Irizarry v. United States
Issues
Is a district court required to provide a defendant with notice of its intent to depart from the sentence range established by the United States Sentencing Guidelines, if the grounds for departure are not identified in either the presentence investigation report or the Government's presentencing hearing submissions?
In 2001 Leah Smith obtained a divorce from and restraining against her former husband, Richard Irizarry, for spousal abuse. Between the divorce in 2001 and 2003, Irizarry sent Ms. Smith 255 e-mails, several threatening to kill Ms. Smith and her family. In 2003, Irizarry was arrested. Irizarry pleaded guilty to making threatening interstate communications to his ex-wife. As a result, he was sentenced to sixty months imprisonment, a sentence nine months longer than the maximum sentence recommended by Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced Irizarry to the maximum amount of time allow under the statute, because of the likelihood Irizarry would continue threatening his ex-wife. Irizarry objected to the sentence because the court failed to give advance notice of its intent to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines as required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(h) ("Rule 32(h)"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, determining that Rule 32(h) does not apply to such sentence variances. In the Supreme Court, Irizarry argues that his sentence should be overturned because Rule 32(h) requires a district court to give the parties notice any time it intends to depart from the sentencing range recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, on a ground not previously identified in the presentence report or a government submission.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Additional Resources
Iraq v. Simon
Iraq v. Beaty (07-1090); Iraq v. Simon
Issues
Whether U.S. courts have jurisdiction over the Republic of Iraq in cases involving the alleged misdeeds, including torture and hostage taking, by Saddam Hussein's regime, or whether Iraq is immune from prosecution.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") prevents foreign governments from being sued in courts of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) creates an exception that allows US courts to hear cases involving foreign governments that sponsor terrorism. Alleged victims of Saddam Hussein's regime sued the current Iraqi government in federal court under this exception. However, due to the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 ("EWSAA"), and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), the issue of whether U.S. courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims has come into question. Iraq argues that both the EWSAA and the NDAA make § 1605(a)(7)'s exception to sovereign immunity inapplicable to them. In both cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that in spite of the EWSAA and the NDAA, U.S. courts maintain subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims brought against Saddam Hussein's regime. Iraq appealed both decisions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court's decision will determine whether victims of Saddam Hussein's government may sue the current Iraqi government in U.S. courts. The outcome of this case will impact U.S.-Iraqi relations, U.S. efforts to rebuild and support the current Iraqi government, and the ability of victims of Saddam Hussein's regime to sue the current Iraqi government.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Iraq v. Beaty (07-1090)
Whether the Republic of Iraq possesses sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases involving alleged misdeeds of the Saddam Hussein regime and predicated on the exception to immunity in former 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
Iraq v. Simon (08-539)
Whether the Republic of Iraq possesses sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases involving alleged misdeeds of the Saddam Hussein regime predicated on the now repealed state sponsor of terrorism subject matter exception to immunity of former 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).
Republic of Iraq, et al., v. Robert Simon, et al.
Robert Simon ("Simon"), a news reporter for CBS News, was one of several American citizens in Kuwait and Iraq immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. See Vine v. Republic of Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C.
Written by
Edited by
Additional Resources
- Annotated U.S. Constitution: Political Questions Doctrine
- Annotated U.S. Constitution: State Sovereign Immunity
- Bloomberg LP: "Iraq Gets U.S. High Court Hearing on Legal Immunity"
- U.S. Department of State: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
- U.S. Department of State: State Sponsors of Terrorism
- WEX: Law about Sovereign Immunity
Indiana v. Edwards
Issues
If a state trial court finds a defendant competent to stand trial, is it entitled to find the defendant not competent to represent himself at trial?
In 1999, Ahmad Edwards stole a pair of shoes from an Indiana department store and then shot at the store security guard who chased after him, wounding the guard and a passer-by. The State of Indiana charged Edwards with theft, criminal recklessness, battery, and attempted murder. In 2004, an Indiana trial court declared Edwards competent to stand trial but later denied Edwards' request to serve as his own lawyer. The judge said that Edwards, a diagnosed schizophrenic, was not competent to represent himself. Edwards then went to trial with counsel, a jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Edwards appealed, arguing that the court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with Edwards and called for a new trial. The appeals court held that once the trial court had found Edwards competent to stand trial, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the court could not impose a higher competency standard to determine whether he could act as his own lawyer. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court's decision. The Supreme Court will consider whether states may impose greater competency standards on defendants who wish to represent themselves than on ordinary defendants.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
May states adopt a higher standard for measuring competency to represent oneself at trial than for measuring competency to stand trial?
The following facts are from the Indiana Supreme Court decision, Edwards v. State, 866 N.E.2d 252 (2007); the Indiana Court of Appeals decision, Edwards v. State, 854 N.E.2d 42 (2006); and the parties' Joint Appendix:
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.
Issues
If an antitrust plaintiff alleges that a competitor unlawfully tied a patented product to an unpatented product, must she also prove that the defendant had sufficient power to control the price or quantity of products in the patented good's market?
The Sherman Antitrust Act forbids product-tying arrangements by companies that possess substantial market power in the tying-product's market. While the party alleging the violation must generally prove such market power exists, market power is assumed when a company holds a valid patent on the tying product. Illinois Tool Works ("Illinois") makes the availability of licensing agreements for its patented products contingent on the exclusive use of other, unpatented products. It urges the Court to overturn the patent-based market-power presumption. Independent Ink, an Illinois licensee, claims that the tying arrangement improperly forces it to buy Illinois' ink, despite the availability of cheaper, effective substitutes, thereby stifling beneficial competition. The direct impact of the Court's decision, whether it preserves the status quo or changes its rule, making antitrust violations harder to prove, will be felt by sellers who tie patented products to unpatented ones, firms who buy products from such companies, and the consumers who ultimately purchase products from either company. Indirectly, the case may mark the Roberts Court's first foray into the doctrine of stare decisis, which provides insight into the current Court's view on when and how to defer to its past decisions. As a result, the effects of the decision may be felt in many areas of the Court's jurisprudence which don't deal with the antitrust law.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether, in an action under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. ? 1, alleging that the defendant engaged in unlawful tying by conditioning a patent license on the licensee's purchase of a non-patented good, the plaintiff must prove as part of its affirmative case that the defendant possessed market power in the relevant market for the tying product, or market power instead is presumed based solely on the existence of the patent of the tying product?
Trident is a wholly owned subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works, Inc. ("Illinois"). Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.
Additional Resources
- LII Law about... Antitrust
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez; Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc.
Issues
Should Employees' walking to and waiting at distribution stations where required safety equipment is distributed to the employees be included as part of either the principal activities for which an employer is employed or integral and indispensable to such principal activities, and therefore compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act?
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. ("FLSA"), as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 ("Portal Act"), an employee must be compensated for the time their employer requires them to spend donning and doffing protective gear. In the combined oral argument for Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc. and IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court will consider an important related question—whether an employee is also entitled to compensation for time spent waiting at stations where required safety and health equipment is distributed, donned, and doffed, and traveling to and from these stations to work sites at the beginning and end of each workday.
Under the FLSA, employers must compensate employees for activities performed during the workday. However, the Portal Act, which amended the FLSA, removed employers' obligation to compensate employees for two categories of activities performed outside the workday. These activities include: "(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity, and (2) activities which are preliminary or postliminary to said principal activity or activities." Tum and Alvarez ("Employees") contend that walking and waiting at safety stations are inextricably linked to the donning and doffing process, and are principal activities that demark the beginning and end of the workday. The Employees also argue that these activities occur within the workday, and thus, the above Portal Act exceptions are inapplicable. Public policy considerations, such as employee safety, financial welfare, and corporate profitability will figure prominently in the Supreme Court's resolution of these conflicting appellate court rulings. The outcome will also profoundly impact workers' salaries, manufacturing costs, and corporate outsourcing policy.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez :
Whether walking that occurs between compensable clothes-changing time and the time employees arrive at or depart from their actual work stations constitutes non-compensable "walking . . . to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity" within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc. :
1. Is the time employees must spend walking to and from stations where required safety equipment is distributed compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), 254(a).
2. Do employees have a right to compensation for time they must spend waiting at required safety equipment distribution stations?
Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc. , 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004)
Tum, representing current and former employees at Barber Foods' poultry processing plant in Portland, Maine, sued to recover unpaid wages for time spent waiting at and walking to stations where required safety equipment is distributed.
Additional Resources
- Law about... Labor law, Workplace safety
Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz
Issues
Does the term "actual fraud" require that, to obtain an exemption from discharge of a debtor's bankruptcy debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor show that a debtor made a fraudulent misrepresentation, or does it include a debtor's fraudulent transfer as an exception to discharge?
The Supreme Court will decide whether "actual fraud" under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) ("section 523(a)(2)(A)") of the Bankruptcy Code includes fraudulent transfers as an exemption to the discharge of debts owed to a creditor, or whether it requires that the creditor show a fraudulent misrepresentation. Husky International Electronics, Inc., a component manufacturer, argues that a creditor has shown actual fraud by a debtor if that debtor was knowingly involved in a fraudulent transfer of funds, regardless of whether the debtor made a misrepresentation to the creditor. Husky argues that, given the longstanding common law use of "actual fraud" to include any kind of intentional fraud, including fraudulent transfers, Congress intended to expand the scope of section 523(a)(2)(A) beyond mere misrepresentations. David Lee Ritz, owner of Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. and one of Husky’s customers, contends that the term "actual fraud" only adds a requirement of intention on behalf of the debtor. He maintains that Congress would have clearly stated that fraudulent transfers would bar a debtor's discharge if it had wanted to expand the Bankruptcy Code in that way. Instead, Ritz maintains that a creditor must show that the debtor intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation. The Court's decision could pose a concern to debtors who have made transfers of funds before filing for bankruptcy, and may restrict creditors’ remedies to recover debts.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Does the “actual fraud” bar to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code apply only when the debtor has made a false representation, or whether the bar also applies when the debtor has deliberately obtained money through a fraudulent-transfer scheme that was actually intended to cheat a creditor?
Between 2003 and 2007, Husky International Electronics, Inc., a supplier of electronic device components, sold and delivered electronic device components to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp., an electronic circuit board manufacturer controlled, directed, and partially owned by Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr. See Husky Int'l Elecs., I
Edited by
Additional Resources
Katherine Doorley, Supreme Court Grants Cert to Consider Actual Fraud Bar in Section 523(a)(2)(A), Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP Bankruptcy Blog (Nov. 17, 2015).
Donna Higgins, 2 Petitions Ask Supreme Court to Resolve Bankruptcy Fraud Circuit Split, Thomson Reuters (Aug. 18, 2015).
Lauren Lipari, What Constitutes Fraud in Bankruptcy? SCOTUS to Resolve First and Fifth Circuit Split in 2016, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP Bankruptcy Report (Nov. 18, 2015).
Hurst v. Florida
Issues
Can Florida’s death sentencing scheme be considered constitutional if it does not require jury unanimity in capital cases and it consigns the jury to an advisory role in sentencing?
The Supreme Court will consider whether Florida’s death sentencing scheme is constitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See Brief for Petitioner, Timothy Lee Hurst at 26-27. Convicted murderer Timothy Lee Hurst argues that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional in light of Ring. See id. at 17-18. Hurst contends that the jury’s advisory verdict does not satisfy the requirements of Ring and violates the Constitution because the it minimizes the jury’s sense of responsibility and subverts the jury’s deliberative function by assigning the fact-finding role to the trial court judge. See id. at 26-27, 35-36. Florida argues that its sentencing framework is constitutional because it complies with the requirements of Ring and ensures that a judge’s sole determination will not necessitate a sentence of death for a defendant. See Brief of Respondent, Florida at 58. The Court’s decision will determine the constitutionality of Florida’s death sentencing scheme, and may impact the individual cases of prisoners who have been sentenced to death in Florida.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Does Florida’s death sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)?
On May 2, 1998, Cynthia Lee Harrison was killed at a Popeye’s Fried Chicken restaurant in Escambia County, Florida, where she worked as an assistant manager. See Hurst v. Florida, No. SC12-1947, at 2 (Fla.
Edited by
Additional Resources
- Greg Stohr, Florida’s Death Penalty Rules Get Supreme Court Review, Bloomberg (2015).
Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
Issues
Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits providing certain types of aid to known terrorist organizations, violates the First and Fifth Amendments by restricting political speech and including overly vague provisions?
It is illegal to provide material support and resources to groups that the government has determined are foreign terrorist organizations. The Humanitarian Law Project argues that this prohibition violates First and Fifth Amendment rights of those individuals or groups that wish to provide resources to the humanitarian arms of foreign terrorist organizations. The government contends that the law is not unconstitutionally vague and that these provisions are necessary to effectively combat terrorism. In addition to determining the scope of the First and Fifth Amendments with respect to this aspect of anti-terrorism efforts, the case will also affect how a variety of groups engage in humanitarian campaigns abroad.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
1. Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the knowing provision of “any . . . service, . . . training, [or] expert advice or assistance,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(l), to a designated foreign terrorist organization, is unconstitutionally vague.
2. Whether the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) on provision of “expert advice or assistance” “derived from scientific [or] technical . . . knowledge” and “personnel” are unconstitutional with respect to speech that furthers only lawful, nonviolent activities of proscribed organizations.
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA permits the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization.” See 8 U.S.C.
Edited by
Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
Issues
Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits providing certain types of aid to known terrorist organizations, violates the First and Fifth Amendments by restricting political speech and including overly vague provisions?
It is illegal to provide material support and resources to groups that the government has determined are foreign terrorist organizations. The Humanitarian Law Project argues that this prohibition violates First and Fifth Amendment rights of those individuals or groups that wish to provide resources to the humanitarian arms of foreign terrorist organizations. The government contends that the law is not unconstitutionally vague and that these provisions are necessary to effectively combat terrorism. In addition to determining the scope of the First and Fifth Amendments with respect to this aspect of anti-terrorism efforts, the case will also affect how a variety of groups engage in humanitarian campaigns abroad.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
1. Whether 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), which prohibits the knowing provision of “any . . . service, . . . training, [or] expert advice or assistance,” 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(l), to a designated foreign terrorist organization, is unconstitutionally vague.
2. Whether the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) on provision of “expert advice or assistance” “derived from scientific [or] technical . . . knowledge” and “personnel” are unconstitutional with respect to speech that furthers only lawful, nonviolent activities of proscribed organizations.
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2009). The AEDPA permits the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization.” See 8 U.S.C.