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It is illegal to provide material support and resources to groups that the government has determined are foreign terrorist organizations. The Humanitarian Law Project argues that this prohibition violates First and Fifth Amendment rights of those individuals or groups that wish to provide resources to the humanitarian arms of foreign terrorist organizations. The government contends that the law is not unconstitutionally vague and that these provisions are necessary to effectively combat terrorism. In addition to determining the scope of the First and Fifth Amendments with respect to this aspect of anti-terrorism efforts, the case will also affect how a variety of groups engage in humanitarian campaigns abroad.

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This case involves a lawsuit brought by the estate of decedent, Mr. Castaneda, against two Public Health Service (“PHS”) officials (collectively, the “Petitioners”) for failing to provide proper medical care to Mr. Castaneda during his custody in a state immigration facility. Mr. Castaneda had a growing, fungating lesion on his penis but was denied a simple skin biopsy from PHS officials. Consequently, Mr. Castaneda died of penile cancer at the age of 36. At issue here is whether the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (“FTCA”), providing that federal employees are not protected from constitutional tort claims, extends to 422 U.S.C. § 233(a) of the Emergency Health Personnel Act, which covers PHS officials. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case may significantly affect the extent to which prisoners may seek recourse if denied constitutionally guaranteed access to adequate medical care while under state custody. This case may also affect public health personnel: while a decision for Respondents may discourage federal employees from committing constitutional violations, it may also negatively impact employment.

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The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) power to regulate interstate energy markets. If the FPA does not address a particular area of regulation, then states can regulate that area. One of FERC’s powers is approving wholesale energy rates. In Hughes, the Court will consider whether Maryland encroached on FERC’s rate-setting power by entering fixed-rate contracts with an energy producer. Petitioners W. Kevin Hughes, the chairman of the Maryland Public Service Commission, and CPV Maryland, LLC (“CPV”), the “energy producer” in this case, argue that Maryland is within its rights to secure new sources of energy through competitive bidding. Maryland does not usurp FERC’s authority unless it actually dictates what price producers sell at, which it did not, Hughes and CPV claim. But respondent Talen Energy Marketing, a CPV competitor, contends that Maryland overstepped its authority by offering fixed-rate contracts, which Talen claims essentially guarantee revenue, to entice bidders like CPV. The outcome of this case may implicate state and FERC regulation of energy markets, and the growth of renewable energy.

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According to the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce rule, when police officers enter a person’s home, they must make their presence known to the occupants and wait a reasonable amount of time before entering. The courts are split as to whether a knock-and-announce violation makes evidence found after the violation excludable. Evidence which the officers would have inevitably discovered, however, is not normally excluded by courts. In Hudson v. Michigan (04-1360), Petitioner Hudson contends that the police’s knock-and-announce violation produced evidence resulting from an unreasonable entry under the Fourth Amendment and should, therefore, be suppressed.  Respondent  in this case, the state of Michigan, has two arguments at its disposal. First, they can argue that the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence regardless of the rule, and thus the evidence is not excludable because of the inevitable discovery doctrine exception. Second, they can argue that there is no causation between the entry violation and the seizure, meaning that the evidence is not the fruit of the Fourth Amendment violation and hence should not be excluded. Respondent further argues that excluding reliable evidence because of a mistake in the timing of entry would be unjustly harsh and produce an undue burden on society. The Supreme Court’s resolution of the current circuit court split will have powerful effects on law enforcement and the continued efficacy of the knock-and-announce rule. 

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While Randall Fields was incarcerated, officers unaffiliated with the prison questioned him regarding activities unrelated to his incarceration. Fields made incriminating statements to the officers, and was convicted after these statements were admitted into evidence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Fields' petition for habeas corpus relief, holding that the state court decision was in conflict with clearly established Supreme Court precedent forbidding the admission of statements made without the protection of Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a prisoner is "in custody," and thus entitled to Miranda protections, any time the prisoner is separated from the general prison population and questioned. Petitioning Warden Carol Howes contends that habeas should not be granted because the state court’s decision is not in conflict with any clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court. In contrast, Respondent Fields argues that there is a clearly established rule granting Miranda protection to prisoners anytime they are isolated and questioned. Howes maintains that recognizing a Supreme Court precedent requiring Miranda rights to be issued any time a prisoner is questioned will grant prisoners greater protections than those given to ordinary citizens. Fields counters that requiring officers to issue Miranda warnings is essential to protecting prisoners’ Fifth Amendment rights.

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Section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code states that “The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order: . . . Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered within 180 days of the [filing of the petition].” Howard Delivery Service argues that it should not have to pay unpaid insurance premiums to Zurich American Insurance because workers compensation does not qualify as a “contribution to an employee benefit plan.” The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that workers compensation does fall within this language, while the Sixth,  Eighth  and Tenth Circuits have argued that it does not. The Supreme Court must now decide whether or not to interpret the language of § 507(a)(4) to include workers compensation policies as “contributions to an employee benefit plan,” which benefit from priority under the Bankruptcy Code.

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Section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code states that “The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order: . . . Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered within 180 days of the [filing of the petition].” Howard Delivery Service argues that it should not have to pay unpaid insurance premiums to Zurich American Insurance because workers compensation does not qualify as a “contribution to an employee benefit plan.” The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that workers compensation does fall within this language, while the Sixth,  Eighth  and Tenth Circuits have argued that it does not. The Supreme Court must now decide whether or not to interpret the language of § 507(a)(4) to include workers compensation policies as “contributions to an employee benefit plan,” which benefit from priority under the Bankruptcy Code.

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Carloyn Muncey was murdered on July 13, 1985 in Union County, Tennessee. Her badly beaten body was found the next day in a brush pile about one hundred yards from her house, and it appeared as though a strong blow to her head had killed her after a long struggle. That same day, two witnesses saw Paul House emerging from the area where Muncey’s body was discovered wiping his hands with a dark rag. Several witnesses, as well as House, gave conflicting statements as to where he was the night of the crime. Over the course of the investigation of the murder, FBI officials found blood on House’s jeans that they determined was Muncey’s blood, as well as semen on Muncey’s clothes that they determined was likely House’s. Based on this circumstantial evidence, a jury in Union County convicted House of first-degree murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on three aggravating circumstances. During post-conviction relief proceedings in state and federal courts, House presented evidence that he was actually innocent of the crime. This new evidence included a confession from Muncey’s husband that he had murdered her, DNA evidence that it was not House’s semen on Muncey’s clothes, and evidence that the blood on his jeans was spilled onto his jeans after the autopsy on Muncey. None of the courts reviewing House’s case found his evidence sufficient to establish his actual innocence, however, and did not allow for review of his procedurally defaulted claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, or to obtain relief from his conviction. The United States Supreme Court must now determine how much evidence an individual such as House must present to prove his actual innocence and overturn a jury’s conviction and death sentence, as well as how much evidence is necessary to establish House’s innocence so that a court can review his procedurally defaulted claims.

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Respondent Cheryl Perich taught for five years at Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (“Hosanna-Tabor”), including four years as a commissioned minister. In 2004, Hosanna-Tabor hired a new teacher to fill Perich’s position after Perich missed several months of teaching due to narcolepsy. When Hosanna-Tabor did not permit Perich to return to her former position, Perich threatened to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich, and Perich initiated legal proceedings with the Respondent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Hosanna-Tabor fired her in retaliation for threatening to sue. Hosanna-Tabor argues that the ministerial exception to the ADA, which prevents employment suits against religious entities by their religious employees, bars Perich's lawsuit because she fulfilled an important religious role. Perich and the EEOC contend that there is no ministerial exception under the anti-retaliation provisions of the  ADA,  and that the Establishment Clause, freedom of association principles, and Free Exercise Clause do not bar her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that Perich did not fall under the ministerial exception because she taught secular subjects with minimal religious components. The Supreme Court will decide whether the ministerial exception applies to a teacher at a religious school who teaches both secular and religious material.

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In 2002, Lester Gerard Packingham pled guilty to taking indecent liberties with a child and was registered as a sex offender in the state of North Carolina. After posting on Facebook in 2010, Packingham was arrested and convicted under a North Carolina statute that prohibits all registered sex offenders from accessing any social networking website. Packingham appealed, arguing that the law violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Packingham’s conviction, finding that the law was an acceptable content-neutral speech restriction. Packingham argues that the law is substantially overbroad and is therefore unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to this case under either strict or intermediate scrutiny. North Carolina maintains that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s interest in protecting children from sexual abuse and therefore satisfies intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact the balance between state governments’ interest in public safety and convicted persons’ First Amendment rights.

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