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The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that a person standing criminal trial has the right to the assistance of an attorney for his defense. In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court interpreted that portion of the Sixth Amendment to mean that a defendant also has the right to an expert “to assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” It is not clear, however, whether a defendant’s right to such an expert entitles him to an independent expert, devoted to advocating specifically for the defense’s case. McWilliams argues that the Sixth Amendment does guarantee an independent expert for the defense of the accused. The State of Alabama, on the other hand, argues that a defendant need only have access to an expert, which may be satisfied through the assistance of an expert neutral to all parties. The outcome of this case will help to further define the scope of protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment regarding a defendant’s right to counsel. 

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This case will address the burden on the defendant who is asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim upon appeal. Kentel Myrone Weaver argues that proving that his counsel failed to object to a courtroom closure during the jury selection proceedings with no strategic considerations should merit a dismissal of the underlying conviction. The state of Massachusetts maintains that this was a harmless error and therefore the conviction should stand. The Supreme Court’s decision will have implications for the scope of protections for the right to effective assistance of counsel.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Free Exercise or Equal Protection Clause requires Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources to grant a qualifying religious institution’s funding application if it would have otherwise received funding absent its religious status. Trinity Lutheran Church argues that the Department’s policy amounts to a violation of the Free Exercise Clause because it singles out and excludes religious institutions by conditioning a generally available public benefit based on religious status. Moreover, Trinity contends that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause because the policy employs a suspect classification based on religion. In contrast, The Missouri DNR argues that the Free Exercise Clause only stops the government from prohibiting the free exercise of religion but does not require that the government provide funding to religious organizations. Secondly, it argues that the State’s policy only needs to meet a rational basis level of scrutiny, as all religious groups do not constitute, in themselves, a suspect classification. Furthermore, the DNR contends that the State’s policy serves legitimate, rational bases, such as a protection against perceived or actual governmental favoritism toward particular religious denominations. At stake are the governmental benefits available to religious organizations in a wide range of contexts and the potential for organizational discrimination against third parties.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether an entity that attempts to collect from defaulted loans is a “debt collector” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). This definition includes two prongs, and Petitioners Henson, et al. argue that in the second prong, “owed or due another” should be read as debts owed to the originator but due to the debt purchaser. See Brief for Petitioners, Ricky Henson, et al. at 19–20. Since the debt that Respondent Santander tried to collect was due to Santander, who is the purchaser of the debt, Petitioners argue that Santander was a debt collector under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) and can therefore be held liable under the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA). See id. at 23. Moreover, they maintain that the Fourth Circuit’s contrary interpretation may encourage the debt industry to engage in practices like loan diversification to avoid regulation and liability under the FDCPA. See id. at 20–21. On the other hand, Santander contends that a number of textual cues in the statute, such as the grammar and repeated use of present tense, demonstrate that “owed or due another” regards the time of collection, which releases Santander of liability because during the period of collection Santander was not collecting on behalf of another entity. See Brief for Respondent, Santander Consumer USA, Inc. at 11. Moreover, Santander argues that most of the abusive practices that could be exempted from the FDCPA may be regulated by another statute. See id. at 14. At stake are the extent of legal accountability for debt purchasers and the incentives for purchasing debt. See Brief of Amici Curiae Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization et al. (“LSO”), in Support of Petitioner at 7; Brief of Amicus Curiae ACA International, in Support of Respondent at 17–18.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the five-year statute of limitations on forfeitures and penalties in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies when the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) directs a wrongdoer to surrender proceeds stemming from his illegal activity (“disgorgement claims”). Petitioner Charles R. Kokesh argues that § 2462 applies to SEC disgorgement claims because these claims fell within the ordinary meaning of “forfeiture” at the time Congress enacted the statute. In addition, Kokesh contends that § 2462 applies because disgorgement claims are in part to punish the wrongdoer and are therefore penalties. Respondent SEC counters that disgorgement claims are not forfeitures under § 2462 because the term “forfeiture” was only intended to include procedures to take tangible property when Congress enacted the statute. The SEC also argues that disgorgement claims are not penalties because they do not make wrongdoers worse off financially than they would have been if they did not violate the law. This case will resolve a circuit split regarding whether § 2462’s statute of limitations applies to SEC disgorgement claims. In doing so, this case will also determine whether the SEC can enforce U.S. securities laws through disgorgement orders without regard to when the alleged violation occurred.

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The Supreme Court will consider whether under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) intervenors in a lawsuit must have Article III standing or whether a case or controversy between the named parties satisfies Article III. Petitioner, the Town of Chester, argues that courts should not permit parties to intervene in an action unless they can prove they have independent Article III standing, which it argues is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. In contrast, Respondent Laroe Estates contends that so long as the initial party who brought the action has Article III standing, other parties can intervene without showing standing. The outcome of this case will have implications for the separation of powers and the potential litigation burdens on courts and parties. 

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This case will allow the Supreme Court to decide the proper forum in which a federal employee may seek judicial review of a U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”) dismissal of their mixed case. A federal employee has a mixed case where they bring a claim based on both “significant adverse employment action[s]” and discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit”) previously held that a mixed-case appeal should be reviewed in the Federal Circuit if the MSPB’s dismissal is based on both a lack of jurisdiction and a failure to reach the merits of the discrimination claim. However, the Supreme Court later held in Kloeckner v. Solis that a U.S. district court would hear mixed cases if the MSPB dismissal is based on procedural (as opposed to jurisdictional) grounds, and the dismissal failed to decide the merits of the underlying discrimination claim. Here, the D.C. Circuit held that Kloeckner did not apply because the MSPB had dismissed the appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. In addition to legal analysis, the Supreme Court might consider the arguments for and against providing a uniform court for judicial review for federal agency claims as well as a federal employee’s right to de novo review of discrimination claims in determining this case.

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This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the applicability of the time limitations in Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 for individual claims brought after a class action lawsuit has been filed in the same matter. Petitioner California Public Employees' Retirement System (“CalPERS”) argues that Section 13 is a statute of limitation, which may be overridden by judge-made rule, as opposed to a statute of repose, which is not subject to judicial extension even in cases of extraordinary circumstances. Accordingly, CalPERS asserts that a prior Supreme Court decision, American Pipe, establishes that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitation as to all putative members of that class. Respondent ANZ Securities, however, argues that Section 13 is a statute of repose, and under the Second Circuit precedent the American Pipe tolling rule does not extend to statutes of repose. The outcome of this case could encourage litigation strategies that decrease court efficiency or, alternatively, benefit large investors at the expense of smaller ones. 

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The United States Supreme Court will consider whether the EPA acted reasonably based on the agency’s interpretation of its obligations under the Clean Air Act when it did not consider the costs, during rulemaking, of regulating the emissions of hazardous air pollutants from oil- and coal-fired electric utilities. The Petitioners argue that because the EPA did not consider  cost  of compliance as a factor in its decision, the EPA’s rule is an incorrect interpretation of the Clean Air Act and is unreasonable. The Respondents counter that the EPA acted reasonably and correctly interpreted the Clean Air Act by not considering  cost  of compliance as a factor in its decision to regulate hazardous air pollutants from electric utility plants. The Court’s decision will implicate the regulation of hazardous air pollutant emissions from electric  utilities,  and may have broader implications for the statutory interpretation of similar regulatory mandates to agencies.

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As Anthony Covington lay on the ground injured from a gunshot wound, he provided police officers on the scene with a description of his alleged shooter, before dying a few hours later. The police arrested the suspected shooter, Richard Bryant, based on Covington’s statements, and Bryant was subsequently convicted of second-degree murder after the Michigan trial court admitted Covington’s statements into evidence. Bryant claims that the admission of Covington’s statements violated his right to cross-examine an opposing witness, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The State of Michigan argues that Covington’s statements were obtained during the police’s response to an “ongoing emergency” and that its admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will likely offer further guidance on what statements are “nontestimonial” under its landmark decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, which redefined the ambit of the Confrontation Clause.

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