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Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal

Issues

Whether public health and safety concerns and the potential for non-religious use are sufficiently compelling reasons for the government to prevent the religious group, UDV, from using a tea containing a Schedule 1 hallucinogenic for religious ceremonies.

 

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) generally prohibits the federal government from restricting the use of controlled substances in bona fide religious ceremonies. A small North American sect of the Brazilian group, “O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal” (“UDV”) has challenged the government’s enforcement of a ban on DMT, a Schedule I narcotic and principle ingredient of “ hoasca ” a tea imported from South America that is central to UDV’s religious rituals. The government argues that its restriction on UDV falls within narrow RFRA exceptions because of the health risks associated with the use of DMT, the potential for diversion of the substance to non-religious uses, and the 1971 United Nations Convention ban on the importation of DMT. In this  case  the Supreme Court will decide whether RFRA's prohibition extends to the use and importation of Schedule I narcotics, which are those substances the federal government deems most harmful.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) requires the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession, and use of a Schedule I hallucinogenic controlled substance, where Congress has found that the substance has a high potential for abuse, it is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and its importation and distribution would violate an international treaty.

In May, 1999, federal customs officials seized goods labeled “tea extract” en route to Sante Fe, New Mexico, to Jeffrey Bronfman, President of the United States Chapter of a Brazilian religious group known as O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal (“UDV”) — roughly translated, “The Beneficial Spiritualist Center of the Union of the Vegetable.” See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao De Vegetal, No. 04-1084 (U.S.

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Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez

Issues

Does a conviction as an accomplice to a theft, rather than as the principal, constitute a “theft offense” that satisfies the “aggravated felony” standard of the Immigration and Nationality Act?

 

In 2002, Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian national, was found guilty of a violation of California Vehicle Code § 10851(a), which makes it illegal to take a vehicle without the owner’s consent or to aid or abet in such a taking. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought Duenas-Alvarez’s deportation based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows the government to deport aliens convicted of an “aggravated felony.” “Theft offenses” are one type of crime included in the category of aggravated felonies. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the deportation order, reasoning that because the California statute allows for convictions based solely on aiding and abetting, conviction under the statute did not necessarily mean that Duenas-Alvarez had committed a “theft offense.” The DHS contends that simply because accomplice liability involves a lower level of involvement in an offense, that does not remove it from the category of “theft offenses.” The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the immigration status of over 8,000 resident aliens who currently face deportation.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a “theft offense,” which is an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)((G), includes aiding and abetting.

    In 2002, Luis Alexander Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen and lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1998, pled guilty in the Superior Court of California to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 5.

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    Gonzales v. Carhart

    Issues

    In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban without including an exception to the ban for cases in which the health of the mother is at risk. Does the absence of the health exception make the Act unconstitutional? 

     

    A group of doctors, led by Dr. Leroy Carhart, sued the federal government, alleging that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is unconstitutional. Because the Act does not provide an exception for procedures that would preserve the mother’s health, Carhart contends that the Act poses an undue burden on women seeking an abortion, particularly where substantial medical evidence demonstrates that certain procedures covered by the ban are necessary and safer than other procedures. Carhart also contends that the Act is unconstitutionally broad and vague, because the Act can be read to ban standard abortion methods. The government argues that the Act does not constitutionally require a health exception, because congressional findings demonstrate that any health risks that the ban poses to women are too infrequent and insubstantial to constitute a risk significant enough to amount to an undue burden that invalidates the Act entirely. The Court’s decision will determine whether governmental interests in protecting potential life and prohibiting procedures that resemble infanticide outweigh a woman’s constitutional right to choose an abortion without the government placing substantial obstacles in her path. Advocates on both sides of the abortion debate view a decision to uphold the Act as a significant first step to future restrictions on the availability of abortions. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether, notwithstanding Congress’s determination that a health exception was unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is invalid because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise unconstitutional on its face. 

    In 2003, Congress passed and President George W. Bush later signed into law the Partial Birth Abortion Ban of 2003 (“Ban”). Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 2006). The Ban outlaws the performance of any abortion during which the doctor partially delivers the fetus prior to taking an overt act that causes the death of the fetus. 18 U.S.C. §1531(b) (2003).

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    Gomez-Perez v. Potter

    Issues

    Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibit federal employers from retaliating against employees who have complained of age discrimination?

     

    Myrna Gomez-Perez worked full-time for the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) in Dorado, Puerto Rico. She transferred to another office to be closer to her ill mother, but after one month, she requested to return to her past position in Dorado. After her request was denied, Gomez-Perez, then forty-five years old, filed an equal employment opportunity ("EEO") complaint with the USPS alleging age discrimination. Gomez-Perez claims that after she filed the complaint, her supervisors retaliated by reducing her work hours and lodging false complaints against her. She filed suit against John E. Potter as Postmaster and the USPS in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico alleging that her supervisors' retaliation was in violation of ? 633a of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The USPS filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted. Gomez-Perez appealed. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment and agreed with the district court that ? 633a of the ADEA prohibited age discrimination against federal employees, but did not create a cause of action for victims of retaliation. Gomez-Perez argues that an implicit right of action for retaliation should be read into the ADEA in order to avoid giving the government a blank check to discriminate after an initial complaint has been filed with the EEOC. The USPS argues for a strict reading of ? 633a, which does not explicitly include a right of action for retaliation. The outcome of this case will affect the right of federal government employees to be free of workplace age discrimination, and will affect the government's costs in investigating workplace discrimination claims.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 633a, prohibits retaliation against employees who complain of age discrimination.

    Myrna Gomez-Perez started working for the United States Postal Service ("USPS") in 1987 in New York. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 476 F.3d 54, 56 (1st Cir.

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    Golan v. Holder

    Issues

    Does a statute extending copyright protection to works that are in the public domain violate the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution?

     

    Congress enacted Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act in order to comply with the international copyright standards of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Section 514 restores copyright protection to foreign works currently found in the public domain. Lawrence Golan and other performers, educators, and motion picture distributors brought this suit challenging Section 514, arguing that Congress’s removal of works from the public domain exceeded its Copyright Clause powers. Golan also argues that Section 514 violates the First Amendment because the law does not serve any important government interests. Attorney General Holder counters that the Copyright Clause does not restrict Congress’s authority to remove works from the public domain. He further argues that Section 514 does not violate the First Amendment because the government has a substantial interest in complying with the Berne Convention and protecting American works abroad. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect millions of foreign works currently in the public domain, existing and future works based on those foreign works, and the copyright protection of American works in foreign countries.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Does the Progress Clause of the United States Constitution prohibit Congress from taking works out of the Public Domain?

    2. Does Section 514 violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution?

    In 1989, the United States became a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”). See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010).

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    Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

    Issues

    Does the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempt Vermont data reporting laws, which require companies that process insurance claims to report certain medical claims data to the state?

     

    Vermont enacted legislation that created a “unified health care database” designed to improve the affordability and quality of health care in Vermont by collecting and analyzing statewide data on insurance claims.  See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 500–01 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 9410(a)(1)Liberty Mutual offers a health insurance benefit plan to Vermont residents; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) governs benefit plans. See id. ERISA requires benefits plans to make claim data reports to the Department of  Labor,  and generally preempts any state laws that relate to an employee benefit plan.  See id. at 503. In August 2011, the Vermont Department of Banking, Insurance, Securities and Health Care Administration (the “Department”) subpoenaed claims data from Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, the company that administers Liberty Mutual’s Plan. See id. at 502. In  district  court, Liberty Mutual sought to enjoin the subpoena, arguing ERISA preempted Vermont’s reporting requirements. See id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that ERISA did preempt the reporting requirements. See id. But Alfred Gobeille, chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board, maintains that ERISA does not preempt Vermont’s law, because (1) Vermont’s law falls under the traditional state power to regulate health care, (2) the law does not infringe any core function of ERISA, and (3) Congress intended for states to retain the ability to collect health care data. See Brief for Petitioner, Alfred Gobeille at 25. Liberty Mutual counters, arguing that Vermont’s reporting requirements conflict with Congress’s intent to create a uniform federal reporting regime, and thus constitute precisely the kind of state law that Congress intended ERISA to preempt. See Brief for Respondent, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. at 13. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case will impact the cost to consumers of purchasing health care, the quality of that care, and the resources that the insurance companies must spend on claims data reporting procedures. See Brief of Amici Curiae AARP et al., in Support of Petitioner at 9-10, 11; Brief of Amici Curiae The American Benefits Council et al., in Support of Respondent at 24, 27-28.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    May Vermont apply its health care database law to the third-party administrator for a self-insured ERISA plan?

    Liberty Mutual Insurance Company administers a health plan, the Liberty Mutual Medical Plan (the “Plan”), which covers 84,000 people nationwide and 137 people in Vermont. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan, 746 F.3d 497, 501 (2d Cir.

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    Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.

    Issues

    To prove that a defendant induced patent infringement, is it necessary to show that the defendant intended or actually knew of the infringement, or is evidence of the defendant’s deliberate indifference sufficient?

     

    PATENT, INFRINGEMENT, INDUCEMENT, STATE OF MIND

    Respondent SEB S.A. owns a patent for a deep fryer featuring an inexpensive, insulated plastic outer shell. In 1997, Petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises, LTD, a subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. (collectively, “Global-Tech”), developed and manufactured a deep fryer that copied features of SEB's deep fryer. On August 27, 1999, SEB sued Global-Tech for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The jury found Global-Tech liable for direct and active inducement of patent infringement, and Global-Tech appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court affirmed, holding that Global-Tech acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of infringing SEB's patent. Global-Tech appealed, arguing that the Federal Circuit applied the wrong standard for the mental-state element of actively inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Global-Tech asserts that the proper standard is “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct to encourage an infringement,” the standard the Supreme Court articulated in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. On the other hand, SEB argues that a patent infringer does not need to have actual knowledge of a patent to be liable for actively inducing patent infringement. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect patent litigation, the extent and cost of patent searches, and market competition and innovation.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the legal standard for the state of mind element of a claim for actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is “deliberate indifference of a known risk” that an infringement may occur, as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held, or “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct” to encourage an infringement, as this Court taught in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780, 162 L. Ed. 2d 781, 801 (2005)?

    SEB S.A. specializes in the design and manufacture of home cooking appliances. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). SEB owns a patent for a deep fryer featuring an inexpensive, insulated plastic outer shell, or skirt. See id. at 1365–66. In 1997, Sunbeam Products, Inc. requested that Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances Inc. (collectively “Global-Tech”) develop and manufacture a deep fryer. See Brief for Petitioners, Global-Tech Appliances Inc. and Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd. at 3.

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    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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    Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.

    Issues

    Whether a payphone service provider can sue a long distance carrier in federal court when that carrier fails to pay compensation for dial-around calls made in violation of Federal Communications Commission regulations.

     

    Payphone users can circumvent the usual payment method and avoid inserting a coin by using an access code or 800 number provided by a long distance carrier. These “dial-around” numbers, while convenient for users, leave payphone service providers uncompensated for the call made. The Federal Communications Commission, as instructed by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, created regulations to ensure that payphone service providers receive compensation for these “dial-around” calls. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., a payphone service provider, argues that Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., a long distance provider, has violated these regulations by failing to compensate Metrophones for such calls. Metrophones argues that under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act, Global Crossing Telecommunications’ violation of the Federal Communications Commission regulation constitutes an unjust and unreasonable practice, making it unlawful and actionable in federal court. Both the District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a private cause of action does exist under Section 201(b). The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will define the scope of Section 201(b) of the Communications Act as well as give insight into the amount of deference to agency pronouncements that the court deems fit. It will also either provide a long awaited opportunity for payphone service providers to assert their rights in this area or leave them looking for another way to obtain compensation.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 creates a private right of action for a provider of payphone services to sue a long distance carrier of alleged violations of the FCC’s regulations concerning compensation for coinless payphone calls.

    Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. (“Metrophones”) is a payphone service provider (“PSP”). Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. (“Global Crossing”) is a long distance provider. The basis of the dispute is compensation Global Crossing is required by law to pay Metrophone for “dial around” calls from payphones.

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