Dean v. United States

Issues

Does a federal law imposing a ten-year minimum additional sentence on a defendant who fired a gun during a violent crime apply even if the firing was an accident?

 

Petitioner Christopher Michael Dean was convicted for a bank robbery in which he fired, probably by accident, a pistol. In addition to his sentence for the bank robbery, Dean was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which imposes a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for the discharge of a firearm during a violent crime. The question presented to the Supreme Court is whether courts can apply the sentence enhancement under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) if the discharge was accidental, or whether prosecutors must first prove that the defendant intended to fire the gun. Dean argues that prosecutors must prove that the defendant intended to fire the gun for the additional ten-year mandatory minimum to apply. The United States, on the other hand, contends that sentence enhancement statutes are not standalone criminal offenses and, therefore, that courts can apply these statutes without proof of intent. The outcome of this case could affect how often convicted individuals will receive enhanced sentences, based on whether the Supreme Court decides that prosecutors must prove intent for sentence enhancement factors, or whether the Court views sentence enhancement statutes as merely tailoring sentences to the specific facts of the underlying offense.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), establishing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant who "discharge[s]" a firearm during a crime of violence, requires proof that the discharge was volitional, and not merely accidental, unintentional, or involuntary.

    Petitioner Christopher Michael Dean and his brother-in-law, Ricardo Curtis Lopez, were convicted in federal district court for a bank robbery that occurred on November 10, 2004, in Rome, Georgia. See United States v.

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    Day v. Crosby

    Issues

    Whether after an individual files a habeas corpus petition in federal court, and the State admits in its answer that the petition was filed within the statute of limitations, the State has then waived a statute of limitations defense to a petition, which in fact was not timely filed.
     
    Whether the district court, after asking the State to file an answer to a habeas petition, and after the State's answer is filed, can then dismiss the habeas petition of its own volition under Habeas Rule 4.

     

    Patrick Day is currently incarcerated in the state of Florida, serving a 55-year sentence for second-degree murder. Florida State Courts affirmed his conviction, and in 2003 Day petitioned for habeas corpus review in United States District Court. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Day was allowed to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but the habeas rules provide a statute of limitations for filing the writ, and allows a district court to dismiss the petition sua sponte (or on its own volition) for any one of a number of reasons. In fact, Day's petition was late, but the district court did not dismiss the petition for this reason until after it asked for the State to file a response to Day's petition. In its response the state failed to raise the statute of limitations defense. In this case the Supreme Court must decide whether the State waived its statute of limitations defense when it failed to raise the defense in its responsive pleading and whether the district court was correct in dismissing the petition sua sponte even after the State erroneously admitted Day's petition was timely in its response. The case raises legal and policy considerations, especially in regard to the federal review of otherwise final state court criminal decisions.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Does the State waive a limitations defense to a habeas corpus petition when it fails to plead or otherwise raise that defense and expressly concedes that the petition was timely?
     
    Does Habeas Rule 4 permit a district court to dismiss a habeas petition sua sponte after the State has filed an answer based on a ground not raised in the answer?
    State Court Proceedings
     
    A Florida jury convicted Patrick Day of second degree murder and sentenced him to prison in September 1998. Brief for the Petitioner ("Pet'r"). at 3. Day appealed his conviction to the Florida First District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the sentence on December 21, 1999. Respondent's Brief on the Merits ("Respt") at 1. Day did not file a petition for certiorari to appeal the decision to the United States Supreme Court, thereby allowing the March 20, 2000 deadline to pass. Id.
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    Davis v. Washington

    Issues

    Are 911 calls — previously admissible as evidence in court even when the witness was absent under exceptions to the hearsay rule — "testimonial" statements and therefore no longer admissible under the new Crawford standard?

     

    The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment codifies the long-recognized right of an accused to confront his/her accuser, and the corresponding “hearsay rule” requires that if the  accuser  does not testify at trial his/her statements can not be used as evidence.  The trial  judge in this case  allowed a 911 call made by Davis' alleged victim into evidence even though the victim failed to appear at trial.  The Washington Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme Court upheld that decision based on a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule for reliable or spontaneous statements. Davis now appeals that these decisions were improper in light of the recent Crawford standard which forbids "testimonial" statements from being introduced in the absence of the witness.  Davis claims that the Framers of the Constitution understood the Confrontation Clause to apply to immediate reports of crime to government agents, and therefore, despite the change of technological context, the Clause also applies to 911 calls.  Washington responds that the motivation of the Confrontation Clause — preventing prosecutorial abuse — will not be served by Davis’s interpretation since 911 operators are unlikely to be soliciting testimony with an eye towards trial.  This case, which will be heard back-to-back with Hammon v. Indiana, is the first in which the Court will address the admissibility of the content of 911 calls in the absence of the witness under the reformulated Crawford standard.  Along with the rights of defendants, the case will also have a significant effect on the ability of prosecutors nationwide to convict the accused in "evidence-based" cases where the alleged victim is unavailable to testify, which are especially prevalent in the domestic violence context.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether an alleged victim's statements to a 911 operator naming her assailant — admitted as "excited utterances" under a jurisdiction's hearsay law — constitute "testimonial" statements subject to the Confrontation Clause restrictions enunciated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

    At 11:54 a.m. on February 1, 2001, a 911 operator in Kent, Washington, picked up a call only to hear a dial tone — the party on the other end had hung up before speaking.  Brief for Respondent at 1, State v.

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    Davis v. United States

    Issues

    Where Supreme Court precedent is retroactively applied to invalidate a search, should the results of the search be allowed into evidence as a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule?

     

    Officer Curtis Miller arrested Petitioner Willie Davis for using a false name during a routine traffic stop. Incident to the arrest, Officer Miller searched the vehicle and discovered a gun. Davis was subsequently charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, Davis made a motion to suppress the gun as evidence, but the district court denied the motion and let the evidence come in. While Davis’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, holding that searches like the one conducted in Davis’s case violate the Fourth Amendment. Davis argued on appeal that the retroactive application of Gant to his case should result in exclusion of the gun as evidence. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Davis, who now appeals to the Supreme Court. The United States maintains that the evidence of the gun should not be suppressed because Officer Miller, in objectively reasonable good faith, believed his search was proper when it was conducted. This case will determine whether retroactive application of the rule in Arizona v. Gant requires exclusion of evidence acquired under a prior rule, or whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search authorized by precedent at the time of the search that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.

    In 2007, Officer Curtis Miller made a routine traffic stop of a car in which Petitioner Willie Davis was riding. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir.

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    Davenport v. Washington Education Association; Washington v. Washington Education Association

    Issues

    1. Does a labor union have a First Amendment right to spend the wages of non-union members for political purposes?
    2. Does a law requiring labor unions to obtain the permission of non-union members before using their paid fees for political purposes (instead of allowing the unions to use such fees from any nonmembers who do not expressly opt out of such use) unconstitutionally violate the unions' First Amendment rights?

     

    The State of Washington and several Washington educational employees brought suit against the Washington Education Association alleging that the union impermissibly used non-union member “shop fees” to finance political activities in violation of Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760's requirement that the union receive affirmative authorization from nonmembers before using their fees for political purposes. The Washington Supreme Court sided with the union and struck down § 760 as unconstitutional. Washington argues that the union does not have a First Amendment right to use shop fees for political purposes. The union responds that § 760 essentially blocks its ability to assert a collective political voice and must survive strict scrutiny to pass constitutional muster. The Supreme Court's decision will determine the balance of First Amendment protection granted to a labor union relative to the protection afforded to dissenting nonmembers who pay shop fees.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Do labor union officials have a First Amendment right to seize and use for politics the wages of employees who have chosen not to become union members?
    2. Does a state campaign finance law that prohibits labor unions and their officials from seizing and using the wages of nonmembers for partisan political campaigns without obtaining the nonmembers' affirmative consent violate the First Amendment rights of labor unions?
    3. Does the requirement in Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760 that nonmembers must affirmatively consent (opt-in) before their fees may be used to support the union's political agenda violate the union's First Amendment rights?

    The Washington Employment Association (WEA) is the exclusive bargaining agent for 70,000 Washington state educational employees. Washington State Public Disclosure Commission v. Washington Education Association (WEA), 130 P.3d 352, 354 (2006).

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    Danforth v. Minnesota

    Issues

    Are state courts compelled to use the federal retroactivity standards outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane to determine the retroactivity of a new federal rule of criminal procedure, or may the state courts devise their own standards for determining retroactivity?

     

    Stephen Danforth was convicted of first degree criminal sexual misconduct in a Minnesota state criminal trial that included videotaped testimonial evidence from Danforth's victim. After Danforth's conviction became final, the United States Supreme Court found that use of such evidence violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. But the Court later found this decision did not apply retroactively to convictions finalized before the decision was announced. The court made this decision using Supreme Court retroactivity standards. Danforth now asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a state post-conviction court can use state retroactivity standards to apply a new Supreme Court decision on criminal procedure to a final conviction, or if it must use the retroactivity standards the Supreme Court has established. This decision will clarify the boundaries between state and federal authority in state post-conviction proceedings that address federal questions.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Are state supreme courts required to use the standard announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), to determine whether United States Supreme Court decisions apply retroactively to state-court criminal cases, or may a state court apply state-law- or state-constitution-based retroactivity tests that afford application of Supreme Court decisions to a broader class of criminal defendants than the class defined by Teague?

     
    The following facts are taken from the opinion of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in which Stephen Danforth's first appeal was denied. In 1996, a Minnesota jury in Hennepin County District Court found Stephen Danforth guilty of first degree criminal sexual misconduct for the sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy named J.S. At trial, the court found that J.S. was incompetent to testify at trial and admitted a videotaped interview in which J.S.
    Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Professors John Blume and Kevin Clermont for their invaluable insights into this case.

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    DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno; Wilkins v. Cuno

    Issues

    Does either the investment tax credit or the property tax exemption at issue violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution or the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States or Ohio State Constitutions by discriminating in favor of businesses locating new investments in Ohio and against incumbent businesses or those locating elsewhere?

    Do the Respondents here (and plaintiffs below) have standing as the state and municipal taxpayers to challenge the tax incentive programs at issue?

     

    The Ohio State investment tax credit (Ohio Revised Code ? 5733.33) encourages development in economically depressed areas by providing tax breaks to companies or individuals that choose to locate in such areas and to install new manufacturing machinery and equipment. The personal property tax incentive, under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ?? 5709.62 and 5709.631, permits municipalities to grant property tax exemptions to corporations that develop in economically depressed areas and meet certain employment and investment levels. Together, these two statutes create incentives for corporate development in Ohio in otherwise unfavorable locations. Respondents, state and non-state taxpayers and one Ohio business forced to relocate upon the construction of a DaimlerChrysler plant, argue that this tax-incentive scheme is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits state taxes from discriminating against interstate commerce. Petitioners assert that (1) the Respondents lack standing to bring the suit, and (2) the dormant Commerce Clause prevents only state taxes which discourage companies from doing businesses in other states and not incentives that encourage companies to locate within the state.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (04-1704):

    Whether Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Revised Code ? 5733.33, which seeks to encourage economic development by providing a credit to taxpayers who install new manufacturing machinery and equipment in the State, violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.

    Whether Respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ? 5733.33.

    Wilkins v. Cuno (04-1724):

    Does the dormant Commerce Clause allow a State to attempt to attract new business investment in the State by offering credits against the State's general corporate franchise or income tax, where the amount of the credit is based on the amount of a business's new investment in the State?

    Whether Respondents have standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ? 5733.33.

    ​

    Factual Background

    DaimlerChrysler contracted with the City of Toledo, Ohio in 1998, to construct a new vehicle-assembly plant in exchange for tax incentives. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741. DaimlerChrysler forecasted its total investment in the project to be about $1.2 billion, which would result in tax incentives totaling an estimated $280 mil

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    Dada v. Mukasey

    Issues

    Whether the time allotted for departure under a voluntary departure order is suspended when an alien files a motion to reopen removal proceedings.

     

    Samson Taiwo Dada, a citizen of Nigeria, overstayed a temporary visitor's visa. After removal proceedings, Dada was granted voluntary departure. Dada failed to leave the United States within the voluntary departure period and instead moved before the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his removal proceedings. Dada argued that the voluntary departure period should be tolled pending the outcome of his motion. Dada contended that otherwise, he and similarly situated aliens would be forced either to abandon their motions to reopen or illegally remain in the United States beyond the voluntary departure period. The Board denied Dada's motion and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The outcome of this case will settle a circuit split concerning the legal effect of motions to reopen and will influence aliens' decisions to seek to reopen removal proceedings.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether the filing of a motion to reopen removal proceedings automatically tolls the period within which an alien must depart the United States under an order granting voluntary departure.

    Samson Taiwo Dada, a citizen of Nigeria, was legally admitted into the United States on a nonimmigrant visa in 1998. Brief for Petitioner at 9. After Dada's visa expired, he married an American citizen who filed a Petition for Alien Relative, Form I-130, on Dada's behalf in 1999. Id. The I-130 petition was subsequently denied for failure to present documents requested by the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.

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    Cutter v. Wilkinson

     

    The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act contains provisions that are applicable to institutionalized persons which prohibit the government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoner's exercise of religion. The issue, in this case, is whether or not such provisions violate the Constitution's Establishment Clause, Spending Clause, or Commerce Clause.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Whether Congress violated the Establishment Clause by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 through § 2000cc-5, which requires state officials to lift unnecessary governmental burdens imposed on the religious exercise of institutionalized persons under their control.

    Factual Summary
     
    In 2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act  ("RLUIPA"), which, in relevant part required that no government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution unless the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
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    Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee

    Issues

    May the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) in an inter partes review (“IPR”) use a  broadest-reasonable  interpretation when construing the claims of a patent, or is the PTAB required to construe claims to their plain and ordinary meaning? May courts review the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR proceeding?

    The Supreme Court will decide the standard that the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) should use when construing claims in an issued patent and whether the PTAB’s decision to institute an inter partes review (“IPR”) proceeding is judicially reviewable. Cuozzo Speed Technologies argues that claims should be given their ordinary meaning and that the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR should be judicially reviewable. Meanwhile, the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) argues that when the PTAB institutes an IPR, the PTAB should construe claims with their broadest-reasonable construction standard. Furthermore, the PTO argues that the PTAB’s decision to institute an IPR is final and non-reviewable by the courts. The Supreme Court’s decision may help resolve inconsistent standards used between district courts and IPR proceedings while affecting innovator’s rights. 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Did the court of appeals err in holding that, in IPR proceedings, the Board may construe claims in an issued patent according to their broadest reasonable interpretation rather than their plain and ordinary meaning?
    2. Did the court of appeals err in holding that, even if the Board exceeds its statutory authority in instituting an IPR proceeding, the Board’s decision whether to institute an IPR proceeding is judicially unreviewable?

    On August 17, 2004, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC (“Cuozzo”) was issued U.S. Patent No.

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