Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of authority granted to the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) in setting hospital Medicare reimbursement rates for outpatient drugs. The Medicare Modernization Act (“MMA”) prescribes two alternative reimbursement rate methodologies for outpatient drugs—hospital acquisition cost or average drug price—and conditions HHS’s choice on whether HHS collects hospital drug cost-acquisition data. American Hospital Association et al. argue that MMA prevents HHS from tailoring rates to hospital acquisition costs and varying rates by group unless HHS has the requisite data. Xavier Becerra responds that MMA gives HHS the authority to “adjust” reimbursement rates as necessary, and therefore deference under Chevron permits HHS discretion to set reasonable rates. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the financial health of 340B hospitals, and the Medicare system more broadly, as well as the scope of the administrative state and judicial deference under Chevron.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether withholding a federal benefits program to a United States territory resident violates equal protection. Petitioner, the United States, asserts that, under rational basis review, Congress properly excluded Puerto Rico from the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program because of the territory’s unique tax status and fiscal autonomy. Respondent José Luis Vaello-Madero counters that Petitioner misconstrues the unique relationship between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the United States, especially regarding the Commonwealth’s contribution to the United States Treasury fund. Furthermore, Valleo-Madero emphasizes the discriminatory nature of the Commonwealth’s exclusion from the SSI program. The outcome of this case has important implications for the treatment of territories in relation to that of states, the self-governance of territories, and the distribution of social security benefits for aged and disabled individuals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a city sign code’s differential treatment of on-premises and off-premises signs constitutes a content-based regulation of speech. The City of Austin’s sign code permits on-premises, but not off-premises, signs to be digitized, and bans the construction of new off-premises signs. Austin argues that this distinction is a lawful, content-neutral regulation. Reagan National Advertising of Texas counters that Austin’s on- versus off-premises distinction constitutes an unlawful, content-based restriction under Reed v. Town of Gilbert and the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. The outcome of this case has important implications for governments considering roadway safety measures and for entities who advertise through off-premises signs like billboards.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the precise meaning of the “knowledge” standard in the Copyright Act. Section 411 of the Copyright Act provides that a copyright registration is inadequate when it includes information that was included with “knowledge that it was inaccurate.” Petitioner Unicolors, Inc. (“Unicolors”) argues that Section 411’s “knowledge” requirement excludes mistakes that are made in good faith and without fraudulent intent. Respondent H&M (“H&M”) counters that the plain meaning of the word “knowledge” indicates that so long as a copyright registrant is aware of the inaccuracy of the information, it is immaterial whether they intended to defraud. This case has significant implications for principles of statutory interpretation, copyright law, and the direction of future copyright infringement litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance the state-secrets privilege and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”). The state-secrets privilege permits the government to withhold certain information from evidence in a proceeding if that information’s disclosure would be detrimental to national security. FISA establishes procedures for judicial oversight of the government’s electronic surveillance of individuals in the United States. After the Federal Bureau of Investigation electronically surveilled Yassir Fazaga (“Fazaga”) and the Islamic Center as a part of counterterrorism efforts, Fazaga and other members of the Center filed suit based unconstitutional searches and the freedom of religion, seeking to use FISA to access the surveillance. The Federal Bureau of Investigation argues that the state-secrets privilege supersedes FISA and should be honored to avoid disclosure of privileged information that would harm national security. Yassir Fazaga counters that FISA displaces the state-secrets privilege and requires in camera and ex parte review of his religious freedom claims. The outcome of this case has strong implications for national security interests and civil liberties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether prisoners have the right to have their spiritual advisors conduct religious actions within execution chambers. Although the Supreme Court has established that there is a right to have a spiritual advisor present, this case asks the court to further define the extent to which spiritual advisors can facilitate religious practice while present. Petitioner John Henry Ramirez argues that not allowing touch or audible prayer by a spiritual advisor severely burdens his religious liberty. Respondents, including Texas Department of Criminal Justice Executive Director Bryan Collier, counter that forbidding these actions is the least restrictive option the prison has for permitting an inmate’s religious exercise while maintaining safety and security during executions. The decision in this case will affect prisons’ execution procedures and religious rights of prisoners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the United States may sue to enjoin S.B. 8, Texas’s law prohibiting medical providers from performing abortions once a heartbeat has been detected. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, the Fifth Circuit stayed the enjoinment of S.B. 8, determining that, due to the enforcement scheme delegating the authority to enforce S.B. 8 to private citizens, Whole Woman’s Health could not seek to enjoin the enforcement of S.B. 8 in federal courts. In response, the United States filed suit seeking an injunction against S.B. 8. Petitioner the United States argues that it has the authority to enjoin state judicial officers from enforcing the law in federal courts to protect its sovereign interests in protecting federal constitutional rights. Respondent Texas contends that the United States has no standing to seek injunctive relief and that sovereign authority does not permit the United States to file suit in this instance. The case has significant implications for accessing abortions and for protecting other constitutional rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Court to determine whether the enforcement scheme of S.B. 8, Texas’s law prohibiting abortion providers from performing abortions once a fetal heartbeat has been detected, shields the law from review in federal court. S.B. 8 delegates the enforcement of the law to private citizens, allowing them to file civil claims against abortion providers. Petitioner Whole Woman’s Health challenges the law in federal court, seeking to enjoin Texas state officials—including judges and judicial clerks —from enforcing the law, because as members of the judiciary they would be required to adjudicate S.B. 8 claims. Respondents Judge Austin Jackson, and other state officials, reply that, because the law explicitly delegates enforcement to private citizens, they cannot be enjoined from performing judicial functions under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. The case has significant implications for accessing abortions and for protecting constitutional rights. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine to what extent proceedings to vacate or enforce an award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) belong in federal court. The Supreme Court has previously decided that motions to compel arbitration can be heard in federal court if there is a federal question when the court “looks through” to the underlying claim. Denise Badgerow contends that the Supreme Court’s look-through approach does not apply to post-award proceedings; in her view, a plain reading of the FAA deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate post-award claims. Walters counters that federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in such instances, and that a motion to vacate an arbitration award does not deprive federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over underlying controversies. The outcome of this case has serious implications for future parties to arbitration proceedings under the FAA and for the federal district courts’ authority to enforce arbitration awards.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court whether First Amendment prohibits an elected body from censuring one of its members in response to the member’s protected speech. The Houston Community College System Board of Trustees censured David Buren Wilson, one of its elected members, after Wilson criticized the Board’s management. Petitioner Houston Community College System argues that a censure is essentially the expression of a collective opinion that cannot cause any harm cognizable under the First Amendment. Respondent David Buren Wilson responds that a censure is inherently punitive and that, in this case, the censure caused him pecuniary injury because it deprived him of access to certain funds.  This case will determine whether the First Amendment sets limits on the ability of elected bodies, such as legislatures and school boards, to discipline members for speech that a majority considers objectionable.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources