civil procedure

Microsoft Corporation v. Baker

Issues

If plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice after defeat of a class certification, can a federal appellate court review a district court order denying class certification under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291?

This case will determine whether a federal appellate court has appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their individual claims with prejudice. Microsoft Corporation argues that a federal court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review an order that denies class certification because it disregards the Supreme Court’s decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), and impedes the discretionary review created by the Court in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Microsoft also maintains there is no jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Article III’s mootness doctrine because a voluntary dismissal eliminates any adverse interests that the plaintiffs had in the case. Seth Baker et al. assert that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice created a final judgment allowing the federal appellate court to review the adverse class certification ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Furthermore, Baker argues that there is no Article III barrier preventing appellate review in this case because the individual plaintiff’s claims were impaired by the ruling and they still maintain an adverse interest in the case. The outcome of this case could impact the procedures that plaintiffs must follow when seeking a class certification. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a federal court of appeals have jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice?

Respondents Seth Baker et al. allege that a design defect in Petitioner Microsoft Corporation’s Xbox 360 game scratched the disks required for playing the console. See Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607, 609 (Cir.

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motion for directed verdict

Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert

Issues

Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)’s 14-day deadline to petition for permission to appeal is subject to equitable exceptions.

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether courts may apply equitable exceptions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)’s 14-day deadline to petition for permission to appeal. After the district court decertified the consumer class suing Nutraceutical and denied Lambert’s motion for reconsideration, Lambert filed a petition for permission to appeal under Rule 23(f) in June 2015. The Ninth Circuit held that the petition was proper because equitable exceptions applied. Nutraceutical now argues that the petition was not timely because it was filed well beyond the 14-day deadline and that equitable exceptions do not apply to Rule 23(f). Lambert contends that the petition was filed in a timely manner and that equitable exceptions make the petition proper even if the filing was not timely. This case will have implications for protecting unsophisticated litigants in class action suits as well as for judicial economy and resources.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred when it held that equitable exceptions apply to mandatory claim-processing rules—such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which establishes a 14-day deadline to file a petition for permission to appeal an order granting or denying class-action certification—and can excuse a party’s failure to file timely within the deadline specified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), in conflict with the decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 10th and 11th Circuits.

Respondent Troy Lambert (“Lambert”) brought a consumer class action in federal district court against Petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation (“Nutraceutical”), alleging that their dietary supplement product was illegally misbranded and violated numerous provisions of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulation

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Philippines v. Pimentel

 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a civil action if an unavailable party is indispensable, that is, if the court could not in good conscience proceed without that party. Foreign sovereigns can make themselves unavailable by asserting their sovereign immunity from suit. The Supreme Court will consider the interaction between these two doctrines in this interpleader action to resolve the ownership of property claimed by the Republic of the Philippines ("Philippines") and by Mariano Pimentel ("Pimentel"). The Philippines successfully asserted its sovereign immunity, and now argues that the action cannot proceed in its absence. Pimentel responds that foreign sovereigns cannot stop an interpleader action merely by claiming an interest in the property at issue and then asserting sovereign immunity. The Court's decision in this case will impact courts' ability to adjudicate title to assets claimed by foreign sovereigns. This issue is likely to become increasingly important as sovereigns make ever-greater investments in private sector assets.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Republic of the Philippines and its Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), having been dismissed from the interpleader action based on their successful assertion of sovereign immunity, had the right to appeal the district court's determination that they were not indispensable parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b); and whether the Republic of the Philippines and its PCGG have the right to seek this court's review of the Court of Appeals's opinion affirming the district court.

2. Whether a foreign government that is a "necessary" party to a lawsuit under Rule 19 (a) and has successfully asserted sovereign immunity is, under Rule 19(b), an "indispensable" party to an action brought in the courts of the United States to settle ownership of assets claimed by that government.

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res judicata

Rivers v. Guerrero

Issues

May a habeas petitioner file a new petition while a current petition is pending without having first received authorization from the court of appeals?

This case asks whether a habeas petitioner may file a new petition while a current petition is pending without having first received authorization from the court of appeals. Rivers, who was convicted of child sex crimes, filed a habeas corpus petition that was denied by the district court. While this petition was pending appellate review, Rivers filed a second habeas petition, which the district court held was successive and thus unable to be submitted without authorization from the appellate court. Rivers argues that a motion to appeal or amend a habeas petition is not successive under Section 2242. Guerrero counters that only arguments contained within the first petition can be considered without authorization from the appellate court and that Rivers’s new  arguments render the second petition successive. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the strain on the legal system and fair opportunity for review of convictions. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) applies only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or to some second-in-time filings — depending on a prisoner’s success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.

In 2012, Petitioner Danny Richard Rivers was convicted in Texas state court for child sex crimes. Rivers v.

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