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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a death row inmate challenging an execution method must prove a feasible alternative execution method when the challenged method will allegedly inflict an unconstitutional level of pain as applied to the inmate’s medical condition. Russell Bucklew argues that the state should bear the burden of proving an alternative method in such an “as-applied” challenge. He reasons that because there is no risk that the challenged execution method will be outlawed in its entirety and because the state is in the best position to evaluate the effect of existing execution methods on the inmate’s medical condition, the Court should place the burden on the state. The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) argues that the inmate in an “as-applied” challenge case should bear this burden. The DOC notes that the inmate would be able to obtain an exemption from capital punishment and needlessly delay their execution by bringing meritless claims if the Court placed the burden on the state rather than on the inmate. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the ability of inmates to challenge execution methods, the administrability of common execution methods such as lethal injection, and the effect of the capital punishment process on drug regulators, physicians, and state corrections officers.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether plaintiffs can serve a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) by addressing the service of process package to the state’s foreign minister and sending it to the foreign state’s embassy located in the United States. The plaintiff, the Republic of Sudan (“Sudan”), maintains that, under the FSIA, plaintiffs must serve a foreign state by sending the service of process package to the foreign minister at the ministry of foreign affairs located in that foreign state’s capital. Sudan contends that Article 22 of the Vienna Convention supports this interpretation because it precludes service “via” or “through” a diplomatic mission. However, the respondents—a group of victims of an al-Qaeda attack including named party Rick Harrison (“Harrison”)—contend that, although the FSIA requires plaintiffs to address and send their service of process mail to a state’s foreign minister, it does not direct plaintiffs to send the package to a particular location. Harrison asserts that, because the FSIA’s text unambiguously allows service through an embassy, the Vienna Convention does not apply in this case. This case has large implications for foreign relations, especially as regards to terrorism. A decision for Harrison may better compensate victims of terrorist attacks and restrict state-sponsored terrorism, whereas a decision for Sudan may better protect the United States as a foreign litigant and aid the effective function of embassies.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how to calculate attorney’s fees for representation in court and before the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Richard Culbertson sought an attorney’s fee of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the Social Security claimants whom he represented in court. Culbertson contends that § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap applies only to his representation before a court. The Court of Appeals applied § 406(b)’s 25-percent cap to the sum of attorney’s fees under § 406(a) and § 406(b). Berryhill agrees with Culbertson’s position, while the Supreme Court-appointed amicus curiae supports the Court of Appeals. This case will impact Social Security claimants’ protections from overbilling and the financial incentives allowing claimants to access competent legal representation.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to discern the scope of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (“AEA”) and determine whether the federal law preempts a state ban on uranium mining. The AEA regulates nuclear materials and facilities in order to promote the safe development and use of atomic energy. Virginia Uranium contends that the AEA preempts a Virginia state ban on uranium mining. The Commonwealth of Virginia counters that the AEA is silent on uranium deposits situated on nonfederal land. The outcome of this case has broad implications for the United States’ nuclear industry, national security, and national economy, as well as the future of the preemption doctrine.

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The Supreme Court will decide how courts should treat agreements delegating gateway questions of arbitrability to arbitrators—questions of whether an arbitrator has the authority to hear a case. Henry Schein, Inc. (“Henry Schein”) argues that, to honor such an agreement, the court must allow the arbitrator to decide gateway questions of arbitrability, even if the case clearly belongs in the court.  In support of their argument, Henry Schein contends that under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), courts must allow arbitrators to decide the merits of claims delegated to arbitrators by contract, even if the merits are not arguable. Archer and White Sales, Inc. (“Archer and White”) counters that if a claim to arbitrability is “wholly groundless,” the court does not have to make the arbitrator evaluate the claim. Archer and White assert that the FAA does not ask courts to compel arbitration when plaintiffs file claims where they clearly belong—in court. From a policy perspective, this case asks the Court to balance the FAA’s strong policy in favor of arbitration with the need to protect the parties to an arbitration clause from arbitration proceedings they did not agree to.

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Lamps Plus, Inc. (“Lamps Plus”) and Frank Varela (“Varela”) executed an arbitration agreement which contained a clause waiving Varela’s right to sue his employer or institute any other civil action or proceeding concerning his employment at Lamps Plus. After a data breach caused by an internet phishing incident, Varela sued Lamps Plus alleging negligence, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy. Lamps Plus moved to compel arbitration of Varela’s individual claims, but the district court decided to dismiss Varela’s claims without prejudice and to compel class arbitration of the claims. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that, as the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires a contractual basis showing the parties’ intent to arbitrate class actions, the court could not read in an agreement to class arbitration based on language relating to personal disputes. Further, the company argues that even if the agreement is ambiguous as to that intent, Supreme Court precedent indicates that courts must resolve such ambiguity in favor of arbitration. Varela counters that issues of jurisdiction and standing prevent the Supreme Court from deciding this case and that, even if the Court were to examine the case on the merits, California contract-law interpretive principles used by the lower court were neutral, applied properly, and, thus, permissible. The Supreme Court’s decision has implications for the employment sector and will likely influence the decision of employers to expressly exclude class actions from future arbitration agreements to maintain the efficiency and informality of arbitration.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Yakama Treaty of 1855 (“the Treaty”), which guarantees to the Yakama Indians the right to travel upon Washington public highways, creates a right for tribal members to avoid the Washington State fuel tax, which imposes a tax on fuels used for the propulsion of motor vehicles on Washington highways. Petitioner Washington State Department of Licensing (“the State”) argues that the tax applies because the Treaty does not expressly preempt the tax and because the tax attaches to the possession of fuel, not the transportation of fuel. Respondent Cougar Den, Inc. contends that, according to well-established rules of Indian treaty interpretation, the Treaty preempts the fuel tax and, further, the tax is an importation tax necessarily implicating the Yakama Indians right to travel. From a policy perspective, the Court’s decision in this case will have potential implications on Washington tax revenues, environmental concerns, and competitiveness in the fuel market.

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The Supreme Court will decide the scope and validity of appeal waivers balanced against a defendant’s right to file an appeal. Gilberto Garza, Jr. contends that Roe v. Flores-Ortega supports the proposition that there is a presumption of prejudice when an attorney fails to file an appeal when instructed, even if the defendant previously signed an appeal waiver and underlying plea bargain. The State of Idaho counters that Flores-Ortega does not create a blanket rule that an attorney’s failure to file prejudices a defendant because the defendant already waived their right and risks additional criminal charges in breaching their plea bargain agreement. The outcome of this case will affect States that use appeal waivers to prevent frivolous appeals in order to promote judicial efficiency and will determine whether an appeal waiver completely bars a defendant from seeking an appeal.  

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The Supreme Court will determine whether the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”) confers immunity on the commercial activities of international organizations now that foreign governments are no longer afforded that immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held, and the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) now argues, that the IOIA entitles international organizations to virtually absolute immunity and does not incorporate subsequent developments in foreign immunity law that have restricted immunity for commercial acts. However, a group of fishermen and farmers who were harmed by an IFC funded power plant in India counter that the IOIA is meant to track the development of sovereign immunity law, as codified in the FSIA, which does not currently extend to commercial acts. The Court’s decision in this case will have implications for jurisdiction over international organizations, international and domestic litigation, and international commercial activity.

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Cy press settlements allow courts to distribute portions of class action settlement funds to outside beneficiaries—such as non-profit organizations—for the indirect benefit of the class.  This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether lower courts violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) when they certified a cy pres settlement, which did not award settlement money to class members, in a class action against Google. Petitioner and class member Theodore H. Frank asserts that the courts should not have certified the cy pres class settlement because it was not “fair, reasonable, and adequate” in the meaning of Rule 23(e), given that it did not compensate class members for their injuries. Frank argues that the attorney fees of class counsel were disproportionate given that class members received no return and contends that cy pres awards generate potential conflicts between interests of class counsel and their clients. Finally, Frank contends that in the case at hand, class counsel had conflicts with the beneficiaries of the cy pres settlement. Other class members, such as Paloma Gaos, and Google respond that the cy pres settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” as distributing settlement money to each class member would be infeasible. Google and Gaos further indicate that the attorney fees were court-approved and state that Frank does not actually contest the award of attorneys’ fees. Finally, Google and Gaos assert that class counsel had no conflicts with the beneficiaries of the cy pres settlement, as the beneficiaries were chosen on their own merits. The outcome of this case has large implications for class action members, their freedom of speech, their due process rights, and to the awarding of cy pres settlements.

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