Holmes v. South Carolina

Issues

By restricting a criminal defendant’s opportunity to present evidence that someone else is culpable, does South Carolina’s third-party guilt evidence rule violate criminal defendants’ Constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process, and opportunity to obtain and confront witnesses?

 

Bobby Lee Holmes was charged with murder and other crimes related to a 1989 assault on an eighty-six year old victim. At trial Holmes sought to introduce evidence suggesting that another man, Jimmy McCaw White, was the real killer. South Carolina’s “third-party guilt” rule, however, presented a significant burden that Holmes had to overcome before his evidence could be admitted. The trial court held that Holmes’ proffered evidence did not meet this standard because it merely cast a “bare suspicion” on White, and Holmes was found guilty and sentenced to death. On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the trial court applied the correct legal standard for admitting third-party-guilt evidence and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the issue of the validity of the South Carolina rule.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether South Carolina’s rule governing the admissibility of third-party guilt evidence violates a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a complete defense grounded in the Due Process, Confrontation, and Compulsory Process Clauses?
At about 8:00 a.m. on December 31, 1989 police officers Dale Edwards, Lt. Barnett, and others responded to a report regarding an elderly woman who had been assaulted, raped, and robbed by a man who forced his way into her home. State v. Holmes, 361 S.C. 333, 336 (S.C. 2004). Before lapsing into mental confusion and eventually dying in March, the eighty-six year old victim told the police that the attack occurred around 6 a.m. Id at 337. She described her assailant as being dark skinned, “middle aged…young [but]…not too young”, and “not too heavy[,] not too slim.” Id.

Additional Resources

Law about... Evidence
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Horne v. Flores; Speaker of the Arizona House v. Flores (consolidated)

Issues

1.   Whether increasing general funding for English Language Learner Programs in Arizona by millions of dollars, hiring more qualified teachers, decreasing class size, and creating new programs satisfies the "substantial change of fact" requirement necessary to be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(5) even when the court feels that the funding is still inadequate.

2.     Whether the subsequently passed No Child Left Behind Statute should be used to help define the ambiguous "appropriate action" standard of the Equal Education Opportunities Act, or whether the two statutes serve different purposes and therefore should not be treated as informing one another.

 

Since 1992, Miriam Flores has been claiming that Arizona does not provide equal education opportunities to students who do not speak English as their first language, in violation of the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974 ("EEOA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. In 2000, a federal district court, finding that Arizona's English Language Learners ("ELL") programs were underfunded, agreed with Flores and ordered Arizona to provide adequate funds to their ELL programs. Arizona did not comply with the order to the court's satisfaction, but did improve their ELL programs through other, managerial type mechanisms. The Arizona House Speaker and Senate President sought Rule 60(b) relief from the court order, claiming that the improvements to the schools constituted "appropriate action" as required by the EEOA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied them relief and now the Supreme Court will have to decide (1) whether Arizona's improvements to its ELL programs, although not achieved through court-ordered sufficient funding increases, constituted "appropriate action" and thus were sufficient for Rule 60(b) relief from the court order, and (2) in determining this question, whether the court should define "appropriate action" using the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001's specific standards for the implementation of adequate English Language Learner programs.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Questions Presented in 08-289

1. By interpreting the phrase "appropriate action" under Section 1703(f) of the Equal Education Opportunity Act as a requirement that the State of Arizona provide for a minimum amount of funding specifically allocated for English Language Learner programs statewide, did the Ninth Circuit violate the doctrine prohibiting federal courts from usurping the discretionary power of state governments to determine how to appropriately manage and fund their public education systems?

2. Should the phrase "appropriate action" as used in Section 1703(f) of the Equal Education Opportunity Act be interpreted consistently with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, where both Acts have the same purpose with respect to English Language Learners and the NCLB provides specific standards for the implementation of adequate English Language Learner programs, but the EEOA does not?

Questions Presented in 08-294

1. Whether a federal-court injunction seeking to compel institutional reform should be modified in the public interest when the original judgment could not have been issued on the state of facts and law that now exist, even if the named defendants support the injunction.

2. Whether compliance with NCLB's extensive requirements for English language instruction is sufficient to satisfy the EEOA's mandate that States take "appropriate action" to overcome language barriers impeding students' access to equal educational opportunities.

In the small Mexican border city of Nogales, Arizona, the vast majority of primary through high school students are Hispanic, and Spanish is their primary language. See Flores v. Horne, 516 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Feb.

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Holland v. Florida

Issues

1. Does equitable tolling apply to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas petitioners?

2. If so, does “gross negligence” of the habeas petitioner’s counsel fall under the “extraordinary circumstances” prerequisite to equitable tolling?

 

Albert Holland, a death row inmate, twice wrote letters to his attorney to inquire as to the status of his federal habeas petition. His attorney failed to reply to either letter. Holland eventually filed a pro se federal habeas petition in federal district court. However, with the delay in filing, the district court denied the habeas petition as untimely. After gaining new counsel, Holland argued that his attorney’s “egregious conduct” constituted “extraordinary circumstances” so as to trigger equitable tolling of the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, even though  representation  of Holland was “grossly negligent,” only an attorney’s “bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment, or so forth” could be considered “extraordinary circumstances. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether “gross negligence” by an attorney constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” under the equitable tolling doctrine. The  decision in this case  will implicate the courts’ ability to timely resolve criminal cases and criminal defendants’ ability to file habeas petitions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In determining that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling to excuse the late filing of his habeas petition, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the reason for the late filing was the “gross negligence” on part of Petitioner’s state-appointed collateral attorney’s failure to file the petition in a timely fashion despite repeated instructions from the Petitioner to do so. However, under the new test announced by the Eleventh Circuit in Petitioner’s case, no allegation of attorney negligence or failure to meet a lawyer’s standard of care, in the absence of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment, could ever qualify as an exceptional circumstance warranting equitable tolling.

This Court should grant certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether “gross negligence” by collateral counsel, which directly results in the late filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, can qualify as an exceptional circumstance warranting equitable tolling, or whether, in conflict with other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit was proper in determining that factors beyond “gross negligence” must be established before an extraordinary circumstance can be found that would warrant equitable tolling.

In 1996, a Florida state court convicted Albert Holland of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery, and subsequently sentenced Holland to death. See Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1336–37 (11th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Congressional Research Services: Federal Habeas Corpus: A Brief Legal Overview

· Federation of American Scientists: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary

· Commission on Capital Cases: Inmate Details for Albert Holland

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Holder v. Gutierrez (10-1542) & Holder v. Sawyers

Issues

Should a parent's years of residence after lawful admission be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor for purposes of satisfying the residency requirements of U.S.C. 1229b(a)?

 

In Holder v. Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers, the Supreme Court will determine whether aliens may impute their parents’ time spent lawfully residing in the United States to satisfy residency requirements for cancellation of removal under Section 1229b. In both cases, the individuals entered the United States as children, lived with their legal permanent resident parents, and later became inadmissible due to violations of the law. Attorney General Eric Holder argues that the plain language of 1229b does not allow  imputation,  and that allowing imputation would be contrary to congressional intent. On the other hand, Respondents Gutierrez and Sawyers contend that Congress intended the Immigration and Nationality Act to preserve family unity. They argue that interpreting the statute to disallow imputation would be unreasonable and contrary to congressional intent. If the Supreme Court upholds the imputation rule, aliens who resided with their legal permanent resident parents as minors would be able to impute  the their  parents’ residency period to satisfy the requirements for cancellation of removal under 1229(b).

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Questions Presented for 10-1542 [Holder v. Gutierrez]

1. Whether a parent's years of lawful permanent resident status can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years."

2. Whether a parent's years of residence after lawful admission to the United States can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status." 

Questions Presented for 10-1543 [Holder v. Sawyers]

Whether a parent's years of residence after lawful admission to the United States can be imputed to an alien who resided with that parent as an unemancipated minor, for the purpose of satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)'s requirement that the alien seeking cancellation of removal have "resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status."

​

 

Factual Background for Holder v. Gutierrez

In 1989, respondent Carlos Martinez Gutierrez illegally entered the United States to reside with his parents at the age of five. See Brief for Petitioner, Eric H. Holder, Jr.

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Hill v. McDonough

Issues

Is a district court’s finding that a patent suit is objectively baseless entitled to deference?

 

Respondent Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc., owns U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105, which covers a method of data entry and management used in the context of medical treatment. In 2002, Allcare notified Petitioner Highmark, Inc., a medical insurance provider, that Highmark was infringing on Allcare’s patent. Highmark sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement; Allcare counterclaimed for infringement. After the district court granted summary judgment in Highmark’s favor, Highmark moved for an award under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which grants attorneys’ fees for “exceptional cases.” Though the district court granted the award for two of Allcare’s claims, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the claims de novo and reversed one of them. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the scope of deference given to district courts to find “exceptional cases.” The ruling in this case, in tandem with another case before the Court, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., will impact how long and how readily litigants may pursue future patent cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a district court's exceptional-case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285, based on its judgment that a suit is objectively baseless, is entitled to deference.

Respondent Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc. (“Allcare”) owns U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105 (“the ’105 patent”), which covers a health management system that facilitates interactions among physicians, patients, employers, banks, and insurance companies. See Highmark, Inc.

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Hertz Corp. v. Friend

Issues

What factors should courts look to when determining the “citizenship” of a multistate corporation to determine whether or not to exercise diversity jurisdiction?

 

Though federal courts are generally only able to hear claims arising under federal law, Congress gives them the power to exercise so-called “diversity jurisdiction” over any state law civil claim between citizens of different states. When a multistate corporation seeks relief in federal court on the basis of a diversity action, courts wrestle with exactly what factors they should look to in determining the corporation’s citizenship. Here, a group of California citizens sued Hertz Corporation in California state court alleging violations of California’s state labor laws. Hertz sought to remove the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit concluded Hertz was a California citizen and denied removal jurisdiction. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to lay out a specific test for determining corporate citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, for purposes of determining principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a court can disregard the location of a nationwide corporation's headquarters - i.e., its nerve center.

Congress gives federal district courts the power to exercise “diversity jurisdiction” over any civil claim for at least $75,000 arising between citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C.

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Diversity Jurisdiction

·      Wex: Statutory Construction

·      Wex: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

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Herring v. United States

Issues

Should the exclusionary rule be extended to situations where a police officer relies in good faith on an invalid warrant, when that reliance was the result of a clerical error made by an employee of a law enforcement agency?

 

In 2004, Alabama police officers arrested Bennie Dean Herring and, in a search immediately following the arrest, recovered methamphetamines and a handgun. The officers arrested Herring because they were erroneously told that that a warrant for his arrest existed. Herring moved to suppress evidence of the methamphetamines and gun, arguing that they were recovered as a result of an unlawful search, and consequently, that the exclusionary rule should apply. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied his motion, finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule extends to good faith reliance by police officers on erroneous information provided by law enforcement personnel. In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained as a result of negligent error by law enforcement personnel outweighs the costs of excluding such evidence, or whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be extended.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires evidence found during a search incident to an arrest to be suppressed when the arresting officer conducted the arrest and search in sole reliance upon facially credible but erroneous information negligently provided by another law enforcement agent.

On July 7, 2004, the petitioner, Bennie Dean Herring, went to the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department to retrieve items from an impounded motor vehicle. See Brief for Petitioner, Herring at 4. Investigator Mark Anderson, who knew Herring, asked warrant clerk Sandy Pope to check the Coffee County databases for outstanding arrest warrants for Herring. See 

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Additional Resources

• CRS Annotated Constitution: Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure”

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Henderson v. Shinseki

Issues

Does equitable tolling apply to Section 7266(a) of the Veterans Judicial Review Act, which sets a 120-day time limit for veterans to file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims?

 

David Henderson, a veteran of the Korean War, was discharged after being diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. After receiving a final decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs denying his request for home care, Henderson had 120 days to file notice of his intent to appeal. Henderson failed to file until 15 days after the deadline had passed and claimed that his illness prevented him from filing on time. Appearing pro se, Henderson requested the Veterans Court apply equitable tolling to permit his appeal. The court denied Henderson’s request but then requested pro bono counsel to assist Henderson in filing for rehearing. While the request for rehearing was in process, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Bowles v. Russell. The lower courts interpreted Bowles to mean that all statutory deadlines for filing appeals are jurisdictional, and therefore Henderson’s request for equitable tolling was rejected because the court could not hear the case. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify how lower courts should evaluate statutory time limits and will help determine which procedural limits are jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 7266(a) of Title 38, U.S.C., establishes a 120-day time limit for a veteran to seek judicial review of a final agency decision denying the veteran's claim for disability benefits. Before the decision below, the Federal Circuit in two en banc decisions held that Section 7266(a) constitutes a statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling under this Court's decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990). In the divided en banc decision below, however, the Federal Circuit held that this Court's decision in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), superseded Irwin and rendered Section 7266(a) jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling.

The question presented is whether the time limit in Section 7266(a) constitutes a statute of limitations subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, or whether the time limit is jurisdictional and therefore bars application of that doctrine. 

Petitioner David Henderson is a Korean War veteran who was discharged from active duty in 1952 due to paranoid schizophrenia. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir.

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Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York

Issues

Does loss of taxable revenue constitute an injury to business or property under RICO and was the City’s injury direct enough to meet the direct injury requirement for standing under RICO?

 

Both the State and the City of New York have enacted laws that require the imposition of taxes on all cigarettes sold or used within their boundaries. The City of New York sued a group of Internet cigarette retailers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The City of New York claimed that the retailers had violated federal and state laws in selling cigarettes to New York residents without charging a tax on tobacco products, constituting a form of consumer fraud as well as tax evasion. The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City's claims, holding that the City did not plead that the Internet retailers were an enterprise as defined by RICO. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the lower court and held that the State could hold the retailers liable for its loss of tax revenue. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will affect the ability of Internet sites to sell tobacco products at a discounted price, as well as refine the application of RICO in civil suits.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether city government meets the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act standing requirement that a plaintiff  be  directly injured in its “business or property” by alleging con-commercial injury resulting from non-payment of taxes by non-litigant third parties.

The State of New York imposes a tax on all cigarettes sold or used in the State (known as a use tax). See City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 432 (2nd Cir.

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Additional Resources

·      Bloomberg.com, Greg Stohr: New York Suits Over Cigarette Sales Get U.S. High Court Review (May 4, 2009)

·      Business Week, Brian Burnsed: Preview of Major Business Cases in Supreme Court’s 2009-2010 Term (Sept. 24, 2009)

·      Trade Regulation Talk, John W. Arden & Mark Engstrom: High Court to Consider RICO’s “Business or Property” Requirement (May 22, 2009)

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