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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are “Officers of the United States” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. If the SEC ALJs are officers, then they cannot simply be hired like a regular government employee; instead, they must be hired according to the procedures required by the Appointments Clause. The SEC successfully argued before the D.C. Circuit that the ALJs are not officers; but following the election of President Trump, the U.S. Solicitor general switched the SEC’s position in this case. Both Raymond J. Lucia and the SEC now agree that the SEC ALJs are officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause because the SEC ALJs have enough sovereign authority entrusted to their discretion to require the structural power-check of the appointment process. Anton Metlitsky, the Court-appointed amicus supporting the judgment below, argues that SEC ALJs are not officers because they do not have the power to make final decisions that bind either the SEC or third parties. The Court’s holding in this case could greatly impact the SEC’s enforcement regime and all the proceedings currently pending before SEC ALJs.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether a court, in deciding not to grant a discretionary post-judgment sentencing revision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in proportion to the amended Federal Sentencing Guidelines, must provide an explanation or can issue its decision through a preprinted form order containing standardized language. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that § 3582(c)(2) does not require a judge to provide an explanation when refusing to grant a motion for a proportional sentencing reduction in accordance with the amended Guidelines. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, have found that judges are required to explain sentencing revision decisions. Petitioner Chavez-Meza argues that a judge must provide some explanation for a disproportional sentencing reduction when the reasons for the decision are not apparent from the record. Respondent United States argues that judges can use preprinted forms when granting sentencing revisions that are disproportional to the Guideline revisions, as long as the form order contains standardized language stating that the court has considered the policy and applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This case will clarify the extent to which application of the amended Guidelines reflects a bipartisan shift away from punitive sentences for drug offenses.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide if the Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act requires or permits an order of restitution against a criminal defendant for a private party’s costs of investigating the underlying crime without a request from the government. Lagos argues that the text of the statute and its legislative context and history preclude such costs from being eligible for restitution. In contrast, the Government argues that the overarching goal of restitution pairs with the text of the statute to permit a broad definition of eligible expenses, including private investigations. Underlying these legal issues is a delicate balance of rights, with the Government supporting restitution in order to help victims recover from crime, and opponents worrying that large restitution awards would prevent defendants from achieving full rehabilitation.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether stock that a railroad transfers to its employees is taxable under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (“RRTA”), 26 U.S.C. § 3231(e)(1). Petitioners Wisconsin Central Ltd. et al. (“Wisconsin Central”) argue that Congress enacted the RRTA to create a retirement program separate and distinct from the program created under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”). Wisconsin Central further asserts that when interpreting the RRTA as Congress intended at the time of enactment, stock transfers from railroad employers to employees were not considered as “compensation.” Finally, Wisconsin Central contends that the Court should not give weight to the exceptions added after the RRTA’s enactment in determining the original definition of “money remuneration” and that those exceptions are not rendered “surplusage” when using the medium-of-exchange definition for money. Respondent United States (“Government”) responds that Congress intended the RRTA’s tax structure to align with FICA’s—which taxes non-qualified stock options—by defining “compensation” as “any form of money remuneration,” which includes stock. The Government maintains that Congress added exceptions to the RRTA to help clarify the statute’s meaning; and, here the language indicates that “money” includes non-cash payments such as non-qualified stock options. Although Wisconsin Central and its supporters contend that stock-based compensation is a valuable form of compensation that rewards employee work, the Government worries that excluding stock from the definition of “money” will promote circumvention of the RRTA tax through strategic structuring of employee compensation plans.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether treaties between the State of Washington (“Washington” or “the state”) and Native American tribes (“the Tribes”) guaranteeing the Tribes the right to fish in certain areas of the state require Washington to protect salmon against despoliation from land development. The present case arises out of a series of barrier culverts—tunnels that allow water to pass underneath roads but prevent fish from passing—that Washington constructed, some pursuant to federal specifications. The culverts prevent salmon from returning, thus inhibiting the Tribes’ ability to fish. Washington argues that the treaties were not created to address such environmental concerns. Moreover, Washington argues that it is not fair for it to be forced to replace the culverts, because the culverts were part of a federally-initiated roadbuilding program, and their design was suggested by the United States. Further, Washington argues that replacing the barrier culverts would not increase the salmon population. The United States and the Tribes disagree, asserting that the parties to the treaties intended to protect the salmon population against man-made despoliation. The United States and the Tribes also assert that no one forced Washington to create the culverts using the design that blocks salmon re-entry and that replacing those culverts would benefit the salmon population. At stake are the future of the salmon populations near the Tribes and potential limitations on state powers to make regulatory decisions.

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The Supreme Court will decide the correct statutory interpretation of the Patent Act concerning the availability of extraterritorial damages for domestic patent infringement. Petitioner WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) argues that the texts of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and 35 U.S.C. § 284 support the recovery of lost profits due to infringing activity conducted outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. WesternGeco claims that in enacting Section 271(f), Congress intended to close a loophole in the Patent Act that left patent holders vulnerable to infringing conduct that occurs abroad. Respondent ION Geophysical Corporation (“ION”) contends that the Patent Act does not permit the recovery of damages caused by a third party’s patent infringement. ION claims that absent a clear, affirmative direction from Congress that the statute is intended to apply extraterritorially, the presumption against extraterritoriality prevails particularly in patent cases, because intellectual property law differs internationally. From a policy perspective, this case is important because of its potential to broadly impact intellectual property rights in the United States, technological innovation, and relations between the United States and foreign countries.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether to overturn Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, which held that the Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing sales or use taxes on out-of-state sellers. Petitioner South Dakota argues that in modern times, a business may not have a physical presence in a state, yet still satisfy the “substantial nexus” requirement as articulated in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady. South Dakota further argues that increases in electronic commerce, concerns with states’ ability to collect adequate revenues, and overall changes in the national economy favoring online sellers weigh in favor of overturning Quill, despite stare decisis. In contrast, Respondent Wayfair, Inc. argues that changes in market conditions do not justify overturning Quill, especially when the underlying constitutional concerns of restraints on interstate commerce remain. Wayfair further argues that imposing sales taxes on remote sellers will unfairly burden small businesses with appreciable compliance costs, especially as the largest online sellers, such as Amazon, already voluntarily pay state sales taxes. If the Court rules in South Dakota’s favor, online retailers will be subject to state sales and use taxes, and likely raise the prices of the goods they sell. If the Court instead rules in Wayfair’s favor and upholds Quill, online retailers will continue to have an apparent advantage compared to local brick-and-mortar businesses.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether R. Scott Appling’s debt to Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP is dischargeable in Appling’s bankruptcy proceedings. Between 2004 and 2005, Appling accumulated a debt of $60,000 to the law firm for legal services, evading collection attempts by saying that he soon expected a tax return of over $100,000. But Appling’s tax return was only $60,000, and he did not use it to pay down any of his debt to the law firm. Appling later filed for bankruptcy. Appling now asks the court to discharge his debt to the law firm, but discharge is not allowed if Appling’s verbal statements about his tax return were “respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition.” The case will turn on interpretation of the relevant bankruptcy statutes. The outcome could affect the ways that lenders, especially small businesses, administer loans.

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This case will have important repercussions for two seemingly disconnected areas of the law: the methods available for defendants to challenge courtroom procedures and the delineation of the jurisdictional boundaries of courts of appeals. The issue in this case is whether the Ninth Circuit had constitutional and statutory authority to hear an interlocutory appeal challenging a policy that all defendants appearing in pretrial proceedings must wear physical restraints. On the one hand, the United States argues that the Ninth Circuit lacked statutory authority because the appeal fell into neither the collateral-order exception nor the ambit of the All Writs Act, and lacked constitutional authority because the claims were moot. On the other hand, Sanchez-Gomez et al. contend that the Ninth Circuit had statutory authority under either the collateral-order exception or the All Writs Act, and had constitutional authority because their claims fell into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. The case will either open or close a novel avenue for criminal litigants to challenge courtroom policies.  

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In American Pipe, the Court held that the statute of limitations is tolled for an individual that files an action after a related class action fails. This case asks the Court to decide whether American Pipe tolling also applies to subsequent class actions. China Agritech, Inc. argues that American Pipe tolling should not apply to subsequent class actions, because such an extension would be inequitable and would conflict with the rationale surrounding current law on class action procedures. Michael Resh counters that American Pipe tolling should apply to subsequent class actions because such an extension would be both equitable and consistent with current law and precedent. The Supreme Court’s ruling could potentially relax the urgency and attentiveness required of class action members, or emphasize the importance of awareness and involvement individuals must display to share in the judgment won by the asserted members of their class. The decision could also implicate burdens on the courts, separation of powers issues, and practical considerations for class action plaintiffs and defendants.

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