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The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) limits the ability of U.S. citizens to bring causes of action against foreign states and their agents in U.S. courts. See Brief for Petitioner, OBB Personenverkehr AG at 25. But the FSIA contains a commercial activity exception, which allows a U.S. court to hear suits involving a foreign state when the action is “based upon” the state’s commercial activity in the United States. See id. In this case, the Supreme Court will consider how to define when an entity is an agent of a foreign state, and the scope of the commercial activity exception’s “based upon” requirement. See id. at i. OBB Personenverkehr AG (“OBB”), a state-run Austrian passenger railway, argues that foreign states are “presumptively immune” from U.S. jurisdiction under the FSIA unless an exception applies. See id. at 25 (internal quotation omitted). OBB contends that injured Americans like Carol Sachs cannot satisfy “the based upon” requirement for claims arising from harm incurred on foreign soil. See id. at 28. Sachs argues that a sale of a ticket in the United States constitutes commercial activity and thus satisfies that requirement. See Brief for Respondent, Carol P. Sachs at 23–24. In the alternative, OBB argues that the FSIA clearly defines who can be an “agent” of the state, and that the Ninth Circuit erred in relying on common-law agency principles to find that a third-party’s ticket seller was an agent of OBB. See Brief for Petitioner at 43–46. Sachs counters that common-law agency principles should apply notwithstanding the language of the FSIA. See Brief for Respondent at 20–21. This case may affect the balance of international litigation and may result in a shift from the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See Brief of Amici Curiae Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation, in Support of Petitioner at 26, 34. This case may also result in changes to how agents of a foreign state engage in business with the United States over the Internet. See Brief of NML Capital, LTD, in Support of Respondent at 16; Brief of Amici Curiae International Rail Transport Committee, in Support of Petitioner at 14.

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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) declared that future challenges to contract rates relating to New England's energy market will be evaluated under Mobile-Sierra’s public interest standard, which presumes that freely negotiated rates are just and reasonable as long as there is no serious threat to the public interest. Petitioners, NRG Power Marketing, LLC, et al. (“NRG Power”) support FERC’s use of the public interest standard. However, respondents, Maine Public Utilities Commission, et al. (“Maine Public Utilities”) contend that the use of the public interest standard deprives non-contracting third party challengers of their statutory right to evaluation under a more scrutinizing just and reasonable standard. Maine Public Utilities finds the statutory standard preferable because challengers merely have to prove that a rate is unjust and unreasonable to succeed in challenging the contract rate. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Maine Public Utilities that the just and reasonable standard is the appropriate standard of review when challenges are initiated by non-contracting third parties. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will impact the stability of the electrical energy market, influence future investments in it, and, ultimately, affect New England’s supply of electricity.

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Congress passed the Voting Rights Act to enforce the dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment-that all Americans had the fundamental right to vote, regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." When the VRA was first enacted in 1965, the original intent was that §§ 4 and 5 would be temporary measures against particular states which would phase out after several years of remedial work. Congress, however, took a different route, and extended these "temporary" measures repeatedly, while broadening their scope to cover more states and political subdivisions. Several jurisdictions, like Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One ("District"), are trying to exempt themselves from these requirements, arguing that these measures are anachronistic and too burdensome. After the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the District's claim, the case is before the Supreme Court on appeal. Is it still necessary for the federal government to regulate state and local governments to prevent discriminatory voting practices? This case might serve as a vehicle for the Supreme Court to answer that question.

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Northern Insurance Company has sued Chatham County, Georgia, to recover for payments made on a boat that suffered damages when one of the county's drawbridges malfunctioned. Chatham claims that it is immune from liability due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The issue before the Supreme Court is therefore whether counties and other municipalities are entitled to sovereign immunity from admiralty lawsuits. If the Court grants sovereign immunity, the quality of county-operated bridges may decline, insurance companies may raise their premiums, and the federal government may have to step in to impose extensive new regulations. If the Court holds that counties are not entitled to immunity, counties may have to dip into state funds to satisfy judgments rendered against it. This would lead to a depletion in resources, which may cause government-run programs like education and public welfare to suffer.

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Timothy Sorrell, a railroad employee, suffered injuries while working for his employer, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) and sued, seeking damages for his injuries, under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). FELA is the federal statute governing railroad workplace injuries. After determining and apportioning negligence among the parties, the Missouri circuit court found for Sorrell, awarding him $1.5 million for his injuries. At issue in this case is the standard of negligence used to determine liability under FELA between plaintiff employee and defendant railroad. In conflict with the United States Supreme Court and several federal courts of appeals, the Missouri circuit court used a different standard to determine plaintiff and defendant liability. Traditionally, federal courts had used proximate cause to determine the liability of both parties. The Missouri circuit court, however, applied Missouri-specific rules that lower the employee’s burden to prove railroad negligence and that keep the railroad’s burden to prove contributory negligence by the employee the same. Given that FELA is the exclusive remedy for railroad employees injured on the job, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in this case will have a significant impact on all workplace injury cases involving railroads. The Supreme Court’s decision will reflect its view on the balance that courts should strike when considering negligence in FELA cases and will ultimately affect the outcome of all FELA cases by either maintaining the status quo or making it easier for plaintiff employees to emerge victorious.

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When Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") in 1996, it did so partly with the intention of making it more difficult for aliens to remain in United States when an agency had deemed they must be removed; the IIRIRA thus contained stricter standards for judicial courts to follow when overruling an agency and allowing such aliens to remain in the country. At issue is how far Congress went in creating stricter standards, and which traditional standards it maintained. Petitioner Jean Marc Nken, an alien who applied for asylum in the U.S., was ordered to leave the country, and filed a motion for a stay of removal pending appeal of his case. The Fourth Circuit, instead of applying a traditional, four-factored test to determine whether to grant the stay, applied Section 1252(f)(2) of IIRIRA, which bars judges from enjoining the removal of aliens unless the alien can clearly show that the removal is prohibited by law. Petitioner appealed, contending that Section 1252(f)(2) was not intended to apply to motions for stays, and instead was only meant to apply to motions for injunctions. How the Supreme Court rules will determine the proper way to interpret IIRIRA, determine how much power judicial courts have over federal agencies once they have made decisions in aliens' cases, and impact both national security concerns  and petitioners fighting the decision to deport them.

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Manoj Nijhawan was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud, and for conspiracy to commit money laundering. Upon his conviction, Immigration Court proceedings were brought against him and he was found to be subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) ("Subsection (M)(i)"). Subsection (M)(i) provides that an "aggravated felony," for purposes of deportation, includes a conviction for "an offense that (i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000." On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the loss determination used for sentencing was sufficient to meet the loss requirement under Subsection (M)(i), even though it was not a necessary element of his conviction. Nijhawan challenges this ruling arguing that both the "fraud or deceit" and "loss" elements must be found by a jury in order for Subsection (M)(i) to apply. Accordingly, he argues that he cannot be deported because the elements of the criminal statute under which he was convicted do not match those required for deportation under Subsection (M)(i). The United States argues that the loss element follows a "qualifier" and therefore need not be an element of the conviction for Subsection (M)(i) to apply.

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In November 2012, Lester Nichols flew from Kansas City, Kansas, to Manila, Philippines. Nichols, a registered sex offender, did not update his registration status in Kansas City prior to his departure. In December 2012, Manila law enforcement officers arrested Nichols, and transferred him to the United States’ custody. The United States then charged Nichols for failing to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). The Supreme Court will decide whether SORNA requires sex offenders who move to foreign countries to update their registration status in the U.S. jurisdiction where they used to reside. Nichols argues that a sex offender who moves to a foreign jurisdiction does not need to update his or her registration status. The United States maintains that SORNA aims to regulate offenders who move abroad.

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Margarita Lopez Torres, nine other judicial candidates, and voters sued the New York State Board of Elections in federal court, claiming that state election laws regulating judicial elections violated the First Amendment rights of party members and candidates. Torres claimed that the state-mandated system by which parties elect nominees makes it impossible, in practice, for candidates without party backing to gain access to the party nomination ballot. In particular, Torres argued that the system enables party leaders to exert control over the nomination process, creating an environment ripe for abuse of judicial independence. As an example of such abuses, Torres offered her experiences as a judicial candidate: despite enjoying popular support in civil court elections, she failed in multiple district elections to receive the nomination of her party after refusing to follow the demands of party leaders.

After reviewing evidence of the lack of competitive elections and the difficulty of gaining access to the nomination ballot without party support, the Eastern District of New York agreed that New York's election laws violated the First Amendment associational rights of voters and candidates. The district granted a preliminary injunction mandating primary elections for party voters to select candidates. The Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that the District Court had acted within its discretion. The New York State Board of Elections ("New York State Board") now appeals, arguing that political parties' First Amendment rights are infringed by the lower courts' holding. The New York State Board further argues that the district court's remedy violates the First Amendment rights of political parties to control their intra-party nomination process. At issue in this case are the competing First Amendment rights of party members, candidates, and political parties during a party's candidate selection process. The Supreme Court decision will better define the scope of these rights in a unique situation: an intra-party nomination convention that is mandated and closely regulated by state law.

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This case will help decide the bounds of the voter list-maintenance processes allowed under 52 U.S.C. § 20507. Petitioner Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted argues that Ohio’s “Supplemental Process” for removing voters from its lists, which addresses voters who have not been active in the last two years, is authorized under § 20507 because it does not use the failure to vote as the only basis for removal. In contrast, Respondents A. Philip Randolph Institute, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, and Larry Harmon (collectively “Randolph”) argue that Ohio’s Supplemental Process violates §20507 because it uses the failure to vote to initiate the removal process. The decision in this case has far-reaching implications for voter engagement and participation. Husted contends that the Supplemental Process is an important tool in fighting voter fraud, whereas Randolph maintains that the Process may disenfranchise minority voters and eligible voters who decide not to vote, harming the perceived integrity of the democratic process.

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