Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

Issues

If water from an interstate river travels through a human-engineered stormwater channeling system before it returns into a lower portion of the same river, does the addition of polluted stormwater constitute a “discharge” from an “outfall” as defined under the Clean Water Act, even though the Supreme Court has previously decided that there can be no “discharge” when water is transferred within a single body of water?

 

Between 2002 and 2008, the Los Angeles County Flood Control District repeatedly detected impermissible levels of water pollution in its stormwater channeling system, the MS4, which collects and transports stormwater runoff through rivers flowing to the Pacific Ocean. The levels were impermissible because they exceeded the pollution amounts allowed to the District through a state-issued permit pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act. The Natural Resources Defense Council and Santa Monica Baykeeper commenced an action, seeking to impose liability on the District for its permit violations in four rivers. The District argues that this case is resolved by the Court’s earlier decision that transferring water within a single water body does not add anything. Its opponents argue that the earlier decision does not apply because the District’s permit establishes that the District discharges pollutants. The Supreme Court’s holding will determine what kinds of precautions a municipality must take to design water treatment systems that comply with the permit system of the Clean Water Act. This decision will impact the way that state and local government agencies plan to reduce pollution and allocate their risks and resources.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Clean Water Act regulates the addition of pollutants to the navigable waters of the United States, including pollutants stemming from municipal stormwater systems. 33 U.S.C. §1342(p).

The questions presented by this petition are:

1. Do "navigable waters of the United States" include only "naturally occurring" bodies of water so that construction of engineered channels or other man-made improvements to a river as part of municipal flood and storm control renders the improved portion no longer a "navigable water" under the Clean Water Act?

2. When water flows from one portion of a river that is navigable water of the United States, through a concrete channel or other engineered improvement in the river constructed for flood and stormwater control as part of a municipal separate storm sewer system, into a lower portion of the same river, can there be a "discharge" from an "outfall" under the Clean Water Act, notwithstanding this Court's holding in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105 (2004), that transfer of water within a single body of water cannot constitute a "discharge" for purposes of the Act?

After rainstorms, unabsorbed stormwater that flows over urban areas collects pollution, ultimately carrying it into rivers and oceans. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (“NRDC”), 673 F.3d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir.

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Lopez v. Gonzales; Toledo-Flores v. United States

Issues

If a permanent resident of the United States is convicted in state court of a drug offense that state law classifies as a felony but that federal law classifies as a misdemeanor, should the offense qualify as an “aggravated felony” for the purposes of federal immigration and sentencing law, resulting in deportation and harsher sentencing under federal law?

 

Both Jose Antonio Lopez and Reymundo Toledo-Flores are permanent residents of the United States who were convicted of drug crimes that are felonies at the state level but misdemeanors under federal law. The government argues that both Lopez’s and Toledo-Flores’s crimes qualify as “aggravated felonies.” If that is the case, Lopez will be barred from seeking a waiver of the deportation order issued against him while Toledo-Flores will be subject to a stricter sentence under the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Lopez and Toledo-Flores argue that their drug crimes do not meet the definition of an aggravated felony because they are not felonies under federal law. Thus, the Court must decide whether drug offenses that are state felonies but federal misdemeanors satisfy the federal statutory definition of aggravated felony.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Lopez v. Gonzales

Whether an immigrant who is convicted in state court of a drug crime that is a felony under the state’s law but would only be a misdemeanor under federal law has committed an “aggravated felony” for purposes of the immigration laws.

Toledo-Flores v. United States

Has the Fifth Circuit erred in holding – in opposition to the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits – that a state felony conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance is a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) and hence an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), even though the same crime is a misdemeanor under federal law?

Lopez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005)

Jose Antonio Lopez is a permanent resident of the United States. A South Dakota state court convicted Lopez of aiding and abetting the possession of a controlled substance, a felony crime in South Dakota. Lopez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir. 2005).

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Long Island Care at Home v. Coke

Issues

Must a federal court defer to a Department of Labor regulation that interprets the Fair Labor Standards Act as exempting home care workers employed by agencies or other third parties if the regulation was published under the heading “Interpretations?”

 

The Fair Labor Standards Act sets the minimum wage and other mandatory benefits for workers. Homecare workers such as babysitters and companions to the elderly are exempt from its provisions when employed directly for the family they work for, but what about when they are employed by a third party provider of such services? After following a notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure the Department of Labor said, in 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) under the heading “interpretations,” that such third-party employed workers are exempt from the minimum wage requirement. Coke, a homecare worker employed by third-party provider Long Island Care at Home, brought suit questioning the validity of § 109(a). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the regulation was unenforceable. The United States Supreme Court now takes up the question of whether the Second Circuit gave the proper amount of deference to the Department of Labor’s stance on the regulation in question.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Second Circuit erred in refusing to give deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to a thirty-year-old Department of Labor regulation—a regulation that has twice been upheld by the Tenth Circuit—on the ground that, even though it was promulgated under express grants of legislative authority and after full notice-and-comment rulemaking, the regulation was contained in a subpart headed “Interpretations.”
Whether, in holding that a longstanding Department of Labor regulation was not persuasive and thus undeserving of any deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Second Circuit erred by failing to address the governing provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and by declining to give any weight to the Department’s interpretation of its own regulations.

Originally, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) mandated a minimum wage and overtime benefits to those workers whose employer was engaged in commerce or produced goods for commerce and whose gross sales met or exceeded $250,000. 29 U.S.C. § 213.

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Logan v. United States

Issues

Should the ACCA treat convictions that allow persons to retain their civil rights the same as convictions that take away and then restore civil rights, and thereby exclude convictions "with civil rights retained" from the mandatory sentencing scheme?

 

James Logan, a citizen of Wisconsin with a prior felony drug conviction, was convicted of felony firearm possession after his girlfriend led the police to find a gun in his glove compartment. Under state law, Logan should have been sentenced to a maximum of ten years. The federal district court sentenced him to fifteen years. The United States claimed that Logan fell under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), which mandates an enhanced penalty for a gun-carrying felon who has three prior violent felony convictions. Logan had three prior misdemeanor battery convictions, all of which counted as "violent felonies" under the ACCA because they were each punishable by more than two years' imprisonment.

Logan's prior misdemeanor battery convictions did not result in the loss of his civil rights. Logan therefore argued that these convictions should not count under the ACCA, which exempts a prior conviction if that conviction has had "civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision. Noting that there was no legislative history for the meaning of "restored," the appellate court interpreted "restored" to mean to give back something that had been taken away, and determined that rights that had never been lost could not be restored. Logan now appeals, arguing that "restored" should be interpreted broadly to avoid sentencing disparities and a result that Congress did not intend. At issue before the Supreme Court is whether convictions where rights were never taken away should be treated the same as convictions where rights were lost and then later regained. The Court's decision will resolve the current circuit split, as well as provide more insight into the continuing debate over mandatory sentencing schemes and the interpretation of federal sentencing laws.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the "civil rights restored" provision of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) applies to a conviction for which a defendant was not deprived of his civil rights, thereby precluding such a conviction as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)?

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume for his insights into this case.

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Lockhart v. United States

Issues

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), defendants with prior state convictions relating to “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” receive a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence; however, does the phrase “involv[e] a minor or ward” apply to each type of conviction above, or does it only apply to the last category, abusive sexual conduct?

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), a mandatory minimum sentence is imposed on a defendant with a prior state conviction relating to “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the clause “involving a minor or ward” modifies only “abusive sexual conduct” or the entire series of terms preceding it. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lockhart v. United States, No. 14-8358, at 13 (Apr. 10, 2015). The convicted offender, Avondale Lockhart, urges the Court to adopt the series-qualifier principle of statutory interpretation by applying “involving a minor or ward” to the entire preceding series of terms contained in section 2252(b)(2). See Brief for Petitioner, Avondale Lockhart at 13. Lockhart contends that because his prior state conviction does not involve a minor or ward, he does not qualify for section 2252(b)(2)’s ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. However, the United States argues that the Court should interpret section 2252(b)(2) using the last-antecedent rule by applying “involving a minor or ward” only to the immediately preceding clause, “abusive sexual conduct,” thereby upholding Lockhart’s jail sentence. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 18. The Court’s decision will determine the scope of offenses covered by mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), and could impact the degree of protection afforded to federal defendants with prior state convictions. See Petition for Writ at 13; Brief for Petitioner at 41–42.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Is section 2252(b)(2)’s mandatory minimum penalty triggered by a prior state conviction “relating to” “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” even though the conviction did not “involv[e] a minor or ward”?

In June 2010, federal agents initiated an undercover investigation of Avondale Lockhart after learning that Lockhart had transferred money to receive child pornography. See United States v. Lockhart, 749 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir.

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Lockhart v. United States

Issues

The Supreme Court faces an issue of statutory construction and interpretation in this case. The language in the Debt Collection Improvement Act (as of 1982) conflicts with language in the Higher Education Assistance Act (as of 1991) as to the time limitation on collection of debt owed to the government. The former prohibits collection of debt more than 10 years outstanding, while the latter contains a clause explicitly stating that there is no such limitation. The Court will hold that either the earlier statute is controlling because it has not been explicitly repealed (thus, shielding debt more than 10 years outstanding), or else the later statute's language constructively repeals the earlier provision (thus, making all debt to the government susceptible for collection).

 

The language of the Higher Education Assistance Act clearly countermands any statute of limitations found in other statutes or administrative law that may bar the government from collecting, through administrative asset or garnishment, outstanding student loan debt. However, the amended Debt Collection Act, the Debt Collection Improvement Act, which was passed after the Higher Education Assistance Act, included language that expressly prevented administrative offset of social security benefits if the claim was outstanding for more than ten years. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits disagree as to whether the ten year statute of limitations applies to prevent offset of social security benefits. If Congress intended to protect social security benefits from administrative offset, then seriously delinquent debtors will be excused from repayment in this fashion. However, should the Court decide that Congress intended to prospectively abrogate the statute of limitations when it passed the Higher Education Assistance Act, then the government will be able to collect overdue student loans by withholding a certain amount from the debtor's social security benefits. Either way, statutory safeguards exist to protect those beneficiaries whose sole income is social security from offsets of excessive amounts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Do the Social Security Act and the Debt Collection Improvement Act bar the United States from withholding social security benefits to collect student loan debt that has been outstanding for more than ten years, as the Eighth Circuit has held, or does the Higher Education Act eliminate any such bar, as the Ninth Circuit held below?

A. Statutory Background

The Debt Collection Act of 1982 (31 U.S.C ? 3716) provided for the collection of outstanding debts owed to the United States through means of administrative offset.? Under this statute, the United States could apply to an administrative agency in order to recoup debt owed by an individual.

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Locke v. Karass

Issues

Whether a state may constitutionally require its nonunion employees to pay fees to a union for representation, if the union may use the income from those fees to represent individuals outside of the state employees’ bargaining unit.

 

The state of Maine has designated the Maine State Employees Association (“MSEA”) as the exclusive “collective bargaining agent” for Maine state employees, including certain employees who are not members of the union. As a result, the nonmembers are required to pay service fees to MSEA, with part of the nonmembers’ fees pooled into the resources of a larger umbrella union. A group of nonmembers recently sued MSEA, claiming that this pooled arrangement with MSEA violates their First Amendment  rights,  because some of these litigation fees end up contributing to units outside MSEA. The District Court for the District of Maine held that the arrangement was constitutional and ruled for the unions, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court is whether such a pooling arrangement for extra-unit, collective-bargaining litigation expenses is constitutional. The Court’s decision will affect the financial burden on both nonmembers and local unions. Moreover, several circuit courts have decided differently on the issue of extra-unit litigation. With this case, the Court has the opportunity to reaffirm, clarify, or change the existing law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, this Court unanimously “determined that the [Railway Labor Act], as informed by the First Amendment, prohibits the use of dissenters’ [union] fees for extraunit litigation.” Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991) (opinion of Blackmun, J., citing Ellis, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984)). In Lehnert, a four-member plurality therefore held “that the Amendment proscribes such assessments in the public sector.” Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia’s separate opinion, concurring in part in the judgment announced by Justice Blackmun, reasoned that “there is good reason to treat [Ellis and the Court’s other statutory cases] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule.” Id. at 555.

May a State, nonetheless, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment of agency fees for purposes of financing a monopoly bargaining agent’s affiliates’ litigation outside of a nonunion employee’s bargaining unit?

The Maine State Employees Association (“MSEA”), a union which is part of a larger umbrella union, the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), represents two types of Maine state employees: those who are members of the union, and some who are not. See Locke v. Karass, 498 F.3d 49, 51, 52 (1st Cir.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Angela Cornell for her research help with this case.

Additional Resources

· LII Law About: Collective Bargaining

· Circuit Court Split: Otto v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n,330 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2003)

· Circuit Court Split: Reese v. City of Columbus, 71 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1995)

· Circuit Court Split: Pilots Against Illegal Dues v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991)

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Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc

 

Courts are currently divided as to which of two tests should be used to analyze a regulatory takings challenge to a rent control statute. One test analyzes the challenge under theTakings Clause, inquiring whether the statute substantially advances a legitimate state interest. The other test analyzes the challenge under the Due Process Clause, inquiring merely whether the legislature could have rationally believed that the statute would substantially advance a legitimate state interest -- a less stringent test. The Supreme Court will resolve the issue of which test is to be applied.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Just Compensation Clause authorizes a court to invalidate state economic legislation on its face and enjoin enforcement of the law on the basis that the legislation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, without regard to whether the challenged law diminishes the economic value or usefulness of any property.
Whether a court, in determining under the Just Compensation Clause whether state economic legislation substantially advances a legitimate state interest, should apply a deferential standard of review equivalent to that traditionally applied to economic legislation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, or may instead substitute its judgment for that of the legislature by determining de novo, by a preponderance of the evidence at trial, whether the legislation will be effective in achieving its goals.

In 1997, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257 in reaction to the high gasoline prices in the state. The act, an attempt to curb gas prices for consumers in Hawaii, controls the maximum rent that oil companies operating in the state can receive from dealers who lease company-owned service stations. The aim of the legislature was to have the lessee-dealers ultimately pass their lower operating costs on to consumers.

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Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche

Issues

Whether a court can demand proof of the citizenship of an unnamed corporate entity affiliated with a named party when it deems that corporate entity to be the “real party in interest;” and whether, for diversity purposes, a court must consider a limited partnership as a citizen of any state with which the limited partnership has a “very close nexus,” as well as any state of which a partner is a citizen.

 

Although plaintiffs initially decide whether to sue in state or federal courts, per Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) allows defendants to remove cases to federal court if opposing parties are citizens of different states. Christophe and Juanita Roche discovered toxic mold in the apartment they were leasing. The Roches filed a complaint in Virginia state court, naming property owners State of Wisconsin Investment Board (“SWIB”) and managers Lincoln Property Company (“Lincoln”) as defendants. SWIB and Lincoln later removed the case to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming Wisconsin and Texas citizenship, respectively. After the district court granted Lincoln summary judgment, Roche challenged the court's jurisdiction on the grounds that Lincoln was a partnership with one of its partners residing in Virginia, claiming that Lincoln manipulated federal diversity jurisdiction by litigating the case in the name of another one of the companies in the Lincoln group. The district court ruled in favor of Lincoln, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Lincoln had failed to prove its diversity from Roche. In deciding whether the Fourth Circuit erred in its holding, the Supreme Court will determine when Federal Courts can require proof of the diversity of parties not named in the complaint. The Court will also decide whether the Fourth Circuit announced a new and valid rule for determining the citizenship of a limited partnership for diversity jurisdiction purposes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether an entity not named or joined as a defendant in the lawsuit can nonetheless be deemed a "real party in interest" to destroy complete diversity of citizenship in a case removed from state court under 28 U.S.C. ? 1441(b).

2. Whether a limited partnership's citizenship for diversity subject-matter jurisdiction purposes is determined not by the citizenship of its partners, but by whether its business activities establish a "very close nexus" with the state. 

In March 2001, Christophe and Juanita Roche (“Roche”) entered into a lease for Unit 104 in the Westfield Village Apartments. Pet'r Lincoln's Br. at 2.

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Lewis v. City of Chicago, IL

Issues

Does a plaintiff have to file an EEOC charge within 300 days after an employer announces its discriminatory hiring practice, or can a plaintiff file an EEOC charge within 300 days after each instance that the employer uses or applies the discriminatory hiring practice?

 

Petitioners, Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al. (“Lewis”), a group of African Americans who applied to become firefighters in Chicago sued the city under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming Chicago’s use of an eligibility test had a disparate racial impact on African Americans, effectively resulting in employment discrimination. The plaintiffs won their discrimination lawsuit in the federal district court, but the Seventh Circuit reversed on the basis that the claim had not been filed within the 300-day filing period for employment discrimination claims. The Court held that the filing period began at the time that the applicants were informed of the results of the test. This case presents the Court with the opportunity to determine whether the subsequent use of the results of an eligibility test with disparate racial impact qualifies as a discretely new violation of the Civil Rights Act that would begin anew another 300-day filing period.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under Title VII, a plaintiff seeking to bring suit for employment discrimination must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after the unlawful employment practice occurred. Where an employer adopts an employment practice that discriminates against African Americans in violation of Title VII's disparate impact provision, must a plaintiff file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the announcement of the practice, or may a plaintiff file a charge within 300 days after the employer's use of the discriminatory practice?

In 1995, the City of Chicago (“Chicago”) adopted a new exam to screen applicants for entry-level firefighter positions. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.

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