MetLife v. Glenn

Issues

Given that an administrator of an ERISA plan has a conflict of interest because it both pays claims and determines whether claims are eligible for payment, how much weight should a court give that conflict of interest in deciding whether the administrator abused its discretion regarding a claim?

 

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., provides a private cause of action for employees challenging wrongful denials of benefits under an employee benefits plan. Under ERISA, Wanda Glenn challenged MetLife's discontinuation of her disability benefits on the ground that the company faced a conflict of interest by both determining eligibilities for benefits payments and making these same payments. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio affirmed MetLife's discontinuation of benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, siding with five other Circuits, ruled that a court reviewing a claims-denial must consider whether and to what extent a plan administrator's conflict of interest may have affected its determination of benefits. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether and to what extent a plan administrator that both authorizes the payment of benefits and is responsible for the payment of those benefits has a conflict of interest that must be considered on judicial review.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

If an administrator that both determines and pays claims under an ERISA plan is deemed to be operating under a conflict of interest, how should that conflict be taken into account on judicial review of a discretionary benefit determination?

In 1989, Wanda Glenn's heart suddenly stopped. Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir.

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Messerschmidt v. Millender

Issues

Under what circumstances are police officers granted qualified immunity from civil lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an illegal search if they relied on a facially valid warrant later determined to be invalid and overbroad?

Should the Court reconsider the standard that the presumption that an officer acted reasonably by obtaining a warrant can be rebutted by showing that the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable”?

 

Petitioner, detective Curt Messerschmidt, obtained and executed a warrant to search Respondent Augusta Millender’s residence. Millender sued Messerschmidt and other law enforcement officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Messerschmidt and other officers violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by executing an invalid search warrant and unreasonably searching her home. The court determined that the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad. Messerschmidt contends that he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability because he relied on a warrant and acted in good faith. Millender, on the other hand, maintains that the officers’ reliance on the warrant was unreasonable, and therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. The decision will determine the scope of qualified immunity for officers who have, in good faith, relied on warrants later determined to be invalid.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Court has held that police officers who procure and execute warrants later determined invalid are entitled to qualified immunity, and evidence obtained should not be suppressed, so long as the warrant is not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 920, 923 (1984); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 344-45 (1986).

1. Under these standards, are officers entitled to qualified immunity where they obtained a facially valid warrant to search for firearms, firearm-related materials, and gang-related items in the residence of a gang member and felon who had threatened to kill his girlfriend and fired a sawed-off shotgun at her, and a district attorney approved the application, no factually on point case law prohibited the search, and the alleged over breadth in the warrant did not expand the scope of the search?

2. Should the Malley/Leon standards be reconsidered or clarified in light of lower courts' inability to apply them in accordance with their purpose of deterring police misconduct, resulting in imposition of liability on officers for good faith conduct and improper exclusion of evidence in criminal cases?

Shelly Kelly decided to end her romantic relationship with Jerry Ray Bowen, but she feared that Bowen might become physically violent. See Millender v. Messerschmidt, 620 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.

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Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.v. Dabit

Issues

Whether, as the seventh circuit held earlier this month and in direct conflict with the decision below, SLUSA preempts state law class action claims based upon allegedly fraudulent statements or omissions brought solely on behalf of  persons  who  were induced thereby to hold or retain (and not purchase or sell) securities?

 

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) preempts state law class action suits that allege misrepresentation “in connection with the purchase or sale” of securities.  In a state class action suit against Merrill Lynch for issuing biased recommendations of certain stocks, Respondent Dabit attempted to escape the preemption of SLUSA by filing a holder suit — alleging that he held and refrained from selling stocks based on Merrill Lynch’s misrepresentations, expressly avoiding any references to purchases or sales of stocks.  The court must resolve a conflict between the Second Circuit’s decision in this case, holding that such holder claims are not preempted by SLUSA and can be brought in state courts, and a recent seventh circuit decision that held otherwise.  This case will be closely watched by the corporate community, as allowing holder suits in state court would allow a new class of plaintiffs to sue corporations and also expose corporations to litigation in the more unpredictable and less experienced (with respect to securities class actions) state courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, as the seventh circuit held earlier this month and in direct conflict with the decision below, SLUSA preempts state law class action claims based upon allegedly fraudulent statements or omissions brought solely on behalf of persons who were induced thereby to hold or retain (and not purchase or sell) securities?

In 2000, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer (“Spitzer”) investigated Merrill Lynch, a global financial services firm, for allegedly issuing biased investment recommendations and illegitimately hyping up stocks to obtain business. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25, 28 (2d cir. 2005), cert. Granted, 126 S.Ct.

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Merrill Lynch, et al. v. Greg Manning, et al.

Issues

Does Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over state law claims based on violations of the Exchange Act, or may state courts hear those state law claims?

 

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) provides federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over state law claims based on violations of the Exchange Act or whether state courts are permitted to hear such state law claims. See Brief for Petitioner, Merrill Lynch, et al. at i. Merrill Lynch argues that Manning relies on Regulation SHO, a federal regulation, and therefore federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the Exchange Act. See id. at 19. On the other hand, Manning argues that, because his claims are based on state law, state courts have jurisdiction over this case, even if some elements of his claim rely on federal law. See Brief for Respondent, Greg Manning, et al. at 25. Ultimately, the Court’s decision has the potential to affect whether uniformity in decision-making is necessary to enforce Regulation SHO and whether state courts can govern duties arising under federal regulations. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, in Support of Petitioner at 8–9.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provide federal jurisdiction over state law claims  seeking  to establish liability based on violations of the Act or its regulations or seeking to enforce duties created by the Act or its regulations?

Greg Manning and others (hereinafter “Manning”), brought a lawsuit against Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., Knight Capital Americas L.P., UBS Securities LLC, 

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Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education,

Issues

Can school districts constitutionally use percentage-based range plans to assign students to public schools based on race in order to capture the benefits of educational diversity?

 

The Jefferson County Public School District in Jefferson County, Kentucky, requires that 15 to 50 percent of all students in each school be African-American. Petitioner Crystal Meredith claims that the district violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it rejected her application to enroll her son at a nearby school on the basis of race. To decide this case, the Supreme Court will have to determine whether racial diversity in K–12 public education is a compelling state interest and whether the district’s racial range mandate is narrowly tailored to further that interest. The decision will determine the extent to which schools are permitted to consider race in school assignment policies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Should Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) be overturned and/or misapplied by the Respondent, the Jefferson County Board of Education to use race as the sole factor to assign students to the regular (non-traditional) schools in the Jefferson County Public Schools?
  2. Whether the race-conscious Student Assignment Plan with mechanical and inflexible quota systems of not less than 15% nor greater than 50% of African American students without individually or holistic review of any student, meets the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of the use of race which is a compelling interest narrowly tailored with strict scrutiny.
  3. Did the District Court abuse and/or exceed its remedial judicial authority in maintaining desegregative attractiveness in the Public Schools of Jefferson County, Kentucky?

Desegregation of Schools in Jefferson County

The backdrop for this case was set in 1954. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court mandated the desegregation of public schools. Over subsequent decades, federal courts ordered school districts with institutionalized segregation plans to desegregate through a system of redistricting and busing. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Sherri Lynn Johnson, Trevor Morrison, and Michael Heise for their insights into this case.

The Supreme Court will hear this case in tandem with a companion case, Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. District ,  which involves a student assignment plan that uses race as a tiebreaker to balance high schools that differ by more than 15 percent from the racial  make up  of the Seattle public school system.

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Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds

Issues

Whether the two-year limitations period to bring a suit under the Securities Exchange Act begins when the plaintiff has obtained knowledge that the defendant acted with the intent to defraud, or simply when the plaintiff obtained general knowledge of facts pointing to potential fraud?

 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), a plaintiff must file a claim alleging violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 no later than two years after the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation.  The Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that the two-year period of limitations begins when the plaintiff had, or should have had knowledge of the facts constituting the violation.  What is at issue in this case is whether knowledge that defendant acted with the intent to deceive is a fact constituting the violation for purposes of triggering the two-year period of limitation.  The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve this question of statutory interpretation and, in so doing, will determine the delicate balance between allowing plaintiffs with meritorious claims access to the federal courts and providing certainty and repose to potential securities fraud defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the Third Circuit err in holding, in accord with the Ninth Circuit but in contrast to nine other Courts of Appeals, that under the "inquiry notice" standard applicable to federal securities fraud claims, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until an investor receives evidence of scienter without the benefit of any investigation?

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1658, claims of “fraud, deceit, manipulation or contrivance” concerning the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be made either “[two] years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation,” or “[five] years after such violation,” whichever is earlier. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). Respondents, Reynolds, et.

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Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States of America, et al.

Issues

Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied Holland’s decision when it ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for claims brought under the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”)? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied the Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida when the D.C. Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin’s (“the Tribe”) 1996–1998 claims for contract support costs. See Brief for Respondent at i. The Tribe argues that despite the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the Holland standard for equitable tolling as rigid and mechanical, the Holland standard should instead conform to the Federal Circuit standard, which is a comprehensive and unified analysis that also follows the proper interpretation of Holland. See Brief for Petitioner at 5–6. In contrast, the United States argues that the elements within a comprehensive analysis do not provide an independent basis for equitable  tolling,  and that equitable tolling should not excuse the Tribe’s miscalculations and legal misunderstandings. See Brief for Respondent at 21–22, 48.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner: Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied this Court’s Holland decision when it ruled that the Tribe was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 Respondent: Whether the court of appeals misapplied this Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida, when it ruled that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Respondent at I. 

Between 1995 and 2004, the Tribe provided healthcare services to its members pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 764 F.3d 51, 54 (U.S. App. 2014).

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Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States of America, et al.

Issues

Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied Holland’s decision when it ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for claims brought under the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”)? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied the Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida when the D.C. Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was not subject to equitable tolling for the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin’s (“the Tribe”) 1996–1998 claims for contract support costs. See Brief for Respondent at i. The Tribe argues that despite the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the Holland standard for equitable tolling as rigid and mechanical, the Holland standard should instead conform to the Federal Circuit standard, which is a comprehensive and unified analysis that also follows the proper interpretation of Holland. See Brief for Petitioner at 5–6. In contrast, the United States argues that the elements within a comprehensive analysis do not provide an independent basis for equitable  tolling,  and that equitable tolling should not excuse the Tribe’s miscalculations and legal misunderstandings. See Brief for Respondent at 21–22, 48.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner: Whether the D.C. Circuit misapplied this Court’s Holland decision when it ruled that the Tribe was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Petitioner at i.

 Respondent: Whether the court of appeals misapplied this Court’s decision in Holland v. Florida, when it ruled that petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for filing of ISDA claims under the CDA? See Brief for Respondent at I. 

Between 1995 and 2004, the Tribe provided healthcare services to its members pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 764 F.3d 51, 54 (U.S. App. 2014).

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MedImmune v. Genentech

Issues

Should patent licensees be required to violate the terms of a patent licensing agreement, and therefore risk a willful patent infringement suit by the patent owner, in order to challenge the validity of the patent in a court of law?

 

A declaratory judgment suit is one in which the plaintiff’s requested relief from the court is a statement of the parties’ rights. In a declaratory judgment action, an “actual controversy” must exist between the parties in order for a court to declare the rights and legal relations of the interested parties. MedImmune v. Genentech asks the Supreme Court to consider what defines an “actual controversy” as applied to suits challenging the validity of patents. Specifically, the Court will decide whether it is necessary for a patent licensee to breach the terms of a patent in order to bring suit against the patent owner. The Court’s  decision in this case  has the potential to shift the balance of power between patent holders and licensees.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Article III’s grant of jurisdiction  of  "all Cases . . . arising under . . . the Laws of the United States," implemented in the "actual controversy" requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), require a patent licensee to refuse to pay royalties and commit  material  breach of the license agreement before suing to declare the patent invalid, unenforceable or not infringed?

MedImmune licensed a patent owned by Genentech called Cabilly I (United States Patent No. 4,816,567), which involved technology relating to the use of cell cultures to manufacture human antibodies.

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Maryland v. Blake

Issues

If one police officer violates a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by making an inappropriate remark after the suspect has invoked that right, can the words and acts of another officer, and other circumstances, such as the passage of time, sufficiently repair the situation in order to allow the suspect to later waive his right to remain silent?

 

When the Annapolis Police arrested Leeander Blake, he invoked his right to remain silent until granted access to an attorney. While Blake was still in custody, and after Blake had invoked his right to remain silent, an officer made an inappropriate remark to him. However, the officer leading the investigation swiftly rebuked this officer, in front of Blake, for his remark. Shortly thereafter, Blake made incriminating statements without an attorney that the State sought to use against him. Under Edwards v. Arizona, a suspect who has invoked his right to remain silent cannot later waive that right unless he initiates the conversation and does so knowingly and intelligently. The Court must decide whether the supervising officer's curative remarks in this case sufficiently restored Blake's rights prior to Blake's incriminating statements.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When a police officer improperly communicates with a suspect after  invocation  of the suspect's right to counsel, does Edwards permit consideration of curative measures by the police, or other intervening circumstances, to conclude that a suspect later initiated communication with the police?

On October 19, 2002 in Annapolis, Maryland, unknown assailants shot Straughan Lee Griffin in the head and stole his car; the assailants ran over his body as they fled. Blake v. Maryland, 381 Md. 218, 222 (2004).

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