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This case will address what pleading standard a plaintiff attempting to use the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) expropriation exception is required to meet to establish jurisdiction. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Petroleos de Venezuela and PDVSA Petroleo (“Venezuela”) argue that, in order for private American corporations like Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. and Helmerich & Payne Venezuela (“H&P”) to bring a claim against a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts, plaintiffs must meet the usual standards of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. In contrast, H&P argues that the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which only denies jurisdiction to “wholly insubstantial or frivolous” claims, is the appropriate standard under the expropriation exception. This case will impact the viability of future claims of expropriation against foreign sovereigns, especially within the context of private corporations seeking redress against foreign governments. 

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This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to review whether the defense of laches will remain available to bar a patent infringement claim within the statutory limitations period of six years. The 1952 Patent Act allowed laches as a defense for patents and was later re-codified by Congress.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reaffirmed this defense in A.C. Auckerman Co. v. R. L. Chaides Construction Co. in 1992. The Copyright Act did not codify a laches defense, however, and in 2014, the Supreme Court ruled against the use of laches in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag and SCA Personal Care, Inc. argue that the Petrella decision is applicable to a patent infringement case and that laches should not be used to bar a patent-holder from enforcing its property rights through a legal damage claim. First Quality Baby Products, LLC et al. seeks to distinguish the text, history, and purpose of the Patent Act from the Copyright Act, and argues that laches should remain a viable defense. The Supreme Court’s holding may alter the relationship between patent and copyright law and change the pleading styles in a patent infringement case.

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Cori and Kerri Rigsby sued State Farm Fire & Casualty Company under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), alleging that State Farm defrauded the federal government while paying out claims related to the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. The district court and the Fifth Circuit found that the Rigsbys’ attorney violated the FCA’s seal requirement by distributing documents to several news outlets, but declined to dismiss the Rigsbys’ suit after applying a three-part balancing test to evaluate whether dismissal was warranted. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over what standard governs the decision to dismiss a relator’s claim for violation of the FCA’s seal requirement. The United States, on behalf of the Rigsbys, points to the FCA’s test, structure, legislative history, and purpose, to argue that only discretionary sanctions apply to a violation of the seal requirement. State Farm maintains that a violation of the seal requirement must result in mandatory dismissal of the suit, rather than a discretionary balancing test. This decision may affect the prevalence of qui tam FCA suits and the government’s ability to recover from defrauding parties.

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This case may have deep repercussions for the fashion industry, since it asks the Supreme Court to clarify garment design copyrightability by determining when a useful article’s design feature is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act. A useful article, such as garment design, cannot be copyrighted, but features of it may be copyrighted.  The case law is muddled as to when features are copyrightable.  Star Athletica, LLC advocates for a two-part test to determine copyrightability. First, a feature must be identified separately from the useful article’s utilitarian aspects. Second, the utilitarian aspects and the feature must be able to exist side-by-side, as fully realized, separate works—one as an artistic work and the other as a useful article. In opposition, Varsity Brands, Inc. et al. contends that Star Athletica mixes and matches various lower court approaches to create a confusing test without statutory support. Instead, Varsity argues that features of a useful article are copyrightable if they are “applied art,” or artwork that appears on a useful article.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 exhaustion requirement applies when a party brings a suit under the American with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act if the plaintiff is seeking a remedy not contemplated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The parties disagree on how to interpret Section 1415(l) of the IDEA and whether the IDEA is even implicated here. Stacy and Brent Fry posit that the plain text and purpose of the IDEA make it so monetary damages are not recoverable under the IDEA and thus neither exhaustion nor the IDEA should apply here. In response, Napoleon Community Schools et al. argues that the text and purpose of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement require that substantively-the-same claims be exhausted before going to court. Depending on the how the Court rules, the ease of access to courts could be altered, thus impacting the role of school-related administrative proceedings.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether an appellant must file a separate appeal if he wishes to challenge a restitution award that was determined after he appealed the original judgment. Manrique argues that an appeal of an original judgment should “mature” to perfect an appeal of the amended judgment. See Brief of Petitioner, Marcelo Manrique at 22. He claims that such a process would be practical and would conform to the rules of process governing criminal appeals. See id. The United States, on the other hand, contends that allowing the original appeal to mature would contradict the text and purpose of Rule 4(b)(2). See Brief for the United States at 17. The outcome of this case will determine how many appeals appellants must file in circumstances involving amended judgments.

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After being convicted of unlawful sexual contact and harassment, Miguel Angel Peña Rodriguez obtained juror affidavits stating that, during jury deliberations, one juror made several racially-charged comments that evidenced a personal bias against Hispanics. The court denied Peña Rodriguez’s motion for a new trial and held that the affidavits were inadmissible under Colorado’s “no impeachment” rule, Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b). Peña Rodriguez claims that allowing the no-impeachment rule to ban evidence of racial bias violates his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The State of Colorado contends that Rule 606(b) is constitutional because other procedures adequately protect Peña Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine the reach of Tanner v. United States and Warger v. Shauers, and could have significant consequences on monitoring the effects of racial bias throughout the trial process.

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The Supreme Court will decide whether the damages awarded in the case of design patent infringement should be calculated as the entire profits of the whole product or be limited to the profits attributable to the patent-protected component. The parties’ arguments center on divergent purposes of the controlling statute, 35 U.S.C. § 289, as well as the meaning of “article of manufacture” as it is used within § 289. Apple, pointing to the plain language, congressional intent, and policy implications, argues that the purpose of § 289 was to overturn judicial precedent and allow a design patent owner to recover damages when only a component of a device infringes the design patent. Samsung, however, argues that Apple’s reading is too broad and cuts against congressional intent because it will result in illogical outcomes and remove centuries-old judicial precedent. Depending on how the Supreme Court rules, this case will impact research and development funding and potentially create a new avenue of patent trolling. 

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This case will address a circuit split between the Seventh Circuit and nine other circuits concerning a individual’s ability to file a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged infringement on that individual’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures or an infringement of an individual’s due process rights. On April 10, 2013, Elijah Manuel sued the city of Joliet, Illinois for injuries suffered as a result of a forty-seven day detention following his unlawful arrest on March 18, 2011. Manuel emphasizes that the Seventh Circuit is alone in explicitly barring malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment and therefore its lower court holding should be overturned. The City of Joliet advocates for continued adherence to the Seventh Circuit’s precedent, which rejects the contention that legal process extends to claims of malicious prosecution, and also contends that Manuel’s claims are time barred by state tort law, which provides adequate remedy for alleged due process violations. Manuel argues that his malicious prosecution claim is a Fourth Amendment claim and falls within the purview of federal and not state law. The case will impact the availability of recovery for post-process detentions as well as the applicability of state restrictions on §1983 claims.

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This case addresses the correct standard to be applied in granting a Certificate of Appealability
(“COA”) on a motion to reopen a judgment. As per the standard, Petitioner Duane Buck argues that he deserved a COA, as a reasonable juror could consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be valid, as well as debate the validity of the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In opposition, Respondent Lorie Davis, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, contends that Buck’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was meritless and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. This case will settle the correct standard for granting a COA, while also addressing issues of implicit racial biases against African American defendants. 

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