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In 1994, Randy Edward Hayes pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense under West Virginia law for the battery of his then-wife, Mary Ann Hayes. Ten years later, police arrested Hayes and charged and convicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Hayes challenged the charge, alleging that since the West Virginia statute under which he was originally convicted did not have a domestic relationship between offender and victim as an element, he could not later be prosecuted under § 921(a)(33)(A), which, he argues, does require a domestic relationship between offender and victim as an element. The Government, while not denying that a domestic relationship is necessary for application of the statute, contends that a domestic relationship is not an element of the predicate offense of a violent misdemeanor in § 921(a)(33)(A). The Government points out that nine other courts of appeal have read the statute in this way. Hayes argues that the Government’s interpretation of the statute illegitimately broadens it beyond its intended meaning.  He says that the Fourth Circuit, which overturned his conviction, was correct in reading the statute’s definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to include a domestic relationship element in the predicate offense. 

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Anticipatory search warrants are used by law enforcement to gain permission to perform a search where the probable cause mandated by the Fourth Amendment does not yet exist. Instead, probable cause is expected to materialize through the anticipated conduct of the suspect, such as when a suspect takes delivery of an illegal item or receives payment for an illegal act. Currently, there is a split between federal circuits as to how much information must be provided about a party against whom such a warrant is served. In this case, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its position that the Fourth Amendment requires the warrant to enumerate plainly the triggering event, just as it requires a particular description of the place to be searched and persons or items to be seized. The Ninth Circuit believes anticipatory warrants are particularly vulnerable to abuses of police power, and requiring the warrant to articulate the triggering event allows citizens to ensure that such searches are lawfully executed. The government argues, and other Federal Courts of Appeal have agreed, that the Fourth Amendment contains no such requirement, and the unique aspects of anticipatory warrants are adequately shielded from abuse by existing probable cause requirements inherent in the warrant application process.

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The Sixth Amendment to the United States constitution provides:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”  In Cuauhtémoc Gonzalez-Lopez’s criminal trial, the district court refused to allow Gonzalez-Lopez to hire the attorney of his choice.  On review, the Eighth Circuit held that this denial violated Gonzalez-Lopez’s Sixth Amendment right to proceed with the counsel of his choice. Gonzalez-Lopez argues that the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right should stand. The government argues that the Eighth Circuit’s ruling conflicts with the Supreme Court’s ‘right to counsel’ decisions, which hold that a criminal defendant cannot obtain reversal of his conviction unless he establishes that an alleged error implicating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel compromised his right to a fair trial.

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Jacob Denedo, a member of the Navy and a permanent resident of the United States, faced various criminal charges in a court-martial proceeding. Denedo pled guilty and, as part of his sentence, was discharged from the Navy. The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Denedo's sentence, and Denedo did not seek any further review. Six years later, the government began deportation proceedings against Denedo based on his court-martial conviction. In response, Denedo petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis with the Court of Criminal Appeals. Denedo claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel's alleged advice that he would not face deportation if he pled guilty. The Court of Criminal Appeals considered Denedo's petition under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Denedo's petition on the merits. On appeal, the United State Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces considered and accepted Denedo's writ. The United States appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Denedo's writ, reasoning a collateral attack on Denedo's court-martial conviction is precluded by the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") Article 73¸UCMJ 10 U.S.C. § 873, and Article 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876. The Supreme Court's holding in this case will decide whether military courts of appeal have subject matter jurisdiction to consider extraordinary requests for relief under the All Writs Act, or whether they must strictly follow procedures in the UCMJ.

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Petitioner, the United States, argues that 18 U.S.C § 4248, which authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually dangerous” persons, is a constitutional exercise of Congressional power. Respondents, Graydon Earl Comstock Jr., et al. (“Comstock”), counter that civil commitment of an individual after the completion of a federal prison sentence exceeds Congressional power, because it (1) encroaches on states’ authority and (2) is neither necessary nor proper to operating a valid federal regulation. The Fourth Circuit rejected the United States’ argument that § 4248 is necessary and proper to its ability to maintain the federal penal system. The Supreme Court must now decide (1) whether § 4248 is incidental to Congress’ Article I powers and (2) whether civil commitment of individuals labeled “sexually dangerous” and already in federal custody or incompetent to stand trial is an encroachment on state power.

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The Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Company sought to recover export tax payments after a federal court found the 1978 tax unconstitutional. Clintwood filed timely administrative refund claims under the IRS Tax Code within its three-year statute of limitations, and received repayments with interest for 1997 to 1999. However, Clintwood also filed an Export Clause damages claim for tax payments from 1994 to 1996 under the Tucker Act, which has a longer six-year statute of limitations. The government argued that the Tax Code provides the exclusive remedy for such refunds, while Clintwood argued that the Tucker Act alternative best remedies the government's unconstitutional taxation. The Court of Federal Claims found that Clintwood was entitled to receive damages, but not interest, under the Tucker Act. On appeal, the Federal Circuit awarded Clintwood both damages and interest for its 1994 to 1996 payments. The Supreme Court will determine whether Clintwood can file claims for repayment of unconstitutional taxes under the Tucker Act, and whether these alternative claims include interest awards. In addition to affecting the outcome of similar pending cases, the Court's decision will likely affect all taxpayers by determining the amount of reimbursement for taxes later found to be unconstitutional.

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This case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine whether the United States Government ("Government") can use uncounseled tribal court convictions to satisfy the predicate offense requirement outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 117(a). Section 117(a) is a domestic assault statute under which the Government may prosecute a person who has committed sexual assault within the U.S. or Indian country and who has already been twice convicted in State, Federal, or Indian court, of assault against a spouse or intimate partner. The Government argues that it may use Bryant’s prior convictions in his § 117 prosecution because the convictions did not violate the U.S. Constitution but were instead obtained on tribal lands where the Constitution is inapplicable. The Government further argues that using the convictions would not violate due process because the statute passes the rational-basis standard of review and is consistent with the principles of comity. Bryant counters, arguing that the Court’s precedent establishes a bright-line rule that invalidates convictions obtained in a manner that violates the Constitution, including Bryant’s convictions here, and that the Government’s reading of Court precedent is overly broad. Bryant further contends that allowing these convictions would lead to either admittance of an abundance of suspect convictions or a complex process requiring courts to determine the validity of each conviction. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will significantly impact the validity of tribal court judgments for purposes of predicate-offense crimes as well as the ability of prosecutors to prevent domestic abuse crimes in Indian Country.

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Respondent James Bormes used the U.S. government’s online pay system to pay for a lawsuit that he had filed electronically. Following the transaction, the website displayed the last four digits of his credit card and the card’s expiration date. Bormes then sued the government, alleging that it had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") by displaying the expiration date. The United States argued that it had sovereign immunity with respect to claims under the FCRA because the Act did not explicitly apply to the U.S. government. When Bormes countered that he could sue the government under the Little Tucker Act, which provides a remedy for those with claims against the government of less than $10,000, the government contended that the Little Tucker Act applied only in situations where parties could not otherwise recover. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court must first determine the scope of the Tucker Acts' waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity regarding claims brought under the Little Tucker Act for suits based on violations of the FCRA. As the country’s largest employer, creditor, and lender, the U.S. government could see a massive increase in litigation and potential liability as a result of this decision. Additionally, the Supreme Court may address how explicit Congress must act in order to exempt the federal government from liability.

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Respondent Xavier Alvarez, an elected member of the Three Valleys Water District, lied about receiving a Congressional Medal of Honor during a board meeting. His lie violated the Stolen Valor Act, which Congress enacted to preserve the value of military awards, and he was criminally convicted and sentenced to probation. Alvarez challenged the facial constitutionality of the Act under the First Amendment, and prevailed on appeal. The United States argues that a “breathing space” test should apply because the Act only limits knowingly false factual statements, and that under this test the Act does not violate the First Amendment. Alvarez counters that strict scrutiny should apply because the Act imposes a content-based restriction, and under strict scrutiny, the Act is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. The ruling in this case may affect the value of military awards, as well as the legal treatment of other false representations.

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Solid waste processing has been a contentious issue since the 1980s when local governments were implicated in environmental lawsuits regarding solid waste disposal. Local governments tried to take control of the issue, but found that they faced commerce clause issues when they tried to protect their local facilities by passing ordinances to ensure enough tipping fees through flow control ordinances. This case represents the latest attempt by local governments to protect local waste processing facilities by requiring that local solid waste be directed to the publicly owned facility. In a key case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994), the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance similar to the one at issue in this case because it was discriminatory to other waste processing facilities and placed a burden on interstate commerce. In this case, the Second Circuit ruled that because the ordinance at issue favored a public facility rather than a private facility as in Carbone, it passed the discrimination test. The Court also held that it passed a balancing test whereby the court balances the local interest and the burden on interstate commerce. At stake in this case are the local governments' interests in sustaining environmentally sound local processing plants that represent significant sunk cost versus interstate waste hauling and out of state processing plants hoping to sustain their businesses.

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