Issues

Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed in his Chapter 13 reorganization plan that he would repay $13,250 in student loans to United Student Aid Funds (“Funds”). Although Funds claimed they were owed an additional $4,582.15, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona confirmed Espinosa's plan as proposed, and Funds did not object to the confirmed plan. Espinosa repaid all debts according to the Chapter 13 plan. Funds subsequently began to intercept Espinosa's income tax refunds, claiming that Espinosa had improperly discharged his student loans, because Espinosa had not initiated a statutorily required adversary proceeding to determine whether repayment of the student loans would constitute an "undue hardship." While the U.S. District Court of Arizona held that Espinosa had violated Funds' due process interests by failing to initiate an adversary proceeding and serve a complaint and summons upon Funds according to the statutory procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and Funds now appeals. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine how student loans and other debts are collected in bankruptcy and will affect the overall relationship between debtors and creditors in America.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

After Respondent Williams sent a hyperlink containing pornographic images of children to an Internet chat room dedicated to child pornography, he was prosecuted under the PROTECT ACT (18 U.S.C. � 2252A(a)(5)(B)) for "pandering" material in a manner intending to cause another to believe that the material contains child pornography. Williams pled guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether the PROTECT Act was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and thus interfered with First Amendment free speech. In particular, Williams argued that the statute criminalized speech about child pornography when the actual materials were not pornographic or did not exist. Williams further claimed that the statute similarly criminalized those who appear to be but are not actually discussing child pornography. The Eleventh Circuit Court held the PROTECT Act unconstitutional, and the United States government appealed. The United States argues that the PROTECT Act is neither overbroad nor vague because it only criminalizes speech which the First Amendment does not protect. It further claims that the statute requires intent and that the PROTECT Act is necessary to combat child pornography.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

The United States indicted Respondent Jason Tinklenberg for illegal possession of a handgun and materials used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, or “crystal meth.” On the last business day before his trial, Tinklenberg filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The Speedy Trial Act requires certain federal criminal trials to begin within 70 days of the defendant’s first appearance before the court, unless certain “delays,” including the filing of pretrial motions, occur. The government argues that two of its pretrial motions qualify as excludable delays. Tinklenberg argues that because these pretrial motions did not result in a postponement of the trial date, the Speedy Trial Act does not exclude them from the 70-day count. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Tinklenberg, finding that 73 non-excludable days occurred before Tinklenberg’s scheduled trial date, and remanded the case to the lower court for dismissal. The Supreme Court's decision will settle which pretrial motions are excludable from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day count, and could affect the trial strategy of prosecutors and criminal defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a guidance policy granting temporary deportation protection to 4.3 million undocumented immigrants, called the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) program. In the same year, twenty-six states (the “states”) challenged the DAPA guidance. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide: (1) whether states have standing to challenge DAPA if it will increase the costs of state-subsidized benefits, such as driver’s licenses; and (2) whether DAPA is lawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The United States argues that the states do not have standing because the increased costs of state subsidized benefits are merely incidental effects of the guidance policy and are self-inflicted. Additionally, the United States argues that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives the executive branch power to choose which immigrants to deport—a power exercised through the DAPA guidance policy. But the states assert that the United States cannot defeat standing by claiming that the costs are self-inflicting. Moreover, the states claim that the INA does not explicitly give the executive power to provide temporary protection from deportation. The Court’s decision could affect the status of and benefits available to undocumented immigrants and the scope of the president’s discretion when executing immigration law. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Issues

The United States prosecuted Robert J. Stevens (“Stevens”) for violating 18 U.S.C. § 48, which states: “Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.” Stevens was prosecuted for selling videos depicting dog fights. Stevens claimed that § 48 violates his First Amendment right to free speech and is therefore unconstitutional. The Third Circuit held that § 48 reached a form of protected speech and that the government’s interest in preventing animal cruelty is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify a ban on depictions of animal cruelty. How the Supreme Court decides this case will reflect its view on the scope of the First Amendment right to speech and affect the power of Congress to identify new areas of unprotected speech.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

Efrain Santos was convicted in Indiana federal court of running an illegal gambling business and money laundering. He presented a collateral attack against his conviction following the Seventh Circuit’s decision in another case, where it held that to prove money laundering, the government is required to show that profits from the underlying illegal activity were used to further promote or conceal that activity. Because Santos’s conviction was based on evidence that he used gross receipts, not profits, to promote his gambling ring, the District Court overturned his money laundering conviction. The Seventh Circuit upheld that decision, and the government appealed, contending that to secure a conviction it is only required to prove that gross receipts are used in a money laundering scheme. The government argues that statutory interpretation and practical enforcement considerations mandate a reading that “proceeds” means gross receipts, and Santos responds that in light of the fact that “proceeds” is not defined within the statute, the rule of lenity requires the Court to uphold the Seventh Circuit’s more restrictive reading of the term as profits. The outcome of this case will affect money laundering prosecutions tied to a wide variety of illegal activities and will affect the government’s burden in proving the elements of this charge.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), applies to felons convicted of firearms possession who have previously been convicted of three or more serious crimes, including state drug offenses with a maximum sentence of ten or more years. A federal district court sentenced Gino Rodriquez to 92 months' imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon. The Government appealed, arguing the court should have applied the ACCA, which requires a minimum fifteen-year sentence. The ACCA does not tell federal judges how to determine what the maximum possible sentence for an underlying crime was under state law. The Government argues that when a crime is committed by a repeat offender, or "recidivist," at the time of their prior conviction, the court should include in the maximum any sentence enhancements imposed based on the offender's recidivism. Rodriquez argues the maximum sentence should be only the statutory maximum for the crime charged, excluding such enhancements. The sentence in question here is a 1995 drug conviction Rodriquez received under Washington State law. The Government said the conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate because in 1995 Rodriquez was a repeat offender and Washington law provided a ten-year peak sentence for such offenders. The district court ruled that Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedents required it to consider only the sentence for the underlying crime without additional penalties for recidivism. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In this case, the United States Supreme Court will clarify how federal courts should treat recidivist sentence enhancements when determining the maximum sentence for a state drug conviction for ACCA purposes. This decision will add to the Court's rapidly developing interpretation of the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

In 2002, an Immigration Naturalization Service agent discovered that Juan Resendiz-Ponce was in the United States illegally and had him deported. A year later border patrol agents detained Resendiz-Ponce after he presented false documentation and falsely stated his intended destination. The United States brought suit against Resendiz-Ponce for attempting to re-enter the country after having been previously deported, and he was convicted. While the indictment alleged that Resendiz-Ponce had attempted to re-enter the United States illegally, it did not allege that he presented false documents, made false statements, or performed any other act associated with his alleged attempt. Resendiz-Ponce appealed his conviction, claiming that the indictment’s failure to allege an act introduced a fatal flaw into his trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with this argument and reversed the conviction. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the omission of an element from a federal indictment requires automatic reversal on appeal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

Respondent Joseph Olson was injured and nearly killed when a nine-ton rock fell on him while he was working in a mine in Arizona. In his suit for damages he alleged that the federal agency responsible for ensuring his safety, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, was negligent in its inspection of the mine and was responsible for his injuries. The federal government argued in its defense that under the Federal Tort Claims Act it can be held liable under state law only in the way in which a private person, not a government agency, is held liable. Thus, the government urged that since there was no like action against private persons for this type of situation, it could not be held liable. This case may have potentially significant effects not just on individuals and their ability to sue the federal government, but also federal agencies and their ability to avoid tort liability during the course of carrying out their duties.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Issues

In 1964, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, the Navajo Nation entered into an agreement with a third party to lease a substantial portion of Navajo land for coal mining activities. In 1984, pursuant to the terms of the lease, the Nation sought the assistance of the Secretary of the Interior to renegotiate the royalty rate allotted in the lease to comport with changed market conditions. After a series of negotiations, in 1987 the Nation agreed to-and the Secretary of the Interior approved-a series of amendments to the original lease. In 1993, the Nation initiated proceedings in the Court of Federal Claims alleging that the Secretary had been improperly influenced by the coal company, and as a result, had breached his fiduciary duty to the Nation when he approved the 1987 lease amendments. After a series of appeals, in 2003, the Supreme Court held the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 did not create an actionable claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the United States. On remand, the Federal Circuit read the Supreme Court's decision narrowly, and held that the Nation's claim was nonetheless actionable based on a common law fiduciary duty arising from the network of statutes and regulations defining the relationship between the Navajo Nation and the United States.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources