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Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.

Issues

Does an arbitration agreement containing a provision that excludes certain claims from arbitration negate a provision in the same agreement that delegates the question of whether an issue should be heard by an arbitrator, rather than a court?


This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an arbitration agreement that incorporates the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) rules delegates the question of arbitrability to the arbitrators, in light of an express exclusion clause for injunctive relief, where the plaintiff sought both damages and injunctive relief. The arbitration agreement at issue in this case includes a “carve-out” provision excluding from arbitration any claims seeking injunctive relief. Rule 7(A) of the AAA’s rules states that the arbitrator has the power to rule on the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim. Petitioner Henry Schein, Inc. argues that the incorporation of the AAA rules “clearly and unmistakably” delegates all questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that, because some issues are delegated to the arbitrator, the presumption of arbitrability should be read to delegate to the arbitrator the question of the application of the exclusion clause. On the other hand, Respondent Archer and White Sales, Inc. contends that the question of arbitrability should remain for the court to decide because of the explicit carve-out exemption. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the efficiency and fairness of dispute resolution.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a provision in an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negates an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator.

The dispute in this case originates from 2016. Respondent Archer and White Sales, Inc. ("Archer") is a distributor of dental equipment, purportedly nationally recognized for its low prices and quality service. Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., (E.D. Tex. 2017) at 1. Archer competed directly against Petitioner Henry Schein, Inc. ("Henry Schein"), the country’s largest distributor of dental equipment.

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Republic of Hungary v. Simon

Issues

Do district courts have the discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons pertaining to international comity?

 This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the common-law doctrine of international comity provides federal courts with the discretion to dismiss claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). Respondent the Republic of Hungary argues that the FSIA must be construed in light of international comity doctrine, and that the federal court should defer to Hungary as Hungary’s interests in hearing this case outweigh those of the United States. Petitioners Rosalie Simon and other Hungarian Holocaust survivors argue that the FSIA has displaced common law and that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction in cases such as this one, where a sovereign state has failed to provide an adequate alternate forum. The outcome of this case will have implications on foreign policy, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, and the remedies available to the victims of Holocaust.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court may abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons of international comity, in a matter in which former Hungarian nationals have sued the nation of Hungary to recover the value of property lost in Hungary during World War II but the plaintiffs made no attempt to exhaust local Hungarian remedies.

During World War II, Hungary undertook a systematic campaign to eradicate its Jewish population. Simon v. Republic of Hungary, (D.C. Cir. 2018) at 1175. As part of this campaign, the Hungarian government stripped Jews of their belongings. Id. Government officials went “home to home, inventorying and confiscating Jewish property.” Simon v.

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Van Buren v. United States

Issues

Does an individual “exceed authorized access” under the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) when the individual is authorized to access information on a computer for a specific purpose but accesses that information for an impermissible purpose?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the scope of the “exceeds authorized access” clause of the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). A person violates the CFAA when the person “accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information” from the computer. Petitioner Van Buren was a policeman who was authorized to access a law enforcement database. For reasons unrelated to his job, he used that access to search a license plate for financial gain. Respondent United States contends that when Van Buren accessed the database for a reason unrelated to his job, he exceeded his authorized access and violated the CFAA. Van Buren argues that he did not exceed his authorized access because the “exceeds authorized access” provision does not punish individuals who misuse information they are otherwise authorized to access. The outcome of this case will have broad implications on how employers protect sensitive data and how prosecutors can pursue hacking and computer fraud. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violates Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses the same information for an improper purpose.

Nathan Van Buren, a police sergeant in Cumming, Georgia, befriended Andrew Albo, a man who had previously been arrested by Van Buren. United States v. Van Buren at 1197. Albo frequently paid prostitutes for services, and Van Buren helped managed disputes arising from those interactions. Id. 

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Trump v. New York

Issues

Does New York have standing to challenge President Trump’s memorandum excluding undocumented immigrants from the apportionment base of the 2020 U.S. decennial census? If so, is it lawful for the President to exclude undocumented immigrants unlawfully residing in the United States from the congressional apportionment base in the 2020 U.S. decennial census?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the president may exclude undocumented immigrants when apportioning congressional seats by population. On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump issued a memorandum declaring that the United States would exclude undocumented immigrants from the congressional apportionment base. Trump argues that New York lacks standing to bring this case since 2020 census questionnaires are no longer being collected and it cannot point to how much federal funding or congressional representation certain states stand to lose. Trump further contends that even if New York has standing, Trump has discretion not to count undocumented immigrants for apportionment purposes. New York asserts that it has standing because it has demonstrated that the memorandum will deter undocumented immigrants from participating in the 2020 decennial census. Moreover, New York asserts that federal statutes require the government to make funding decisions based on the total population count and that certain states could lose congressional representation if the memorandum is implemented. Finally, New York argues that the Census Act, Reapportionment Act, and the Constitution prevent the president from exercising discretion to exclude undocumented immigrants from the census. The outcome of this case has implications for the apportionment of representatives from states with large undocumented populations and the participation of undocumented immigrants in the decennial census.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether a group of states and local governments have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a July 21, 2020, memorandum by President Donald Trump instructing the secretary of commerce to include in his report on the 2020 census information enabling the president to exclude noncitizens from the base population number for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) whether the memorandum is a permissible exercise of the president’s discretion under the provisions of law governing congressional apportionment.

The U.S. Constitution mandates that an “actual enumeration” of the population be conducted every ten years, so that the resulting number can be used to apportion congressional seats. New York v.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Thomas Manahan and Stephen Yale-Loehr for their guidance and insight into this case.

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Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe

Issues

Under the Alien Tort Statute, can domestic corporations be held liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses—specifically, child slavery—in a foreign country, when the aiding and abetting allegedly occurred on U.S. soil?

This case asks the Court to determine whether domestic corporations may be held liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations committed in foreign countries. Petitioners Nestlé and Cargill contracted for exclusive buyer-seller contracts with cocoa plantations on the Ivory Coast; Respondents John Doe et. al. were child slaves on those farms. John Doe alleges that Nestlé and Cargill aided and abetted the farmers from headquarters in the United States by providing monetary support while aware of the widespread use of child slavery on those farms, thus making them liable under the Alien Tort Statute. Nestlé and Cargill counter that the harm inflicted upon John Doe occurred exclusively on foreign soil, making the case impermissibly extraterritorial; furthermore, they argue recent Court cases determined that corporations were immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute. The Court’s decision in this case will implicate political questions of foreign policy and foreign affairs, corporate incentives to invest in developing countries, and the United States’ support for human rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute may overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that activity; and (2) whether the judiciary has the authority under the Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations.

In the Ivory Coast, cocoa plantations utilize child slaves to produce cheap cocoa. Doe I v.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Muna Ndulo for his guidance and insights into this case. The authors would like to thank Professor Muna Ndulo for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Edwards v. Vannoy

Issues

Does the right to a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal court, decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, apply retroactively?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Ramos v. Louisiana, which held that a criminal defendant charged in state court can only be convicted by a unanimous jury, applies retroactively to cases that were finalized before Ramos was decided. Petitioner Thedrick Edwards was convicted under Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury rule and contends that Ramos recognized an ancient guarantee of criminal procedure that should be given retroactive effect under Teague v. Lane. Alternatively, Edwards asserts that Ramos enunciated a new watershed rule that must be applied retroactively because of the importance of juror unanimity to ensure accurate convictions. In response, Respondent Darrel Vannoy, the Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, argues that Ramos overruled Apodaca v. Oregon and announced a new rule that significantly changes criminal proceedings in states that allowed conviction by nonunanimous juries. Additionally, Vannoy claims that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1966 independently bars the retroactive application of Ramos. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for individuals seeking retrial for guilty verdicts decided by nonunanimous juries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), applies retroactively to cases on federal collateral review.

Ryan Eaton drove to his girlfriend’s apartment near Louisiana State University on May 13, 2006, around 11:30 P.M. Edwards v. Cain, Report and Recommendation at 3. As Eaton exited the vehicle, two armed assailants abducted him and took him to the ATM to withdraw cash, then to Eaton’s apartment to steal some personal property, and then to Eaton’s girlfriend’s apartment where the assailants raped two women at gun point. Id. at 4.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

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DOJ v. House Committee on the Judiciary

Issues

In conducting an impeachment investigation and trial, does the House Committee on the Judiciary act in the same role as an ordinary court that oversees litigation between parties? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an impeachment trial before a legislative body qualifies as a “judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Department of Justice (DOJ) argues that an impeachment inquiry is not a judicial proceeding, and therefore, President Trump’s impeachment trial is not subject to the exception to grand-jury secrecy for judicial proceedings and can remain redacted. The House Committee on the Judiciary counters that the Committee plays the same role during its impeachment inquiry as an ordinary court that oversees litigation between parties, and therefore, the impeachment inquiry is a judicial proceeding. As such, the House Committee demands access to unredacted transcripts and all other documents that special counsel Robert Mueller’s grand jury considered. The outcome of this case determines whether House Democrats can gain access to Mueller’s report on President Trump’s alleged interference with Mueller’s investigation as part of their ongoing impeachment inquiry and the extent of the House Committees’ access to information in future impeachment inquiries. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an impeachment trial before a legislative body is a “judicial proceeding” under Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In May 2017, an investigation was conducted to determine whether members of President Trump’s election campaign had cooperated with the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 presidential election. In re Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“In re Comm.

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CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service

Issues

Does the Anti-Injunction Act bar pre-enforcement challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act to newly promulgated agency guidelines that include discretionary tax-penalty enforcement provisions, or is the act narrowly confined to direct tax assessments and collections?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act and to determine whether it bars pre-enforcement legal challenges to agency guidelines and regulations that incorporate a tax-penalty enforcement mechanism into the framework. CIC Services argues that the Supreme Court should construe the Administrative Procedure Act’s review provisions broadly enough and the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibitory provisions narrowly enough to provide material tax advisors relief from the Internal Revenue Service’s new interpretative guidelines concerning reportable transactions. The Internal Revenue Service counters that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to CIC’s challenge so the lawsuit is barred and that none of the available exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act’s provisions apply to CIC’s sought injunction. This case has important implications for corporations whose business involves reporting earnings to the Internal Revenue Service, as well as for federal agencies’ abilities to avoid lawsuits by tying in certain tax-penalty provisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bars challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates issued by administrative agencies that are not taxes.

The Internal Revenue Service has the authority to require taxpayers and some third parties to submit certain records about “reportable transactions.” CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Serv. at 249. The Internal Revenue Service also defines what constitutes a reportable transaction.

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Brownback v. King

Issues

Does a judgment in favor of the United States on state law tort claims brought under Section 1346(b)(1) of the Federal Tort Claims Act necessarily preclude a plaintiff from seeking recourse under Bivens for a civil rights violation stemming from the same underlying factual allegations?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a judgment against the plaintiff on a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim, alleging violations under state tort law, bars the plaintiff from pursuing a constitutional remedy under Bivens. Petitioner Douglas Brownback contends that the district court’s dismissal of Respondent James King’s FTCA claims on the basis of his failure to establish the elements of Section 1346(b) constitutes a final judgment on the merits of all claims pertaining to the same subject matter. Brownback argues that consistent with the purpose of the statute, Section 2676 of the FTCA bars King from pursuing his Bivens action. King counters that the judgment bar should be interpreted to incorporate the doctrine of res judicata, which precludes subsequent claims only if a court with jurisdiction has entered a judgment on the merits. King argues that since no such jurisdiction exists over the claims in this case, his Bivens action should not be barred. The outcome of this case has significant implications for plaintiffs’ access to courts and the avenues for relief plaintiffs may pursue to hold government officials accountable for state tort and constitutional violations.    

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a final judgment in favor of the United States in an action brought under Section 1346(b)(1) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, on the ground that a private person would not be liable to the claimant under state tort law for the injuries alleged, bars a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics that is brought by the same claimant, based on the same injuries, and against the same governmental employees whose acts gave rise to the claimant’s FTCA claim.

On July 18, 2014, Officer Ted Allen, a detective with the Grand Rapids Police, and Agent Douglas Brownback, a special agent with the FBI, participated in a joint fugitive task force in search of a criminal suspect pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the State of Michigan. King v.

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California v. Texas

Issues

Do the individual and state plaintiffs have standing to challenge the amended individual mandate provision of the ACA; and, if they do, is the provision unconstitutional because Congress reduced the penalty for non-compliance with the provision to zero; and, finally, if the provision is unconstitutional, can it be severed from the rest of the ACA?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the status of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) after Congress amended the ACA’s individual mandate in 2017. When Congress enacted the ACA in 2010, the individual mandate required individuals to maintain health insurance or pay a penalty. In 2012, the Court upheld the individual mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s Taxing Power. In 2017, as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress lowered the individual mandate’s penalty for failing to maintain health insurance to zero dollars. Texas contends that by setting the penalty for non-compliance to zero dollars, Congress rendered the individual mandate unconstitutional because it no longer is a valid exercise of Congress’s Taxing Power. Texas further argues that the individual mandate is not severable from the rest of the ACA, requiring the Supreme Court to strike down the entirety of the ACA. California disputes this. As a threshold matter, California contends that the opposing parties do not have standing to bring this claim because they have not been injured by the penalty of zero dollars. But even if they have standing, California argues that the individual mandate is constitutional. Finally, if it is not constitutional, California contends that the individual mandate can be severed from the rest of the ACA. This case, and the viability of the ACA, has drastic policy implications for the millions of Americans who rely on the ACA for their health insurance.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the individual and state plaintiffs in this case have established Article III standing to challenge the minimum-coverage provision in Section 5000A(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA); (2) whether reducing the amount specified in Section 5000A(c) to zero rendered the minimum-coverage provision unconstitutional; and (3) if so, whether the minimum-coverage provision is severable from the rest of the ACA.

In March 2010, President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) into law. Texas v. United States at 2. The ACA’s proponents hoped to expand healthcare coverage while offsetting the costs of rising health insurance premiums.

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