Issues

After his arrest in 2003, Jason Pepper pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and cooperated with the authorities by testifying against his co-defendants. Due to his lack of prior convictions, cooperation with the authorities, and his desire to seek drug treatment, the district court judge gave Pepper a 24-months prison sentence, which was substantially below the 97 to 121 months recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit reversed for resentencing, determining that the district court abused its discretion by decreasing Pepper's sentence based on the court's desire to give Pepper the shortest possible sentence. During the appeal, Pepper successfully completed his sentence, married, stayed drug-free, obtained a job, and achieved straight A's in college. Upon remand to the district court, Pepper was again sentenced to 24 months in prison, this time due to his post-sentence rehabilitation. The Eighth Circuit again reversed for resentencing, finding that the judge could not consider post-sentencing rehabilitation in choosing a sentence below the Guidelines. The district court, under a new judge, increased Pepper's sentence significantly and sent him back to prison after he had been out for several years. Pepper argued that this was improper because post-sentencing rehabilitation is an appropriate factor to consider during resentencing, and the new judge violated the "law of the case" doctrine by not following part of the previous judge's determination. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether post-sentence rehabilitation is a proper factor to consider in resentencing, and whether the law of the case doctrine applies to Pepper's appeal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

The Utah police, without obtaining a warrant, arrested Afton Callahan and searched his home after Callahan was caught selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant. Callahan brought a civil suit alleging that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches. The officers assert that Callahan waived his privacy right when he invited a confidential informant into his home because he assumed the risk that the informant would divulge illegal activity to the police. They also argue that the “consent once removed” doctrine allows a warrantless search once a confidential informant is invited into the home and establishes probable cause. In the alternative, the officers raise a “qualified immunity” defense, which protects government officials from liability where a constitutional right is not clearly established and they could reasonably believe their conduct is constitutional. Callahan claims that the officers’ reasoning is unfounded; inviting the confidential informant into his home does not mean that officers can subsequently enter and search his home without a warrant. Furthermore, the consent once removed doctrine, as applied to confidential informants, has not been accepted by the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment; whether they are entitled to the qualified immunity; and whether the two-pronged qualified immunity test as articulated in Saucier v. Katz, should be overruled.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

Woodrow Sanders and Patricia Simmons are U.S. military veterans who did not receive notice regarding who was responsible for obtaining evidence for their disability claims as is required by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000. At issue in this consolidated case is whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) presumptively bears the burden of proving that a notice error in such benefits claims was harmless. The veterans argue that the language of 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) and the pro-claimant structure of the veterans benefits system create a presumptive burden on the VA. The VA argues that the Supreme Court should interpret the statute according to the prejudicial error rule of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706; this interpretation would require a claimant to prove that a VA notice error actually harmed the outcome of his or her claim. A Supreme Court ruling in favor of the veterans would bolster the pro-claimant system, making it easier for veterans to successfully bring claims. A decision for the veterans, however, could slow down the processing of deserving claims because the VA would have to defend its denial of claims where there was a notice error, but where the claimant did not suffer any harm from the error.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

Seattle School District No. 1 uses an “open choice” plan in which students rank their preferred schools. When a student’s first choice cannot be accommodated, the District uses race as a tiebreaker in order to achieve a desired racial balance in each individual school. Parents Involved in Community Schools, a non-profit organization, argues that the District’s policy amounts to unconstitutional racial balancing under the Supreme Court’s 2003 decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). The District, however, argues that its consideration of race is to further the compelling state interest of achieving the beneficial effects of racial diversity. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the District had a compelling state interest in achieving the benefits of racial diversity and that its plan was narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court will now review that determination in light of its Equal Protection decisions in Grutter and Gratz and is asked to decide whether racial diversity in high schools is a compelling state interest.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13769, which temporarily banned citizens of seven Muslim-majority nations from immigrating to the United States. Various states challenged the executive order on grounds of religious discrimination. In March of 2017, the president signed Executive Order 13780, and in September 2017 he issued a third iteration of the order via presidential proclamation. The proclamation affects the immigration and visa rights of nationals of eight different Muslim-majority countries. President Trump argues that the proclamation is a proper application of his executive authority, and that it accords with the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Hawaii contends that the proclamation is motivated in part by religious discrimination and is therefore unconstitutional. The outcome of the case could significantly impact existing immigration policy, as well as determine the scope of the Executive’s power to implement and enforce such policy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case will decide whether American courts are bound to accept a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws. Animal Science Products Inc. (“Animal Science Products”) argues that a “binding deference standard”, which requires courts to accept an appearing foreign government’s description of its laws, inhibits a court’s ability to independently reach an accurate determination of foreign law. Furthermore, Animal Science contends, the lower court’s decision to uphold binding deference misapplied the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Pink. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals (“Hebei”) counters that requiring courts to accept an appearing foreign government’s reasonable statement of its laws appropriately balances judicial independence and international comity concerns. Moreover, Hebei asserts that the court below was correct in finding United States v. Pink to support binding deference. This issue affects how federal courts interpret foreign law in international litigation. Accordingly, this case will impact international litigation strategy and entities with operations that are regulated outside of the U.S.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

After a federal court struck down the Texas State Legislature’s redistricting plans as racially discriminatory and issued substantially similar interim plans for the 2012 election, the Legislature adopted those interim plans as law. However, Texas Voters (both individual voters and organizations) claim that these plans are still infected by discriminatory intent and effect. Texas argues that its Legislature did not engage in racial discrimination, vote dilution, or racial gerrymandering. Further, Texas insists that when its new Legislature repealed the old plans and adopted court-created new plans, any purported discriminatory intent was eliminated. Voters counter that the Supreme Court should adhere to the lower court’s finding of discrimination, which was not cleansed by a legislative workaround that essentially reenacted the original, problematic plans. This case requires the Supreme Court to determine when a state legislature exhibits a discriminatory intent in reconfiguring its electoral districts and how deeply that intent permeates into subsequent legislation. Further, this case may redefine the parameters for courts to evaluate redistricting, balancing the needs to protect voters’ rights and preserve state sovereignty. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

The “stop-time rule” states that an alien’s period of continuous physical presence is interrupted after the government serves the alien with a notice to appear.  The Court will determine in this case whether a notice to appear must include the time and location of the immigration removal proceedings in order to invoke the stop-time rule. Pereira argues that the statutory text, structure, and legislative history indicate that a notice to appear must contain all of the information listed in its statutory definition and contends that the Court should not defer to the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) because the BIA’s interpretation is unreasonable. Sessions counters that the statutory text, legislative history, and purpose demonstrate that a valid notice to appear does not need to contain such information and asserts that the Court should defer to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. From a policy perspective, this case is significant because it will impact the ability of certain immigrants to cancel their removal and may affect the practices of immigration courts nationwide.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are “Officers of the United States” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. If the SEC ALJs are officers, then they cannot simply be hired like a regular government employee; instead, they must be hired according to the procedures required by the Appointments Clause. The SEC successfully argued before the D.C. Circuit that the ALJs are not officers; but following the election of President Trump, the U.S. Solicitor general switched the SEC’s position in this case. Both Raymond J. Lucia and the SEC now agree that the SEC ALJs are officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause because the SEC ALJs have enough sovereign authority entrusted to their discretion to require the structural power-check of the appointment process. Anton Metlitsky, the Court-appointed amicus supporting the judgment below, argues that SEC ALJs are not officers because they do not have the power to make final decisions that bind either the SEC or third parties. The Court’s holding in this case could greatly impact the SEC’s enforcement regime and all the proceedings currently pending before SEC ALJs.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

The Supreme Court will decide whether a court, in deciding not to grant a discretionary post-judgment sentencing revision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in proportion to the amended Federal Sentencing Guidelines, must provide an explanation or can issue its decision through a preprinted form order containing standardized language. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that § 3582(c)(2) does not require a judge to provide an explanation when refusing to grant a motion for a proportional sentencing reduction in accordance with the amended Guidelines. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, have found that judges are required to explain sentencing revision decisions. Petitioner Chavez-Meza argues that a judge must provide some explanation for a disproportional sentencing reduction when the reasons for the decision are not apparent from the record. Respondent United States argues that judges can use preprinted forms when granting sentencing revisions that are disproportional to the Guideline revisions, as long as the form order contains standardized language stating that the court has considered the policy and applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This case will clarify the extent to which application of the amended Guidelines reflects a bipartisan shift away from punitive sentences for drug offenses.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources