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Holder v. Gutierrez (10-1542) & Holder v. Sawyers

Issues

Should a parent's years of residence after lawful admission be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor for purposes of satisfying the residency requirements of U.S.C. 1229b(a)?

 

In Holder v. Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers, the Supreme Court will determine whether aliens may impute their parents’ time spent lawfully residing in the United States to satisfy residency requirements for cancellation of removal under Section 1229b. In both cases, the individuals entered the United States as children, lived with their legal permanent resident parents, and later became inadmissible due to violations of the law. Attorney General Eric Holder argues that the plain language of 1229b does not allow  imputation,  and that allowing imputation would be contrary to congressional intent. On the other hand, Respondents Gutierrez and Sawyers contend that Congress intended the Immigration and Nationality Act to preserve family unity. They argue that interpreting the statute to disallow imputation would be unreasonable and contrary to congressional intent. If the Supreme Court upholds the imputation rule, aliens who resided with their legal permanent resident parents as minors would be able to impute  the their  parents’ residency period to satisfy the requirements for cancellation of removal under 1229(b).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Questions Presented for 10-1542 [Holder v. Gutierrez]

1. Whether a parent's years of lawful permanent resident status can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years."

2. Whether a parent's years of residence after lawful admission to the United States can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status." 

Questions Presented for 10-1543 [Holder v. Sawyers]

Whether a parent's years of residence after lawful admission to the United States can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status."

 

Factual Background for Holder v. Gutierrez

In 1989, respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered the United States to reside with his parents at the age of five. See Brief for Petitioner, Eric H. Holder, Jr.

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Hill v. McDonough

Issues

Is a district court’s finding that a patent suit is objectively baseless entitled to deference?

 

Respondent Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc., owns U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105, which covers a method of data entry and management used in the context of medical treatment. In 2002, Allcare notified Petitioner Highmark, Inc., a medical insurance provider, that Highmark was infringing on Allcare’s patent. Highmark sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement; Allcare counterclaimed for infringement. After the district court granted summary judgment in Highmark’s favor, Highmark moved for an award under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which grants attorneys’ fees for “exceptional cases.” Though the district court granted the award for two of Allcare’s claims, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the claims de novo and reversed one of them. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the scope of deference given to district courts to find “exceptional cases.” The ruling in this case, in tandem with another case before the Court, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., will impact how long and how readily litigants may pursue future patent cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court's exceptional-case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285, based on its judgment that a suit is objectively baseless, is entitled to deference.

Respondent Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc. (“Allcare”) owns U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105 (“the ’105 patent”), which covers a health management system that facilitates interactions among physicians, patients, employers, banks, and insurance companies. See Highmark, Inc.

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Hertz Corp. v. Friend

Issues

What factors should courts look to when determining the “citizenship” of a multistate corporation to determine whether or not to exercise diversity jurisdiction?

 

Though federal courts are generally only able to hear claims arising under federal law, Congress gives them the power to exercise so-called “diversity jurisdiction” over any state law civil claim between citizens of different states. When a multistate corporation seeks relief in federal court on the basis of a diversity action, courts wrestle with exactly what factors they should look to in determining the corporation’s citizenship. Here, a group of California citizens sued Hertz Corporation in California state court alleging violations of California’s state labor laws. Hertz sought to remove the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit concluded Hertz was a California citizen and denied removal jurisdiction. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to lay out a specific test for determining corporate citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, for purposes of determining principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a court can disregard the location of a nationwide corporation's headquarters - i.e., its nerve center.

Congress gives federal district courts the power to exercise “diversity jurisdiction” over any civil claim for at least $75,000 arising between citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Diversity Jurisdiction

·      Wex: Statutory Construction

·      Wex: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

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Herring v. United States

Issues

Should the exclusionary rule be extended to situations where a police officer relies in good faith on an invalid warrant, when that reliance was the result of a clerical error made by an employee of a law enforcement agency?

 

In 2004, Alabama police officers arrested Bennie Dean Herring and, in a search immediately following the arrest, recovered methamphetamines and a handgun. The officers arrested Herring because they were erroneously told that that a warrant for his arrest existed. Herring moved to suppress evidence of the methamphetamines and gun, arguing that they were recovered as a result of an unlawful search, and consequently, that the exclusionary rule should apply. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied his motion, finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule extends to good faith reliance by police officers on erroneous information provided by law enforcement personnel. In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained as a result of negligent error by law enforcement personnel outweighs the costs of excluding such evidence, or whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be extended.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires evidence found during a search incident to an arrest to be suppressed when the arresting officer conducted the arrest and search in sole reliance upon facially credible but erroneous information negligently provided by another law enforcement agent.

On July 7, 2004, the petitioner, Bennie Dean Herring, went to the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department to retrieve items from an impounded motor vehicle. See Brief for Petitioner, Herring at 4. Investigator Mark Anderson, who knew Herring, asked warrant clerk Sandy Pope to check the Coffee County databases for outstanding arrest warrants for Herring. See 

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• CRS Annotated Constitution: Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure”

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Henderson v. Shinseki

Issues

Does equitable tolling apply to Section 7266(a) of the Veterans Judicial Review Act, which sets a 120-day time limit for veterans to file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims?

 

David Henderson, a veteran of the Korean War, was discharged after being diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. After receiving a final decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs denying his request for home care, Henderson had 120 days to file notice of his intent to appeal. Henderson failed to file until 15 days after the deadline had passed and claimed that his illness prevented him from filing on time. Appearing pro se, Henderson requested the Veterans Court apply equitable tolling to permit his appeal. The court denied Henderson’s request but then requested pro bono counsel to assist Henderson in filing for rehearing. While the request for rehearing was in process, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Bowles v. Russell. The lower courts interpreted Bowles to mean that all statutory deadlines for filing appeals are jurisdictional, and therefore Henderson’s request for equitable tolling was rejected because the court could not hear the case. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify how lower courts should evaluate statutory time limits and will help determine which procedural limits are jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 7266(a) of Title 38, U.S.C., establishes a 120-day time limit for a veteran to seek judicial review of a final agency decision denying the veteran's claim for disability benefits. Before the decision below, the Federal Circuit in two en banc decisions held that Section 7266(a) constitutes a statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling under this Court's decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). In the divided en banc decision below, however, the Federal Circuit held that this Court's decision in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), superseded Irwin and rendered Section 7266(a) jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling.

The question presented is whether the time limit in Section 7266(a) constitutes a statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, or whether the time limit is jurisdictional and therefore bars application of that doctrine. 

Petitioner David Henderson is a Korean War veteran who was discharged from active duty in 1952 due to paranoid schizophrenia. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir.

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Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York

Issues

Does loss of taxable revenue constitute an injury to business or property under RICO and was the City’s injury direct enough to meet the direct injury requirement for standing under RICO?

 

Both the State and the City of New York have enacted laws that require the imposition of taxes on all cigarettes sold or used within their boundaries. The City of New York sued a group of Internet cigarette retailers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The City of New York claimed that the retailers had violated federal and state laws in selling cigarettes to New York residents without charging a tax on tobacco products, constituting a form of consumer fraud as well as tax evasion. The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City's claims, holding that the City did not plead that the Internet retailers were an enterprise as defined by RICO. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the lower court and held that the State could hold the retailers liable for its loss of tax revenue. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will affect the ability of Internet sites to sell tobacco products at a discounted price, as well as refine the application of RICO in civil suits.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether city government meets the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing requirement that a plaintiff  be  directly injured in its “business or property” by alleging con-commercial injury resulting from non-payment of taxes by non-litigant third parties.

The State of New York imposes a tax on all cigarettes sold or used in the State (known as a use tax). See City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 432 (2nd Cir.

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Additional Resources

·      Bloomberg.com, Greg Stohr: New York Suits Over Cigarette Sales Get U.S. High Court Review (May 4, 2009)

·      Business Week, Brian Burnsed: Preview of Major Business Cases in Supreme Court’s 2009-2010 Term (Sept. 24, 2009)

·      Trade Regulation Talk, John W. Arden & Mark Engstrom: High Court to Consider RICO’s “Business or Property” Requirement (May 22, 2009)

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Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation

Issues

Do taxpayers have the ability to challenge the actions of the Executive Branch based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which prohibits the Legislative Branch from making laws violating the freedom of religion?

 

In 2001, President Bush announced the Faith Based and Community Initiatives plan, which uses funds appropriated by Congress to establish a series of conferences designed to coordinate and support both religious and secular community organizations. The Freedom from Religion Foundation, represented by taxpayer plaintiffs, challenged this program on the basis that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, but the suit was dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that various Supreme Court precedents establish that the Foundation did have standing. The government has appealed the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Foundation’s inability to identify a particular Congressional appropriation removes the programs from the Establishment Clause prohibition on Congressional action supporting religion.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether taxpayers have  standing  under Article III of the Constitution to challenge on Establishment Clause grounds the actions of the Executive Branch pursuant to an Executive Order, where the plaintiffs challenge no Act of Congress, the Executive Branch actions at issue are financed only indirectly through general appropriations, and no funds are disbursed to any entities or individuals outside the government.

In 2004, the Freedom from Religion Foundation (“the Foundation”), represented by three taxpayer plaintiffs, filed suit in Federal District Court, challenging part of President Bush’s Faith Based and Community Initiatives (“FBCI”) plan. See Freedom from Religion, Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2006).

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Heffernan v. City of Paterson

Issues

To raise a First Amendment retaliation claim, must public employees show they were fired for actually engaging in constitutionally protected activities?

 

In Paterson, New Jersey’s 2006 mayoral election, Mayor Jose Torres faced former police chief Lawrence Spagnola. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2015). Although he was friends with Spagnola and supported him privately, Paterson police detective Jeffrey Heffernan did not campaign for Spagnola, vote in the election, or consider himself politically active. But the day after picking up a Spagnola campaign yard sign at his mother’s request, Heffernan was demoted for his alleged political activities. See id. The Supreme Court will decide if Heffernan, to raise a First Amendment retaliation claim, must show that he actually engaged in constitutionally protected activity, or merely demonstrate that the City of Paterson fired him based on its belief that he engaged in protected activity. Heffernan argues that the First Amendment protects government employees from adverse action that is based upon political expression or association, regardless of the true nature of employees’ activities. See Brief for Petitioner, Jeffrey Heffernan at at 14. But Paterson maintains that the First Amendment protects only the literal exercise of association and speech. See Brief for Respondent, City of Paterson et al. at 8–12. The Court’s decision will impact how public employees engage in political activity, and the amount of litigation surrounding retaliation claims. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does the First Amendment bar the government from demoting a public employee based on a supervisor’s perception that the employee supports a political candidate?

After twenty years in Paterson, New Jersey's police department, Jeffrey Heffernan was named a detective in 2005. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 149 (3d Cir.

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Health Care Service Corporation v. Pollitt

Issues

Whether a government contractor who provides insurance coverage to federal employees is entitled to remove a complaint against it to federal court under either the “complete preemption” doctrine with respect to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”) or the federal officer removal statute?

 

In 2007, Juli Pollitt sued Health Care Service Corporation (“HCSC”) in state court for bad-faith insurance practices. HCSC removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed because the court reasoned that the Federal Employees  Benefit  Act preempted the case. Pollitt appealed, and the Seventh Circuit vacated the lower court decision, holding that removal was inappropriate because the claim was not “completely preempted” by federal law. The Seventh Circuit added that whether the federal officer removal statute applied here was a question of fact and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court decision will decide whether a government contractor who provides insurance coverage to federal employees is entitled to remove a suit under either the “complete preemption” doctrine or the federal officer removal statute. This decision is of great importance to all businesses that contract with the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act ("FEHBA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-14, completely preempts -- and therefore makes removable to federal court -- a state court suit challenging enrollment and health benefits determinations that are subject to the exclusively federal remedial scheme established in FEHBA.

2. Whether the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which authorizes federal removal jurisdiction over state court suits brought against persons "acting under" a federal officer when sued for actions "under color of [federal] ... office," encompasses a suit against a government contractor administering a FEHBA plan, where the contractor is sued for actions taken pursuant to the government contract.

Respondent, Juli Pollitt (“Pollitt”), sued her health care insurance carrier, Petitioner, Health Care Service Corporation (“HCSC”), in state court for bad-faith conduct by insurers. See Pollitt v. Health Care Service Corp., 558 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir.

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Additional Resources

• Wex: Law about Jurisdiction

• Wex: Law about Removal

• The National Underwriter: Labor’s Own Benefits Problems Reach Supreme Court

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Haywood v. Drown

Issues

Whether a state may constitutionally withdraw jurisdiction over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil actions filed in state courts against state corrections officers.

 

While Keith Haywood was serving a prison sentence for his second felony conviction, corrections officers filed two separate misbehavior reports against him. After Haywood was found guilty of both offenses, he sued several corrections officers, including the hearing officers who heard his case, in civil lawsuits. Haywood asserted several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The New York Supreme Court dismissed Haywood’s claims on the basis of New York Corrections Law § 24, which prohibits suits against individual state corrections officers rather than against the state itself. The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Haywood is now appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States. His case will determine whether a state has the sovereign authority to withdraw jurisdiction over an area of federal law. The Supreme Court’s decision will also affect New York corrections officers, who, at present, are immune to suits arising in the course of their jobs. In reaching its decision, the Court will have to balance the efficiency concerns the corrections officers raise with the fairness concerns that Haywood and his supporters raise.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a state’s withdrawal of jurisdiction over certain damages claims against state corrections employees — from state courts of general jurisdiction — may be constitutionally applied to exclude federal claims under Section 1983, especially when, as here, the state legislature withdrew jurisdiction because it concluded that permitting such lawsuits is  bad  policy?

In 1992, Keith Haywood received a fifteen- to thirty-year sentence in Attica Correctional Facility for his second violent felony. See Haywood v. Drown, 9 N.Y.3d 481, 484 (N.Y. 2007); see also People v.

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Additional Resources

· Workplace Prof Blog

· Oyez

· PrawfsBlawg: A blog post from before the Supreme Court granted cert, arguing that the Court should do so.

· Constitutional Law: Check out more about the Supremacy Clause here.

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