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In 2012 the State of Maryland, under Democratic Governor Martin O’Malley, and with the help of NCEC Services, a company specializing in electoral analytics and political strategy, redrew its Sixth Congressional District to comply with one-person-one-vote rules. This resulted in the exclusion of approximately 66,000 registered Republicans and the inclusion of 24,000 Democrats in the District. O. John Benisek alleges that the new Sixth District was the result of backdoor meetings intended to consolidate Democratic control of the District. Linda Lamone, the State Administrator of Elections, on the other hand, contends that the current district lines more closely resemble the historic party composition of the voters. Benisek argues that this redistricting treats Republicans unfavorably in violation of the First Amendment. Lamone counters that this is not a valid claim in court because no rigorous judicial standard can be created to assess the impact of gerrymandering in redistricting efforts. Lamone contends that the Plaintiffs cannot put forth a clear, neutral, and judicially manageable standard for these cases, and thus the political process should resolve the issue. But Benisek responds that this is a First Amendment case where the correct inquiry is whether voters suffered retaliation for their political beliefs. The outcome of this case will have implications for the proper role of the legislature and the judiciary in the redistricting process and for levels of citizen civic engagement and political influence.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether the application of a revocation-upon-divorce statute—a state law that automatically revokes the beneficiary status of a policyholder’s former spouse after a divorce—to a contract signed prior to the enactment of the statute violates the Contracts Clause. The Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Petitioners Ashley Sveen and Antone Sveen (“the Sveens”) argue that the application of Minnesota’s revocation-upon-divorce statute to a life insurance policy that the decedent, Mark Sveen, purchased before the enactment of the statute is a valid exercise of the State’s authority to regulate divorce. The Sveens claim that the Minnesota statute does not violate the Contracts Clause because it serves a legitimate public interest and does not substantially impair contractual obligations. Respondent Kaye Melin counters that the original purpose of the Contracts Clause was to prevent legislative interference with private contracts and that modern courts should interpret it as such. Melin argues that the retroactive application of the Minnesota statute would not survive under the original meaning of the Contracts Clause and that the application also violates the Contracts Clause as it is currently understood. This case will provide clarity regarding courts’ disagreement as to the appropriate interpretation of the Contracts Clause and will affect the way in which estates are settled.

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This case will determine how much a state can force a medical provider to say when that speech is antithetical to the provider’s religious beliefs. California’s Reproductive FACT Act (“the Act”) requires licensed pregnancy-service facilities to disseminate a notice stating that: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women” and providing a phone number that patients can call to seek more information. The Act also requires unlicensed clinics to distribute a notice disclosing that they are not licensed by the state. The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”) argues that the Act unconstitutionally compels speech and should be subjected to strict scrutiny, which it cannot survive. NIFLA further contends that the Act discriminates impermissibly against pro-life clinics based on their viewpoint. California responds that the Act is a permissible exercise of the government’s authority to regulate speech between professionals and their clients, which survives any level of scrutiny. California also claims that the Act addresses fraudulent practices affecting women’s understanding of their reproductive healthcare choices and does not suppress pro-life viewpoints. Will free speech prevail over regulation of doctors and will the result benefit pregnant women?

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether there will be an exception to the rule of tribal sovereign immunity when a tribe is sued in an in rem proceeding. Petitioner Upper Skagit Indian Tribe argues that there should not be an exception for in rem proceedings because actions against a tribe’s land challenge its sovereignty and cannot be distinguished from in personam actions in the way they affect a tribe’s personal interests. The Upper Skagit Indian Tribe asserts that because the Court has never recognized this exception it is up to Congress instead to weigh the policy considerations at issue and create new legislation if necessary. Respondents Sharline and Ray Lundgren argue that the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe does not have sovereignty over the land at issue because it lost title to the land in 1855 and cannot regain sovereignty through a commercial purchase, which is how it got the land back in 2013. Furthermore, the Lundgrens argue that there should be an exception to tribal sovereign immunity for cases of in rem jurisdiction because of the state interest in regulating the conditions of title to property within its territory. This case will determine whether there will be a new class of cases in which a private individual can subject an Indian tribe to a lawsuit.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether American Express can contractually prevent merchants from steering customers’ credit-card choice at point-of-sale. The Second Circuit reversed the lower court, deciding in favor of American Express because of insufficient proof of anticompetitive effects in light of benefits captured by assessing both the merchant and customer sides of the market. Several states, joined by the United States, argue that American Express’s anti-steering provisions burden consumers and merchants by increasing prices. American Express counters that price increases correspond to increases in product value. If the Court upholds the Second Circuit’s test that considers both sides of a two-sided market, this would significantly change the long-standing approach to assessing antitrust claims, and affect the way the credit card market operates.

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This case will decide whether public-sector workers represented by a union can be required to pay agency fees. Janus argues that requiring public-sector workers to pay agency fees constitutes compelled speech and association, imposing undue restrictions on workers’ First Amendment rights. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”) argues that imposing agency fees on all workers allows unions to appropriately and fairly represent all workers’ interests, which unions are legally required to do. This issue affects every dues-paying, public sector worker. Accordingly, this case will impact the way unions organize and represent public-sector workers.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether an individual can pursue a retaliatory arrest claim against the government for violating his First Amendment free speech rights, even though his arrest was supported by probable cause. Petitioner Fane Lozman argues that if a plaintiff who asserts a retaliatory arrest claim can establish a causal connection between his protected speech and the subsequent government action, the burden should then shift to the government to prove that it would have made the same decision even without the alleged animus. Lozman admits that the existence of probable cause may be sufficient for the government to meet its burden in some cases, but argues that a finding probable cause should not automatically defeat a retaliatory arrest claim. In contrast, Respondent City of Riviera Beach argues that probable cause should operate as an absolute bar to a retaliatory arrest claim. This case will clarify the government’s ability to arrest people suspected of committing a crime while engaged in protected speech and also the liability of government officials who allegedly encourage selectively arresting political dissidents for committing minor offenses.

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This case asks the Court to decide whether an email service provider must comply with a warrant issued pursuant to the Stored Communications Act to disclose communication information if they exercise control over the information but physically store it outside the United States. This case implicates the presumption against application of U.S. law outside of U.S. borders, as well as the true focus of section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act. The Government argues that the focus of the statute is “disclosure” and the relevant conduct occurs in the U.S., and therefore the information must be disclosed. Microsoft argues that the focus is “privacy” and the relevant conduct occurs outside the U.S., and therefore outside the reach of the statute. This decision could impact international cooperation and comity due to potential conflict-of-laws issues, as well as other nations’ willingness to do business with U.S.-based carriers.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Minnesota’s Statute section 211B.11(1) political-apparel ban at polling sites violates the First Amendment. Petitioners Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. (“MVA”) contend that the statute jeopardizes the right of voters to peacefully express themselves. According to MVA, the statute’s vague use of the word “political” allows poll workers to arbitrarily discriminate against voters wearing anything arguably political. MVA contends, under a strict-scrutiny analysis, that the ban on speech is not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in promoting voting decorum and that there is no government interest that justifies a ban on all political apparel. Respondents Joe Mansky, et al. (“Mansky”) counter that the statute and its application have only prohibited political apparel that, from the perspective of a reasonable person, is related to ballot issues on election day in order to ensure that Minnesotans have the right to vote freely, without undue influence. Mansky maintains that the non-public forum analysis is the proper test to determine the statute’s constitutionality, and that the statute is reasonable and viewpoint neutral in light of the government’s goal to have polling sites focus on voting. This case will clarify the scope of the right to vote versus the right to self-expression, as well as analyze the rights of individuals when participating in democratic deliberation.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to review the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, particularly the clause’s applicability to probable cause hearings. Petitioner, the City of Hays, argues that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only during a criminal trial and that they should therefore not be civilly liable for the introduction of an incriminatory statement during a pretrial hearing. Respondent Matthew Vogt contends that his Fifth Amendment right applies to an entire “criminal case,” which includes pretrial proceedings. This case may resolve questions about the scope of defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights, as well as issues relating to judicial efficiency and internal workplace investigations.

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