Madison v. State of Alabama

Issues

Does the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment bar the execution of a prisoner with vascular dementia, who has no memory of his crime and the circumstances surrounding his imprisonment?

The Supreme Court will decide if it is lawful to execute a man who—years after committing murder—developed vascular dementia that affects his ability to understand his surroundings and prevents him from remembering the facts of his crime. Petitioner Vernon Madison contends that a broad range of mental conditions can prohibit defendants from understanding the circumstances of their executions and thus should prevent lawful execution of such defendants. The State of Alabama counters that a defendant’s memory of the murder is irrelevant to the analysis of whether the defendant’s execution is unlawful under the Eighth Amendment. The American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association, in support of Madison call for an expansion of the category of mental disabilities that can render a person incompetent to be lawfully executed and contend that the execution of inmates with dementia would not serve deterrence purposes. However, fourteen states writing in support Alabama distinguish dementia and other age-related disabilities from intellectual disability and add that the retributive aspects of the death penalty are important enough to allow the execution of inmates with dementia and other age-related mental disorders. Accordingly, the Court’s decision will affect defendants who are exempt from execution as well as the litigation strategy of death row inmates as they approach the age of onset for age-related mental disorders during the lengthy appeals process.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman, a state may execute a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him with no memory of his commission of the capital offense.

Whether evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bar the execution of a prisoner whose competency has been compromised by vascular dementia and multiple strokes causing severe cognitive dysfunction and a degenerative medical condition that prevents him from remembering the crime for which he was convicted or understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution.

In 1985, Petitioner Vernon Madison shot and killed Officer Julius Schulte in Mobile, Alabama and was sentenced to death by a jury for capital murder.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John H. Blume for his insights.

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Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido

Issues

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act apply to state political subdivisions regardless of how many employees they have, or only to state political subdivisions with at least twenty employees?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) applies to political subdivisions of a state regardless of the subdivision’s number of employees, or whether the ADEA applies only to those political subdivisions of a state that have at least twenty employees for statutorily-required length of time. Mount Lemmon Fire District contends that the ADEA defines “employer” to cover only political subdivisions having twenty or more employees. John Guido and Dennis Rankin assert that the ADEA’s definition of “employer” creates separate categories of employers, one of which is state political subdivisions with no minimum-employee requirement. The outcome of this case will have implications on the liability of small state political subdivisions under the ADEA for age-based hiring decisions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

 Under the ADEA, does the same twenty-employee minimum that applies to private employers also apply to political subdivisions of a State, as the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held, or does the ADEA apply instead to all State political subdivisions of any size, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?

In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) “to protect older workers from ‘arbitrary age discrimination in employment.’” Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District at 3, 5. Originally, the statute—which applies to “employers,”—only applied to private-sector employers.

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Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service

Issues

Did the United States Fish and Wildlife Service properly determine that currently unoccupied and uninhabitable land constitutes critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog under the Endangered Species Act, and is this decision subject to judicial review?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the United States Fish and Wildlife Service has overstepped its authority under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 by designating land that is currently uninhabited and inhospitable for the endangered dusky gopher frog as "critical habitat" for such frog populations. The Supreme Court will also consider whether the agency’s decision in this matter is subject to judicial review. The Fifth Circuit held and the Fish and Wildlife Service now argues that the agency's designation was in accordance with the discretion afforded to the agency by Congress, and that the Endangered Species Act does not authorize judicial review. The Court’s decision in this case will have implications for property rights, federalism, and agency discretion.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether the Endangered Species Act prohibits designation of private land as unoccupied critical habitat that is neither habitat nor essential to species conservation.
  2. Whether an agency decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat because of the economic impact of designation is subject to judicial review.

The dusky gopher frog is an endangered species whose population once spread across forests from Louisiana to Alabama. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452, 458 (5th Cir. 2016). However, habitat degradation has reduced the frog's population range to a single part of Mississippi.

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Rothgery v. Gillespie County, TX

Issues

Does an arrested person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach at a hearing before a magistrate judge, although no formal charges have been filed against the arrestee and no prosecutor was involved in the arrest or hearing?

 

On July 15, 2002, Walter Allen Rothgery was arrested without warrant and appeared before a local magistrate as required by Texas law. Following his release on bond, Rothgery made several written requests for appointed counsel to Gillespie County officials, but county officials failed to appoint defense counsel until after a grand jury indicted Rothgery six months later. Rothgery sued Gillespie County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the County's failure to grant his request until after indictment violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rothgery contended that his initial appearance before the magistrate constituted the commencement of "adversary judicial proceedings," which triggers an accused person's Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel under U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Gillespie County supports the Fifth Circuit's holding that Rothgery's right to counsel did not attach until after Rothgery's indictment because, until that time, the state had not committed itself to prosecute Rothgery. The decision in this case will determine when the right to counsel vests, and will impact the administration of criminal proceedings and law enforcement.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when "adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). This Court has held that when a defendant is arrested, "arraigned on [an arrest] warrant before a judge," and "committed by the court to confinement," "[t]here can be no doubt . . . that judicial proceedings ha[ve] been initiated." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977).

In this case, petitioner was arrested and brought before a magistrate judge who informed petitioner of the accusation against him, found probable cause that he had committed the offense based on a police officer's sworn affidavit, and committed him to jail pending trial or the posting of bail. The question presented is whether the Fifth Circuit correctly held-in a decision that conflicts with those of other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort-that adversary judicial proceedings nevertheless had not commenced, and petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights had not attached, because no prosecutor was involved in petitioner's arrest or appearance before the magistrate.

On July 15, 2002, police officers from the Fredericksburg, Texas Police Department arrested Walter Allen Rothgery for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a third-degree felony under Texas law. See Tex.

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Ross v. Blake

Issues

Does a prisoner’s reasonable belief that she exhausted her administrative remedies in a claim against prison officials excuse her from the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement, which compels prisoners to use all available administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court?

 

The Supreme Court will decide whether a reasonable belief exception applies to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. 1997(e). The PLRA requires that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Respondent Shaidon Blake, an inmate serving a life sentence in Maryland state prison, sued two prison officers, Michael Ross and James Madigan (collectively, “Ross”), in federal court for injuries sustained during an altercation. Blake did not first pursue relief through Maryland’s formal Administrative Remedy Process (“ARP”), but instead filed a complaint with the prison’s Internal Investigations Unit (“IIU”). Ross argues that because the PLRA’s mandate is strict, Blake lacks standing under the law to sue. He contends that both Congressional intent and the express text of the statute clearly foreclose the judiciary’s ability to import any “traditional” exceptions to administrative exhaustion into the PLRA. But Blake asserts that the IIU investigation precluded the option of pursuing any other administrative remedy. Even if it had not, he contends that the ARP system is far too complex to qualify as “available” under federal law. Consequently, Blake holds that the Court need not reach the issue presented because he properly exhausted all available remedies. The Court’s decision could affect prison management and prisoners’ rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did the Fourth Circuit misapply this Court’s precedents in holding, in conflict with several other federal courts of appeals, that there is a common law “special circumstances” exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act that relieves an inmate of his mandatory obligation to exhaust administrative remedies when the inmate erroneously believed that he had satisfied exhaustion by participating in an internal investigation?

Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The PLRA requires that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . .

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Roper v. Simmons

Issues

Roper v. Simmons presents the Supreme Court with two questions: whether or not the execution of those who were sixteen or seventeen at the time of a crime is "cruel and unusual" and whether the lower courts may analyze evolving standards in order to determine the former. The Court will likely rely upon the principles in Atkins to determine whether or not to overturn its conflicting decision in Stanford v. Kentucky (492 U.S. 361 (1989)). Legislative activity since Stanford has significantly changed, and this change is bolstered by the views of germane organizations and the decreasing number of states imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders. See Id. The Court will thus determine whether the weight of this evidence is enough to overcome the goals served by the death penalty.

 

Christopher Simmons was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for first degree murder for a crime that he committed at age 17. He appealed as of right to the Missouri Supreme Court, which exercises exclusive jurisdiction in death penalty case. In 1997, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997). On his initial appeal, Simmons could not argue that his youth prohibited his execution because the United States Supreme Court held in 1989 that there was no national consensus against the execution of young adults who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of their crimes, and that, as a result, executing juveniles was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (discussing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). The Missouri Supreme Court thus affirmed the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Missouri on both the conviction and death sentence. See id.

In 2002, the United States Supreme Court reversed Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which held that a national consensus did not exist against execution of the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In Atkins, the Supreme Court concluded that such a consensus had developed in the thirteen years since Penry and that executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 321. Hoping that the Supreme Court's ruling in Atkins might signal a parallel shift in the Court's view toward the execution of juvenile offenders, Simmons appeared before the Missouri Supreme Court again in 2003 on a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that a national consensus opposing the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders had emerged since Stanford v. Kentucky. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 399. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that "the Supreme Court would today hold such executions are prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 400.

The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear Simmons' case in order to address two specific issues. First, the Court will consider whether a lower court may contradict a previous ruling by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Court will decide whether it was permissible for the Missouri Supreme Court to conclude that the execution of juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual punishment and violates the Eighth Amendment, in direct contradiction to the Supreme Court's ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky. Second, the Supreme Court will decide for itself whether a national consensus now opposes the execution of offenders younger than eighteen years and, therefore, whether the practice now violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Once the Supreme Court holds that a particular punishment is not "cruel and unusual" and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, can a lower court reach a contrary decision based on its own analysis of evolving standards?

2. Is the imposition of the death penalty on a person who commits a murder at age seventeen "cruel and unusual," and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

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Rockwell International Corp. v. U.S.

Issues

Did the Tenth Circuit incorrectly decide in favor of a whistleblower on the basis of a lenient construction of the False Claims Act’s definition of an “original source”?

 

The federal False Claims Act permits private citizens and company employees, known as relators, to bring suit in the name of the United States (known as a qui tam suit) against a corporation that has committed fraud against the government, and to share in any judgment thereon. James Stone, a former engineer for Rockwell International, brought a qui tam suit against Rockwell for environmental health and safety violations at the Rocky Flats weapons facility. However, Rockwell claimed that Stone was ineligible to bring suit because the knowledge he had was not sufficiently “direct and independent” to qualify him as an “original source” under the statute. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will resolve a split among the circuit courts regarding precisely what level of “direct and independent knowledge” a potential qui tam plaintiff must have to qualify as an original source. The Court’s decision will ultimately affect any business that contracts with the federal government or participates in government programs, and could make it either substantially easier or more difficult for potential whistleblowers to bring suit under the False Claims Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Tenth Circuit erred by affirming the entry of judgment in favor of a qui tam relator under the False Claims Act, based on a misinterpretation of the statutory definition of an “original source” set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)?

The Rocky Flats weapons production facility, near Denver, Colorado, manufactured plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons from 1953 to 1988. Between 1975 and 1989, Petitioner Rockwell International operated the site for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) under a Management and Operating contract. See U.S. v.

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Robertson v. United States, ex rel. Watson

Issues

Can an individual constitutionally bring a cause of action for criminal contempt against another individual?

 

In March of 1999, Respondent Wykenna Watson obtained a civil protection order (“CPO”) against Petitioner John Robertson, alleging Robertson attacked her in March 1999. In June of 1999, Robertson violated his CPO when he attacked Watson again. In a plea bargain with the United States Attorney’s Office, Robertson agreed to plead guilty to attempted aggravated assault for the March incident in return for the United States’ agreement not to pursue two other charges arising from the June incident. Afterwards, Watson brought a criminal contempt action against Robertson, alleging that the June incident violated the CPO. The trial court convicted Robertson of three violations of his CPO, and Robertson subsequently petitioned to have his convictions vacated. Robertson argued that Watson’s criminal contempt action violated his plea bargain with the United States because criminal contempt proceedings are necessarily brought on behalf of the United States. In this case, the Supreme Court’s decision may alter criminal contempt proceedings in the face of plea bargains and affect the balance of power between the branches of government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an action for criminal contempt in a congressionally created court may constitutionally be brought in the name and pursuant to the power of a private person, rather than in the name and pursuant to the power of the United States.

In March 1999, Respondent Wykenna Watson obtained a temporary protection order in the Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against Petitioner John Robertson. In re Robertson, 940 A.2d 1050, 1052 (D.C. 2008). Watson alleged that, on March 27, 1999, Robertson had “repeatedly pursued and hit her on various parts of her body . . .

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·      WomensLaw.org: District of Columbia: Restraining Orders

·      LII/Wex: Contempt

·      LII/Wex: Separation of powers

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Roberts v. Sea-Land Services

Issues

Whether, in order to determine the appropriate method for calculating the maximum and minimum compensation owed under Section 6 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, “newly awarded compensation” means that compensation is awarded at the time the employee becomes entitled to the compensation, or at the time the administrative order directing compensation is issued.

 

In 2002, Petitioner Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working for his employer, Respondent Sea-Land Services. After the fall, Roberts claimed disability and sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Initially, Sea-Land paid Roberts, but, in May 2005, Sea-Land discontinued payments. An administrative law judge ordered Sea-Land to resume payments, but a dispute arose concerning the proper method for calculating payment. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide when Petitioner Roberts was “newly awarded compensation” under the Act. Roberts argues that this occurred in 2007, when the administrative law judge entered the compensation order. However, Sea-Land Services argues that the judge correctly determined that this occurred in 2002, the year Roberts became entitled to compensation. The Court’s decision will determine which fiscal year is used to calculate the maximum compensation owed. The result could substantially increase Roberts’s compensation under the Act, and will determine how such calculations are performed in similar federal compensation programs.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 ("Longshore Act") provides generally for compensation for total disability in periodic payments at a rate of two-thirds of the "average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury," and for most partial disabilities the same fraction of the difference between that weekly wage and the worker's residual "wage-earning capacity." §§ 8-10, 33 U.S.C. §§ 908-10. But it has always imposed upper and lower limits on the rate payable as so determined.

Section 6(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 906(b), provides that the compensation rate cannot be more than twice "the applicable national average weekly wage," as determined for each fiscal year; nor can compensation for total disability be less than the lesser of half the "applicable national average weekly wage" so determined and the worker's full pre-injury earnings.

The question which fiscal year's limits are the "applicable" ones is addressed by § 6(c):

Determinations under subsection (b)(3) of this section with respect to a [fiscal year] shall apply to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits during such period, as well as those newly awarded compensation during such period. 33 U.S.C. § 906(c). The identity of the years whose limits are "applicable" under this provision has divided the two courts of appeals with the heaviest Longshore Act dockets.

The questions presented are simple and straightforward:

1. Whether the phrase "those newly awarded compensation during such period" in Longshore Act § 6(c), applicable to all classes of disability except permanent total, can be read to mean "those first entitled to compensation during such period," regardless of when it is awarded.

2. Whether the phrase "employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits during such period" in § 6(c) can likewise be read to mean those "entitled to [such] compensation during such period," without reference to when it is received.

Petitioner Dana Roberts worked as a gatehouse dispatcher in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, for Respondent Sea-Land Services (“Sea-Land”). See Roberts v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 625 F.3d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir.

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Business Law Daily, BLD Staff: U.S. Supreme Court to Hear LHWCA Case (Sept. 27, 2011).

Business Insurance, Roberto Ceniceros: Supreme Court to Hear Case Determining LHWCA Wage Time Frame (Sept. 27, 2011).

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RJR Nabisco v. European Community

Issues

Does RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, apply outside the United States?

 

The European Community sued RJR Nabisco, a cigarette manufacturer, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. RICO imposes civil and criminal penalties on racketeering activity. The European Community alleges that RJR Nabisco ran an international money laundering operation, which occurred abroad. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine the jurisdictional limits of RICO. RJR Nabisco maintains that RICO should not apply extraterritorially. The European Community counters that Congress clearly indicated that RICO’s reach could extend extraterritorially when the underlying offense is extraterritorial. The Court’s resolution of this case may alter the jurisdictional status of RICO and will affect business interests on both sides of the Atlantic.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, or to what extent, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) applies extraterritorially.

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