Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown

Issues

Whether a court can acquire general personal jurisdiction to hear any claim against a foreign company when the company’s only connection with the forum state is the distribution of products by other entities of the parent corporation.

 
Appealed from: North Carolina Court of Appeals (Aug. 18, 2009)​Two North Carolina teenagers were killed in France when a tire, manufactured by Goodyear Luxembourg, malfunctioned and caused an accident. Their estates sued the foreign manufacturers of the defective tire for negligence in a North Carolina state court, and the state court found that it had general jurisdiction over the defendants and could hear the case. Goodyear Luxembourg argues that North Carolina does not have general jurisdiction because the company has no presence in or direct business with North Carolina. The teenagers' estates argue that the court properly found jurisdiction because Goodyear Luxembourg is part of the larger and highly integrated Goodyear enterprise, which does have significant contact with North Carolina. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the ease with which plaintiffs may sue foreign manufacturers in state court, and could potentially affect commercial relations between the United States and other nations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a foreign corporation is subject to  general  personal jurisdiction, on causes of action not arising out of or related to any contacts between it and the forum state, merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products placed in the stream of commerce by the defendant.

On April 18, 2004, Matthew Helms and Julian Brown died as a result of a bus accident near Paris, France. See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App.

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Additional Resources

· Washington Legal Foundation: Court Urged to Reject Expansion of Jurisdiction over Foreign Companies (Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. Brown) (Nov. 19, 2010)
 
· Nixon Peabody, Raymond L. Mariani: U.S. Supreme Court to Revisit Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Manufacturers (Nov. 16, 2010).
 
The Supreme Court will hear this case in tandem with J. McIntyre Machinery, LTD v. Nicastro, which concerns state personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer which generally targets the U.S. market but has no physical presence in the United States and uses an independent company as its exclusive distributor within the United States.
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Gonzalez v. United States

Issues

Can a defendant's lawyer, without personally consulting the defendant, orally agree to waive the defendant's right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?

 

A federal court convicted Gonzalez of drug charges in a trial in which a magistrate judge presided over jury selection. Though counsel for the defendant consented to the magistrate conducting voir dire (the questioning and evaluation of potential jurors) in lieu of an Article III judge, Gonzalez neither personally consented nor objected. Gonzalez argues that the right to personally choose whether an Article III judge will or will not preside over voir dire is an important constitutional right; the government argues that the rule in Peretz v. United States does not require personal consent, that the consent of counsel was adequate, and that conducting voir dire was within the scope of duties that may be delegated to magistrates. Gonzalez counters that the government misconstrues the language in Peretz.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Is a federal criminal defendant's counsel's oral consent to have a United States magistrate judge preside over jury selection binding on the defendant when the record does not reflect the defendant's own knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?
    A federal jury in Lorado, Texas convicted Homero Gonzalez on several criminal conspiracy and substantive counts related to possession of more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. Brief for Respondent at 1,2. Gonzalez, a 45-year old Mexican citizen residing legally in the U.S., did not speak English at the time of trial and required a court interpreter to translate the proceedings into Spanish. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Gonzalez appeared before a magistrate judge for his detention hearing and arraignment and then appeared before a district judge for four pretrial conferences. Id. at 2.
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    Gonzalez v. Thaler

    Issues

    1. Did the Court of Appeals meet all of the requirements necessary to issue a valid certificate of appealability and, therefore, to hear the petitioner’s case?

    2. Did the one-year statute of limitations for filing a writ of habeas corpus begin running on the day that the state court made its judgment final, or on the day that the period for a prisoner to appeal to the state court of last resort expired?

     

    Petitioner Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated when he was charged with murder ten years after an alleged shooting occurred. Although Gonzalez did not appeal his case to the Texas state court of last resort, he later petitioned for federal habeas review. The district court held that Gonzalez’s petition was time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it was filed more than one year after the period to appeal to the highest Texas state court expired. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability, but did not indicate which underlying constitutional claim was at issue in the certificate of appealability. The parties now disagree on whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s case after issuing the certificate of appealability, and which event starts the one-year clock for federal habeas review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect petitioners’ ability to seek federal habeas review; it will also affect the allocation of judicial resources in reviewing certificates of appealability and federal habeas claims.

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    1. Was there jurisdiction to issue a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and to adjudicate petitioner's appeal?

    2. Was the application for writ of habeas corpus out of time under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) due to “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”?

    In June 1995, Roberto Velasquez was murdered outside a Texas apartment building; his sister identified Petitioner Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez as the shooter. See Gonzalez v. Texas, No. 05-05-01140-CR (Tex.App.

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    Additional Resources

    Life Sentences Blog, http://www.lifesentencesblog.com/?p=2515 (Michael O’Hear, June 14, 2011)

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    Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.

    Issues

    Given congressional findings that the techniques comprising partial-birth abortion would never be necessary to preserve the mother’s health, does the lack of such a health exception or any other facial flaw in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 render the ban unconstitutional? 

     

    The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Supreme Court has held that “liberty” encompasses a woman’s right to choose abortion. Although states may regulate abortion after the fetus has reached viability, they may only do so if their regulations provide an exception for procedures that are necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. In 2000, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional a Nebraska ban on partial-birth abortions that lacked a health exception, based on district court evidence of the medical necessity of such a procedure. Congress subsequently determined that such a health exception was unnecessary, because the procedures used for partial-birth abortion, in Congress’s view, are never necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother. Congress then enacted the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. In 2004, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America sued to have the Act declared unconstitutional and enjoined. The Supreme Court will now take up the constitutionality of the Act.

     

      Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

      Whether, notwithstanding Congress's determination that a health exception was unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is invalid because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise unconstitutional on its face. 

      In 2003, Congress enacted the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (“Ban”), which defined “partial-birth abortion” as “deliberately and intentionally vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus . . . for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and perform[ing] the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus.” 18 U.S.C.

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      Gonzales v. Oregon (formerly Oregon v. Ashcroft)

      Issues

      Whether the Controlled Substance Act authorizes the Attorney General to decide that physician-assisted suicide does not serve a "legitimate medical purpose," thereby nullifying an Oregon statute permitting this particular practice in some circumstances.

       

      Congress enacted the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") in 1970 as part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate and control certain drugs and other substances. A 1984 Amendment to the Act authorized the Attorney General to prohibit medical practitioners' use of a controlled substance if that use was "inconsistent with the public interest." 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4). In 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft determined that Oregon physicians' use of a federally registered controlled substance to facilitate physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose, despite an Oregon statute which authorized such use. In Oregon's suit, brought to enjoin Ashcroft from giving any legal effect to his directive, the District Court ruled for Oregon and issued a permanent injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Oregon argues that since states traditionally regulate medical practices, Gonzales (the new Attorney General, replacing Ashcroft) must show that Congress expressly intended to authorize the Attorney General to make such a determination. Gonzales argues that the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of a federal regulation is entitled to deference, even without a clear statement of legislative intent, and that Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA is reasonable. In the alternative, Gonzales argues that Ashcroft's interpretation is consistent with Congress's intent in passing the CSA and the 1984 Amendment. This case will decide the fate the Oregon statute by either expanding or limiting the federal government's authority over traditionally state-regulated medical practices. This case also has far-reaching moral and ethical implications that go beyond the scope of states' rights.

      Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

      Whether the Attorney General has permissibly construed the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and its implementing regulations to prohibit the distribution of federally controlled substances for the purpose of facilitating an individual's suicide, regardless of state law purporting to authorize such distribution.

      In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act ("CSA") as part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate and control certain drugs and other substances. Under the CSA, physicians who prescribe controlled substances are considered "practitioners" who "dispense" controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) and (21). In order to obtain authorization to dispense such controlled substances, practitioners must register with the Attorney General and obtain a Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") certificate of registration.

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      Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal

      Issues

      Whether public health and safety concerns and the potential for non-religious use are sufficiently compelling reasons for the government to prevent the religious group, UDV, from using a tea containing a Schedule 1 hallucinogenic for religious ceremonies.

       

      The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) generally prohibits the federal government from restricting the use of controlled substances in bona fide religious ceremonies. A small North American sect of the Brazilian group, “O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal” (“UDV”) has challenged the government’s enforcement of a ban on DMT, a Schedule I narcotic and principle ingredient of “ hoasca ” a tea imported from South America that is central to UDV’s religious rituals. The government argues that its restriction on UDV falls within narrow RFRA exceptions because of the health risks associated with the use of DMT, the potential for diversion of the substance to non-religious uses, and the 1971 United Nations Convention ban on the importation of DMT. In this  case  the Supreme Court will decide whether RFRA's prohibition extends to the use and importation of Schedule I narcotics, which are those substances the federal government deems most harmful.

      Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

      Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) requires the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession, and use of a Schedule I hallucinogenic controlled substance, where Congress has found that the substance has a high potential for abuse, it is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and its importation and distribution would violate an international treaty.

      In May, 1999, federal customs officials seized goods labeled “tea extract” en route to Sante Fe, New Mexico, to Jeffrey Bronfman, President of the United States Chapter of a Brazilian religious group known as O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal (“UDV”) — roughly translated, “The Beneficial Spiritualist Center of the Union of the Vegetable.” See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao De Vegetal, No. 04-1084 (U.S.

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      Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez

      Issues

      Does a conviction as an accomplice to a theft, rather than as the principal, constitute a “theft offense” that satisfies the “aggravated felony” standard of the Immigration and Nationality Act?

       

      In 2002, Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian national, was found guilty of a violation of California Vehicle Code § 10851(a), which makes it illegal to take a vehicle without the owner’s consent or to aid or abet in such a taking. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought Duenas-Alvarez’s deportation based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows the government to deport aliens convicted of an “aggravated felony.” “Theft offenses” are one type of crime included in the category of aggravated felonies. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the deportation order, reasoning that because the California statute allows for convictions based solely on aiding and abetting, conviction under the statute did not necessarily mean that Duenas-Alvarez had committed a “theft offense.” The DHS contends that simply because accomplice liability involves a lower level of involvement in an offense, that does not remove it from the category of “theft offenses.” The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the immigration status of over 8,000 resident aliens who currently face deportation.

       

        Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

        Whether a “theft offense,” which is an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)((G), includes aiding and abetting.

        In 2002, Luis Alexander Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen and lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1998, pled guilty in the Superior Court of California to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 5.

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        Gonzales v. Carhart

        Issues

        In 2003, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban without including an exception to the ban for cases in which the health of the mother is at risk. Does the absence of the health exception make the Act unconstitutional? 

         

        A group of doctors, led by Dr. Leroy Carhart, sued the federal government, alleging that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is unconstitutional. Because the Act does not provide an exception for procedures that would preserve the mother’s health, Carhart contends that the Act poses an undue burden on women seeking an abortion, particularly where substantial medical evidence demonstrates that certain procedures covered by the ban are necessary and safer than other procedures. Carhart also contends that the Act is unconstitutionally broad and vague, because the Act can be read to ban standard abortion methods. The government argues that the Act does not constitutionally require a health exception, because congressional findings demonstrate that any health risks that the ban poses to women are too infrequent and insubstantial to constitute a risk significant enough to amount to an undue burden that invalidates the Act entirely. The Court’s decision will determine whether governmental interests in protecting potential life and prohibiting procedures that resemble infanticide outweigh a woman’s constitutional right to choose an abortion without the government placing substantial obstacles in her path. Advocates on both sides of the abortion debate view a decision to uphold the Act as a significant first step to future restrictions on the availability of abortions. 

        Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

        Whether, notwithstanding Congress’s determination that a health exception was unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is invalid because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise unconstitutional on its face. 

        In 2003, Congress passed and President George W. Bush later signed into law the Partial Birth Abortion Ban of 2003 (“Ban”). Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 2006). The Ban outlaws the performance of any abortion during which the doctor partially delivers the fetus prior to taking an overt act that causes the death of the fetus. 18 U.S.C. §1531(b) (2003).

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