Lee v. United States

Issues

When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, would it be irrational for a longtime legal resident of the United States to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial in the face of strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory deportation?

Petitioner Jae Lee pleaded guilty to possession of ecstasy with the intent to distribute, an aggravated felony and deportable offense. Lee argues that he is entitled to Strickland relief because ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced his case. The United States argues that, although Lee did experience ineffective assistance of counsel, he is not entitled to Strickland relief because it would have been unreasonable to seek trial in lieu of a guilty plea in this case. This case allows the Supreme Court to examine what Sixth Amendment constitutional relief is available to noncitizen United States residents that experience ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in mandatory deportation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the context of a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended familial and business ties to the United States, whether it is always irrational for a defendant to reject a plea offer notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory and permanent deportation.

In 2009, Jae Lee, a legal resident of the United States, was charged with the possession and intent to distribute ecstasy. See Lee v. United States, No. 14-5369, at 2 (6th Cir. June 8, 2016). Following his lawyer’s incorrect advice, Lee pleaded guilty to the charges against him, not realizing at the time that he ran the risk of mandatory removal from the United States.

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TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC

Issues

Does the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, define “where the defendant resides” for purposes of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)?

In 1957, the Supreme Court held in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. that the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), was the “sole and exclusive” venue provision in patent infringement actions. After Congress amended the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, in 1988, the Federal Circuit in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. held that the statutory amendments supplanted Fourco and § 1391(c)’s definition of a defendant’s “residence” applied to § 1400(b). In 2011, Congress amended the general venue statute again.

TC Heartland and its many amici argue that the 2011 amendments supersede VE Holding and reinstate Fourco, thereby restricting a corporate defendant’s “residence” to its state of incorporation. In contrast, Kraft maintains that the 2011 amendments bolster VE Holding’s conclusion that a corporate defendant “resides” wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction. The Court’s decision about which venue definition is proper in patent infringement actions could significantly limit where defendants are eligible to be sued, thereby reducing forum shopping in patent infringement actions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

TC Heartland is an Indiana limited liability company, headquartered in Indianapolis, which manufactures and sells liquid beverage enhancer products.

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Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton

Issues

Does the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974’s “church plan” exemption apply to a pension plan maintained by an otherwise-qualifying church-affiliated organization, regardless of whether a church initially established the plan?

This consolidated case provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve a conflict over the application of the “church plan” exemption of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The parties disagree over whether the exemption applies to a pension plan maintained by a church-affiliated entity but not established by a church. Petitioners Advocate Health Care Network et al. (“Advocate”) argue that historical evidence and the statutory text establish that the exemption covers pension plans created by church agencies in addition to plans created by churches themselves. Advocate contends that a contrary interpretation would invite impermissible government interference with and discrimination between religious denominations. Maria Stapleton and fellow Respondents (“Stapleton”) contend that the language and purpose of the “church plan” exemption illustrate that it was not meant to cover a pension plan that was not created by a church. Stapleton also asserts that exempting the pension plans of church-affiliated entities from ERISA violates the Establishment Clause and puts thousands of church-agency employees at risk of losing their retirement benefits. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) governs employers that offer pensions and other benefits to their employees. “Church plans” are exempt from ERISA’s coverage. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(33), 1003(b)(2). For over thirty years, the three federal agencies that administer and enforce ERISA—the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation—have interpreted the church plan exemption to include pension plans maintained by otherwise qualifying organizations that are associated with or controlled by a church, whether or not a church itself established the plan.

The question presented is whether ERISA’s church plan exemption applies so long as a pension plan is maintained by an otherwise qualifying church-affiliated organization, or whether the exemption applies only if, in addition, a church initially established the plan.

This case is a combination of appeals from United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Third Circuits. The facts from each case are substantially similar. 

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Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon

Issues

Is international service of process by mail permitted under the Hague Service Convention?

In this case the Supreme Court will determine whether the Hague Service Convention permits parties to serve foreign defendants with process through the mail. Water Splash argues that Article 10(a) and surrounding provisions of the Hague Service Convention indicate that the term “send” was intended to include service of process by mail. Water Splash also asserts that sources beyond the text of Hague Service Convention portray this same intention. In opposition, Menon argues that the Hague Service Convention text unambiguously indicates that the word “send” does not include service of process, and the Court should not look to external sources where the text of the treaty is unambiguous.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In 1965, the member states of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, including the United States, adopted a treaty known as the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Service Convention”). Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention states:

“Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with — (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad[.]”

The question presented is:

Does the Hague Service Convention authorize service of process by mail?

Water Splash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Champlain, New York. Menon v. Water Splash, Inc., No. 14-14-00012-CV at 2 (14th Cir. 2016).

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County of Los Angeles v. Mendez

Issues

Does a police officer violate the Fourth Amendment when the officer uses reasonable force in response to a hazardous situation the officer created, and does an injured individual’s actions that give rise to the need for use of force constitute an intervening, superseding event that severs the causal relationship between the police officers’ conduct and the individual’s injuries?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a police officer’s conduct leading up to her use of force against a citizen is relevant to the inquiry of whether that force was reasonable, and if so, what the limits are on holding that officer liable. The deputies of the County of Los Angeles argue that no liability should attach to their decision to open fire on Angel and Jennifer Mendez, because they were responding to the Mendezes’ threatening behavior. The Mendezes argue that the deputies provoked their threatening behavior, so they should be liable for opening fire on the Mendezes. The parties disagree as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which would hold the deputies liable under the Fourth Amendment, conforms to Supreme Court precedent. A win for the deputies could promote police officer safety and help preserve the integrity of the qualified immunity doctrine by keeping standards of behavior clear. A win for the Mendezes could preserve the balance of protections for police officers and citizens and provide better incentives for officer reasonableness during every stage of an investigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule holds officers liable under the Fourth Amendment for objectively reasonable force, vitiates qualified-immunity protections, and permits tort liability in the absence of proximate cause. Should this Court reject the provocation rule and continue to analyze police use of force under the established legal framework set out in Graham?
  2. The Court of Appeals held alternatively that the Deputies were liable for the shooting “under basic notions of proximate cause.” Did the court err in holding that the failure to secure a warrant proximately caused the shooting, particularly where the Deputies shot in reasonable self-defense after one of the Plain-tiffs pointed a gun at them and the outcome would not have changed if the Deputies had a warrant?

On October 1, 2010, a group of police officers and deputies were searching for a wanted parolee in a California neighborhood. See Mendez v. Cty. Of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2016); Brief for Petitioners, County of Los Angeles et al.

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Impression Products v. Lexmark International

Issues

Does a “conditional sale” transferring title with post-sale restrictions on the use or resale of the item avoid the patent exhaustion doctrine, thus permitting a suit for infringement as a means of enforcing the post-sale restriction; and, does a foreign sale of a patented article exhaust the U.S. patent rights in that article?

The Supreme Court must decide whether Lexmark International, Inc., a company that manufactures toner cartridges for use in its printers, can use post-sale restrictions to prevent remanufacturers such as Impression Products, Inc., the defendant in this case, from refurbishing and reselling the cartridges. Petitioner Impression Products argues that under the patent exhaustion doctrine, all of a patent holder’s rights to a patented item are exhausted by the initial authorized sale of the item. Accordingly, Impression Products argues that the patent holder cannot place restrictions on how the patented article is used after its sale. Respondent Lexmark International, however, contends that Section 154(a) gives a patent holder authority to impose restrictions on the post-sale use of a patented item and allows a patent holder to transfer less than the complete patent rights to the buyer. Thus, a patent holder need not completely exhaust the patent after the sale. The ultimate decision by the Supreme Court may have an impact on the judicial doctrine of patent exhaustion and may potentially hinder the market for remanufactured patented goods. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The “patent exhaustion doctrine”—also known as the “first sale doctrine”—holds that “the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).

The questions presented are:

  1. Whether a sale that transfers title to the patented item while specifying post-sale restrictions on the article’s use or resale avoids application of the patent exhaustion doctrine and therefore permits the enforcement of such post-sale restrictions through the patent law’s infringement remedy.
  2. Whether, in light of this Court’s holding in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013), that the common law doctrine barring restraints on alienation that is the basis of exhaustion doctrine “makes no geographical distinctions,” a sale of a patented article—authorized by the U.S. patentee—that takes place outside of the United States exhausts the U.S. patent rights in that article.

Lexmark International, Inc. is a company that makes and sells toner cartridges compatible with its printers. Lexmark International, Inc., v. Impression Products, Inc., No. 14-1617 (Fed. Circuit Feb. 12, 2016) at 9. Lexmark owns several patents on the cartridges it produces.

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Microsoft Corporation v. Baker

Issues

If plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice after defeat of a class certification, can a federal appellate court review a district court order denying class certification under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291?

This case will determine whether a federal appellate court has appellate jurisdiction to review an order denying class certification after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their individual claims with prejudice. Microsoft Corporation argues that a federal court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review an order that denies class certification because it disregards the Supreme Court’s decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), and impedes the discretionary review created by the Court in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Microsoft also maintains there is no jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Article III’s mootness doctrine because a voluntary dismissal eliminates any adverse interests that the plaintiffs had in the case. Seth Baker et al. assert that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice created a final judgment allowing the federal appellate court to review the adverse class certification ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Furthermore, Baker argues that there is no Article III barrier preventing appellate review in this case because the individual plaintiff’s claims were impaired by the ruling and they still maintain an adverse interest in the case. The outcome of this case could impact the procedures that plaintiffs must follow when seeking a class certification. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a federal court of appeals have jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice?

Respondents Seth Baker et al. allege that a design defect in Petitioner Microsoft Corporation’s Xbox 360 game scratched the disks required for playing the console. See Baker v. Microsoft Corp., 797 F.3d 607, 609 (Cir.

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Howell v. Howell

Issues

Does the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act preempt state domestic relations law when a veteran waives part of his military retirement pay in order to receive veterans’ disability benefits and an ex-spouse seeks to collect reimbursement for the resultant decrease in her court-ordered half of his retirement pay, as ordered at the time of divorce? 

Court below

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”) overrides state domestic relations law. In deciding this matter, the Court will determine whether a divorced veteran, who waives a portion of the total allocated military retirement pay (“MRP”) in order to receive disability benefits, must reimburse an ex-spouse for lost MRP when there exists a divorce decree ordering the equal division of the full MRP between the parties. Petitioner John Howell argues that the USFSPA overrides an Arizona divorce court order granting fifty percent of his MRP to his ex-wife, Respondent Sandra Howell, as the parties agreed during their divorce, without regard for Mr. Howell’s subsequent disability waiver. Mr. Howell contends that, because the court order directly conflicts with the USFSPA and its objectives, the court order is not legally valid. Respondent Sandra Howell counters that the divorce court’s order is valid because there is no direct conflict between the order and the USFSPA. This case will clarify the scope of the Military Powers Clauses and the Supremacy Clause for cases involving veterans’ benefits and domestic relations issues that have been traditionally left to the states to regulate, such as divorce. This case will also address the effects on retired and active-duty military personnel as well as their ex-spouses in navigating disability payments, partially-waived MRPs, and divorce decrees that allocate a portion of pre-waiver MRP to the ex-spouse. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act preempts a state court’s order directing a veteran to indemnify a former spouse for a reduction in the former spouse’s portion of the veteran’s military retirement pay, where that reduction results from the veteran’s post-divorce waiver of retirement pay in order to receive compensation for a service-connected disability. 

Petitioner John Howell and Respondent Sandra Howell, residents of Arizona, divorced in 1991. See Brief for Petitioner, John Howell at 8. Mr. Howell, who was anticipating retiring from the Air Force shortly after the divorce, came to an agreement with Ms.

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Murr v. Wisconsin

Issues

Should two legally-distinct, but adjacent, commonly-owned parcels be treated as a single parcel when determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether two commonly-owned, contiguous parcels should be considered as a single parcel when determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred. The case arises after four residents of Wisconsin, the Murrs, decided to sell one of two contiguous parcels they had received from their parents. Wisconsin forbid the sale, citing a regulation under which two contiguous parcels of less with a combined area of less than one acre are considered a single parcel. The Murrs argue that the parcels are separate and distinct, as evident by the separate deed to each property. The State of Wisconsin argues that the parcels should be aggregated under the “parcel as a whole” analysis the Supreme Court devised. At stake is just compensation to landowners harmed by overreaching regulation, and the ability of the states and localities to regulate their domain and protect the environment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In a regulatory taking case, does the “parcel as a whole” concept as described in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), establish a rule that two legally distinct, but commonly owned contiguous parcels, must be combined for takings analysis purposes?

Between 1994 and 1995, Joseph, Michael, Donna, and Peggy Murr (collectively, “the Murrs”), received from their parents two neighboring lots along the St. Croix River—Lots E and F. See Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 2013AP2828, at *2, 4 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec.

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Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha v. Regal-Beloit Corp., Union Pacific Railroad Co., v. Regal-Beloit Corp.

Issues

Whether the Carmack Amendment applies to the inland portion of an intermodal shipping agreement when the parties agreed to a bill of lading that specified the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act to control.

 

Respondent, Regal-Beloit, (“Regal”) a manufacturer of electric motors, brought suit against Petitioners, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (“K-line”), and Union Pacific Railroad (“UPRR”), the shippers of the motors. Regal alleges that goods were damaged while they were traveling on a UPRR train that derailed in Oklahoma. K-line and UPRR sought and were granted dismissal at the trial level, pursuant to a forum selection clause in the bill of lading between the parties. Regal claims that the bill of lading clause should not apply because the Carmack Amendment governs this transaction, while Petitioners claim that it does not and urge that their contract be upheld. The Ninth Circuit held that the Carmack Amendment applied and reversed the lower court. This case highlights a conflict between the forum selection clause in the bill of lading and the Carmack Amendment, which preempts state and common law claims and provides that it be the exclusive remedy for interstate shipping, and also narrowly restricts the venues in which disputes may be heard. The court must decide whether the Carmack Amendment will apply in this case, where the shipping involved not only domestic rail travel from California to Midwest destinations, but also included an international carriage by sea from China to California. The Court’s decision in this case will impact manufacturers and shippers across all industries. Petitioners additionally charge that a decision for Regal may upset the settled expectations of the international shipping industry, while Regal contends that a decision for Petitioners denying the Carmack Amendment’s applicability could potentially lead to litigation chaos.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which governs certain rail and motor transportation by common carriers within the United States, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11706 (rail carriers) & 14706 (motor carriers), applies to the inland rail leg of an intermodal shipment from overseas where the shipment was made under a "through" bill of lading issued by an ocean carrier that extended the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30701 Note, to the inland leg, there was no domestic bill of lading for rail transportation, and the ocean carrier privately subcontracted for rail transportation.

Regal-Beloit (“Regal”), an electric motor company, contracted with Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (“K-Line”), a shipping company, to have K-Line ship Regal’s goods from Shanghai, China, to several cities in the American Midwest. See Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 557 F. 3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2009).

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