Mayo Foundation v. United States

Issues

Whether (1) Congress intended that the term “student” be given a broad construction under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, and (2) the Treasury Department’s regulation construing “student” to exclude medical residents is arbitrary and unreasonable?

 

The Mayo Foundation is suing for a refund of FICA taxes paid on behalf of its medical residents. The IRS claims that medical residents are not students and thus are not eligible for the FICA exemption for student employment. The Treasury Department released regulations that deny the student exemption to any employee that works more than 40 hours per a week. The Mayo Foundation contends that the IRS’s interpretation of the term “student” is incorrect and contrary to congressional intent. If the court rules that medical residents are students, this could lead to significant tax savings for hospitals and residents while reducing the availability of worker protections for medical residents.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Treasury Department can categorically exclude all medical residents and other  fulltime  employees from the definition of “student” in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10), which exempts from Social Security taxes “service performed in the employ of a school, college, or university” by a “student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school, college, or university.”

FICA Tax

The tax dispute between the Respondent, United States of America (“IRS”), and the Petitioners, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Mayo Clinic, and Regents of the University of Minnesota (“Mayo”), is over whether Mayo is responsible for paying 

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Inside Higher Ed, Doug Lederman: High Court to Hear Tax Case (June 2, 2010)

chamberofcommerce.org, Tax Information Guide

 

 

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Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.

Issues

Whether the possible “transformations” of body chemistry involved in giving  a patient prescription drugs  and testing the patient's blood for a naturally occurring correlation are enough to validate a patent for the correlation.

 

In this case, the Supreme Court will evaluate the validity of two patents held by Respondent Prometheus Laboratories. Prometheus had marketed a multistep medical test based on these patents, which describe the proper dosage range of powerful immunosuppressive drugs. However, after Petitioner Mayo Medical Laboratories announced its intention to market a competing medical test in 2004, Prometheus sued for patent infringement. Mayo now argues that the patents are invalid because they seek to monopolize a natural phenomenon, preempting all other uses of a naturally occurring correlation between metabolites and patient health. Prometheus, on the other hand, argues that the patents are valid because they involve concrete applications and cover patentable correlations, not just natural phenomena. The  decision in this case  may affect the cost and quality of patient health care, as well as the incentives for research and development in the medical industry.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 35 U.S.C. § 101 is satisfied by a patent claim that covers observed correlations between blood test results and patient health, so that the claim effectively preempts all uses of the naturally occurring correlations, simply because well-known methods used to administer prescription drugs and test blood may involve “transformations” of body chemistry.

Petitioner Mayo Collaborative Services (“Mayo”) is a for-profit medical laboratory operating within the Mayo Clinic, a charitable institution providing medical education, research, and clinical care. See Brief for Petitioner, Mayo Collaborative Services at 8. The Mayo laboratory is recognized in particular for its treatment of autoimmune diseases, including gastrointestinal conditions like 

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Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano

Issues

Where an individual must show that a company has misrepresented or omitted a material fact in order to claim a violation of the Securities Exchange Act, should a court apply a standard of statistical significance to determine whether the omitted or misrepresented fact is material?

 

Petitioners, Matrixx Initiatives Inc. and three of its officers (“Matrixx”), argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in allowing respondents, James Siracusano and other Matrixx shareholders (“Siracusano”), to sue under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for Matrixx’s alleged failure to share product information with its shareholders. Specifically, Siracusano claims that Matrixx should have disclosed so-called adverse event reports that linked one of its products, Zicam Cold Remedy (“Zicam”), to anosmia, a condition that affects an individual’s ability to smell. Supreme Court precedent provides that, as part of the plaintiff’s case in showing a securities violation, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant misrepresented or omitted a material fact. In arguing that it was not required to disclose the studies, Matrixx relies on a statistical significance standard in determining whether the studies linking the drug to anosmia were material. Siracusano rejects the statistical significance standard, arguing that Matrixx should have shared such studies with investors regardless of the significance of the statistical correlation between Zicam and anosmia. The Ninth Circuit rejected the statistical significance standard and engaged in a factual analysis of Siracusano’s claims, finding that the allegations were sufficient. The Supreme Court will decide whether shareholders' ability to state a claim turns on the statistical significance of the withheld information, or whether a factual analysis is required.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Respondents filed suit under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, alleging that petitioners committed securities fraud by failing to disclose "adverse event" reports-i.e., reports by users of a drug that they experienced an adverse event after using the drug. The First, Second, and Third Circuits have held that drug companies have no duty to disclose adverse event reports until the reports provide statistically significant evidence that the adverse events may be caused by, and are not simply randomly associated with, a drug's use. Expressly disagreeing with those decisions, the Ninth Circuit below rejected a statistical significance standard and allowed the case to proceed despite the lack of any allegation that the undisclosed adverse event reports were statistically significant.

The question presented is: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 based on a pharmaceutical company's nondisclosure of adverse event reports even though the reports are not alleged to be statistically significant.

Between October 22, 2003 and February 6, 2004, Respondent James Siracusano bought thousands of shares in Petitioner Matrixx Initiatives Inc. (“Matrixx”). See Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. 04-1012, 2005 WL 3970117, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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Mathis v. United States

Issues

How should sentencing courts determine whether a defendant has satisfied the predicate felonies necessary to mandate a higher minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

 

The Supreme Court will decide how a sentencing court using the “modified categorical approach” should determine if a defendant felon has satisfied the predicate felonies necessary to mandate a higher minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Mathis argues that the “modified categorical approach” can be based only on the text of the state criminal statute as well as state court analysis of its elements, without regard to the court record or the means necessary to accomplish an element. The United States contends that the standard is simply that criminal statutes phrased in the disjunctive are divisible and that courts may then use court documents under the “modified categorical approach” to determine if the defendant was convicted of the generic crime. This decision will impact the severity of prison terms for many prior felons and has great repercussions for noncitizen felons. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Must a predicate prior conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), qualify as such under the elements of the offense simpliciter, without extending the modified categorical approach to separate statutory definitional provisions that merely establish the means by which referenced elements may be satisfied rather than stating alternative elements or versions of the offense?

In March 2013, Richard Mathis (“Mathis”) was accused of forcibly molesting a teenage boy. See United States v. Richard Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.

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Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak and Salazar v. Patchak (Consolidated)

Issues

1. Whether the Quiet Title Act preserves sovereign immunity in challenges brought against federal Indian trust lands when the action does not claim personal title to the land.

2. Whether a private claimant who alleges injuries, derived from the operation of a gaming facility on Indian trust lands, has prudential standing to sue under the Indian Reorganization Act.

 

The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of the Pottawatomi Indians (“the Band”) requested that the Secretary of the Interior take certain lands in trust under the Indian Reorganization Act in order to allow the tribe to operate a casino under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. David Patchak, a nearby resident, sued to block the land transfer. The district court dismissed his suit for lack of prudential standing to sue. The court of appeals reversed, and further held that under the Administrative Procedures Act the federal government had expressly disclaimed sovereign immunity. On appeal, the Petitioners—both the federal government and the Band—argue that Patchak’s claim is blocked by the government’s sovereign immunity, invoked by the Quiet Title Act, in claims brought to divest the government of Indian trust lands. In addition, Petitioners contend that Patchak’s interests in the suit do not fall within the zone of interests of the operative statute—the Indian Reorganization Act—and thus Patchak lacks prudential standing. Patchak argues that because his claim challenges agency action under the Administrative Procedures Act, it falls outside the Quiet Title Act and the sovereign immunity invocation. Patchak contends that his interest in the land’s use falls within the IRA’s zone of interests and establishes prudential standing. The Supreme Court’s decision in the case will resolve a standing circuit split on whether the Quiet Title Act applies to cases in which the plaintiff’s interest in divesting the title is something other than a claim of ownership to the land.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Quiet Title Act and its reservation of the sovereign immunity in suits involving "trust or restricted Indian lands" apply to all suits concerning land in which the "claims an interest," 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), as the Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or whether they apply only when the plaintiff claims title to the land, as the D.C. Circuit held.

Whether 5 U.S.C. 702 waives the sovereign immunity of the United States from a suit challenging its title to lands that it holds in trust for an Indian Tribe.

2. Whether prudential standing to sue under federal law can be based on either (i) the plaintiff’s ability to "police" an agency's compliance with the law, as held by the D.C. Circuit but rejected by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, or (ii) interests protected by a different federal statute than the one on which suit is based, as held by the D.C. Circuit but rejected by the Federal Circuit.

Whether a private individual who alleges injuries resulting from the operation of a gaming facility on Indian trust land has prudential standing to challenge the decision of the Secretary of the Interior to take title to that land in trust, on the ground that the decision was not authorized by the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.

The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of the Pottawatomi Indians (“the Band”), a federally-recognized tribe, owned 147 acres of land, known as the Bradley Tract, in Wayland Township, Michigan. See Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d. 702, 703 (D.C. Cir.

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Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency

Issues

Where the EPA Administrator is required by the Clean Air Act to set auto emission standards for pollutants that may endanger public health, may the Administrator decline to do so for policy reasons not specifically found in the Clean Air Act and does the EPA Administrator actually have authority to regulate certain air pollutants associated with climate change under the Clean Air Act?

 

In October 1999, several environmental groups petitioned the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) to use its power to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles. According to these groups, greenhouse gases should be classified as “air pollutants,” which can be regulated under the Clean Air Act if they “can be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Among the possible “dangers” to welfare, the Clean Air Act lists effects on “weather” and “climate.” However, almost four years later, the EPA officially denied the petition, saying that the Clean Air Act did not give the EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and, even if it did, the EPA would deny the exercise of such authority. According to the EPA, the causal link between greenhouse gases and global warming has not been proven conclusively. Clearly, the Court’s decision in this case will have a significant effect on federal, state, and local efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, the Court’s decision could determine the amount of deference that a federal agency should receive in its determinations and could lend credibility to particular side of the scientific argument concerning the tie of greenhouse gases to global warming.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the EPA Administrator may decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy considerations not enumerated in section 202(a)(1) [of the Clean Air Act].

2. Whether the EPA Administrator has authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associated with climate change under section 202(a)(1).

In October of 1999, the International Center for Technology Assessment (the “CTA”) petitioned the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide and three other greenhouse gasses released by motor vehicles as per § 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 7521(a)(1).

Additional Resources

Law about... Environmental law

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Maryland v. Shatzer

Issues

Is a confession made by a criminal defendant more than two years and six months after invoking his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel admissible in court?

 

In 2003, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution, invoked his Miranda rights, refusing to speak about alleged sexual child abuse without an attorney present. The investigation into Shatzer’s alleged sexual child abuse was closed later that year. In 2006, upon further evidence, the police opened a new investigation on the same matter and re-interrogated Shatzer, who had remained incarcerated for an unrelated offense during the entire interval. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made certain admissions. At trial, Shatzer moved to suppress the statements he made in 2006, arguing that the police’s re-interrogation violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, which held that, once a suspect requests counsel, the police and/or prosecutor may not subject that suspect to further interrogations until counsel is made available. Maryland argues that this presumption does not apply here due to (1) a break in police custody and (2) a substantial passage of time between Shatzer’s request for counsel and the subsequent interrogation. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with Shatzer, holding that the Circuit Court for Washington County erred by admitting Shatzer’s statements. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely impact the manner in which the police and prosecutors approach and interview suspects who have invoked their right to counsel.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is the Edwards v. Arizona prohibition against interrogation of a suspect who has invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel inapplicable if, after the suspect asks for counsel, there is a break in custody or a substantial lapse in time (more than two years and six months) before commencing reinterrogation pursuant to Miranda?

In 2003, the Hagerstown Police Department (“Police Department”) began investigating Respondent, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), for alleged sexual abuse of his three-year-old son. See Shatzer v. Maryland, 954 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Md. Ct. App.

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Martinez v. Ryan

Issues

Does a criminal defendant have the right to effective assistance of counsel during a collateral post-conviction proceeding when that proceeding presents the defendant’s first opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim?

 

Petitioner Luis Mariano Martinez, a convicted felon serving consecutive terms of 35 years to life, filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief in federal court. Martinez alleges that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. Because his appellate counsel failed to raise that ineffective-assistance claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, an Arizona court precluded the claim on procedural grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Martinez did not have the right to counsel during his post-conviction proceeding, and concluded that he may not claim ineffective assistance at that stage in order to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, Martinez is barred from raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, regardless of whether his post-conviction counsel rendered him ineffective assistance and caused the procedural default that precluded his trial-level claim. Martinez argues that he has a constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim; he concludes that ineffective post-conviction counsel should negate the procedural default with respect to his ineffective-trial-counsel claim in this federal habeas proceeding. Respondent Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, asserts that defendants do not have a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, concluding from this that the ineffective assistance of Martinez’s post-conviction counsel cannot negate his procedural default. In this decision, the Supreme Court will have to weigh the possibility that poorly-represented defendants will lose ineffective-assistance claims due to procedural defaults against the benefits of efficient state criminal proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.

Petitioner Luis Mariano Martinez was convicted in an Arizona state trial court for sexual conduct with a person under fifteen years old and was sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms of 35 years to life. See Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 733 (9th Cir.

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Martel v. Clair

Issues

Whether a state death row inmate is entitled to receive new court-appointed counsel based on claims that his first court-appointed counsel was not investigating facts or pursuing claims that the inmate believes are material to his habeas corpus proceeding.

 

In 1987, a California jury convicted Respondent Kenneth Clair of the murder of Linda Rodgers, sentencing him to death. Clair filed a habeas corpus petition requesting new court-appointed counsel in 1995, but the district court rejected his request. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision, and remanded to allow Clair’s new attorney to present additional claims. Clair argues that the district court abused its discretion by not properly investigating Clair’s request for substitute counsel, and consequently that he (Clair) must be allowed to make new claims and present additional evidence in the interests of justice. The State of California, however, argues that Clair should not be permitted to circumvent the workings of the justice system by rearguing his case merely because of dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the standard courts use in granting requests from habeas petitioners for substitute counsel, as well as the finality of appellate denials of habeas petitions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a condemned state prisoner in federal habeas corpus proceedings is entitled to replace his court-appointed counsel with another court-appointed lawyer just because he expresses dissatisfaction and alleges that his counsel was failing to pursue  the potentially important evidence.

Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in 1987 for the murder of Linda Rodgers. See People v. Clair, 2 Cal.4th 629, 645 (Cal.

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