Stokeling v. United States

Issues

Does a conviction under the Florida robbery statute, which includes as an element the requirement of overcoming victim resistance, constitute a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, when the Florida statute has been interpreted to only require slight force to meet the requirement of overcoming victim resistance?

The Supreme Court will determine whether a conviction under the Florida robbery statute, which contains as an element “overcoming victim resistance,” constitutes a “violent felony” under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), thereby triggering enhanced sentencing under the ACCA. Petitioner Denard Stokeling (“Stokeling”) argues that under the ACCA, a “violent felony” involves the use of “violent force.” Stokeling maintains that Florida robbery is not a “violent felony” because only a slight amount of force suffices to meet its “overcoming victim resistance” element, which does not constitute “violent force.” Respondent United States (“Government”) contends that a “violent felony” under the ACCA is a felony “capable of causing pain or physical injury.” The Government asserts that Florida robbery is a “violent felony” because any act that violates the Florida robbery statute is by definition “capable of causing pain or physical injury.” From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will determine which criminals will be subjected to enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), when the offense has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight force to overcome resistance.

In 2016, Petitioner Denard Stokeling, a convicted felon, pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart

Issues

Whether the Eleventh Amendment’s notion of state sovereign immunity prevents a state-created agency from suing state officials in federal court to seek conformity with federal law.

 

The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), an independent state agency, advocates for individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. In accordance with federal funding requirements, Virginia law authorizes VOPA to access an individual's records if VOPA believes an individual was abused. During an investigation, a state facility denied VOPA access to the records of three individuals, and VOPA sued three state officials alleging that they violated federal law. The Eleventh Amendment provides that states cannot be sued in federal court by residents of one of the United States or of a foreign state. However, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Young, recognized an exception to the Eleventh Amendment allowing a party to sue state officials for injunctive or declaratory relief to correct an ongoing violation of federal law. The Fourth Circuit held that, because the plaintiff in this suit was a state-created agency rather than a private individual, the suit could not proceed under the Ex parte Young exception and that allowing it to proceed in federal court would be a violation of Virginia’s sovereign immunity. This decision may affect the ability of independent agencies to protect vulnerable individuals from neglect and has the potential to increase legal conflict between state agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Eleventh Amendment categorically precludes an independent state agency from bringing an action in federal court against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to remedy a violation of federal law under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.

The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA") is an independent state agency that advocates for individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. See Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 113 (4th Cir.

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· Annotated U.S. Constitution: Eleventh Amendment

· Richmond Times, Michael Martz: Watchdog Group Faults Lynchburg Facility for Mentally Retarded (Jan. 6, 2006)

· Constitutional Law Prof Blog, Steve Vladeck: VOPA v. Reinhard and Ex parte Young: Why Cert. Should (and Will) Be Granted (May 20, 2010)

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Vermont v. Brillon

Issues

Can a defendant have his case dismissed, on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, when his own public defender has requested or otherwise caused all of the delays?

Court below

 

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides defendants with the right to a speedy trial. In July of 2001, Michael Brillon was charged with aggravated domestic violence, and was ultimately sentenced to twelve-to-twenty years confinement. However, due to excessive delays before his trial caused solely by his public defenders, the Supreme Court of Vermont vacated his conviction and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The questions the United States Supreme Court will have to decide is whether delays caused by an indigent's public defenders' lack of preparedness can be the basis for a sixth amendment right to a speedy trial violation, on the theory that the state is responsible for providing adequate public defenders to indigents; and if so, does this give greater rights to indigent defendants than defendants with private attorneys?

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether continuances and delays caused solely by an indigent defendant's public defender can arise to a speedy trial right violation, and be charged against the State pursuant to the test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), on the theory that public defenders are paid by the state.

2. Whether the right to counsel, as established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), should result in broader speedy trial rights to indigent defendants than defendants who are able to retain private counsel, such that only delays by private counsel get charged against the defendant under the Barker v. Wingo test.

In July of 2001, Michael Brillon was arrested and charged with domestic violence for hitting his girlfriend in the face during an altercation. Vermont v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Sup. Ct. of VT, March 14, 2008). Although domestic violence is normally a misdemeanor in Vermont, Brillon was charged with an enhanced felony domestic assault and as an habitual offender; he had three prior felony convictions, and this incident was a violation of his the pretrial conditions of release.

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Vasquez v. United States

Issues

Whether a harmless-error analysis that focused on the weight of admissible evidence, rather than on the erroneous evidence’s effect on the jury, constituted a Sixth Amendment violation.

 

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois convicted Alexander Vasquez of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. However, the district court had erroneously admitted statements made during recorded telephone conversations by Marina Perez into evidence for their truth. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the lower court’s error was harmless because the jury would have come to the same conclusion had there been no error. Vasquez now appeals, arguing that the Seventh Circuit misapplied the harmless-error analysis by ignoring the impact the error had on the jury. The Supreme Court will decide how courts should properly carry out harmless-error tests, as well as examine the possible constitutional questions such an error would create.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Did the Seventh Circuit violate this Court's precedent on harmless error when it focused its harmless error analysis solely on the weight of the untainted evidence without considering the potential effect of the error (the erroneous admission of trial counsel's statements that his client would lose the case and should plead guilty for their truth) on this jury at all?

2. Did the Seventh Circuit violate Mr. Vasquez's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by determining that Mr. Vasquez should have been convicted without considering the effects of the district court's error on the jury that heard the case?

Carlos Cruz and Joel Perez planned to purchase cocaine from Alejandro Diaz at a gas station. See U.S. v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir.

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Vartelas v. Holder

Issues

Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(c)(v), as amended in 1996 by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, applies to a lawful permanent resident whose commission of a crime prior to the amendment creates grounds for inadmissibility.

 

Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a Greek citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to counterfeiting and was convicted in 1994. In 2003, following a brief trip to Greece, Vartelas received notice to appear for removal proceedings. The immigration judge ordered Vartelas’s deportation, after deeming Vartelas inadmissible under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Vartelas argues that application of this 1996 Act to his 1994 crime violates the presumption against retroactivity and the reasonable expectations he had when entering his guilty plea. Respondent Attorney General Eric Holder argues that Vartelas’s case does not have a retroactive effect because it penalizes acts conducted after the statute’s enactment: Vartelas’s decision to leave and re-enter the United States. This case affects lawful permanent residents who were convicted of crimes prior to the Act’s enactment. The Supreme Court’s decision could restrict their ability to travel internationally, which in turn could damage their ability to maintain family ties or fulfill religious obligations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), April 1, 1997, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13), provided: The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary.

In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), this Court held that a lawful permanent resident ("LPR") who made an "innocent, casual, and brief" trip across an international border did not "intend" a "departure" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).

However, effective April 1, 1997, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) repealed 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). The amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) provides: (C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for the purpose of the immigration laws unless the alien, (v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), unless since offense the alien has been granted relief under section 212(h) or 240A(a). (Emphasis added)

Two other Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the amended 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) cannot be retroactively applied to an alien who pled guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude prior to the effective date of IIRIRA.

The question presented is:

Should 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), which removes LPR of his right, under Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), to make "innocent, casual, and brief" trips abroad without fear that he will be denied reentry, be applied retroactively to a guilty plea taken prior to the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)?

In 1994, Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) of the United States, was convicted of conspiring to make or possess a counterfeit security, following entry of his guilty plea. See Vartelas v.

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The Huffington Post: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Eight New Cases (Sept. 28, 2011)

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Van de Kamp v. Goldstein

Issues

Whether supervising prosecutors can claim absolute immunity from civil law suits that allege their failure to establish policies guaranteeing criminal defendants’ constitutional rights, or whether such actions are “administrative” in nature and therefore only eligible for qualified immunity.

 

After being wrongfully convicted of murder based on the perjury of a jailhouse informant, Thomas Lee Goldstein brought a Section 1983 suit against John Van de Kamp and Curt Livesay, the chief prosecutors at the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.  Goldstein alleges that the prosecutors failed to establish a system to share information about benefits given to informants, with the result that the prosecutor who tried Goldstein did not have information on the informant and consequently did not inform Goldstein, as is constitutionally required.  Van de Kamp and Livesay claimed absolute immunity from civil suit, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Imbler v. Pachtman.  The Ninth Circuit, however, held that since their alleged failures were administrative, and not prosecutorial in nature, Van de Kamp and Livesay were not entitled to absolute immunity.  In further defining the boundaries of absolute immunity, the Supreme Court’s decision will affect the amount of protection from personal liability prosecutors can have at all levels of government, as well as affect the potential remedies available to criminal defendants who were wrongfully convicted based on prosecutorial misconduct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1) Where absolute immunity shields an individual prosecutor’s decisions regarding the disclosure of informant information in compliance with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) made in the course of preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or trial in any individual prosecution, may a plaintiff circumvent that immunity by suing one or more supervising prosecutors for purportedly improperly training, supervising, or setting policy with regard to the disclosure of such informant information for all cases prosecuted by his or her agency?

2) Are the decisions of a supervising prosecutor as chief advocate in directing policy concerning, and overseeing training and supervision of, individual prosecutors’ compliance with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) in the course of preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or trial for all cases prosecuted by his or her agency, actions which are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and hence shielded from liability under Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)?

Thomas Lee Goldstein, a twenty-five-year-old engineering student and Marine Corps veteran, was arrested in 1979 for a Long Beach, CA shooting.  See Brief for Respondent at 2.  He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison based on the testimony of an eyewitness (who later admitted that he only identified Goldstein as the murderer because of police intimidation), and the testimony of a jailhouse informant by the name of Eddie Fink

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Vaden v. Discover Bank

Issues

When a party petitions a court to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA, should that court be able look at the facts of the underlying the dispute to find subject matter jurisdiction?

 

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a party to a private arbitration agreement may petition a court to compel arbitration. However, the FAA only applies if federal law is implicated. A credit card agreement between Discover Bank and Betty Vaden contained an arbitration provision obligating cardmembers to arbitrate any disputes arising under the agreement. Discover Bank’s affiliate eventually sued Vaden in state court when she failed to make payments, and Vaden counterclaimed under state law. Discover Bank then petitioned the U.S. District Court of Maryland to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA. The district court granted the petition, but the Fourth Circuit remanded, holding that the district court could only compel arbitration if the underlying dispute presented a federal question. The district court found that a federal question existed in the underlying dispute. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that it had jurisdiction because federal banking law preempted Vaden’s state law claims. Vaden argues that the Fourth Circuit’s holding conflicts with other circuits that hold that the petition itself must present a federal question.

The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a circuit split on whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over Section 4 FAA petitions where jurisdiction is based solely on the complaint for the underlying dispute. If the Court affirms the Fourth Circuit, parties may be able to invoke the FAA to compel arbitration when a federal question arises only in a counter-claim, even though the federal court would not have jurisdiction over the underlying dispute.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether a suit seeking to enforce a state-law arbitration obligation brought under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4, “aris[es] under” federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, when the petition to compel itself raises no federal question but the dispute sought to be arbitrated—a dispute that the federal court is not asked to and cannot reach— involves federal law.

2. If so, whether a “completely preempted” state-law counterclaim in an underlying state-court dispute can supply subject matter jurisdiction.

Betty Vaden became a Discover cardmember in 1990. Although Discover Bank issued Vaden her credit card, it contracted many services such as collecting on delinquent accounts to Discover Financial Services (“DFS”). See Discover Bank; Discover Financial Services, Inc. v. Vaden, 489 F.3d 594 (4th Cir. 2007) (hereinafter Vaden II). In June 1999, Discover Bank sent Vaden a Platinum card.

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Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, American Chemistry Council v. EPA, Energy-Intensive Manufacturers v. EPA, Southeastern Legal Foundation v. EPA, Texas v. EPA, Chamber of Comm. v. EPA (Consolidated)

Issues

Does the Environmental Protection Agency have authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions?

 

Following the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA began regulating greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources, such as cars and trucks. The categorization of greenhouse gases an an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act automatically triggered the regulation of stationary sources, such as factories, through the EPA’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V permit programs. However, because the new regulatory framework easily triggered EPA oversight for low levels of emissions, the EPA decided to increase the threshold emissions level for greenhouse gases. Petitioners, including various states and industry groups, assert that the EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources expands the scope of the Act beyond Congress’s original intent. Accordingly, Petitioners argue that the EPA lacks authority for this regulation. The EPA responds that because greenhouse gases are plainly air pollutants, the agency has the statutory authority to regulate them. Moreover, the EPA contends that this reading of the Act conforms with Congress’s intent to give the EPA broad discretion in regulating air pollution to protect public health and welfare. The Supreme Court’s determination of whether the EPA may continue to regulate greenhouse gases under these programs will significantly impact the United States’ approach to climate change.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

After this Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that its promulgation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas (GHG) emission standards under Title II of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), compelled regulation of carbon dioxide and other GHGs under the CAA's Title I prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) and Title V stationary-source permitting programs. Even though EPA determined that including GHGs in these programs would vastly expand the programs contrary to Congress's intent, EPA adopted rules adding GHGs to the pollutants covered. The panel below held the CAA and Massachusetts compelled inclusion of GHGs and, based on that holding, dismissed all petitions to review the GHG permitting program rules on standing grounds. The questions presented are: 

  1. Whether Massachusetts compelled EPA to in-clude GHGs in the PSD and Title V programs when inclusion of GHGs would (i) transform the size and scope of these programs into something that EPA found would be "unrecognizable to ... Congress," Petition Appendix 345a, 380a, and (ii) expand the PSD program to cover a substance that does not deteriorate the quality of the air that people breathe. 
  2. Whether dismissal of the petitions to review EPA's GHG permit-program rules was inconsistent with this Court's standing jurisprudence where the panel premised its holding that standing was absent on its merits holding that GHGs are regulated "pursuant to automatic operation of the CAA." Id. at 96a.

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.

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Utah v. Strieff

Issues

Should courts suppress evidence obtained from a suspect after a police officer executes a valid arrest warrant, if the officer first illegally detained the suspect?

Court below

 

In 2006, an anonymous tip led Utah police officer Douglas Fackrell to investigate suspected drug activity at a house. After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the house, Fackrell illegally detained him. During the stop, Fackrell learned Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant. Fackrell arrested and searched Strieff, and found drugs and paraphernalia. In Strieff, the Supreme Court will decide whether evidence obtained incident to an illegal search should be admitted under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule. Generally, the exclusionary rule permits defendants to suppress evidence that has been obtained in violation of the Constitution. The attenuation exception, however, provides that evidence may be admissible if intervening circumstances have sufficiently weakened the taint of the original violation. Utah argues that the exclusionary rule only applies when it will deter future police misconduct. The state maintains that Fackrell did not flagrantly violate Strieff’s constitutional rights, and had a duty to arrest Strieff after discovering the arrest warrant. Accordingly, the rule would not deter misconduct. But Strieff contends the attenuation exception does not apply, because Fackrell could have foreseen that stopping Strieff illegally could have led to the discovery of a warrant. Strieff concludes that attenuation only applies when the “intervening event” that weakens the taint of Fackrell’s violation is unforeseeable. The Court’s decision could affect how police handle outstanding arrest warrants, and how judges balance Fourth Amendment protections with the need to admit relevant evidence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Should evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant be suppressed because the warrant was discovered during an investigatory stop later found to be unlawful?

In December 2006, an anonymous tipster reported drug activity at a Utah residence. See State v. Strieff, 2015 UT 2, 3 (2015). In response to the tip, police officer Douglas Fackrell conducted “intermittent surveillance” of the residence.

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Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar

Issues

Should the scope of the False Claims Act be expanded to include noncompliance of staffing regulations?  

 

The U.S. Supreme Court will consider whether the False Claims Act (“FCA”) applies to fraudulent misrepresentation in payment claims due to violations of staffing regulations for medical centers. Petitioner Universal Health Services argues that the basis for liability stemming from the FCA does not allow for the implied certification theory, under which liability may be based on merely filing for payment, and thus should merit reversal of the judgment below. On the other hand, respondent Escobar contends that UHS knowingly and materially committed fraud under the FCA provisions notwithstanding the absence of an express fraudulent statement. This case will determine whether businesses that provide services to the government will be subject to FCA liability and will establish the range of remedies available to qui tam litigants under the FCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Is the “implied certification” theory of legal falsity under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., viable?
  2. If the “implied certification” theory is viable, can a government contractor’s reimbursement claim be legally false under that theory if the provider failed to comply with a statute, regulation, or contractual provision that does not state that it is a condition of payment; or does liability for a legally false reimbursement claim require that the statute, regulation, or contractual provision expressly state that it is a condition of payment?

Yarushka Rivera (“Rivera”), the daughter of relators Carmen Correa and Julio Escobar (“Escobar”), was a member of MassHealth, Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, and in 2007 received mental health support at Arbour Counseling Services (“Arbour”), which was owned and operated by petitioner Universal Health Services (“UHS”). See 

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