Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams

Issues

  1. Among the three guideposts that courts should consider when reviewing punitive damages, can the high degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and the similarity between the punitive damages award and authorized civil penalties in comparable cases supersede the consideration that punitive damages should be proportionate to the harm suffered by the plaintiff?
  2. Can a jury punish a defendant for harms suffered by non-parties without violating due process?
Court below

 

Mayola Williams brought suit against Philip Morris U.S.A. alleging that Philip Morris fraudulently and negligently caused the death of her husband, who smoked Philip Morris cigarettes for over forty years. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a trial jury’s punitive damages award of $79.5 million. Philip Morris contends that the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive because it was not reasonably related to Mr. Williams’ injuries. Williams argues that the Oregon Supreme Court was within its discretion to affirm the trial jury’s punitive damages award because the award conformed with many of the guidelines for determining reasonable damages, and those guidelines are the most important factor. This decision will impact punitive damages calculation in product liability and other tort cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether, in reviewing a jury’s award of punitive damages, an appellate court’s conclusion that a defendant’s conduct was highly reprehensible and analogous to a crime can “override” the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the Plaintiff’s harm.
  2. Whether due process permits a jury to punish a defendant for the effects of its conduct on non-parties.

Jesse Williams died from cancer as a result of smoking Philip Morris brand cigarettes for over forty years. Williams v. Philip Morris, 340 Or. 35, 38 (2006).

Additional Resources

  • Charles Lane, Justices To Rule on Punitive Damages, Wash. Post, May. 31, 2006, at D01
  • Brief of the American Tort Reform Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 126 S.Ct. 2329 (2006) (No. 05-1256).
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Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams

Issues

1. Whether, when the Supreme Court remands a case and instructs a state court to apply a constitutional standard, the state court can then decide the case using a procedural rule not previously mentioned in litigation.

2. Whether punitive damages 97 times greater than compensatory damages can be awarded based on the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct rather than the harm actually suffered by the plaintiff.

Court below

 

In 1997, Mayola Williams’s husband Jesse Williams died from lung cancer as a result of smoking cigarettes manufactured and marketed by Philip Morris USA Inc. Mayola Williams sued Philip Morris alleging negligence, strict product liability, and fraud. At trial, the court rejected Philip Morris’s request for a jury instruction on punitive damages which stated that Philip Morris could not be punished for harms suffered by nonparties. The jury awarded Williams $79.5 million dollars in punitive damages. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams (“Williams II”), the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court upholding this award and instructed the lower court to apply its standard of prohibiting punishment of a defendant for damage to nonparties. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld its decision, finding that a state procedural law not previously addressed justified the trial judge’s denial of the requested instruction. In this case, the Court will decide whether a lower court can decline to apply a standard that the Court has articulated and instead uphold its ruling on state procedural law grounds. This decision will affect the Supreme Court’s institutional supremacy and state courts’ treatment of punitive damages awards.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When this case was last before it, this Court reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and held that due process precludes a jury from imposing punitive damages to punish for alleged injuries to persons other than the plaintiff. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). This Court then remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court with directions to “apply the [constitutional] standard we have set forth.” Ibid. On remand, however, the Oregon Supreme Court refused to follow this Court’s directive. Instead, the Oregon court “adhered to” the judgment that this Court had vacated because it found that Philip Morris had procedurally defaulted under state law and thereby forfeited its claim of federal constitutional error. App., infra, 22a.

The questions presented—the second of which was accepted for review but not reached when this case was last before the Court—are:

1. Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose—for the first time in the litigation—a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

2. Whether a punitive damages award that is 97 times the compensatory damages may be upheld on the ground that the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct can “override” the constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plaintiffs harm.

In 1950, Jesse Williams began smoking cigarettes and eventually smoked three packs a day of Marlboros, which are manufactured and marketed by Philip Morris USA Inc. (“Philip Morris”). See Brief for Petitioner, Philip Morris USA Inc.

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Perry v. New Hampshire

Issues

Does admitting eyewitness identification evidence at trial whenever the identification was made under suggestive circumstances violate due process?

 

Barion Perry was convicted of theft for attempting to take amplifiers from a car. A nearby woman, Nubia Blandon, identified Perry as the perpetrator. Perry filed a pretrial motion to suppress Blandon’s identification. Perry argues that eyewitness testimony should not be admitted into evidence at trial when it was obtained under suggestive circumstances. The State of New Hampshire contends that improper state action should be required before eyewitness testimony is barred and that due process does not require preliminary judgments on the reliability of evidence before it is admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the trial court's denial of the motion because there was no evidence of improper state action. The Supreme Court’s decision could affect the conditions under which parties can use eyewitness testimony at trial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Do the due process protections against unreliable identification evidence apply to all identifications made under suggestive circumstances, as held by the First Circuit Court of Appeals and other federal courts of appeals, or do they apply only when the suggestive circumstances were orchestrated by the police, as held by the New Hampshire Supreme Court and other courts? 

At approximately 3:00 a.m.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

• New York Times, Adam Liptak: 34 Years Later , Supreme Court will Revisit Eyewitness IDs (Aug. 22, 2011)

• St. Louis Today, Maggie Clark: New Doubt Is Cast on Eyewitness Testimony (Sept. 25, 2011)

 
 
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Permanent Mission of India v. New York City

Issues

  1. Does the exception to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for cases “in which . . . rights in immoveable property situated in the United States are in issue” provide jurisdiction to pass declaratory judgment on the validity of a tax lien?
  2. May U.S. courts appropriately consider international treaties in interpreting international law?

 

In April 2003, New York City brought actions against the Permanent Missions of India and Mongolia to the United Nations for unpaid property taxes. The Missions claimed that they were immune to suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., but the Court held that it had jurisdiction under a statutory exception for cases in which rights in real property situated in the United States are in issue. In doing so, the Court interpreted the Act using the European Convention on State Immunity and the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine the most proper construction of the real property exception to sovereign immunity under the Act. Additionally, the Court will clarify whether the lower court’s use of international law to interpret a United States federal statute was appropriate.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does the exception to sovereign immunity for cases “in which ... rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4), provide jurisdiction for a municipality’s lawsuit seeking to declare the validity of a tax lien on a foreign sovereign’s real property when the municipality does not claim any right to own, use, enter, control or possess the real property at issue?

2. Is it appropriate for U.S. courts to interpret U.S. statutes by relying on international treaties that have not been signed by the U.S. Government and that do not accurately reflect international practice because they have only been signed by a limited number of other nations?

The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations (Indian Mission) is located in a 26-floor building in Manhattan, New York City. New York v. Permanent Mission of Indian to the United Nations, 446 F.3d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 2006).

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Perdue v. Kenny A.

Issues

Are courts ever allowed to increase the amount awarded in attorney’s fees to prevailing civil rights litigation plaintiffs in recognition of extraordinary performance by their counsel?

 

In 2005, Kenny A. and eight other plaintiffs (collectively “Kenny A.”) settled a federal civil rights class action lawsuit against the Georgia Department of Human Resources and others. The settlement provided, in relevant part, that “the Plaintiff Class is entitled to recover its expenses of litigation, including reasonable attorneys fees . . . pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia approved a lodestar amount and a fee enhancement, which the court attributed to the extraordinary performance by Kenny A.’s counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, courts may increase the amount they award in attorney’s fees to prevailing civil rights litigation plaintiffs in recognition of extraordinary performance by their counsel. The Court's decision will affect the economic incentives around federal civil rights litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Can a reasonable attorney’s fee award under a federal fee-shifting statute ever be enhanced based solely on quality of performance and results obtained, or are these factors already included in the lodestar calculation?

Kenny A. and eight other named plaintiffs (collectively "Kenny A.") are minors in the custody of the Georgia Department of Human Resources. See Kenny A. v. Perdue, 532 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 2006). Kenny A.

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Additional Resources

·      Law.com: Civil Rights Defendants Going After Attorneys’ Fees (Aug. 24, 2009)

·      The ’Lectric Law Library: Attorney’s Fees

·      Litigation Management Blog, Barger & Wolen LLP: Lodestar Adjustment (Feb. 6, 2009)

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Pepper v. United States

Issues

1. When a defendant's sentence has been set aside, may a federal district court judge consider a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation in re-sentencing?

2. If a new judge is assigned to resentence the defendant, must the new judge follow the original judge’s sentencing findings under the law of the case doctrine?

 

After his arrest in 2003, Jason Pepper pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and cooperated with the authorities by testifying against his co-defendants. Due to his lack of prior convictions, cooperation with the authorities, and his desire to seek drug treatment, the district court judge gave Pepper a 24-months prison sentence, which was substantially below the 97 to 121 months recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit reversed for resentencing, determining that the district court abused its discretion by decreasing Pepper's sentence based on the court's desire to give Pepper the shortest possible sentence. During the appeal, Pepper successfully completed his sentence, married, stayed drug-free, obtained a job, and achieved straight A's in college. Upon remand to the district court, Pepper was again sentenced to 24 months in prison, this time due to his post-sentence rehabilitation. The Eighth Circuit again reversed for resentencing, finding that the judge could not consider post-sentencing rehabilitation in choosing a sentence below the Guidelines. The district court, under a new judge, increased Pepper's sentence significantly and sent him back to prison after he had been out for several years. Pepper argued that this was improper because post-sentencing rehabilitation is an appropriate factor to consider during resentencing, and the new judge violated the "law of the case" doctrine by not following part of the previous judge's determination. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether post-sentence rehabilitation is a proper factor to consider in resentencing, and whether the law of the case doctrine applies to Pepper's appeal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

There is a conflict among the United States Courts of Appeals regarding a defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation and whether it can support a downward sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Whether a federal district judge can consider a defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation as a permissible factor supporting a sentencing variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) after Gall v. United States? Whether as a sentencing consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), post-sentencing rehabilitation should be treated the same as post-offense rehabilitation. When a district court judge is removed from resentencing a defendant after remand, and a new judge is assigned, is the new judge obligated under the doctrine of the "law of the case" to follow sentencing findings issued by the original judge that had been previously affirmed on appeal?

In 2003, Petitioner Jason Pepper was charged with and pled guilty to a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. See U.S. v. Pepper, 412 F.3d 995, 996 (8th Cir.

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Pearson v. Callahan

Issues

1. Whether police officers’ warrantless entry into a suspect’s home violates the Fourth Amendment, where the confidential informant, who was invited into the suspect’s home, established probable cause and signaled the officers to enter and make an arrest?

2. Does case law from other jurisdiction upholding such entries allow the police officers to assert a qualified immunity defense?

3. Should the Supreme Court overrule its decision in Saucier v. Katz, where it formulated a two-pronged test for determining whether qualified immunity applies?

 

The Utah police, without obtaining a warrant, arrested Afton Callahan and searched his home after Callahan was caught selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant. Callahan brought a civil suit alleging that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches. The officers assert that Callahan waived his privacy right when he invited a confidential informant into his home because he assumed the risk that the informant would divulge illegal activity to the police. They also argue that the “consent once removed” doctrine allows a warrantless search once a confidential informant is invited into the home and establishes probable cause. In the alternative, the officers raise a “qualified immunity” defense, which protects government officials from liability where a constitutional right is not clearly established and they could reasonably believe their conduct is constitutional. Callahan claims that the officers’ reasoning is unfounded; inviting the confidential informant into his home does not mean that officers can subsequently enter and search his home without a warrant. Furthermore, the consent once removed doctrine, as applied to confidential informants, has not been accepted by the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment; whether they are entitled to the qualified immunity; and whether the two-pronged qualified immunity test as articulated in Saucier v. Katz, should be overruled.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Several lower courts have recognized a “consent once removed” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Does this exception authorize police officers to enter a home without a warrant immediately after an undercover informant buys drugs inside (as the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held), or does the warrantless entry in such circumstances violate the Fourth Amendment (as the Tenth Circuit held below)?

2. Did the Tenth Circuit properly deny qualified immunity when the only decisions directly on point had all upheld similar warrantless entries?

3. In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the Parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: “Whether the court's decision in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) should be overruled?”

On March 19, 2002, Brian Bartholomew entered the home of Afton Callahan under the pretense of wanting to purchase methamphetamine. See Brief for Petitioners, Pearson at 4. In reality, Bartholomew was a confidential informant working with the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force (“Task Force”) to catch Callahan dealing narcotics. See Callahan v.

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Peake v. Sanders

Issues

Is a failure to give required notice to a veteran claiming disability benefits presumptively prejudicial?

 

Woodrow Sanders and Patricia Simmons are U.S. military veterans who did not receive notice regarding who was responsible for obtaining evidence for their disability claims as is required by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000. At issue in this consolidated case is whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) presumptively bears the burden of proving that a notice error in such benefits claims was harmless. The veterans argue that the language of 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) and the pro-claimant structure of the veterans benefits system create a presumptive burden on the VA. The VA argues that the Supreme Court should interpret the statute according to the prejudicial error rule of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706; this interpretation would require a claimant to prove that a VA notice error actually harmed the outcome of his or her claim. A Supreme Court ruling in favor of the veterans would bolster the pro-claimant system, making it easier for veterans to successfully bring claims. A decision for the veterans, however, could slow down the processing of deserving claims because the VA would have to defend its denial of claims where there was a notice error, but where the claimant did not suffer any harm from the error.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096, requires the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to provide a notice to benefits claimants. Under 38 U.S.C. 7261(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005), review of administrative decisions resolving claims for veterans benefits must “take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.” The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a failure of the VA to give the notice required by the VCAA must be presumed to be prejudicial.

This case involves two consolidated decisions issued by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. See 38 U.S.C.

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Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1*

Issues

Whether a school district’s decision to admit a student to a desegregated high school based on that student’s race, in an effort to achieve a racial balance within the school and therefore foster diversity in the educational setting, violates that student’s Equal Protection rights given by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Seattle School District No. 1 uses an “open choice” plan in which students rank their preferred schools. When a student’s first choice cannot be accommodated, the District uses race as a tiebreaker in order to achieve a desired racial balance in each individual school. Parents Involved in Community Schools, a non-profit organization, argues that the District’s policy amounts to unconstitutional racial balancing under the Supreme Court’s 2003 decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). The District, however, argues that its consideration of race is to further the compelling state interest of achieving the beneficial effects of racial diversity. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the District had a compelling state interest in achieving the benefits of racial diversity and that its plan was narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court will now review that determination in light of its Equal Protection decisions in Grutter and Gratz and is asked to decide whether racial diversity in high schools is a compelling state interest.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. How are the Equal Protection rights of public high school students affected by the jurisprudence of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)?
  2. Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools?
  3. May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally permits a student to attend any high school of her choosing deny a child admission to her chosen school solely because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance in particular schools, or does such racial balancing violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

This case was brought by a non-profit organization, Parents Involved in Community Schools (“PICS”), representing parents of students in the Seattle School District (“District”) who objected to the school district’s use of race as a tiebreaker for admission to schools as violating the Equal Protection Clause.

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Trump v. Hawaii

Issues

Can the president lawfully prevent foreign nationals from certain Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States?

On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13769, which temporarily banned citizens of seven Muslim-majority nations from immigrating to the United States. Various states challenged the executive order on grounds of religious discrimination. In March of 2017, the president signed Executive Order 13780, and in September 2017 he issued a third iteration of the order via presidential proclamation. The proclamation affects the immigration and visa rights of nationals of eight different Muslim-majority countries. President Trump argues that the proclamation is a proper application of his executive authority, and that it accords with the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Hawaii contends that the proclamation is motivated in part by religious discrimination and is therefore unconstitutional. The outcome of the case could significantly impact existing immigration policy, as well as determine the scope of the Executive’s power to implement and enforce such policy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the respondents’ challenge to the president’s suspension of entry of aliens abroad is justiciable; (2) whether the proclamation – which suspends entry, subject to exceptions and case-by-case waivers, of certain categories of aliens abroad from eight countries that do not share adequate information with the United States or that present other risk factors – is a lawful exercise of the president’s authority to suspend entry of aliens abroad; (3) whether the global injunction barring enforcement of the proclamation’s entry suspensions worldwide, except as to nationals of two countries and as to persons without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States, is impermissibly overbroad; and (4) whether the proclamation violates the establishment clause of the Constitution.

On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13769 (“EO-1”), which placed significant immigration restrictions on foreign nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.

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