Burton v. Waddington

Issues

The Supreme Court in Blakely ruled that mandatory state sentencing guidelines are the statutory maximum for purposes of applying the Apprendi rule, which prohibits judges from enhancing criminal sentences beyond statutory maximums based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Is the holding in Blakely a new rule that cannot be applied retroactively, or is it instead dictated by the earlier holding in Apprendi?

 

A jury convicted Petitioner Lonnie Lee Burton of rape, robbery, and burglary. After initially choosing to run Burton’s robbery and burglary convictions concurrent with his rape conviction, the sentencing judge on remand imposed the same 562-month aggregate sentence but ran the three convictions consecutive to each other after finding that Burton’s earlier sentence was too lenient. As a result, Burton’s sentence was 258 months above the 304 month ceiling of the statutory sentencing range. Burton contends that the sentencing court acted in violation of Blakely v. Washington. Burton further contends that the rule from Blakely, decided after his sentence became final, is not a new rule, but rather a rule dictated by the earlier case Apprendi v. New Jersey. The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Blakely is a new rule or is in fact dictated by Apprendi. If Blakely is a new rule, the Court will decide whether it applies retroactively. A decision for either side has the potential to change the amount of discretion that judges exercise when sentencing defendants.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner was given an exceptional sentence of 258 months above the 304 month ceiling of the statutory sentencing range, a sentence that became final after Apprendi v. New Jersey, but before Blakely v. Washington:

  1. Is the holding in Blakely a new rule or is it dictated by Apprendi?
  2. If Blakely is a new rule, does its requirement that facts resulting in an enhanced statutory maximum be proved beyond a reasonable doubt apply retroactively?

On October 18, 1991, Petitioner Lonnie Lee Burton followed a 15-year-old Washington boy home from school. State v. Burton, 2000 WL 987045 (Wash.App. Div. July 17, 2000) at 1.

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Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, et al. v. United States; Shell Oil Co. v. United States

Issues

Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), whether a manufacturer is liable for spilling or leaking a hazardous substance while delivering that substance to a purchaser.

Under CERCLA, when may a court impose joint and several liability, and when may it, instead, reasonably apportion liability among responsible parties?

 

Throughout the 60's and 70's, a now-defunct company called Brown & Bryant stored agricultural chemical products manufactured by Shell Oil Company on parcels of land owned by Brown & Bryant, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company, and Union Pacific Transportation Company. The storage and handling of these chemicals led to leaks, and eventually a cleanup effort headed by California's Department of Toxic Substances Control ("DTSC") and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").  After Brown and & Bryant had ceased to exist, the EPA and DTSC sued the railways and Shell under The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") to recover the costs of the cleanup. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found the railways liable because they owned the land on which hazardous materials were stored and processed, and Shell liable for arranging the disposal of the materials. The District Court found the railways liable for 9% of the costs of cleanup and Shell liable for 6%.  The EPA and the DTSC appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's apportionment of liability, finding that liability should be joint and several. The Ninth Circuit also upheld Shell's liability as the "arranger" of the disposal hazardous substances. In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether joint and several liability may be imposed upon several parties under CERCLA even where a district court finds an objectively reasonable basis for dividing the cost of cleanup. The Supreme Court will also decide what constitutes "arranger" liability under CERCLA.

 

     

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Burlington No. & Santa Fe R. Co. v. United States (07-1601)

The Comprehensive, Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., allows the government to obtain reimbursement for the costs of remediating hazardous waste sites from the owners and operators of land on which a disposal of hazardous substances has occurred. Because even passive landowners may be subjected to CERCLA liability, Congress removed language from early CERCLA bills mandating joint and several liability for multiple defendants who own or operate a particular site. In the present case, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless imposed joint and several liability for the entire cost of a facility's remediation on two landlords, even though they owned only a portion of the overall site for a fraction of its period of operation, and the parcel they owned required no remediation.

The question presented is:

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred by reversing the district court's reasonable apportionment of responsibility under CERCLA, and by adopting a standard of review and proof requirements that depart from common law principles and conflict with decisions of other circuits.

Shell Oil Co. v. United States (07-1607)

1. Whether liability for "arranging" for disposal of hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), may be imposed upon a manufacturer who merely sells and ships, by common carrier, a commercially useful product, transferring ownership and control to a purchaser who then causes contamination involving that product.

2. Whether joint and several liability may be imposed upon several potentially responsible parties under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), even where a district court finds an objectively reasonable basis for divisibility that would suffice at common law.

In 1960, Brown & Bryant, Inc. ("B&B"), a now-defunct company, owned and operated an agricultural chemical storage and distribution facility located in Arvin, California on a 3.8-acre parcel of land.  See United States v. Burlington North & Santa Fe Railway. Co., 502 F.3d 781, at 790 (9th Cir.

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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White

Issues

Does an employer engage in an adverse employment action, and thereby violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when he retaliates against an employee who files a discrimination claim by temporarily suspending her without pay and reassigning her to a position with different responsibilities?

 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers from retaliating against an employee who opposes discriminatory practices. However, the requisite provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), does not define what kinds of adverse employment decisions are actionable. Courts of appeal have adopted three different standards to guide this determination: the Sixth Circuit prohibits any “materially adverse change in the terms of employment;” the Ninth Circuit prohibits any adverse treatment “reasonably likely to deter” the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity; and finally, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits only prohibit an “ultimate employment decision.” In this case, the Sixth Circuit held that a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full back pay, or an inconvenient reassignment, constituted actionable adverse employment decisions. The Supreme Court must now determine which of the foregoing standards is correct.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an employer may be held liable for retaliatory discrimination under Title VII for any "materially adverse change in the terms of employment" (including a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full backpay or an inconvenient reassignment, as the court below held); for any adverse treatment that was "reasonably likely to deter" the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity (as the Ninth Circuit holds); or only for an "ultimate employment decision" (as two other courts of appeals hold).

On June 23, 1997, Burlington Northern hired Sheila White to work in its Maintenance of Way department at the Tennessee Yard. White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co.,364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 2004). Marvin Brown, roadmaster of the Yard, assigned White to operate the forklift, a position formerly held by Ralph Ellis until his June 1997 resignation. Id.

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Burgess v. United States

 

In 2002, a South Carolina state court convicted Keith Burgess of misdemeanor drug possession, an offense punishable by up to two years' incarceration. In 2003, a federal court convicted Burgess of conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base in violation of the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"). The court ruled that Burgess' prior state-court conviction constituted a "felony drug offense" under the CSA and thus qualified Burgess for sentence enhancement from ten to twenty years' imprisonment.� Burgess appealed, claiming that the sentence enhancement provision did not apply.� Burgess argued that court should have applied the CSA's definition of "felony" instead of "felony drug offense," under which the state-court conviction merely constituted a misdemeanor. This case highlights the role of judicial review in the application of mandatory minimum sentences.

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    Bullcoming v. New Mexico

    Issues

    During a trial, when the prosecution introduces a forensic laboratory report, does it satisfy the Confrontation Clause if a laboratory analyst who did not perform the analysis testifies and is cross-examined by the defendant, or must the analyst who prepared the report take the stand?

     

    Following an arrest for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), Petitioner Donald Bullcoming’s blood was tested at the New Mexico Department of Health in order to determine his blood alcohol content (BAC). At trial, the laboratory’s report was admitted into evidence even though the actual analyst who performed the test was not a witness. Instead, another analyst from the Department of Health testified to the laboratory’s procedures and the machinery used to conduct the BAC test. On appeal, Bullcoming argues that the information in the report was testimonial and that, because the actual analyst was not a witness subject to cross-examination, his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated. Respondent New Mexico contends that the report is not testimonial because the testing analyst merely transcribed raw data and that, even if it is testimonial, Bullcoming’s confrontation rights were satisfied by the opportunity to retest the sample and cross-examine another analyst. To decide this case, the Supreme Court must balance a defendant’s right to confrontation against the burden that requiring the actual analyst to testify imposes on the state.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a  non-testifying  forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the statements.

    A jury convicted Petitioner Donald Bullcoming of aggravated Driving While Intoxicated (DWI); he was sentenced to two years in prison. See New Mexico v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 4–5 (N.M.

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    Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna

    Issues

    Whether a court or an arbitrator should resolve an allegation that a contract is void for illegality when that contract contains an arbitration clause.

    Court below

     

    Buckeye Check Cashing, a service provider in the payday loan industry, agreed to loan money to John Cardegna. The loan agreement contained an arbitration clause that compelled the parties to use arbitration, and not the courts, in case of dispute. Cardegna brought a class action lawsuit against Buckeye for allegedly charging interest rates higher than Florida usury law allows. Buckeye responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. Cardegna resisted arbitration, maintaining that the arbitration clause was part of an illegal contract and therefore void ab initio—the clause had never come into existence as a matter of law. The issue before the Court is thus whether a court or an arbitrator should determine whether the underlying contract is void for illegality before enforcing the arbitration clause. The outcome will depend on whether the Supreme Court believes the separability doctrine applies to such contracts. If the Court affirms and holds that Cardegna's claims should be decided by the courts, the payday industry and its consumers, businesses that use arbitration clauses, and the policies behind the Federal Arbitration Act may suffer. If the Court instead decides that the claims should be sent to arbitration, low-income consumers, consumer protection regulation, and the integrity of the judicial system as a whole may be negatively affected.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Florida Supreme Court erred by holding, consistent with the Alabama Supreme Court but in direct conflict with six federal courts of appeals, that the Federal Arbitration Act allows a party to avoid arbitration by claiming that the underlying contract containing an arbitration clause (but not the arbitration clause itself) is void for illegality.

    John Cardegna needed money. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, 894 So.2d 860, 861 (Fla. 2005), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 2937 (2005).

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    Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.

    Issues

    Whether 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act provides a blanket immunity to vaccine manufacturers from tort actions filed in state or federal court by injured victims seeking compensation for injuries allegedly arising from defectively designed vaccines.

     

    After their daughter suffered severe health problems following a routine vaccination for diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (“DTP”), Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz sued Wyeth, Inc., the manufacturer of the vaccine, alleging that Wyeth’s DTP vaccine was outmoded and inadequately designed. In response, Wyeth argued that Section 22(b)(1) of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (“NCVIA”) exempted vaccine manufacturers from all design-defect claims, including the one asserted by the Bruesewitz family. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Wyeth and dismissed the claim. The Supreme Court must now determine whether to sustain the categorical preclusion of all design-defect claims advanced against vaccine manufacturers, or whether to expose vaccine manufacturers to potential design-based litigation. This decision will affect the right of vaccine victims to seek compensation for their injuries and the ability of vaccine manufacturers to avoid costly litigation that may drive them out of the vaccine market.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the Third Circuit erred in holding that, contrary to its plain text and the decisions of this Court and others, section 22(b)(1) preempts all vaccine design defect claims, whether the vaccine’s side effects were unavoidable or not?

    This case turns on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the word “unavoidable” as it is used in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (“NCVIA”). See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir.

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    Patrick McCrory and A. Grant Whitney, Jr. v. David Harris and Christine Bowers

    Issues

    Did North Carolina’s 2011 congressional redistricting plan improperly use race as the primary motivating factor in creating the first and twelfth voting districts? 

    The Court must consider whether the proposed redistricting plans to North Carolina’s Congressional District 1 and Congressional District 12 constitute unconstitutional gerrymandering. Appellants Patrick McCrory, Governor of North Carolina, and A. Grant Whitney, Jr., Chairman of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, contend that the redistricting plans were not drawn based on race but rather were politically motivated. Appellees David Harris and Christine Bowser claim that direct and circumstantial evidence demonstrates that race was the predominant factor in the redrawing of district lines. The case is significant because it will address whether complying with the Voting Rights Act satisfies a compelling government interest and whether gerrymandering challengers must provide an alternative map when they present direct and circumstantial evidence of race-based redistricting. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    In 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly drew a new congressional redistricting map to ensure that North Carolina’s congressional districts would comply with the one-person, one-vote requirement in the wake of the 2010 census. Shortly thereafter, several organizations brought suit in state court challenging two of those districts as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The state court rejected their claims in full, concluding that the General Assembly drew one district based on political, not racial, considerations, and that it drew the other in a manner narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act. Dissatisfied with that result, two members of one of the plaintiff organizations brought this suit challenging the same two districts on the same grounds. The parties even submitted the state court record in full.  Without even acknowledging the direct conflict with the state court case that its decision produced, the district court reached precisely the opposite conclusion.   

    The question presented is: 

    Whether the First and Twelfth Districts of North Carolina’s 2011 congressional redistricting plan are unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.

    North Carolina voters have repeatedly challenged two North Carolina voting districts in a redistricting plan intended to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”). The VRA aims to eliminate racial discrimination in voting by providing every voter with an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of his or her choice. See Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-cv-949, at 5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2016).

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    Life Technologies Corp., et al. v. Promega Corp.

    Issues

    Is the shipment of one commodity component from the United States for the foreign assembly and unauthorized sale of a patented, multi-component invention a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)?

    Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), when a party, without the authority to do so, ships from the United States either “all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention” or “any component . . . that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention” in a way that would induce another party abroad to combine the component(s) to form the patented invention, that party commits patent infringement. Section 271(f)(1) prevents parties from evading domestic patent law when engaging in international transactions. The parties differ on how broad § 271(f)(1) should be construed. Life Technologies Corporation argues that courts should construe § 271(f)(1) narrowly to refer to the percentage of components for the invention that a party ships abroad. Promega Corporation, on the other hand, argues that the statute takes into account a combination of quantity and relative importance of the component(s) shipped abroad. The outcome of this case will determine the limits of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) and, consequently, the limits of private action in shipping materials abroad. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) provides that it is an act of patent infringement to “suppl[y] . . . in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, . . . in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside the United States.” Despite this Court’s clear dictate that section 271(f) should be construed narrowly, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007), the Federal Circuit held that Life Technologies is liable for patent infringement for worldwide sales of a multi-component kit made abroad because just a single, commodity component of the kit was shipped from the U.S.

    The question presented is:

    Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that supplying a single, commodity component of a multi-component invention from the United States is an infringing act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), exposing the manufacturer to liability for all of its worldwide sales.

    Promega Corporation (“Promega”) owns four patents for methods of amplifying particular “short tandem repeats” (“STR”) loci in a DNA strand and has an exclusive license over a fifth method for the same. Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., No. 10-cv-0281, at 5 (Fed. Cir. Dec.

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    Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.

    Issues

    Under the Bankruptcy Code, can a bankruptcy court in a Chapter 11 case approve a settlement that distributes the debtor’s estate to creditors in a way that deviates from the Code’s priority scheme?

    Respondents Jevic Holding Corporation et al. (“Jevic”) fired Petitioners Casimir Czyzewski et al., members of a certified class of truck drivers (“the drivers”), when the company filed for bankruptcy in 2008. The drivers were entitled to receive payment on their wage claims before other unsecured creditors received any distribution from Jevic’s bankruptcy estate, but they were skipped over when Jevic’s two largest creditors reached a settlement with Jevic. The drivers argue that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize a bankruptcy court to approve settlement that differs from the Code’s priority scheme. Jevic counters that the drivers have not presented a case or controversy because the drivers cannot show that a decision in their favor is likely to redress their injury. Further, Jevic argues that the Code does not make the absolute priority rule applicable to Chapter 11 settlements. The outcome of this case could affect the scope of the Bankruptcy Code priority scheme and could disadvantage employees who hold priority wage claims against their bankrupt employer. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether a bankruptcy court may authorize a distribution of settlement proceeds that violates the priority scheme established by the Bankruptcy Code, over the objection of priority creditors whose rights are impaired by the proposed distribution.

    JEVIC FILES BANKRUPTCY

    On May 19, 2008, Jevic Holding Corporation (“Jevic”) fired its 1,800 employees—including Petitioners (“the drivers”), a certified class of truck drivers—without warning. See In re Jevic Holding Corp., et al., No. 14-1465, 5 (3d Cir. May 21, 2015). The next day Jevic, voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

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