Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust

Issues

Did the Appeals Court have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order to remand a suit removed under SLUSA, where the district court held the suit in state court was not removable under SLUSA and it thus had no “subject matter jurisdiction,” given that when a case is remanded under the lack of subject matter jurisdiction statute 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) a party cannot appeal the remand order?

 

Petitioners are a group of investors who owned shares in mutual funds offered or advised by respondents, Putnam Funds Trust. These investors brought a class action suit in Illinois state court asserting  breach  of fiduciary duty and alleging that the mutual funds set prices in a way that allowed arbitrageurs to exploit differences in prices to the detriment of long-term investors. The respondents removed the suit to federal court pursuant to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). The judge then remanded the case to state court because the petitioners had not alleged a loss “in connection with the purchase or sale of securities” as required under the Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), such a remand is not appealable if the remand is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, in conflict with previous decisions by the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, ruled that the remand was reviewable because the basis of the SLUSA remand  was not  lack  of  subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not apply. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars appellate review of remand orders in suits removed under statutes such as SLUSA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction, contrary to the holdings of three other circuits, to review a district court order remanding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction a suit removed under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)'s bar on appellate review of remand orders based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the district courts' conclusion that petitioners' claims are not preempted by and thus not removable under SLUSA.

In 1998, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”). Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 847 (2004).

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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum

Issues

Whether an American federal court can hear a claim under the Alien Tort statute, when that claim arose out of conduct in a foreign country.

 

Petitioner Esther Kiobel, representing a group of individuals from the Ogoni region in Nigeria, filed a class action lawsuit against Respondents, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC, and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, LTD (“Royal Dutch”) under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). The ATS grants jurisdiction to some federal courts for certain violations of international law. Petitioners allege that Royal Dutch aided the Nigerian government in committing various acts of violence against protestors of the oil exploration projects in the Ogoni region.  Petitioners claim that they have standing to sue under the ATS because the history, text, and purpose of the statute support the application of the ATS to actions in foreign countries. Petitioner also contends that previous court decisions interpreted the ATS to extend beyond U.S. territory. In response, Royal Dutch argues that the ATS is not an exception to the presumption that U.S. law does not apply extraterritorially, and should not be applicable to actions outside of the U.S. The Court's decision in this case will clarify the reach of the U.S. federal courts' jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial tort claims. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a merits question, as it has been treated by all courts prior to the decision below, or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals held for the first time.

Esther Kiobel represents a class of citizens from the Ogoni region in Nigeria who filed a class action suit against the respondents Royal Dutch Petroleum, Shell Transport and Trading Company and Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (“Royal Dutch Petroleum”) in the United States District Court for

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Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States of America

Issues

Does the Veterans Act of 2006 allow the Department of Veterans Affairs discretion in deciding whether to award a contract to a veteran-owned business?

 

The Supreme Court will consider whether the 2006 Veterans Act (the “Veterans Act”) always requires the Department of Veteran Affairs (the “VA”) to award its contracts to veteran-owned small businesses. See Brief for Petitioner, Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. at i. Kingdomware, a veteran-owned small business, maintains that the language, purpose, and history of the Veterans Act verify that the requirement is mandatory. See Brief for Petitioner at 28. The United States, as respondent, maintains that the Veterans Act’s contract-awarding procedure does not apply when the VA places orders under pre-existing Federal Supply Schedule contracts. See Brief for Respondent, United States of America at 25. Further, the United States asserts that the VA’s interpretation of the Veterans Act is reasonable and warrants judicial deference. See Brief for Respondent at 47. The Court’s  decision in this case  could significantly affect the business opportunities available to veterans and the VA’s ability to provide efficient and cost-effective services. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Veteran Small Business Coalition et al. (“NVSBC”), in Support of Petitioner at 12; see Brief for Respondent at 39.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the Federal Circuit err in construing the 2006 Veterans Act's mandatory set-aside restricting competition for Department of Veterans Affairs’ contracts to veteran-owned small businesses as discretionary?

In January 2012, the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”) decided to obtain an Emergency Notification System (“ENS”) for several of its medical centers and outpatient clinics. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 226, 235 (Fed. Cl.

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Kentucky v. King

Issues

In emergency circumstances, police may enter and search a private residence without a warrant. Does this exception apply when police create the emergency circumstances through their own lawful action, such as knocking on a door?

 

While pursuing a known drug felon, police officers smelled burning marijuana emanating from behind a closed apartment door. After knocking and announcing themselves, the police heard shuffling within the apartment. Believing that valuable evidence was being destroyed inside, they entered the apartment, found a variety of drugs and drug paraphernalia and arrested Respondent Hollis Deshaun King. King claims that this entry and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights because there was no exigent circumstance which permitted the officers to enter his apartment without a warrant. The Commonwealth of Kentucky asserts that the smell of burning marijuana, in addition to the sounds of shuffling and movement within the apartment, validated the police's warrantless entry. To decide this case, the Supreme Court will have to weigh privacy interests against the need for police officers to safely and effectively perform their duties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

When does lawful police action impermissibly "create" exigent circumstances which preclude warrantless entry; and which of the five tests currently being used by the United States Courts of Appeals is proper to determine when impermissibly created exigent circumstances exist?

In October 2005, the police of Lexington-Fayette Urban County, Kentucky performed a “buy bust” operation in which a confidential informant attempted to buy crack cocaine from a suspected drug dealer. See King v. Kentucky, 302 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Ky.

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Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC

Issues

The Commonwealth of Kentucky ("Kentucky") provides normal retirement benefits to public employees who are 55 years of age and have satisfied a minimum service requirement, or who have worked for Kentucky for 20 years. Kentucky also provides disability-retirement benefits to employees who are ineligible for normal retirement benefits (e.g. employees who are under 55 or who have not satisfied the service requirement) and who become disabled. Because age is a factor in determining whether an employee may receive normal retirement benefits, by definition, age is also a factor in determining whether an employee may receive disability-retirement benefits.

Moreover, the calculation that determines the amount of benefit paid to an employee under both plans includes the employee's age as well as the years served. Under the disability-retirement plan, however, Kentucky inflates the number of years worked to the level needed to receive normal retirement benefits. In other words, when an employee has not yet reached age 55, or has not yet worked 20 years, Kentucky will pay them as though they have, or, at the very least, increase their payment to a statutory cap. Because it takes fewer years to bring an older employer to that threshold, the disability-retirement plan often provides a greater benefit to younger employees.

The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court asks, as the benefits provided under the disability-retirement plan often exceed those under normal retirement, and in certain instances, are provided exclusively under the disability-retirement plan, whether the plan's use of age as a factor violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ? 621, et seq, as amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA") 29 U.S.C. ? 621 note.

 

After finding that older individuals faced discrimination in the workplace, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ?621 et seq. The ADEA prohibits employers from arbitrarily discriminating against older employees. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought suit against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Kentucky Retirement Services ("KRS"), who administers the state retirement program, because the retirement program distinguishes among recipients, at least in part, on the basis of age. The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the retirement scheme in question violated the ADEA. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether an employer may deny an employee disability benefits because of his or her eligibility to receive normal retirement benefits under the ADEA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

This Petition involves a public employee retirement plan that includes normal and disability retirement benefits. A member who is eligible for normal retirement benefits based on attained age plus a minimum service requirement, or based on service alone, is not eligible for disability retirement benefits. Because age may be a factor in determining eligibility for normal retirement, it is an indirect factor in determining eligibility for disability retirement. Moreover, the calculation of disability retirement benefits is based upon actual years of service plus the number of years remaining before the member reaches retirement age or eligibility based on years of service alone; age may thereby be an indirect factor in determining the amount of disability retirement benefits.

The question presented in this Petition is accordingly: Whether any use of age as a factor in a retirement plan is "arbitrary" and thus renders the plan facially discriminatory in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?

Kentucky law prescribes two methods in which a public employee may reach what is termed "normal retirement." Brief for Petitioner at *4. Under normal circumstances, a public employee may retire upon crossing either of two thresholds, whichever comes first. Id. Employees who work in hazardous positions become eligible to receive normal retirement benefits when t

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Kennedy v. Louisiana

Issues

Is it cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to sentence a person to death solely for the rape of a child? If not, does Louisiana's capital rape law nevertheless violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to  providing  sufficient narrowing guidance to juries concerning who, among those guilty of this crime, should be eligible for the death penalty?

 

A Louisiana jury found Patrick Kennedy guilty of aggravated rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter under Louisiana's aggravated rape statute. This statute provided a sentence of death for the rape of a child under twelve years of age. After finding aggravating circumstances, as required by Louisiana law, the jury recommended Kennedy to be sentenced to death. After the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, Kennedy petitioned the United States Supreme Court to invalidate the sentence on either of two grounds: first, that imposing a death sentence for rape, where the victim does not die, constitutes disproportionate, and therefore "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment; second, that the aggravating circumstances in the  case-that  the offender was perpetrating an aggravated rape and the victim was under twelve years  old-merely  repeated elements of the underlying crime and therefore did not sufficiently limit eligibility for a death sentence to avoid arbitrary sentencing. Kennedy's first contention asks the Court to revisit its decision in Coker v. Georgia, which invalidated, on Eighth Amendment grounds, a death sentence for the rape of a sixteen-year-old.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause permits a State to punish the crime of rape of a child with the death penalty.

2. If so, whether Louisiana's capital rape statute violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it fails genuinely to narrow the class of such offenders eligible for the death penalty.

The following facts are taken from the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court, State v. Kennedy, 957 So.2d 757 (La. 2007), and the Verdict, Agreement and Settlement of the District Court, in this case, 2003 WL 2473647:

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Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut

 

In 1998, the small town of New London, Connecticut saw a dramatic turnaround in its economic fate when pharmaceutical giant Pfizer announced its development of a waterfront global research facility in the city's Fort Trumbull area. New London created a development corporation to revitalize the area around the new facility, and granted this entity the power of eminent domain. This power has long enabled governments to condemn–essentially take–private property for "public use," so long as they conform to due process and provide just compensation. In this case, the development corporation filed condemnation proceedings against the petitioners in an attempt to condemn their homes–some of which had been in their families for over a century. This property was to be used to create an office park, a parking lot, and a new park. This case tests the limits of the government's power to take private property for "public use" under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in circumstances when the "use" is largely commercial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

What protection does the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement provide for individuals whose property is being condemned, not to eliminate slums or blight, but for the sole purpose of "economic development" that will perhaps increase tax revenues and improve the local economy?

New London, Connecticut is a small historic whaling port comprising six square miles and providing a home to approximately 25,000 residents. See City of New London website at http://ci.new-london.ct.us/index.html (last checked on February 7, 2005). 

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Honeycutt v. United States

Issues

Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), is a co-conspirator of a defendant who has been convicted of violating a federal drug law liable for the forfeiture of the crime’s proceeds, even if the co-conspirator was never in possession of them?

When a person is convicted of a federal crime, the United States government can often seize the property or proceeds obtained through the commission of the crime. Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), Congress mandates that a person who is convicted of a Chapter 13 federal drug crime must forfeit the “property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation.” It is unclear, however, whether the government can hold a co-conspirator of a drug crime liable to forfeit the proceeds of such violation when the co-conspirator never actually received any of the proceeds of the crime. Petitioner Terry Honeycutt argues that the statute only reaches the persons who have actually individually obtained the proceeds of the crime. The United States, on the other hand, argues that a co-conspirator of a federal drug crime under Chapter 13 is jointly-and-severally liable for the forfeiture of the crime’s proceeds, regardless of whether that person ever obtained the proceeds. The outcome of this case will determine the reach of the government’s seizure power under 21 U.S.C. § 853.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under 21 U.S.C. §853(a)(1), a person convicted of violating a federal drug law must forfeit to the government “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or
indirectly, as the result of such violation.”

The question presented is:

Does 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) mandate joint-and-several liability among co-conspirators for forfeiture of the reasonably foreseeable proceeds of a drug conspiracy?

Terry Honeycutt was a salaried employee at his brother’s store where he oversaw sales and product inventory. United States v. Honeycutt, No. 1:12-cr-00144 at 2 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 2016). In 2008, Honeycutt noticed that an increasing number of customers were purchasing Polar Pure, a water purification product that was being used to manufacture methamphetamine around the area.

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Turner v. United States

Issues

What standard applies to the materiality of evidence withheld from criminal defendants by the government in order to assess whether a due process violation occurred, and should that standard differ based on the strength of the government’s case?  

This case will address whether certain undisclosed evidence falls under the standard for prosecutorial disclosures as described by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The defendants, Russell Overton and Charles Turner, were convicted of a murder that occurred in 1984 and contend that several pieces of evidence were improperly withheld by the prosecution, resulting in a violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The United States asserts that the evidence in question does not fall within the scope of the Brady standard, and therefore no post-conviction relief is required. The outcome of this case will further articulate the standards of materiality, favorability, and suppression under Brady and elucidate what information a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to know before trial.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether petitioners' convictions must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Christopher and Charles Turner, Clifton Yarborough, Kevin Smith, Levy Rouse, and Timothy Catlett were convicted for the 1984 murder of Catherine Fuller. Turner v. United States, Nos. 12-CO-1362, 12-CO-1538, 12-CO1539, 12-CO-1540, 12-CO-1541, 12-CO-1542 & 12-CO-1543, at 14 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2015).

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Lee v. United States

Issues

When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, would it be irrational for a longtime legal resident of the United States to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial in the face of strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory deportation?

Petitioner Jae Lee pleaded guilty to possession of ecstasy with the intent to distribute, an aggravated felony and deportable offense. Lee argues that he is entitled to Strickland relief because ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced his case. The United States argues that, although Lee did experience ineffective assistance of counsel, he is not entitled to Strickland relief because it would have been unreasonable to seek trial in lieu of a guilty plea in this case. This case allows the Supreme Court to examine what Sixth Amendment constitutional relief is available to noncitizen United States residents that experience ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in mandatory deportation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the context of a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended familial and business ties to the United States, whether it is always irrational for a defendant to reject a plea offer notwithstanding strong evidence of guilt when the plea would result in mandatory and permanent deportation.

In 2009, Jae Lee, a legal resident of the United States, was charged with the possession and intent to distribute ecstasy. See Lee v. United States, No. 14-5369, at 2 (6th Cir. June 8, 2016). Following his lawyer’s incorrect advice, Lee pleaded guilty to the charges against him, not realizing at the time that he ran the risk of mandatory removal from the United States.

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