Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC

Issues

The Commonwealth of Kentucky ("Kentucky") provides normal retirement benefits to public employees who are 55 years of age and have satisfied a minimum service requirement, or who have worked for Kentucky for 20 years. Kentucky also provides disability-retirement benefits to employees who are ineligible for normal retirement benefits (e.g. employees who are under 55 or who have not satisfied the service requirement) and who become disabled. Because age is a factor in determining whether an employee may receive normal retirement benefits, by definition, age is also a factor in determining whether an employee may receive disability-retirement benefits.

Moreover, the calculation that determines the amount of benefit paid to an employee under both plans includes the employee's age as well as the years served. Under the disability-retirement plan, however, Kentucky inflates the number of years worked to the level needed to receive normal retirement benefits. In other words, when an employee has not yet reached age 55, or has not yet worked 20 years, Kentucky will pay them as though they have, or, at the very least, increase their payment to a statutory cap. Because it takes fewer years to bring an older employer to that threshold, the disability-retirement plan often provides a greater benefit to younger employees.

The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court asks, as the benefits provided under the disability-retirement plan often exceed those under normal retirement, and in certain instances, are provided exclusively under the disability-retirement plan, whether the plan's use of age as a factor violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ? 621, et seq, as amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") 29 U.S.C. ? 621 note.

 

After finding that older individuals faced discrimination in the workplace, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ?621 et seq. The ADEA prohibits employers from arbitrarily discriminating against older employees. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought suit against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Kentucky Retirement Services ("KRS"), who administers the state retirement program, because the retirement program distinguishes among recipients, at least in part, on the basis of age. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the retirement scheme in question violated the ADEA. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether an employer may deny an employee disability benefits because of his or her eligibility to receive normal retirement benefits under the ADEA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Petition involves a public employee retirement plan that includes normal and disability retirement benefits. A member who is eligible for normal retirement benefits based on attained age plus a minimum service requirement, or based on service alone, is not eligible for disability retirement benefits. Because age may be a factor in determining eligibility for normal retirement, it is an indirect factor in determining eligibility for disability retirement. Moreover, the calculation of disability retirement benefits is based upon actual years of service plus the number of years remaining before the member reaches retirement age or eligibility based on years of service alone; age may thereby be an indirect factor in determining the amount of disability retirement benefits.

The question presented in this Petition is accordingly: Whether any use of age as a factor in a retirement plan is "arbitrary" and thus renders the plan facially discriminatory in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?

Kentucky law prescribes two methods in which a public employee may reach what is termed "normal retirement." Brief for Petitioner at *4. Under normal circumstances, a public employee may retire upon crossing either of two thresholds, whichever comes first. Id. Employees who work in hazardous positions become eligible to receive normal retirement benefits when t

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Kennedy v. Louisiana

Issues

Is it cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to sentence a person to death solely for the rape of a child? If not, does Louisiana's capital rape law nevertheless violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to  providing  sufficient narrowing guidance to juries concerning who, among those guilty of this crime, should be eligible for the death penalty?

 

A Louisiana jury found Patrick Kennedy guilty of aggravated rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter under Louisiana's aggravated rape statute. This statute provided a sentence of death for the rape of a child under twelve years of age. After finding aggravating circumstances, as required by Louisiana law, the jury recommended Kennedy to be sentenced to death. After the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, Kennedy petitioned the United States Supreme Court to invalidate the sentence on either of two grounds: first, that imposing a death sentence for rape, where the victim does not die, constitutes disproportionate, and therefore "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment; second, that the aggravating circumstances in the  case-that  the offender was perpetrating an aggravated rape and the victim was under twelve years  old-merely  repeated elements of the underlying crime and therefore did not sufficiently limit eligibility for a death sentence to avoid arbitrary sentencing. Kennedy's first contention asks the Court to revisit its decision in Coker v. Georgia, which invalidated, on Eighth Amendment grounds, a death sentence for the rape of a sixteen-year-old.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause permits a State to punish the crime of rape of a child with the death penalty.

2. If so, whether Louisiana's capital rape statute violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it fails genuinely to narrow the class of such offenders eligible for the death penalty.

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court, State v. Kennedy, 957 So.2d 757 (La. 2007), and the Verdict, Agreement and Settlement of the District Court, in this case, 2003 WL 2473647:

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Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut

 

In 1998, the small town of New London, Connecticut saw a dramatic turnaround in its economic fate when pharmaceutical giant Pfizer announced its development of a waterfront global research facility in the city's Fort Trumbull area. New London created a development corporation to revitalize the area around the new facility, and granted this entity the power of eminent domain. This power has long enabled governments to condemn–essentially take–private property for "public use," so long as they conform to due process and provide just compensation. In this case, the development corporation filed condemnation proceedings against the petitioners in an attempt to condemn their homes–some of which had been in their families for over a century. This property was to be used to create an office park, a parking lot, and a new park. This case tests the limits of the government's power to take private property for "public use" under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in circumstances when the "use" is largely commercial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

What protection does the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement provide for individuals whose property is being condemned, not to eliminate slums or blight, but for the sole purpose of "economic development" that will perhaps increase tax revenues and improve the local economy?

New London, Connecticut is a small historic whaling port comprising six square miles and providing a home to approximately 25,000 residents. See City of New London website at http://ci.new-london.ct.us/index.html (last checked on February 7, 2005). 

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Honeycutt v. United States

Issues

Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), is a co-conspirator of a defendant who has been convicted of violating a federal drug law liable for the forfeiture of the crime’s proceeds, even if the co-conspirator was never in possession of them?

When a person is convicted of a federal crime, the United States government can often seize the property or proceeds obtained through the commission of the crime. Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), Congress mandates that a person who is convicted of a Chapter 13 federal drug crime must forfeit the “property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation.” It is unclear, however, whether the government can hold a co-conspirator of a drug crime liable to forfeit the proceeds of such violation when the co-conspirator never actually received any of the proceeds of the crime. Petitioner Terry Honeycutt argues that the statute only reaches the persons who have actually individually obtained the proceeds of the crime. The United States, on the other hand, argues that a co-conspirator of a federal drug crime under Chapter 13 is jointly-and-severally liable for the forfeiture of the crime’s proceeds, regardless of whether that person ever obtained the proceeds. The outcome of this case will determine the reach of the government’s seizure power under 21 U.S.C. § 853.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under 21 U.S.C. §853(a)(1), a person convicted of violating a federal drug law must forfeit to the government “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or
indirectly, as the result of such violation.”

The question presented is:

Does 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) mandate joint-and-several liability among co-conspirators for forfeiture of the reasonably foreseeable proceeds of a drug conspiracy?

Terry Honeycutt was a salaried employee at his brother’s store where he oversaw sales and product inventory. United States v. Honeycutt, No. 1:12-cr-00144 at 2 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2016). In 2008, Honeycutt noticed that an increasing number of customers were purchasing Polar Pure, a water purification product that was being used to manufacture methamphetamine around the area.

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Turner v. United States

Issues

What standard applies to the materiality of evidence withheld from criminal defendants by the government in order to assess whether a due process violation occurred, and should that standard differ based on the strength of the government’s case?  

This case will address whether certain undisclosed evidence falls under the standard for prosecutorial disclosures as described by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The defendants, Russell Overton and Charles Turner, were convicted of a murder that occurred in 1984 and contend that several pieces of evidence were improperly withheld by the prosecution, resulting in a violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The United States asserts that the evidence in question does not fall within the scope of the Brady standard, and therefore no post-conviction relief is required. The outcome of this case will further articulate the standards of materiality, favorability, and suppression under Brady and elucidate what information a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to know before trial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether petitioners' convictions must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Christopher and Charles Turner, Clifton Yarborough, Kevin Smith, Levy Rouse, and Timothy Catlett were convicted for the 1984 murder of Catherine Fuller. Turner v. United States, Nos. 12-CO-1362, 12-CO-1538, 12-CO1539, 12-CO-1540, 12-CO-1541, 12-CO-1542 & 12-CO-1543, at 14 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2015).

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Lee v. United States

Issues

When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, would it be irrational for a longtime legal resident of the United States to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial in the face of strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory deportation?

Petitioner Jae Lee pleaded guilty to possession of ecstasy with the intent to distribute, an aggravated felony and deportable offense. Lee argues that he is entitled to Strickland relief because ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced his case. The United States argues that, although Lee did experience ineffective assistance of counsel, he is not entitled to Strickland relief because it would have been unreasonable to seek trial in lieu of a guilty plea in this case. This case allows the Supreme Court to examine what Sixth Amendment constitutional relief is available to noncitizen United States residents that experience ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in mandatory deportation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the context of a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended familial and business ties to the United States, whether it is always irrational for a defendant to reject a plea offer notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory and permanent deportation.

In 2009, Jae Lee, a legal resident of the United States, was charged with the possession and intent to distribute ecstasy. See Lee v. United States, No. 14-5369, at 2 (6th Cir. June 8, 2016). Following his lawyer’s incorrect advice, Lee pleaded guilty to the charges against him, not realizing at the time that he ran the risk of mandatory removal from the United States.

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TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC

Issues

Does the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, define “where the defendant resides” for purposes of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)?

In 1957, the Supreme Court held in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. that the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), was the “sole and exclusive” venue provision in patent infringement actions. After Congress amended the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, in 1988, the Federal Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. held that the statutory amendments supplanted Fourco and § 1391(c)’s definition of a defendant’s “residence” applied to § 1400(b). In 2011, Congress amended the general venue statute again.

TC Heartland and its many amici argue that the 2011 amendments supersede VE Holding and reinstate Fourco, thereby restricting a corporate defendant’s “residence” to its state of incorporation. In contrast, Kraft maintains that the 2011 amendments bolster VE Holding’s conclusion that a corporate defendant “resides” wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction. The Court’s decision about which venue definition is proper in patent infringement actions could significantly limit where defendants are eligible to be sued, thereby reducing forum shopping in patent infringement actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

TC Heartland is an Indiana limited liability company, headquartered in Indianapolis, which manufactures and sells liquid beverage enhancer products.

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Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton

Issues

Does the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974’s “church plan” exemption apply to a pension plan maintained by an otherwise-qualifying church-affiliated organization, regardless of whether a church initially established the plan?

This consolidated case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve a conflict over the application of the “church plan” exemption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The parties disagree over whether the exemption applies to a pension plan maintained by a church-affiliated entity but not established by a church. Petitioners Advocate Health Care Network et al. (“Advocate”) argue that historical evidence and the statutory text establish that the exemption covers pension plans created by church agencies in addition to plans created by churches themselves. Advocate contends that a contrary interpretation would invite impermissible government interference with and discrimination between religious denominations. Maria Stapleton and fellow Respondents (“Stapleton”) contend that the language and purpose of the “church plan” exemption illustrate that it was not meant to cover a pension plan that was not created by a church. Stapleton also asserts that exempting the pension plans of church-affiliated entities from ERISA violates the Establishment Clause and puts thousands of church-agency employees at risk of losing their retirement benefits. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) governs employers that offer pensions and other benefits to their employees. “Church plans” are exempt from ERISA’s coverage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(33), 1003(b)(2). For over thirty years, the three federal agencies that administer and enforce ERISA—the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation—have interpreted the church plan exemption to include pension plans maintained by otherwise qualifying organizations that are associated with or controlled by a church, whether or not a church itself established the plan.

The question presented is whether ERISA’s church plan exemption applies so long as a pension plan is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan.

This case is a combination of appeals from United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Third Circuits. The facts from each case are substantially similar. 

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Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon

Issues

Is international service of process by mail permitted under the Hague Service Convention?

In this case the Supreme Court will determine whether the Hague Service Convention permits parties to serve foreign defendants with process through the mail. Water Splash argues that Article 10(a) and surrounding provisions of the Hague Service Convention indicate that the term “send” was intended to include service of process by mail. Water Splash also asserts that sources beyond the text of Hague Service Convention portray this same intention. In opposition, Menon argues that the Hague Service Convention text unambiguously indicates that the word “send” does not include service of process, and the Court should not look to external sources where the text of the treaty is unambiguous.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In 1965, the member states of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, including the United States, adopted a treaty known as the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Service Convention”). Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention states:

“Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with — (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad[.]”

The question presented is:

Does the Hague Service Convention authorize service of process by mail?

Water Splash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Champlain, New York. Menon v. Water Splash, Inc., No. 14-14-00012-CV at 2 (14th Cir. 2016).

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County of Los Angeles v. Mendez

Issues

Does a police officer violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer uses reasonable force in response to a hazardous situation the officer created, and does an injured individual’s actions that give rise to the need for use of force constitute an intervening, superseding event that severs the causal relationship between the police officers’ conduct and the individual’s injuries?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a police officer’s conduct leading up to her use of force against a citizen is relevant to the inquiry of whether that force was reasonable, and if so, what the limits are on holding that officer liable. The deputies of the County of Los Angeles argue that no liability should attach to their decision to open fire on Angel and Jennifer Mendez, because they were responding to the Mendezes’ threatening behavior. The Mendezes argue that the deputies provoked their threatening behavior, so they should be liable for opening fire on the Mendezes. The parties disagree as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which would hold the deputies liable under the Fourth Amendment, conforms to Supreme Court precedent. A win for the deputies could promote police officer safety and help preserve the integrity of the qualified immunity doctrine by keeping standards of behavior clear. A win for the Mendezes could preserve the balance of protections for police officers and citizens and provide better incentives for officer reasonableness during every stage of an investigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule holds officers liable under the Fourth Amendment for objectively reasonable force, vitiates qualified-immunity protections, and permits tort liability in the absence of proximate cause. Should this Court reject the provocation rule and continue to analyze police use of force under the established legal framework set out in Graham?
  2. The Court of Appeals held alternatively that the Deputies were liable for the shooting “under basic notions of proximate cause.” Did the court err in holding that the failure to secure a warrant proximately caused the shooting, particularly where the Deputies shot in reasonable self-defense after one of the Plain-tiffs pointed a gun at them and the outcome would not have changed if the Deputies had a warrant?

On October 1, 2010, a group of police officers and deputies were searching for a wanted parolee in a California neighborhood. See Mendez v. Cty. Of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2016); Brief for Petitioners, County of Los Angeles et al.

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