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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of the sentencing requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (“Section 3583(k)”), which imposes a mandatory resentencing requirement for individuals who violate a condition of their supervised release. Specifically, the Court will consider whether Section 3583(k) denies criminal defendants their right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. The United States argues that the mandatory sentencing is constitutional because the jury right only applies to the imposition of a sentence, while Section 3583(k) merely administers a sentence that had already been imposed. Haymond contends that Section 3583(k) imposes a new sentence for the conduct found to be a violation of the conditions of supervised release. This outcome in this case may have a meaningful impact on the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment and influence how courts determine which punishment to impose after a defendant violates conditions of probation or parole.  

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a debtor-licensor’s “rejection” of a trademark licensing agreement terminates the licensee’s rights under the agreement. Mission Product Holdings Inc. argues against termination, claiming that no such termination would occur from a breach of contract outside of the bankruptcy context, and that, in any case, there is a statutory exception that protects a licensee’s rights to use intellectual property post-rejection. Tempnology, LLC counters that rejection limits the licensee to the sole remedy of seeking monetary damages, and that the statutory exception for intellectual property does not contemplate trademarks as intellectual property. The outcome of this case will clarify the effect of rejection on contractual rights and whether trademarks are distinguishable from other types of intellectual property under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether the government is a “person” for the purposes of post-issuance review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). Return Mail, Inc. (“Return Mail”), the owner of a patent for processing undeliverable mail items, argues that Congress intended the AIA to incorporate a specific meaning of the term “person,” supported by statute and judicial precedent, that excluded the government, and would thus prohibit government agencies from initiating AIA review proceedings. The United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) counters that the statutory context, as supported by historical evidence and statements made by the Supreme Court, reveals Congress’s intent to include government agencies in the term “person” for the purposes of the AIA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the term “person” in the AIA did not exclude the government, and that the government could petition for patent review under the AIA. Return Mail is now appealing that decision in a case that will have implications for patent litigation, the estoppel doctrine, and executive agencies.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve whether the National Park Service (“NPS”) has the authority to regulate activity on navigable waters on non-federal land located within, but not deemed part of, the national park system in Alaska. John Sturgeon contends that Section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”), which defines “public lands” as those to which the United States has title, excludes non-federal lands and waters falling within the boundaries of Alaska’s national parks from NPS regulations. Sturgeon further argues that the NPS does not derive any regulatory authority from any reserved water rights the federal government may own. Bert Frost, in his official capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the NPS, contends that Section 103(c) merely restricts the NPS’s preexisting regulatory authority over navigable waters within national parks, as granted by Congress. According to Frost, the NPS may only enforce water-related rules regarding activities hazardous to the use and management of public lands. The outcome of this case will have implications concerning the balance of power between the state and federal government to regulate non-public lands and waters falling within the national park system in Alaska.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of power granted to the States under the Twenty-first Amendment and to explain when exercises of that power infringe upon the dormant Commerce Clause. Tennessee requires that a person must be a Tennessee resident for two years before they may receive a retail or wholesale liquor license and for ten years before they may re-apply for a retail or liquor license. Clayton Byrd, Tennessee Fine Wines and Spirits, LLC, and Affluere Investments, Inc. argue that Tennessee’s requirements amount to discrimination against out-of-state economic interests in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association counters that the Twenty-first Amendment grants the States broad power to regulate the in-state distribution of alcohol, and that a state does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause if the state treats alcohol produced out-of-state the same as alcohol produced in-state. The outcome of this case will help determine how the power to regulate the sale, use, and distribution of alcohol is divided between the federal government and the States.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, which established a requirement that property owners must first exhaust state‑court remedies before their federal takings claims are ripe for litigation in federal court. The Township of Scott’s zoning ordinance requires that property owners whose property contains a cemetery must leave that property open to the public during daylight hours and allow state agents access to determine the existence and location of any property or to ensure compliance with the ordinance. Rose Mary Knick, a resident of the Township, sued the Township after receiving violation notices, arguing that the ordinance is a taking without just compensation. Knick further argues that Williamson County’s ripeness requirement is an unworkable standard that prevents plaintiffs from reasonably accessing such courts. The Township of Scott counters that Knick does not have a valid federal statutory claim because none of Knick’s federal rights were violated. That is, the Township argues, a state‑court remedy for just compensation existed, which Knick did not avail herself of. Further, it contends that Williamson County does not prevent litigants from accessing federal court because courts have flexibility in deciding if it is fair to hear a plaintiff’s claim. Homeowners, takings litigation, and access to federal forums are some of the considerations implicated in this case. This is because overruling Williamson County may allow future plaintiffs to bring their claims in the court of their choosing without insurmountable procedural obstacles barring their path.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether Sections 1395hh(a)(2) or 1395hh(a)(4) of the Medicare Act requires the Department of Health and Human Services to provide notice and an opportunity for comment when issuing an interpretation of the Medicare Act that affects calculations involving Medicare Part C patients and Medicare payments. Petitioner Alex M. Azar II, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, argues that the agency’s issuance of a legally nonbinding interpretation of the Medicare Act that affected Medicare payment could not substantively affect legal standards and therefore did not trigger the notice-and-comment requirements of Sections 1395hh(a)(2) or 1395hh(a)(4). Respondents Allina Health Services et al. contend that this issuance was legally significant because hospitals and contractors were required to follow it, therefore triggering the notice-and-comment requirements of both Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4). The Court’s decision could affect the administration of the Medicare Program, including the Department of Health and Human Services’ ability to respond swiftly to frequent Medicare changes and its ability to accurately anticipate the financial impacts of its issuances.

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This case asks the Supreme Court whether a third-party defendant in a state court class action may remove a counterclaim from state court to federal court. Petitioner Home Depot U.S.A. Inc. (“Home Depot”) argues that the Supreme Court’s case Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, which holds that an original plaintiff may not remove a counterclaim to federal court, does not apply to third-party defendants. Moreover, Home Depot asserts that the text of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) allows for the removal of class action counterclaims by any defendant, including third-party defendants. Conversely, Respondent George W. Jackson—a class action representative who counterclaimed against Home Depot—contends that Shamrock Oil actually bars third-party defendants from removing. Furthermore, Jackson maintains that CAFA’s discussion of removal does not explicitly expand the term “defendant” to third-party defendants, and thus should not be read to allow Home Depot to remove Jackson’s counterclaim. This case has large implications for consumer class action suits in state court, as it will affect class action litigation strategy and forum selection in potentially hostile state courts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret Section 505 of the Copyright Act and to decide whether it authorizes courts to award litigation costs that are non-taxable as specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Specifically, Section 505 of the Copyright Act states that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs,” and the dispute hinges on the meaning of “full costs.” The lower court determined that Rimini Street Inc. (“Rimini”) and its CEO, Seth Ravin (“Ravin”), infringed copyrights held by Oracle USA, Inc. (“Oracle”), and the court ordered Rimini and Ravin to recompense Oracle for certain litigation costs that are not taxable. The parties’ arguments draw on the structure of the statutes and historical practice. The Supreme Court’s decision could have a meaningful impact on future copyright infringement litigation because the available awards could alter parties’ incentives to sue.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of a federal agency’s sovereign immunity to private lawsuits. The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), while attempting to raise a submerged power line in the river, injured Gary Thacker, who was participating in a fishing tournament. In their lawsuit against the TVA, Gary Thacker and his wife, Venida Thacker, contend that the TVA is not immune to their negligence claim because the TVA is not entitled to a discretionary-function exception—which immunizes a federal agency from private claims that arise from any of its discretionary governmental functions—and, therefore, the TVA may be sued under its statute’s sue-or-to-be-sued clause. The TVA counters that, pursuant to separation-of-powers principles, the TVA Act in fact implies a discretionary-function exception, and, even if it does not, the Suits in Admiralty Act, which indisputably has a discretionary-function exception, would apply and thus immunize the TVA from the Thackers’ suit. At stake here is the balance between a private citizen’s right to sue and the extent that sovereign immunity covers discretionary decisions of administrators and legislators.

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