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Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick

Issues

Whether the registration requirement contained in § 411(a) of the Copyright Act is jurisdictional, denying district courts jurisdiction over claims arising from the infringement of unregistered copyrights.

 

Freelance writers, led by Letty Cotton Pogrebin, brought a class action lawsuit against publishers, led by Reed Elsevier, Inc., for copyright infringement, claiming that the publishers electronically reproduced their works without authorization. The majority of the claims in the class related to alleged infringements of unregistered copyrights. With the approval of the District Court, the parties settled the lawsuit. The Second Circuit held, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class or to approve a settlement with respect to claims arising from unregistered copyrights. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 411(a) will determine whether claims relating to unregistered copyrights can be settled in class actions along with claims arising from registered work. An affirmation of the Second Circuit’s opinion may make settlements more difficult.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts over copyright infringement actions?

Petitioners, Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al. (“Reed Elsevier”), are publishers of electronic content, such as the New York Times Co. and archival database operators, such LexisNexisSee Brief for Petitioners, Reed Elsevier Inc., et al.

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·      Civil Procedure and Federal Courts Blog, Law Professor Blogs Network: Case of Interest--Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick

·      NY Times: Supreme Court to Revisit a Case on Breach of Copyright

·      Wired: Supreme Court to Hear Freelance Writers' Settlement

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Ransom v. MBNA America Bank, N.A.

Issues

Whether an above-median debtor may claim a vehicle ownership cost deduction for vehicles the debtor owns outright.

 

This case reflects a lack of certainty in the bankruptcy code regarding the proper treatment of the vehicle ownership deduction when calculating an above-median Chapter 13 debtor’s disposable income. Courts are split on whether the deduction can be taken where the debtor owns a vehicle in full and is not responsible for monthly payments on the vehicle. Jason Ransom filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 and claimed a vehicle ownership deduction based on his ownership of an automobile that he owned free and clear. The Ninth Circuit found that the vehicle ownership deduction was not permitted if there was no existing obligation on the vehicle. Ransom argues that the court misinterpreted the statute and failed to recognize that a plain reading of the statute supports the deduction. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the availability of the vehicle ownership deduction to Chapter 13 debtors who own their vehicles outright.​

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, in calculating the debtor's "projected disposable income" during the plan period, the bankruptcy court may allow an ownership cost deduction for vehicles only if the debtor is actually making payments on the vehicles.

Jason Ransom ("Ransom") is a single man living in Nevada. See Ransom v. MBNA, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir.

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· Bankruptcy Case Blog, Tracy Keeton: A Fork in the Road: Courts Split on Transportation Ownership Deductions (Apr. 6, 2010)

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RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank

Issues

Whether a bankrupt debtor under a Chapter 11 plan can sell collateral assets free and clear of liens and at the same time prohibit a secured creditor from using its credit to bid on the assets.

 

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and related entities obtained a secured $142 million loan in 2007 to construct the Radisson Hotel at Los Angeles International Airport. Substantially all of RadLAX’s assets were designated as collateral for this loan. However, still saddled with $120 million of debt, RadLAX filed for bankruptcy in August 2009. RadLAX proposed a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that called for an auction sale of all its assets, free and clear of liens. The plan prohibited secured lenders from credit bidding, i.e. using their loan amounts to offset the asset prices at the auction. Amalgamated Bank, representing the lender, objected to the plan, arguing that the plan violatedSection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court agreed and rejected RadLAX’s plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case may affect the balance of power between debtors and secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a debtor may pursue a Chapter 11 plan that proposes to sell assets free of liens without allowing the secured creditor to credit bid, but instead providing it with the indubitable equivalent of its claim under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.

This case involves the interpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”). See 11 U.S.C.

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Bloomberg Businessweek: RadLax, Madoff, AMR, MF Global, Hostess, Ambac: Bankruptcy (Mar. 15, 2012)

HotelNewsNow.com: Hotel Credit Bidding Draws Supreme Court’s Eye (Dec. 22, 2011)

New York Times DealBook: High Court Spotlight on Right to ‘Credit Bid’ (Dec. 14, 2011)

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Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.

 

In the latest Supreme Court case on patent law, LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE) sued Quanta Computers, Inc. (Quanta) for patent infringement. A patent license agreement between LGE and Intel allowed Intel to use LGE's patents but required Intel to notify its customers, including Quanta, that its license did not extend to third-party purchasers' combinations of Intel and non-Intel components. LGE alleges that Quanta infringed LGE's patents by combining Intel and non-Intel components. LGE argued that Intel's sale to Quanta did not exhaust LGE's rights as a patent holder, allowing LGE to sue Quanta. Quanta, however, argued that Intel's authorized sale to Quanta exhausted LGE's patent rights. The Federal Circuit agreed with LGE, holding that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply because the notice provided by Intel to Quanta created a conditional sale, and that sales of patented devices do not exhaust a patent holder's methods claims. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether a patent holder can sue customers who use patented components purchased from licensees. The outcome of this case will clarify the exhaustion doctrine generally and will help define the scope of patent holders' rights, including their ability to collect royalties from and sue downstream users of their patents.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding, in conflict with decisions of this Court and other courts of appeals, that respondent's patent rights were not exhausted by its license agreement with Intel Corporation, and Intel's subsequent sale of product under the license to petitioners.

LG Electronics, Inc. (LGE), a Korean company, owns patents that relate to personal computers. See LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.

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Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services

Issues

Whether Powerex Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation that is wholly owned by the government of Canada, is an “organ” of Canada and, thus, entitled to the benefits of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), including the right to remove suits brought against them in state court to federal court. Also, whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand order, despite the fact that 28 USC §1447(d) prohibits appellate review of an order remanding a case to the state court from which it is removed.

 

Alleging illegal manipulation of the electricity market, the State of California and individual energy customers (collectively, “California energy customers”), brought suit in California state court against Powerex Corp., a Canadian corporation that is wholly owned by a corporation that is—in turn—wholly owned by the Canadian government. Powerex removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) which gives “organs” of foreign states the right to remove suits brought against them in state court to federal court. The District Court concluded that Powerex did not qualify as an “organ” of a foreign state under FSIA and remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s determination that Powerex is not an “organ” of a foreign state and thus not entitled to the benefits of the FSIA. In this case, the Supreme Court will likely provide a new test for determining what constitutes an “organ” of a foreign state under the FSIA. The Supreme Court will also decide the threshold question of whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether an entity that is wholly and beneficially owned by a foreign state’s instrumentality, and whose sole purpose is to perform international treaty and trade agreement obligations for the benefit of the foreign state’s citizens, may nonetheless be denied status as an “organ of a foreign state” under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976(FSIA), 28 USC § 1603(b)(2), based on an analysis of sovereignty that ignores the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation, conduct, and operations on behalf of its government.
  2. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the District Court’s remand order, notwithstanding 28 USC §1447(d).

The Petitioner, Powerex Corp. (“Powerex”), is a Canadian corporation wholly owned by BC Hydro, a Canadian corporation that is wholly owned by the Canadian governmentAmicus Curiae Brief for the United States at 2.

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Pottawattamie County, IA v. McGhee

Issues

Can a prosecutor who knowingly procures false testimony and introduces such testimony at trial be subject to a §1983 civil suit?

 

In 2005, Curtis W. McGhee and Terry J. Harrington, both convicted of murder in 1978, sued Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and former county attorneys Joseph Hrvol and David Richter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the Pottawattamie prosecutors coerced false testimony from third party witnesses and then introduced that testimony in their murder trials. The prosecutors argued that they were immune from the lawsuit based on the doctrine of absolute immunity, but both the district court and the Eighth Circuit disagreed. The Supreme Court’s decision will reveal the extent to which prosecutors are immune from liability for their pre-trial misconduct. This clarification may affect the way prosecutors try cases, and will, undoubtedly, influence the degree to which defendants can hold their prosecutors accountable for due process violations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a prosecutor may be subjected to a civil trial and potential damages for a wrongful conviction and incarceration where the prosecutor allegedly (1) violated a criminal defendant's "substantive due process" rights by procuring false testimony during the criminal investigation, and then (2) introduced that same testimony against the criminal defendant at trial.

In 1978, Petitioners Joseph Hrvol and David Richter obtained convictions and life sentences against Respondents Curtis McGhee and Terry Harrington for the murder of retired police captain John Schweer in Council Bluffs, Iowa the previous year. See McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008).

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Polar Tankers, Inc. v. Valdez, Alaska

Issues

Whether a city's property tax only on large vessels using the city's ports violates the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution, and whether a state's inclusion of certain out-of-state activities in its calculations of percentage value violates the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.

Court below

 

In 1999, the city of Valdez imposed a tax on vessels using its harbors. This case concerns the constitutionality of that tax and the apportionment methodology used to assess the tax. Petitioner Polar Tankers claims that the tax is a tonnage duty prohibited by the Constitution's Tonnage Clause. Polar Tankers argues that the apportionment methodology utilized by Respondent Valdez distorts a vessel's value, and that the effect of the distortion is to allow Valdez to make revenue that is grossly disproportionate to the amount of time a vessel actually spends using Valdez' ports. Furthermore, Polar Tankers argues that Valdez' apportionment scheme creates a risk of double taxation for vessels. Valdez, however, claims that the tax is nothing more than an ad valorem property tax. Valdez argues that the Tonnage Clause does not apply to ad valoremtaxes, and that its apportionment scheme is based on a vessel's productive activity in Valdez. Lastly, in response to the charge of creating a risk of double taxation for vessels, Valdez states that domicile states do not have exclusive authority to tax vessels for time spent on the high seas. Thus, the outcome of this case will affect taxation as it relates to interstate commerce.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether a municipal personal property tax that falls exclusively on large vessels using the municipality's harbor violates the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution, art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

2. Whether a municipal personal property tax that is apportioned to reach the value of property with an out-of-State domicile for periods when the property is on the high seas or otherwise outside the taxing jurisdiction of any State violates the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.

Situated on the terminus of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, Respondent the City of Valdez ("Valdez") serves as a crucial link in the transportation of crude oil from Alaskan oil fields to refineries. See City of Valdez v.

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Puerto Rico v. Valle

Issues

Does the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibit Puerto Rico from prosecuting defendants for the same crime they were convicted of in federal court?

 

Two defendants were charged in Puerto Rico court and federal court on the same set of facts and for largely the same crimes. See Luis M. Sanchez Valle v. The People of Puerto Rico, 2015 WL 1317010 (P.R. 2015), at 2a, 4a (pincited to linked document). Each defendant was convicted and sentenced in federal court first, and then moved to dismiss the pending state charges. The defendants argued that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited Puerto Rico from prosecuting them for the same crimes they were convicted of in federal court. See id. at 2a–5a. The trial courts granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals reversed. Relying on the dual sovereignty doctrine, the court held that Puerto Rico, an independent sovereign, could charge the defendants for crimes under the Puerto Rico Constitution. See id. However, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court reversed, deciding that Puerto Rico had no sovereign status, derived its power to prosecute from the U.S. Constitution, and thereby could not charge the defendants for the same crime. The Supreme Court will decide whether the Puerto Rico Supreme Court was right. See Brief for Petitioner, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico at i. Puerto Rico argues that the island is a sovereign state, and that under the dual sovereignty doctrine, there are no double jeopardy concerns. See id. at 19, 22. However, Valle contends that the Puerto Rico has no sovereign statusSee Brief of Respondents, Luis M. Sánchez Valle and Jaime Gómez Vásquez at 3. The Court’s decision will affect the balance of the federal system and the dignity of the people of Puerto Rico. See id. at 61.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Are the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Federal Government separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution?

On September 28, 2008, Luis M. Sanchez del Valle was charged with violating the Puerto Rico Weapons Act by selling ammunition and a firearm without a permit and illegally carrying a firearm. See Luis M. Sanchez Valle v. The People of Puerto Rico, 2015 WL 1317010 (P.R. 2015), at 2a (pincited to linked document). The charges were brought in Puerto Rico state court, the Court of First Instance.

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Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust

Issues

Does Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code prohibit Puerto Rico from providing distressed municipalities with debt restricting mechanisms?

 

Many of Puerto Rico’s municipalities are in financial crisis, and public utility companies are facing insolvency. In this consolidated case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto Rican laws permitting distressed municipalities to restructure their debt. Puerto Rico and its Government Development Bank assert that Puerto Rico is not prevented from passing local bankruptcy laws because Congress has not directly addressed territorial law in this area. But public utility creditors Franklin California Tax-Free Trust and BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC, argue that Congress preempted any state or territorial municipal bankruptcy legislation in an effort to ensure a uniform federal bankruptcy standard. The Court’s ruling will impact Puerto Rican municipalities’ ability to provide essential services to their residents, and the rights of creditors to collect on their debt. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, which does not apply to Puerto Rico, nonetheless preempt a Puerto Rico statute creating a mechanism for Puerto Rico’s public utilities to restructure their debts?

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is facing a severe financial crisis, and several public utility companies are on the verge of insolvency. See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 324 (1st Cir.

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Puckett v. United States

Issues

The right to have an error corrected by a Federal appellate court can depend on the nature of the error, specifically the underlying rights that were affected by the error. This case will answer the question of whether or not a discretionary standard, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, should apply to errors involving a plea agreement breach by a prosecutor that was not objected to by the defendant’s counsel when it was made.

 

James Puckett was charged in Federal District Court with armed bank robbery and use of a firearm during the commission of the crime. Puckett agreed to plead guilty to both charges partially in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to recommend a sentencing reduction to the judge based on Puckett’s acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. After the plea agreement but before the sentencing, Puckett engaged in acts to defraud the United States Postal Service, and the prosecutor refused to recommend the sentencing reduction. Puckett’s counsel did not formally object to the prosecutor’s refusal to file the recommendation, thus creating a “forfeited” error. Consequently, when the court sentenced Puckett, he received no reduction in his sentence. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Puckett requested that the case be remanded and that he be allowed to revoke his guilty plea. The Fifth Circuit denied Puckett’s request and upheld the sentence, finding that Puckett had not met his burden under Rule 52(b). Under Rule 52(b), the party challenging the error must prove that the error was significant enough to warrant reversal even though the party forfeited his right to have the court consider the error by not objecting when it occurred. Puckett sought review by the Supreme Court and his writ of certiorari was granted on October 1, 2008.​

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a forfeited claim that the government breached a plea agreement is subject to the plain error standard of Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In July 2002, petitioner James Benjamin Puckett was charged in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. See U.S. v. Puckett, 505 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir.

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