Moore v. Texas

Issues

Can a state require the use of outdated medical standards in determining whether an individual is ineligible for execution due to intellectual disability?

After the Supreme Court prohibited the execution of the intellectually disabled in Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Bobby James Moore petitioned for habeas relief from his death sentence on the grounds of intellectual disability. A Texas habeas court found that Moore was intellectually disabled under the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities’ current definition of intellectual disability. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, rejected Moore’s claim and held that Texas courts must apply AAIDD’s 1992 intellectual disability definition, which was adopted in a 2004 Texas case. Moore claims that mandating the use of outdated and non-clinical criteria violates the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedent. Texas maintains that its definition of intellectual disability is within the national consensus and, therefore, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court will determine the breadth of the Eighth Amendment’s protections for intellectually disabled defendants, and the case will have significant consequences for all defendants with intellectual disabilities that are on death row or facing the death penalty in Texas and may have wider effects across the country.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does it violate the Eighth Amendment and this Court’s decisions in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intellectual disability and require the use of outdated medical standards in determining whether an individual may be executed?

In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of murder in Texas and sentenced to death. See Ex parte Moore, No. WR-13,374-05, 1 (Tex. Crim. App.  Sept. 16, 2015). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Moore’s conviction and sentence and denied his state habeas corpus petition.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Cornell Law School Professors Blume and Johnson for their insights into this case.

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Beckles v. United States

Issues

Does the Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), apply retroactively to the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines?

The Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), makes the residual clause in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines void for vagueness and, if so, whether this new rule gives relief to Petitioner Travis Beckles by retroactively applying to collateral cases challenging federal sentences under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Beckles argues that § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is void for vagueness under Johnson because the residual clauses in both cases are identical, and the Court held that the clause in Johnson was void for vagueness. Beckles also asserts that this new rule applies retroactively under the Court’s test in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Respondent the United States argues, however, that Beckles’s new rule would not apply retroactively because it is a procedural rather than a substantive rule, and thus the Court should reject his request at this threshold. The United States further argues that if the Court does reach the merits, § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness with respect to those applications expressly specified in the commentary to § 4B1.2(a)(2) because this commentary clarifies the otherwise vague guideline. This case will address whether retroactive resentencing for “career offenders” will burden the federal system and will clarify the advisory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines in terms of due process concerns.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), deemed unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining "violent felony"). The residual clause invalidated in Johnson is identical to the residual clause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining "crime of violence").

The questions presented are:

  1. Whether Johnson applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)?
  2. Whether Johnson's constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review?
  3. Whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a "crime of violence" only in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a "crime of violence" after Johnson?

In 2007, police arrested Travis Beckles after recovering a sawed-off shotgun in his residence. See United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 837–38 (11th Cir. 2009). At trial, the jury found Beckles guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

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Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ahlborn

Issues

If a party receives Medicaid benefits for an injury, and later receives a settlement payment from a third party, can the state force the party to use the entire settlement to repay the state's Medicaid expenses?

 

Medicaid provides certain needy individuals with funds for medical treatment. The program is administered by the states with federal funding and statutory guidelines. Federal Medicaid law generally forbids states from placing liens on the "pre-death" property of Medicaid beneficiaries. The Arkansas Medicaid program requires beneficiaries to sign over their interest in any future legal claim before receiving benefits. Technically, this case will decide whether the federal statutes prohibit states from doing this. More importantly, the decision will determine to what extent states can recoup Medicare expenses from private tort judgments and settlements, and could have a profound effect on how the costs of the Medicaid are distributed between the states and private parties.

Heidi Ahlborn suffered severe, permanently disabling injuries in a 1996 car accident. Ahlborn v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Services, 397 F.3d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 2005). She sought and received roughly $215,000 in medical benefits through Arkansas's Medicaid program. Id.

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Arizona v. United States

Issues

Can Arizona engage in cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws and create state offenses for violations of federal immigration regulations?

 

In 2010, Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, which creates state immigration offenses and expands local police officers’ immigration law enforcement authority. The United States sued Arizona in federal district court, arguing the state law was preempted by federal law, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state law from taking effect. The district court granted a preliminary injunction with respect to four provisions of the Arizona law and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Petitioners, the State of Arizona and the Governor of Arizona, Janice K. Brewer, argue that federal law does not preempt its statute because Arizona’s statute merely creates a formal cooperative relationship between federal and state officers to implement federal laws. Respondent, the United States, asserts that implementation of the statute would infringe upon the Executive Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration, and is therefore invalid.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070) to address the illegal immigration crisis in the State. The four provisions of S.B. 1070 enjoined by the courts below authorize and direct state law-enforcement officers to cooperate and communicate with federal officials regarding the enforcement of federal immigration law and impose penalties under state law for non-compliance with federal immigration requirements.

The question presented is whether the federal immigration laws preclude Arizona's efforts at cooperative law enforcement and impliedly preempt these four provisions of S.B. 1070 on their face.

The state of Arizona maintains that it faced rampant illegal immigration, which increased crime and harmed Arizona’s economy. See Brief for Petitioners, State of Arizona and Janice K.

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Additional Resources

Robert Barnes, The Washington Post: Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Arizona’s Immigration Law (Dec. 12, 2011)

Adam Liptak, N.Y. Times: Court to Weigh Arizona Statute on Immigration (Dec. 12, 2011)

Constitutional Law Prof Blog: Supreme Court to Hear Arizona S.B. 1070 on Preemption Issue (Dec. 12, 2011)

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Arizona v. Johnson

Issues

In the course of a minor traffic stop, is the police officer’s reasonable belief that the vehicle’s passenger may be armed and dangerous a sufficient reason to conduct a search of the passenger for a concealed weapon, even where there is no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?

 

Lemon Johnson was a passenger in the back seat of a vehicle stopped for a mandatory insurance suspension. A police officer initiated a conversation with Johnson that was unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop. After asking him to exit the car, the officer conducted a pat-down search of Johnson because she was concerned for her safety upon noticing signs that Johnson may have been affiliated with a gang. During the pat-down search, the officer found a gun, which was used as evidence to convict Johnson at trial. Johnson argues that this evidence should have been suppressed because the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights: the officer had no reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring, and therefore the pat-down search did not meet the standard articulated by Terry v. Ohio. In this case, the State of Arizona argues that police officers should have the right to conduct a pat-down search if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual is armed and dangerous. Numerous organizations and all lower courts that have considered the issue have adopted this standard to increase officer safety. Johnson, however, maintains that expanding Terry in the way that Arizona proposes is unnecessary and would encourage discretionary pat-down searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the context of a vehicular stop for a minor traffic infraction, may an officer conduct a pat-down search of a passenger when the officer has an articulable basis to believe the passenger might be armed and presently dangerous, but has no reasonable grounds to believe that the passenger is committing, or has committed, a criminal offense?

On the night of April 19, 2002, Maria Trevizo, a police officer assigned to the state gang task force, was on patrol with two other officers in a neighborhood known for gang-related activity near Tucson, Arizona. See Arizona v.

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Arizona v. Gant

Issues

May a law enforcement officer conduct an automobile search as an incident to all lawful arrests, or must the officer reasonably fear for his own safety or for the integrity of the evidence before searching the automobile?

Court below

 

Police arrested Rodney Gant for driving with a suspended license. During a warrantless search of Gant’s car incident to his arrest, officers found a weapon and cocaine. Gant moved to suppress this evidence; the court denied his motion, and he was convicted of possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Gant claims the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because he was arrested for an unrelated charge and because neither officer safety nor the integrity of the evidence was imperiled. The State of Arizona argues that the Court should adopt a clear, bright-line rule that automatically permits officers to conduct a vehicle search contemporaneous to an arrest. The outcome of this case will affect law enforcement officers’ conduct during motor vehicle stops and accompanying arrests and vehicle searches.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the Fourth Amendment require law enforcement officers to demonstrate a threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle’s recent occupants have been arrested and secured?

On August 25, 1999, two uniformed police officers responded to a report of narcotics activity at a house in Tucson, Arizona. See State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640, 641 (Ariz. 2007). Respondent Rodney Gant told the officers that the owner was not home but would return later. See id.

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Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett; McComish v. Bennett (consolidated)

Issues

1. Under Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and Davis v. Federal Election Commission, does the matching public funding provision of Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act violate the First Amendment protection of political speech?

2. Does the Citizens Clean Elections Act advance a compelling state interest in preventing corruption, or does it unconstitutionally burden protected political speech?

 

At issue in these consolidated cases is the constitutionality of Arizona’s Citizens Clean Elections Act. Petitioners—several past and present candidates for elected office, and two political action committees—claim that the matching public funding provision of the Act burdens the free speech of candidates who do not utilize public funding. Respondent, Ken Bennett, in his official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State, contends that the Act is designed to prevent corruption and does not impose any actual burden on protected political speech. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Act did not violate the First Amendment, because it furthered a compelling government interest in preventing corruption. In resolving this question, the Supreme Court must strike a balance between the First Amendment right to protected political speech and clean election measures implemented by a state. This decision will affect state and national elections that utilize matching public funding schemes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Arizona Free Enterprise

In Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), this Court held that the First Amendment forbids the government from attempting to level the playing field in elections by raising contribution limits for candidates who are outspent by self-financed opponents. Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act achieves a similar result by providing extra subsidies in the form of "matching funds" to publicly financed candidates who are outspent by independent expenditure groups and privately financed candidates. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the First Amendment forbids Arizona from providing additional government subsidies to publicly financed candidates that are triggered by independent expenditure groups' speech against such candidates?

2. Whether the First Amendment forbids Arizona from providing additional government subsidies to publicly financed candidates that are triggered by the fundraising or expenditures by these candidates' privately financed opponents?

McComish

1. Whether Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), and Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), require this Court to strike down Arizona's matching funds trigger under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it penalizes and deters free speech by forcing privately-financed candidates and their supporters to finance the dissemination of hostile political speech whenever they raise or spend private money, or when independent expenditures are made, above a "spending limit."

2. Whether Citizens United and Davis require this Court to strike down Arizona's matching funds trigger under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it regulates campaign financing in order to equalize "influence" and financial resources among competing candidates and interest groups, rather than to advance directly a compelling state interest in the least restrictive manner.

In 1998, the State of Arizona passed the Citizens Clean Election Act (“the Act”), which created a framework through which the state provides public financing to candidates for statewide political offices. See McComish v. Bennett , 611 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 2010) .

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Additional Resources

The New York Times, Adam Liptak: Justices to Assess Arizona Campaign Financing (Nov. 29, 2010)

CNN, Bill Mears: High Court to Review Arizona Election Finance Law (Nov. 29, 2010)

Huffington Post, Paul Davenport: Supreme Court Blocks Public Financing in Arizona Elections (June 8, 2010)

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Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn; Garriott v. Winn

Issues

1. Do Arizona taxpayers have a sufficiently personal injury to file a lawsuit against Section 1098, which authorizes a tax credit for voluntary donations to student tuition organizations?

2. Although Section 1089 is neutral on its face, is it nonetheless unconstitutional as applied if taxpayers have used it as a means of providing funding primarily to religious schools?

 

Arizona taxpayers brought claims alleging that Arizona’s Tuition Tax Credit violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Tax Credit gives taxpayers a reduction in their tax liabilities for their donations to school tuition organizations. These organizations may give scholarships to students of particular faiths to attend certain religious schools. The taxpayers contend that they have the right to sue the government and these organizations for two reasons: the state loses over $50 million in tax revenue each year because the money that the organizations receive would otherwise be state tax revenue and the Tuition Tax Credit promotes religion. The petitioners claim that the taxpayers do not assert a sufficiently personal injury to initiate a lawsuit, and they claim that program does not violate the Establishment Clause because individual taxpayers, not the government, choose where to donate their money. The Supreme Court will decide whether the taxpayers have the right to sue and if so, whether Arizona’s Tax Credit violates the Establishment Clause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Questions Presented in Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn

1. Do Respondents lack taxpayer standing because they do not allege, nor can they, that the Arizona Tuition Tax Credit involves the expenditure or appropriation of state funds?

2. Is the Respondents' alleged injury-which is solely based on the theory that Arizona's tax credit reduces the state's revenue-too speculative to confer taxpayer standing, especially when considering that the credit reduces the state's financial burden for providing public education and is likely the catalyst for new sources of state income?

3. Given that the Arizona Supreme Court has authoritatively determined, under state law, that the money donated to tuition granting organizations under Arizona's tax credit is private, not state, money, can the Respondents establish taxpayer standing to challenge the decisions of private taxpayers as to where they donate their private money?

Question Presented in Garriott, Director, Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Winn

Under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Section 43-1089, individuals who contribute money to school tuition organizations (STOs) that provide scholarships to students wishing to attend private schools are entitled to an income tax credit. Respondents alleged that Section 1089's neutral language and the Legislature's stated secular purpose for enacting it were a pretense and that the tuition tax credit program had the primary effect of advancing religion because a majority of taxpayers who contributed to STOs chose to contribute to STOs that awarded scholarships to students attending religious schools.

The question presented is the following:
Did the court of appeals err in holding that if most taxpayers who contribute to STOs contribute to STOs that award scholarships to students attending religious schools, Section 1089 has the purpose and effect of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause even though Section 1089 is a neutral program of private choice on its face and the State does nothing to influence the taxpayers or the STOs' choice?

In 1997, the Arizona Legislature approved the Arizona Tuition Tax Credit, Section 1089 of which permits individuals to claim income tax credit in return for contributions to school tuition organizations ("STOs"). See Brief for Petitioner Gale Garriott at 3–4. Tax cr

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Additional Resources

· Wex: Establishment Clause

· Annotated U.S. Constitution: First Amendment

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Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.

Issues

Whether a defect in a claim as to the nature of “employment” under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination by employers with fifteen or more employees, limits the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts in hearing Title VII claims, as held by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, or if it only raises an issue going to the merits of the claim, as held by the Second, Seventh, and Federal Circuits?

 

In November of 2001, Jenifer Arbaugh brought suit against her former employer, Y & H Corporation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, alleging that she was discriminated against because of her sex, and was forced to resign her position as a bartender and waitress. Y & H admitted to the questions of jurisdiction and its status as an employer under Title VII. In a district court trial, a jury found for Arbaugh. Y & H then advanced the claim that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Arbaugh’s claim because Y & H did not have fifteen full-time employees at the time of the incident, and thus did not actually qualify as an “employer” under § 2000e(b) of Title VII. If an employer’s status is a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, as Y & H proposes, then Arbaugh’s suit would have to be dismissed even though a verdict had already been passed because jurisdiction cannot be admitted to or waived by a defendant, and a challenge to jurisdiction may be brought up at any point in the litigation, even after a verdict has been given. Arbaugh responded that the definition of “employer” is a question of merit and not of subject-matter jurisdiction. As such Y & H could have and did indeed waive the matter in its admission. The district court, after a lengthy determination of whether Y & H did qualify as an employer, ruled in favor of Y & H, and dismissed Arbaugh’s case. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the so-called “employee-numerosity” issue is a jurisdictional question. The Supreme Court’s decision is expected to definitively determine whether the employment status of a Title VII defendant is a jurisdictional matter or one going to the merits of the case to be decided by the trier of fact. The Supreme Court will also resolve existing conflicts between and within the various circuits as to this question, and will hopefully establish a uniform standard for all plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII employment claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 701(b) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applies the Title VII prohibition against employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Does this provision limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal courts, or does it only raise an issue going to the merits of a Title VII claim?

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Anza v. Idea Steel Supply Corp.

 

Ideal Steel Supply Corporation and National Steel Supply Inc. were competitors for many years in the New York area, with facilities in Queens and later the Bronx. They each sold steel mill products and other hardware, and the owners were even related by marriage. As Ideal Steel’s sales in the Bronx dropped and National Steel’s increased, despite both companies charging the same price for their product, Ideal Steel became suspicious. In particular, Ideal Steel was concerned about National Steel’s “cash, no tax” policy, in which customers of National Steel that paid with cash did not have to pay the sales tax required by New York State. Ideal Steel filed a civil suit in federal district court alleging that the “cash, no tax” policy constituted racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, in that the failure to charge state sales tax and the filing of false sales tax returns was a pattern of mail and wire fraud intended to give National Steel an unfair competitive advantage over Ideal Steel. The district court dismissed Ideal Steel’s claim, ruling that Ideal Steel failed to allege that there was a sufficient connection between National Steel’s alleged illegal conduct and the harm to its business or lost profits. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and ordered that the suit should proceed, ruling that it was sufficient for Ideal Steel to prove that New York State relied on National Steel’s fraudulent conduct, which allowed the scheme to continue, and ultimately led to the harms alleged. The United States Supreme Court must now examine the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and determine whether a company such as Ideal Steel is injured by such violations where the company is not directly defrauded and did not rely on the illegal acts.  

The Alleged Scheme

Respondent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (“Ideal Steel”) and Petitioner Anza’s company, National Steel Supply Inc., are direct competitors in the business of selling steel mill products and other hardware in the Bronx and Queens, New York. Brief for Respondent at 3.

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