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Joshua Richter, convicted of murder, alleged that he received inadequate assistance from his attorney at trial. Richter argued that his attorney should have presented expert testimony concerning a blood splatter at the crime scene, which could have corroborated his version of the events. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Richter and granted his request for habeas corpus relief. Kelly Harrington, the prison warden, claimed that Richter did not receive inadequate counsel and that the California Supreme Court’s earlier summary disposition denying habeas corpus relief should be upheld. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the level of deference that should be granted to lower court orders, such as summary dispositions, which could discourage lower courts from issuing such orders in the future.

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Petitioner, Bridget Hardt (“Hardt”), a former employee of Dan River Inc., brought suit against Respondent, Reliance Insurance Co. (“Reliance”), the insurance provider for Dan River Inc., in an attempt to recover attorney’s fees for a previous suit Hardt had brought in the Eastern District of Virginia to recover benefits pursuant to Dan River Inc.’s Group Long-Term Disability Insurance Program Plan (“the Plan”). The Eastern District remanded the case to Reliance, which, under ERISA, not only administers the Plan, but also decides whether an applicant is entitled to benefits. On remand, Reliance provided Hardt with the requested benefits. Hardt now sues seeking attorney’s fees under ERISA § 502(g)(1). Reliance counters that Hardt did succeed on the merits in the lower court and, therefore, cannot satisfy ERISA’s definition of “prevailing party.” Hardt, on the other hand, argues that the text of the statute does not include a prevailing party standard as a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether ERISA § 502(g)(1) requires a party to succeed on the merits before attorney’s fees may be awarded and, if so, whether Hardt satisfies that requirement.

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The Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3599, provides indigent defendants in death penalty cases the assistance of federally funded lawyers. Edward Jerome Harbison was convicted of first degree murder by a Tennessee jury and sentenced to death. Harbison requested the retention of his federally provided lawyer for his state clemency proceedings. This request was denied, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that § 3599 does not apply to strictly state proceedings. Harbison appeals this ruling, arguing that the language of § 3599 indicates it applies to all death penalty proceedings, including state clemency proceedings. Although the respondent, Warden Ricky Bell, takes no position on this issue, amicus United States argues that Congress intended § 3599 to apply exclusively to federal proceedings, and that the legislative history supports this interpretation. With its decision in this case, the Supreme Court may resolve a split of opinion among the federal circuit courts regarding the scope of § 3599.

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In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, the Supreme Court held that a wife’s out of court statement against her husband could only be admitted as testimonial evidence subject to cross-examination.  The instant case presents a similar question, with the added complication of whether statements made at a crime scene during the investigative stage should be admitted as testimonial or non-testimonial statements. Hershel Hammon’s wife made a statement to police officers responding to a domestic disturbance call—there is no question that such a statement is admissible, but the real issue is whether once admitted the statement is a testimonial statement subject to the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. If it is not a testimonial statement within the meaning of Crawford, then the defendant does not have a right under the Sixth Amendment to cross-examine his wife. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.

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This case concerns the extent of a bankruptcy court's flexibility in determining the "projected disposable income" of a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). Stephanie Kay Lanning filed for bankruptcy in October 2006 and proposed monthly payments of $144, based on her current income and expenses. Jan Hamilton, Lanning's bankruptcy trustee, objected and said that Lanning's "projected disposable income" was actually over $1,000 per month. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas overruled the objection and approved Lanning's plan. The court found that, while Hamilton's calculation of "projected disposable income" based on Lanning's income from the prior six months was correct under Form 22C, the results were inequitable because Lanning's income was artificially inflated for two months because of a buyout from her prior employer. The Bankruptcy Appeals Panel and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals both affirmed. Hamilton argues that the plain language of the statute mandates his “mechanical” approach, while Lanning argues that her "forward-looking" approach avoids absurd results. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will provide clarity to a statutory term that has flummoxed the lower courts, while simultaneously affecting the flexibility of bankruptcy judges.

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Salim Ahmed Hamdan, alleged former aide to terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, challenges the legality of the military commission that seeks to establish its jurisdiction to try him as an alleged enemy combatant in connection with the September 11th attacks. The government responds that the President has the constitutional, congressional, and statutory authority to create military commissions and to use them in the ongoing conflict with al Qaeda. This case involves the critical question of allocation of power among Congress, the President, and the federal courts in the “war on terror.” It also presents issues arising under the 1949 Geneva Convention. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will have to balance the interests of national security versus the preservation and promotion of individual human rights.

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In this consolidated case, the Supreme Court must determine the correct interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides enhanced damages in patent infringement cases. Currently, plaintiffs must show that defendants “willfully infringed” to obtain enhanced damages. Courts employ a two-prong test, with subjective and objective elements. The objective element requires plaintiffs to show “by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted” patent infringement. In separate actions, petitioners Halo Electronics Inc. and Stryker Corp. sued respondents Pulse Electronics Inc. and Zimmer Inc. respectively for patent infringement. In each case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Halo and Stryker failed to satisfy the objective prong of the willfulness test. But Halo and Stryker argue that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of objective willfulness is unfairly burdensome and should be replaced by a totality-of-the-circumstances standard. Pulse and Zimmer contend that the objective willfulness standard properly allows only culpable infringers to pay punitive damages, in accord with the historical purpose of punitive damages. The Court’s decision may affect how plaintiffs prove infringement, and whether culpable infringers escape liability.

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Petitioners Lynwood and Brenda Hall filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and subsequently sold their family farm, which resulted in a postpetition tax liability of approximately $29,000. The Halls proposed to treat this tax liability as an unsecured dischargeable claim. The IRS objected to the debtors’ plan based on Internal Revenue Code requirements. At trial, the Bankruptcy Court agreed with the IRS that the tax liability was not considered an administrative expense under Bankruptcy Code Section 507(a)(2), covered by Section 1222(a)(2)(A), or entitled to treatment as unsecured dischargeable debt, and therefore that the $29,000 was required to be paid in full outside of the bankruptcy context. On appeal, the Halls argue that their postpetition tax liability should be treated as an unsecured dischargeable debt under Section 1222(a)(2)(A) because, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s finding, the tax liability is an administrative expense under Section 507(a)(2). Furthermore, the Halls contend that a Chapter 12 estate can incur a tax liability. Respondent United States argues that postpetition debts are not included in Chapter 12 plans, and that, even if postpetition debts were included, a Chapter 12 estate cannot incur a tax liability because it is not a separate taxable entity. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine the proper application of Section 1222(a)(2)(A) to postpetition tax liabilities.

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In 2000, Hall Street Associates filed suit seeking declaratory relief and damages from Mattel, Inc. for its failure to indemnify Hall Street for the cost of cleaning up water contamination at a toy manufacturing facility Mattel leased from Hall Street. After litigation began, the parties agreed to arbitrate some of the issues in dispute. They signed an agreement allowing either party to appeal the arbitrator's decision in court if it contained errors of law or unsubstantiated findings of fact. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit ruled in a separate case that any arbitration provisions giving courts more review power than that granted to them in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) were invalid. Since the provisions of the arbitration agreement between Hall Street and Mattel went beyond those in the FAA, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the District Court's decision to review the arbitrator's findings according to the parties' provisions. At issue here is whether the FAA provides the sole grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards. Hall Street maintains that it is consistent with the spirit of the FAA and in the best interests of encouraging arbitration for courts to recognize all grounds for judicial review agreed upon by the parties, whether or not they go beyond those contained in the FAA. Mattel's position is that the best way to preserve the integrity of arbitration proceedings is to limit the review power of courts to the grounds contained in the FAA. Because the Supreme Court's decision in this case will affect the amount of freedom disputing parties have in crafting their arbitration agreements, ultimately it may affect whether parties choose to undergo the arbitration process at all.

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Jack Gross sued his employer FBL Financial Group, Inc. ("FBL") in 2004, claiming that FBL had demoted him due to his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Under the trial judge's instructions to the jury, Gross had to prove by circumstantial or direct evidence that his age was a motivating factor in FBL's decision to demote him. The burden then shifted to FBL to prove that Gross's age was not the determining factor, and that it would have demoted Gross regardless of his age. The jury ultimately found for Gross. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins ("Price Waterhouse") requires plaintiffs to present direct evidence to shift the burden to the defendant, and that Gross had presented only circumstantial evidence. Though Price Waterhouse dealt with Title VII claims, the Eighth Circuit held that ADEA claims should be treated similarly and rejected Gross's claim that Price Waterhouse no longer applied. In this case, the Supreme Court may determine the applicability of Price Waterhouse and the burden of proof in ADEA cases.

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