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In October 1999, several environmental groups petitioned the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) to use its power to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles. According to these groups, greenhouse gases should be classified as “air pollutants,” which can be regulated under the Clean Air Act if they “can be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Among the possible “dangers” to welfare, the Clean Air Act lists effects on “weather” and “climate.” However, almost four years later, the EPA officially denied the petition, saying that the Clean Air Act did not give the EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and, even if it did, the EPA would deny the exercise of such authority. According to the EPA, the causal link between greenhouse gases and global warming has not been proven conclusively. Clearly, the Court’s decision in this case will have a significant effect on federal, state, and local efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, the Court’s decision could determine the amount of deference that a federal agency should receive in its determinations and could lend credibility to particular side of the scientific argument concerning the tie of greenhouse gases to global warming.

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In 2003, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution, invoked his Miranda rights, refusing to speak about alleged sexual child abuse without an attorney present. The investigation into Shatzer’s alleged sexual child abuse was closed later that year. In 2006, upon further evidence, the police opened a new investigation on the same matter and re-interrogated Shatzer, who had remained incarcerated for an unrelated offense during the entire interval. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made certain admissions. At trial, Shatzer moved to suppress the statements he made in 2006, arguing that the police’s re-interrogation violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, which held that, once a suspect requests counsel, the police and/or prosecutor may not subject that suspect to further interrogations until counsel is made available. Maryland argues that this presumption does not apply here due to (1) a break in police custody and (2) a substantial passage of time between Shatzer’s request for counsel and the subsequent interrogation. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with Shatzer, holding that the Circuit Court for Washington County erred by admitting Shatzer’s statements. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely impact the manner in which the police and prosecutors approach and interview suspects who have invoked their right to counsel.

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Petitioner Luis Mariano Martinez, a convicted felon serving consecutive terms of 35 years to life, filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief in federal court. Martinez alleges that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. Because his appellate counsel failed to raise that ineffective-assistance claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, an Arizona court precluded the claim on procedural grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Martinez did not have the right to counsel during his post-conviction proceeding, and concluded that he may not claim ineffective assistance at that stage in order to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, Martinez is barred from raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, regardless of whether his post-conviction counsel rendered him ineffective assistance and caused the procedural default that precluded his trial-level claim. Martinez argues that he has a constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim; he concludes that ineffective post-conviction counsel should negate the procedural default with respect to his ineffective-trial-counsel claim in this federal habeas proceeding. Respondent Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, asserts that defendants do not have a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, concluding from this that the ineffective assistance of Martinez’s post-conviction counsel cannot negate his procedural default. In this decision, the Supreme Court will have to weigh the possibility that poorly-represented defendants will lose ineffective-assistance claims due to procedural defaults against the benefits of efficient state criminal proceedings.

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In 1987, a California jury convicted Respondent Kenneth Clair of the murder of Linda Rodgers, sentencing him to death. Clair filed a habeas corpus petition requesting new court-appointed counsel in 1995, but the district court rejected his request. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision, and remanded to allow Clair’s new attorney to present additional claims. Clair argues that the district court abused its discretion by not properly investigating Clair’s request for substitute counsel, and consequently that he (Clair) must be allowed to make new claims and present additional evidence in the interests of justice. The State of California, however, argues that Clair should not be permitted to circumvent the workings of the justice system by rearguing his case merely because of dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the standard courts use in granting requests from habeas petitioners for substitute counsel, as well as the finality of appellate denials of habeas petitions.

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When billionaire oil tycoon J. Howard Marshall II died, he was survived by his wife of one year, Vickie Lynn Marshall-better known as Anna Nicole Smith. Mr. Marshall's son from a previous marriage, E. Pierce Marshall, became the executor of the elder Marshall's estate and the principal beneficiary of an inter vivos trust, neither of which included Mrs. Marshall. Nevertheless, a legal battle between Mrs. Marshall and E. Pierce over exactly what Mr. Marshall intended for his wife has taken place since Mr. Marshall's death. The case has bounced from a probate court in Texas, to a federal bankruptcy court in California, and now to the Supreme Court of the United States. The issue now before the Court concerns the relationship between federal and state powers, as related to the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction-namely, when can federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, decide cases involving traditionally state-directed claims in inheritance. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will affect the rights not only of state and federal judicial systems, but also the multitude of individuals throughout the nation planning, managing, and litigating their rights in estates, finances, and the future livelihoods of themselves and their loved ones.

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Robert Marrama sought to convert his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to a Chapter 13 after meeting the requirements for Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court denied Marrama’s motion to convert based on Marrama’s prior bad faith conduct in failing to report in his bankruptcy schedules the value of a tax refund and vacation home. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether courts have discretion to deny conversions based on an evaluation of the debtor’s conduct. The decision will hinge on the statutory language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. While this issue may be limited to filings that occurred before Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, it will give the court the opportunity to clarify the scope of the good faith requirement in bankruptcy proceedings and the amount of discretion afforded to bankruptcy judges.

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In 2006, several individuals who had bought cars contacted a group of lawyers in South Carolina claiming various car dealerships overcharged them. To investigate this claim, the lawyers requested from the state department of motor vehicles the disclosure of the personal information of thousands of people who had bought from dealerships in Spartanburg County. Under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), this information is normally protected from disclosure. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the lawyers engaged in mass solicitation without the consent of the person whose information was disclosed, the litigation exception of the DPPA nonetheless protected the lawyers' activity. Petitioner Maracich argues that the DPPA provision requiring the consent of individuals to disclose their personal information imposes a consent requirement onto requests to solicit potential clients for the purpose of litigation. In contrast, Respondent Spears argues that the DPPA exception for litigation waives the consent requirement for solicitation specifically related to litigation. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on September 25,  2012  to examine the merits of the Fourth Circuit's decision. The outcome of this case may help determine how far lawyers can go to obtain personal information and how far Congress can go to reach into an area traditionally regulated by the States. 

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