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In this case the Supreme Court will determine if evidence obtained by wiretapping while investigators were outside the state where the authorizing judge sits is admissible in court. Petitioners Los and Roosevelt Dahda were arrested, charged, and convicted in a conspiracy to distribute over two thousand pounds of marijuana. Most of the evidence used against them was obtained by wiretapping phones. A judge in Kansas authorized the wiretap, including wiretaps both inside and outside Kansas. The Dahda brothers argue that the judge had no authority to authorize interception outside Kansas and that, therefore, the entire warrant is deficient under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and all the evidence obtained from wiretaps cannot be used against them at trial. The Government agrees that the warrant was overbroad, but claims that the warrant was not wholly deficient and thus the Government should be allowed to present the evidence obtained from wiretaps within Kansas. Much is at stake in this case: organizations supporting the Dahda brothers claim a ruling for the Government would undermine personal privacy. The Government disagrees, asserting that no privacy concerns are implicated.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether Larry English, trial counsel for Robert McCoy, violated McCoy’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by conceding McCoy’s guilt against McCoy’s wishes. McCoy was arrested in Idaho and charged in Louisiana with a triple homicide. English believed that maintaining McCoy’s innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence would lead to the death penalty for his client, so English went against his client’s wishes and conceded guilt to the jury, hoping to receive leniency in sentencing. The jury returned a guilty verdict and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction and McCoy appealed the constitutional question to the Supreme Court. McCoy argues that the Sixth Amendment guarantees him autonomy to decide whether he, or his counsel, will admit guilt. Louisiana argues that once a defendant accepts the assistance of counsel he cedes control over all strategic decisions, including the decision to concede guilt. McCoy also claims that English acted unethically and failed to provide effective assistance of counsel, which Louisiana denies. The outcome of this case could reshape the client-counsel relationship in criminal cases.

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The issue in this case involves whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime-pay exemption for “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles,” contained in 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), also exempts service advisors. Encino Motorcars argues that the plain language and structure of § 213(b)(10)(A) unambiguously exempt service advisors from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. Navarro argues that the plain language and structure of § 213(b)(10)(A) clearly do not exempt service advisors from the FLSA’s overtime requirements and that Congress’s intent in enacting the exemption and the FLSA as a whole support this interpretation. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because a decision favoring Navarro could force dealerships across the United States to alter their payment systems for service advisors, of which there are around 100,000. Such an outcome could also expose dealerships to retroactive liability and back-pay in order to settle FLSA claims concerning overtime. 

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In 2016, President Obama appointed four active-duty military officers already serving on the Army or Air Force Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) to serve as judges on the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR). This case consolidates petitions from eight servicemembers whose appeals were each ruled on in a CCA proceeding by one of the judges also appointed to the CMCR. Dalmazzi and her fellow petitioners, individuals whose sentences were affirmed by one of these judges, challenge the judges’ dual appointments as violations of 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2), which bars military officers from holding civil offices requiring appointment by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. Dalmazzi also argues that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3). The United States counters that the CMRC judgeship is not a civil office and appointments there do not require advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally, the United States argues that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction in some of the consolidated cases. This case creates potential implications for the scope of the Appointments Clause and the Executive Branch’s power to select judges.

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The Court will decide when a party may take an immediate appeal in a single district consolidated case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the statute addressing appellate jurisdiction of all final decisions made by the district courts of the United States. Elsa Hall argues that § 1291 allows an appeal from a final judgment in a consolidated case even if the judgment does not resolve all claims. On the other hand, Samuel Hall argues that only a judgment resolving all consolidated claims may be appealed under § 1291. This issue arises in every consolidated case in which a district court enters judgment that leaves some claims in the consolidated case unresolved. Accordingly, the case will impact how plaintiffs bring claims and the appeals process in federal courts.

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In 1992, Panetti killed his parents-in-law by shooting them at close range inside their Texas home while his wife and daughter watched in terror. After surrendering to police, Panetti was tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death. Panetti, however, suffers from a long history of mental illness including schizoaffective disorder. Although he understands that he killed two people and he knows that the state’s stated reason for his execution is because of the murders, he believes that the state actually intends to execute him in order to carry out a satanic conspiracy against him. Panetti petitioned both the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus, but both courts upheld Panetti’s execution on the grounds that he is “aware” of his death sentence and its stated purpose. Panetti argues that “awareness” is not enough and that a prisoner must also have a “rational understanding” of the connection between his crime and punishment. By accepting certiorari review of this case, the Supreme Court of the United States will determine whether executing a mentally ill prisoner who lacks “rational understanding” of the reasons for his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment.

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In 2002, Jose Padilla (“Padilla”; not the terrorism detainee), a Legal Permanent Resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to a Kentucky drug trafficking offense. Padilla claims he pled guilty in reliance on his defense counsel’s advice that he did not have to worry about deportation as a consequence of his plea. In fact, under federal law, drug trafficking is a deportable offense. Padilla claims that under the Sixth Amendment, he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to advise him as to the possible immigration consequences of his plea, and in fact misadvised him. The Commonwealth of Kentucky contends that Padilla was not denied effective assistance of counsel, because the Sixth Amendment does not require that defense counsel advise clients of collateral consequences, and immigration consequences are collateral consequences of guilty pleas. The outcome of this case will affect the duty a defense counsel has to a non-citizen client when advising a client regarding a guilty plea and the rights of a non-citizen to claim ineffective assistance of counsel when not advised or misadvised of immigration consequences.

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Juan Valladolid, an employee of the Petitioner, Pacific Operators Offshore, died when a forklift crushed him at Pacific's oil-processing facility on the California coast. Valladolid’s widow filed a claim for federal workers’ compensation under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), but the claim was rejected because Valladolid died on land rather than on the outer continental shelf. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that OCSLA benefits are not limited to injuries or deaths that occur on the outer continental shelf. Rather, the court held, coverage depends on the existence of a causal nexus between the injury or death and operations on the outer continental shelf. Petitioner Pacific argues that OCSLA contains a strict “situs-of-injury” requirement, while Respondent Valladolid contends that such a requirement would defeat Congressional intent. The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a longstanding question of statutory interpretation, and may shed light on the Court’s current approach to workers’ compensation laws.

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This case involves price squeeze claims and whether they are viable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In addition, the Court will likely determine if price squeeze claims must be pled and treated in the same way as traditional predatory pricing claims. This claim arose when linkLine, an internet service provider, sued its wholesale DSL supplier, AT&T, for engaging in anticompetitive practices in order to stifle competition in the California telecommunications market. The Ninth Circuit rejected AT&T’s argument that linkLine’s claim was not viable under antitrust jurisprudence, especially in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Verizon v. Trinko. The Supreme Court’s ruling will determine the status of price squeeze claims in antitrust jurisprudence, and could also clarify how the costs of retail production of a vertically integrated company with a wholesale monopoly should be measured when considering retail predatory pricing claims. 

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Pat Osborn sued Barry Haley, a United States Forest Service manager, in state court, alleging that Haley had influenced her employer, Land Between the Lakes Association, to fire her and that, in so doing, Haley had acted outside the scope of his employment. Pursuant to the Westfall Act, the United States Attorney General certified that Haley was acting within the scope of his employment and successfully removed the case to federal district court. Once there, the United States denied that Haley had interfered with Osborn’s employment and proposed to substitute itself for Haley. The district court, however, assumed the veracity of Osborn’s allegations and refused substitution, remanding the action to state court. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently reversed, ruling that the lower court must resolve the factual disputes underlying the scope question and that the Westfall Act forecloses remand to the state court. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will have significant implications for plaintiffs seeking to bring suit against federal employees and will likewise affect the way that the federal government and its employees respond to such suits.

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