reduce the availability of abortion services while failing to advance any valid interest, including the state’s interest in promoting health. Whole Woman’s Health argues that H.B. 2 imposes an undue burden on women’s access to abortions. Hellerstedt contends that H.B. 2’s justification of improving patient health is supported by substantial evidence, and H.B. 2 will not impose a burden in the majority of cases. This case implicates H.B. 2’s effect on women’s health and H.B. 2’s imposed costs on women seeking abortions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1a. When applying the Due Process Clause standard associated with the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey decision, does a court err by refusing to consider whether and to what extent laws that restrict abortion for the stated purpose of promoting health actually serve the government’s interest in promoting health?



1b. Did the Fifth Circuit err in concluding that this standard permits Texas to enforce, in nearly all circumstances, laws that would cause a significant reduction in the availability of abortion services while failing to advance the State’s interest in promoting health—or any other valid interest?

2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that res judicata provides a basis for reversing the district court’s judgment in part?

In 2013, Texas passed House Bill Two (“H.B. 2”), which places specific requirements on abortion clinics. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015) at 576. The Texas Legislature stated that it enacted H.B.

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Whitman v. Department of Transportation

Issues

Does the Civil Service Reform Act, which provides that that procedures established by collective bargaining agreements for redressing employment grievances serve as the "exclusive administrative procedures" available, preclude Federal employees from bringing actions in Federal court to redress grievances, even if the employee seeks equitable relief, such as an injunction against future drug tests, for claims that an employer violated an employee's constitutional rights?

 

Terry Whitman served as an air traffic controller with the Federal Aviation Administration for twenty years. Under FAA and Department of Transportation rules, Whitman and all other air traffic controllers were subject to random drug tests due to the "safety-sensitive functions" of their employment. From 1996 to 2002, Whitman was repeatedly subjected to such tests, even though the results were negative each time. He learned over the course of the years that he was required to take many more tests than his coworkers. Whitman felt that his employers were violating his constitutional right to privacy by using non-random searches, and Whitman wanted them to be stopped. He brought a suit in the Federal district court in Alaska seeking an injunction against further testing. The court dismissed his complaint, however, stating that under the Civil Service Reform Act, the Federal court had no power over his action, and that he had to use the proper administrative procedures under the Civil Service Reform Act to obtain the remedy he desired. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Now the Supreme Court must decide whether under the Civil Service Reform Act, Federal courts are precluded from hearing grievances for which the Act has already provided an administrative grievance procedure.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1.? Whether 5 U.S.C. ? 7121(a)'s provision that the negotiated grievance procedures of a federal collective bargaining agreement be "the exclusive administrative procedures" to resolve grievances precludes an employee from seeking direct judicial redress when he would otherwise have an independent basis for judicial review of his claims.

2.? Whether the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. ? 7101 et seq., precludes federal courts from granting equitable relief for constitutional claims brought by federal employees against their employer.

Petitioner Terry Whitman ("Whitman") was employed as an air traffic controller at the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA") Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center. Brief of the Petitioner at 8-9.

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Weyhrauch v. United States

Issues

Whether the government must first prove that a defendant violated a disclosure duty under state law before it can convict that state official of non-disclosure of material information in violation of the federal mail-fraud statute under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346.

 

Petitioner, Bruce Weyhrauch ("Weyhrauch"), a member of the Alaska House of Representatives, was charged with honest services mail fraud for intending to devise a scheme to deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to his honest services in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Respondent, the United States of America ("United States"), asserts that Weyhrauch should have disclosed his attempts to procure future employment from VECO, an oil company, before voting for legislation that would benefit the company. Weyhrauch claims that he cannot be convicted of honest services fraud because Alaska only requires the disclosure of actual conflicts of interest, not possible ones. The United States believes a violation of § 1346 does not require a concurrent violation of state law in order to convict Weyhrauch of honest services fraud. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether § 1346 mandates the creation of a federal common law extending the federal government’s authority over criminal matters usually handled by the states. The Court’s decision will also settle a circuit split and decide what type of conduct constitutes honest services fraud.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, to convict a state official for depriving the public of its right to the defendant's honest services through the non-disclosure of material information, in violation of the mail-fraud statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346), the government must prove that the defendant violated a disclosure duty imposed by state law.

Petitioner Bruce Weyhrauch (“Weyhrauch”) is a former member of the Alaska House of Representatives. See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008).

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· The New York Times – A Question of When Dishonesty Becomes Criminal

· Washington Legal Foundation - Honest Services Statute: When Federal Righteousness Goes Off The Rails

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Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.

Issues

Whether a business can be held to violate antitrust laws if it is shown that the business purchases too many or pays too much for materials in order to keep competitors from purchasing those materials at a fair price, or whether another standard should apply, such as the standard in Brooke Group, which requires showing that the business sustained a loss as a result of its action but was likely to make the money back once it had a monopoly.

 

Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., a sawmill, went out of business when Weyerhaeuser, a giant in the forest industry, used its market share to drive up the price of sawlogs. The issue is in this case is whether the jury used the proper standard to find that Weyerhaeuser had violated the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act. Weyerhaeuser argues that the Brooke Group standard should have applied, whereby a plaintiff must show that the defendant: (1) paid so much for raw materials that the price at which it sold its products did not cover its costs; and (2) had a “dangerous probability” of subsequently recouping those losses. Ross-Simmons advocates for the looser standard applied by the Ninth Circuit, whereby liability may be established by showing that the defendant purchased more raw materials “than it needed” or paid a higher price for those inputs “than necessary” so as to prevent competitors buying the materials at a “fair price.” The Court’s decision could result in a dramatic shift in either of two directions: it could either shield large corporations from suits related to the corporation’s influence on the market, or give small businesses a powerful weapon to wield against the pressures that a large corporation can exert.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), the Court held that an antitrust plaintiff alleging predatory selling must prove that the defendant (I) sold its product at a price level too low to cover its costs and (2) had a dangerous probability of recouping its losses once the scheme of predation succeeded.

The question in this case is whether a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing may, as the Ninth Circuit held, establish liability by persuading a jury that the defendant purchased more inputs "than it needed" or paid a higher price for those inputs "than necessary," so as "to prevent the Plaintiffs from obtaining the [inputs] they needed at a fair price"; or whether the plaintiff instead must satisfy what the Ninth Circuit termed the "higher" Brooke Group standard by showing that the defendant (I) paid so much for raw materials that the price at which it sold its products did not [cover] its costs and (2) had a dangerous probability of recouping its losses.

From a bird’s eye view, a patchwork of green and hazy brown shapes weaves together much of the Pacific Northwest, especially the area surrounding the Columbia River, which serves as the border between Oregon and Washington. The logging industry has been active in the area for over a century, leaving that trademark quilt pattern as tracts of forest are harvested.

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Welch v. United States

Issues

Should the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), apply retroactively, such that a person sentenced under the now unconstitutional residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act could have her sentence vacated or remanded?

 

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), should apply retroactively. If so, the Court may decide whether the sudden snatching of a purse constitutes a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Gregory Welch was sentenced to a mandatory minimum fifteen years of prison under the ACCA, because he had three previous violent felony convictions. Subsequently, Welch challenged his sentence, arguing that one of the predicate convictions, Florida-law strong-arm robbery, was not a violent felony. Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, relying on the so-called “residual clause” of the ACCA. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Welch contends that Johnson struck down the residual clause as unconstitutional. Welch and the United States both argue that Johnson should be applied retroactively. Further, Welch argues that because Johnson should be applied retroactively and his conviction was based solely on the portion of the ACCA that was deemed unconstitutional, his conviction should be vacated. But the United States argues that the case should be remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether a sudden snatching of a purse constitutes a violent felony under the constitutionally valid “elements prong” of the ACCA. The Court’s decision could increase ACCA-related litigation and decrease the length of some defendants’ sentences.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Was the District Court in error when it denied relief on Petitioner’s § 2255 motion to vacate, which alleged that a prior Florida conviction for “sudden snatching” did not qualify for ACCA enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)?
  2. Did Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), announce a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review?

Police believed that the suspect of an armed robbery was at petitioner Gregory Welch’s apartment. See United States v. Welch, 683 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir.

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Watters v. Wachovia Bank

Issues

1. Are State-chartered subsidiaries of national banks exempt from State regulation because of their relationship with a national bank?

2. Does equating a State-chartered subsidiary of a national bank to a national bank constitute conversion of a State corporation into a Federal corporation in violation of the Tenth Amendment?

 

Michigan has attempted to regulate State-charted nonbank subsidiaries of national banks. National banks are governed by the National Bank Act and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Through §484(a) of the National Bank Act, national banks are not subject to State regulation. Through 12 C.F.R. 7.4006, the OCC expanded the reach of §484 to cover subsidiaries of national banks as well. Wachovia Mortgage, a State-chartered nonbank subsidiary of Wachovia Bank, a national bank, operates in Michigan. Michigan seeks to exercise regulatory power over the entity. Both courts below held that the OCC’s expansion of §484 was valid and that Michigan could not exercise regulatory power over the subsidiary, Wachovia Mortgage. The decision of the Supreme Court in this case will affect the balance of power between State and Federal regulatory and consumer protection measures.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) of the National Bank Act limits visitorial powers over "national banks" except as authorized by federal law. National banks are defined and created under the National Bank Act. State-chartered nonbank operating subsidiaries of national banks are created under State corporate law. The Comptroller of the Currency, by Rule 12 CFR 7.4006, made 12 USC § 484(a) equally applicable to State-chartered nonbank "operating subsidiaries" of national banks. Is the interpretation of the Comptroller of the Currency that 12 CFR 7.4006 preempts Michigan's laws regulating mortgage lending as applied to State chartered nonbank operating subsidiaries, entitled to judicial deference under Chevron USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837 (1984)?

2. A national bank has been declared to be a national corporation in Guthrie v Harkness, 199 US 148, 159 (1905). 12 CFR 7.4006 treats a State-chartered nonbank operating subsidiary of a national bank as equivalent to a national bank and, thus, as a national corporation. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated to the extent a statute permits the conversion of State corporations into federal ones in contravention of the laws of the place of their creation. Hopkins v Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Cleary, 296 US 315, 335 (1935). Does 12 CFR 7.4006, by equating a State-chartered nonbank operating subsidiary with a national bank for purposes of federal preemption of State regulation, violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

Wachovia Bank is a national bank chartered under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21. Wachovia Mortgage is a "State-chartered nonbank, operating subsidiary of Wachovia Bank." Watters v. Wachovia, 431 F.3d 556, 558 (6th. Cir. 2005); Brief for the Petitioner at 7.

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Law about... Banking

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Watson v. United States

Issues

Federal law imposes a mandatory five year sentence for the "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, but the meaning of "use" is unclear: does a defendant "use" a firearm when he furnishes drugs to an undercover government agent in exchange for an unloaded firearm?

 

Following a transaction in which he exchanged illegally-obtained prescription drugs for a firearm, Petitioner Watson was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. In addition to sentences imposed under other federal statutes, Watson received a mandatory consecutive five year sentence, imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D). Watson pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the agreed-upon facts supported his conviction. The Fifth Circuit confirmed his conviction, finding that receiving a firearm constitutes "use" under the statute and under Supreme Court law set forth in Bailey v. United States, which defined "use" as "active employment" of the firearm. Watson argues that receiving a firearm is insufficient to constitute use, while the United States contends that both receiving and offering a firearm constitute "active employment" and therefore "use" under the statute. The Court's decision will set uniform standards of punishment throughout the country. A finding for Watson could reduce crowding in an already overburdened prison system, while a decision for the United States could reduce the strain on a similarly overburdened court system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether mere receipt of an unloaded firearm as payment for drugs constitutes "use" of the firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and this Court's decision in Bailey.

On November 12, 2004, Michael A.

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Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

Issues

Where no other reason exists for a federal court to have jurisdiction in a case, is a defendant corporation entitled to have the case heard in federal court because that corporation should be considered a “person acting under a federal officer” where the conduct in question occurred in a field which is heavily regulated by the federal government?

 

Philip Morris removed a class action tobacco lawsuit from an Arkansas state court to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs Watson and Lawson sought to remand the case to state court, but their motion was denied. The Eighth Circuit held that Philip Morris was a corporation qualifying as a “person acting under a federal officer” and thus entitled to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The Supreme Court takes up the question of whether parties operating in an arena of heavy federal regulation qualify under this federal officer removal statute or, to the contrary, if the statute’s origins and history preclude such interpretation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a private actor doing no more than complying with federal regulation is a “person acting under a federal officer” for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), entitling the actor to remove to federal court a civil action brought in state court under state law.

Lisa Watson and Loretta Lawson are smokers who purchased “light” cigarettes from tobacco company Philip Morris. Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 2003 WL 23272484 *1 (E.D. Ark 2003) (not reported in F. Supp.2d). Watson and Lawson, and the class of individuals they represent, have sued the Philip Morris company for false advertising with regard to these purchased cigarettes, specifically, the Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights brands. Id.

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