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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the categorical approach under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) should apply to “serious drug offense” determinations. Petitioner Eddie Lee Shular argues that under the ACCA, a “serious drug offense” must be considered under the same offense-matching categorical approach that is applied to a “violent felony” under the Act. Shular further argues that the “serious drug offense” provision of the statute requires a mens rea element in the prior state offense in order to qualify under the ACCA. Respondent United States counters that the categorical approach is not applicable to the “serious drug offense” provision of the ACCA, and that a mens rea element is not a requirement under the Act. The outcome of this case will affect uniformity in the criminal justice system, constitutional avoidance, and the ability of courts to limit detrimental effects and disparate impacts.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the New York Convention permits a non-signatory to an international arbitration agreement to compel a signatory to arbitrate. GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. argues that non-signatories may compel a signatory to arbitrate by invoking equitable estoppel because it is available for domestic arbitration under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act. GE further argues that this is permissible because the Convention contemplates that countries will apply their pro-arbitration domestic laws. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al. disagrees, arguing that the Convention’s text and structure impose a baseline writing requirement to show consent to arbitration. The Court’s decision will affect business parties’ calculation of their arbitration liabilities and how carefully they draft the scope of their arbitration agreements.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the extent to which there is “room for play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, namely the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. While the Free Exercise Clause forbids the government from burdening religious practice, the Establishment Clause forbids the government from advancing it. But in some instances, the government may operate in the sphere of religion—what is known as the “room for play between the joints”—without running afoul of either provision. Article X, Section 6(1) of the Montana Constitution excludes religious entities from participating in some generally applicable funding programs. In drafting the provision, legislators sought to erect a greater barrier between church and state. However, the provision may also have unduly burdened religious practice. Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson, and Jaime Schaefer—mothers who wish to use state-administered scholarship funds to send their children to religious schools—argue that Article X, Section 6(1) violates the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by forbidding scholarship recipients from using the funds to cover tuition expenses at religiously-affiliated schools. The Montana Department of Revenue counters that Article X, Section 6(1) does not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the Equal Protection Clause and does not create hostility toward religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Department contends that Article X, Section 6(1) creates a greater barrier between church and state. The outcome of this case will impact other religious entities’ ability to participate in government benefit programs, and it will impact the national debate over school choice programs.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether ERISA plan participants have standing to sue for breaches of fiduciary duty where the underlying employee benefit plan is overfunded. Thole and Smith argue that they have standing under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)–(3) and the common law of trusts because neither conditions standing on a showing of individual financial loss. U.S. Bank counters that Thole and Smith have not suffered an injury sufficient to support standing because their retirement benefits were never actually at risk and they have no interest in a plan’s overfunded surplus. The outcome of this case will determine the circumstances in which certain plan participants may enforce ERISA violations.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a plaintiff must show that an entity willfully infringed on a trademark in order to be awarded the infringer’s profits for violating the Lanham Act. Romag Fasteners, Inc. argues that the plain text of Section 1117(a) and the structure of the Lanham Act omits a willfulness requirement, and the phrase “subject to the principles of equity” in Section 1117(a) does not justify such a requirement. Fossil, Inc. counters that the textual analysis of Section 1117(a) should incorporate traditional principles of equity that require willfulness for profits awards because the text expressly allows for consideration of equitable principles. The outcome of this case has important implications for the rights of trademark holders and awards of damages.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether courts can prevent a defendant from raising a defense if the defendant failed to assert that defense against the same plaintiff in a prior, similar lawsuit. The Second Circuit recognized “defense preclusion” as a valid civil procedure concept to bar Lucky Brands Dungarees from raising a new defense in a trademark infringement lawsuit against Marcel Fashions Group where Lucky Brands Dungarees could have raised this defense in a previous lawsuit over the same alleged infringement. Lucky Brands Dungarees contends that applying defense preclusion against a defendant conflicts with fundamental principles of res judicata and is a novel invention by the Second Circuit that is harmful to defendants whose interests change over time. Marcel Fashions Group counters that defense preclusion is a logical feature of res judicata and argues that this doctrine clearly applies to defendants who, after losing a lawsuit, do not change their conduct. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact when and how defendants strategically raise defenses in civil litigation.

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In 2010, two public officials, Bridget Anne Kelly and William E. Baroni, Jr., reallocated two toll lanes on the George Washington Bridge’s upper level to punish Fort Lee’s mayor for refusing to endorse then-New Jersey governor Chris Christie’s re-election campaign. Despite disguising this corrupt act as a traffic study, Kelly and Baroni were indicted for and convicted of wire fraud, defrauding a federally funded entity, and conspiracy to defraud. Petitioner Kelly and Respondent Baroni now argue that the Port Authority was never deprived of a legally-protected property right and that fraud cannot have occurred because the alleged victim received exactly what was bargained for, even though the public officials lied about their true intentions. Respondent United States contends that the Port Authority was deprived of a property right because Kelly and Baroni’s traffic-study lie encumbered the Port Authority’s exclusive free use of the George Washington Bridge and because neither Kelly nor Baroni had the authority to make such drastic changes. The outcome of this case has implications on future politics and whether political corruption should be prosecuted as a federal crime.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under Section 633a(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), federal-sector plaintiffs must show that age discrimination was the but-for cause of an adverse employment action, or whether federal-sector plaintiffs must merely show that their age was a motivating factor for the adverse action. Section 633a(a) states that employment decisions affecting employees or applicants at least 40 years of age “shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” Noris Babb, a clinical pharmacist, sued Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Robert Wilkie alleging, among other claims, age and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the ADEA after she was denied a promotion, training, and two clinic positions. Babb argues that Section 633a(a) requires her only to prove that age was a motivating factor in the VA’s adverse personnel decisions. Wilkie, on the other hand, contends that Section 633a(a) requires Babb to prove that age was the but-for cause of—that is, the actual reason for—the employment decisions. This case has implications on the ability of federal-sector workers to prove age discrimination claims under the ADEA.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) precludes judicial review of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“the Board”) decision to grant an inter partes review after determining that an effective statute of limitations under Section 315(b) does not apply. Thryv, Inc., contends that the plain language of Sections 314(d) and 315(b) and relevant Supreme Court precedent renders such decisions nonappealable. Click-To-Call Technologies counters that the plain language of Section 314(d) contains nothing to indicate that judicial review of the Board’s interpretation of Section 315(b) is prohibited, and that Supreme Court precedent has confirmed this understanding. The outcome of this case will have important implications on the scope of administrative power, incentives for product innovation, and the integrity of the patent system.

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This case arises out of a custody dispute between an Italian father, Domenico Taglieri, and an American mother, Michelle Monasky, whose marriage had deteriorated, and where the mother had removed the child to the United States before a court could determine the parents’ custody rights. To determine whether the child must be returned to Italy, the Supreme Court must decide whether to uphold the Sixth Circuit’s order to return the child based on its affirmation of the district court’s determination that the child habitually resided in Italy. Monasky argues that the Hague Convention’s text supports an actual-agreement standard for habitual residence, and that the Hague Convention does not contemplate courts imposing habitual residence on a child when the child’s situation in the state would be precarious and the child lacks meaningful connections with the state. She further argues that the statute, appellate history, and the mixed legal and factual nature of habitual residence support de novo review. Taglieri responds that the lower courts properly applied a fact-sensitive analysis of the child’s situation in Italy and, furthermore, that if “actual agreement” were required, the Hague Convention would under-protect children in hotly disputed custody cases who most need protection. He also contends that clear-error review should apply because habitual residence issues are more factual than legal, and because such review is more expedient, consistent with the Hague Convention’s aims. The outcome of this case will have implications for international child abduction and custody cases involving claims of domestic violence.

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