Beard v. Banks

Issues

What right do prisoners have to read secular publications and display photographs while serving their sentences? To what extent can prison officials infringe on this right to serve the prison’s legitimate policy goals?

 

The Long Term Segregation Unit (“LTSU”) of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was established to house “the worst of the worst” of the prison’s population. When they first enter the LTSU, inmates cannot keep newspapers, magazines, or photographs in their cells, though they have limited access to religious and legal materials. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the prison’s regulation is “rationally related to a legitimate penological interest,” and therefore constitutional under the Court’s holding in Turner v. Safley. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines and photographs to the most difficult inmates in the prison system in an effort to promote security and good behavior violate the 1st Amendment?

The Long Term Segregation Unit (“LTSU”) in Pittsburgh’s State Correctional Institution serves as a prison within a prison, housing inmates deemed “too disruptive, violent or problematic” to reside in the general prison population. Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 136–137 (3rd Cir. 2005). Inmates may end up in the LTSU after unsuccessful escape attempts, assaults on guards or fellow prisoners, or incidents of sexual predation. Id.

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Bartlett v. Strickland

Issues

If a racial minority group constitutes less than 50% of a voting district’s population, but enough other voters tend to vote for the minority group’s preferred candidate to enable it to elect the leader of its choice, does Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, require a state to place that group within its own voting district?

 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act declares that a state may not act in a way that impairs or dilutes, on account of race or color, a citizen’s opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of his or her choice. In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew its district lines and created House District 18 with the intention of complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The “controlling majority” of citizens in the new House District 18 consisted of thirty-nine percent African-American voters and enough non-African-American “crossover” voters to allow the African-American voters to elect a leader of their choice. This redistricting decision was challenged on the grounds that the Voting Rights Act does not require the creation of districts in which African-Americans or other ethnic minorities do not, by themselves, constitute a voting majority. The question the Supreme Court will decide is whether a racial minority group must constitute a “controlling majority” or an actual majority in order to trigger the districting requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed district’s population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew voting district lines throughout North Carolina in response to the 2000 decennial census. Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (N.C.

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Barber v. Thomas

Issues

Whether the proper calculation of “good time credits” to shorten the sentence of federal prisoners, based on their good behavior, is based on actual time served or the sentence imposed, when considering both the rule of lenity and the deference due to the decisions of the Bureau of Prisons.

Petitioners Michael Barber and Tahir Jihad-Black are serving sentences in federal prison for various gun and drug charges. The Ninth Circuit allowed Petitioners to consolidate their cases with several earlier cases in order to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Petitioners are challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which allows well-behaved and compliant federal-prisoners to receive up to 54 days off their sentences for “each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Petitioners argue that “term of imprisonment” means the total sentence imposed by the court. Respondent contends that it refers to the prisoners’ actual time served. The standard of computation ends up differing because under Petitioners’ method, a prisoner receives good behavior credit for years they do not end up serving. Petitioners argue that the courts do not owe the BOP’s interpretation deference, because the statute is unambiguous and the record does not contain any reason for the BOP’s interpretation. Even if the statute is ambiguous, Petitioners argue that the rule of lenity should apply. The rule of lenity holds that when considering penal statutes, the courts should resolve any ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. Respondent agrees that the statute is unambiguous, but counters that it instead requires computation of good time credit on the basis of time served. Respondent also argues that even if the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is civil rather than penal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The federal good time credit (GTC) statute provides for credits ‘‘up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Throughout federal sentencing statutes, and elsewhere in the same sentence, ‘‘term of imprisonment” means the sentence imposed. However, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") interprets ‘‘term of imprisonment” as unambiguously meaning time served. For each year of a sentence imposed, the BOP interpretation results in seven fewer days of available credits. The first question presented is:

Does ‘‘term of imprisonment” in Section 212(a)(2) of the Sentencing Reform Act, enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), unambiguously require the computation of good time credits on the basis of the sentence imposed?

The circuits, using a variety of rationales, have rejected the BOP’s claim that the statute was unambiguous, but deferred to the BOP interpretation under Chevron based on “term of imprisonment” being ambiguous. In this litigation, the BOP has conceded that the regulation implementing the GTC statute, and previously accorded deference, was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BOP rule under Skidmore. The second question presented is:

If “term of imprisonment” in the federal good time credit statute is ambiguous, does the rule of lenity and the deference appropriate to the United States Sentencing Commission require that good time credits be awarded based on the sentence imposed?

Under federal law, a federal prisoner serving a sentence of more than one year but less than life, “may receive credit toward the service of [his] sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). These good time credits (“GTCs”) are subject to a determination by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") that “the prisoner has displa

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Bank of America, NA v. Caulkett; Bank of America, NA v. Toledo-Cardona

Issues

Does 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) permit a bankruptcy court to “strip off” a junior lien on a home that is completely underwater?  

 

The Supreme Court will determine whether 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) permits bankruptcy courts to “strip off” junior liens on property if the value of the property used as collateral is less than the amount the debtor owes to the senior lienholder—in other words, the junior mortgage lien is “completely underwater.” Bank of America asserts that junior liens should not be “stripped off,” or treated as unsecured loans, because § 506 only “strips off” claims from property that are disallowed and because the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dewsnup v. Timm, disallowing “stripping down” of primary liens to the value of the underlying property, should extend to this case. Caulkett and Toledo-Cardona argue that second liens should be treated as unsecured, and hence disallowed, loans when the value of the collateral exceeds the amount owed on the first mortgage and that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dewsnup is limited to “stripping down” and should not extend to these circumstances. The Court’s ruling impacts the right of junior lienholders to collect on loans in the event of a debtor’s declaration of bankruptcy and the treatment of previously secured, but subordinate, debt in bankruptcy proceedings. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void." In Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), this Court held that section 506(d) does not permit a chapter 7 debtor to "strip down" a mortgage lien to the current value of the collateral. The question presented in this case, on which the courts of appeals are divided, is does section 506(d) permits a chapter 7 debtor to “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral?

In 2013, Respondents David Caulkett and Edelmiro Toledo-Cardona (collectively, “the borrowers” or “Caulkett and Toledo-Cardona”) each filed a petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida (“bankruptcy court”). 

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Bank Markazi v. Peterson et al.

Issues

Did Congress violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers by enabling plaintiffs in a single pending case to attach Iranian assets to satisfy their unpaid judgments?

 

In dozens of consolidated cases, Deborah D. Peterson and other plaintiffs (collectively, “Peterson”) representing terror victims collected billions of dollars in judgments against Iran for financing terrorist attacks. See Peterson v. Republic of Iran et al., 758 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2014). In 2010, Peterson sued Bank Markazi, the government-owned Central Bank of Iran, under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”). See id. TRIA allows plaintiffs to attach or garnish the blocked assets of terrorists or their agents. While the action was pending, President Obama issued an executive order blocking the transfer of Bank Markazi’s assets from New York-based accounts, and Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act. See id. at 188–89. The Act’s relevant portion, section 8772, authorized the Peterson plaintiffs to execute against Bank Markazi’s assets to satisfy their unpaid judgments. The law was explicitly limited to Peterson’s action, pending in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Based on section 8772, the district court granted Peterson Summary judgment, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court will decide whether Congress violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers by enacting laws that compelled a certain outcome in Peterson’s case. See Brief for Petitioner Bank Markazi, The Central Bank of Iran at i; Brief for Respondents Deborah D. Peterson, et al., at i. Bank Markazi argues that section 8772 impermissibly determines the outcome of a single pending case, which marks a Congressional expansion of power that is not supported by the Constitution or the Court’s precedent. See Brief for Petitioner at 26, 35. Peterson contends that Bank Markazi’s attack on the statute is unwarranted, because Congress has the constitutional authority to modify the governing law for pending civil litigation in in outcome-determinative ways. See Brief for Respondents at 16, 35–37. The outcome of this case will affect the balance of power between Congress and the courts, and clarify Congress’ power to affect pending litigation. See Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Courts Scholars, in Support of Petitioner at 11–13.   

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does § 8772—a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case—violate the separation of powers?Does § 8772—a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case—violate the separation of powers?

Deborah D. Peterson and several individuals (collectively, “Peterson”) represent people killed in terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran. See Peterson v. Republic of Iran et al., 758 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir.

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Bank of America v. Miami, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Miami

Issues

Does a lawsuit against a bank satisfy the Fair Housing Act’s “zone of interest” and proximate cause requirements, where a municipality alleges harm to its fiscal interests from urban blight stemming from foreclosures caused by the bank’s discriminatory lending practices?

In this consolidated action, the Supreme Court will decide whether a city can sue a bank under the Fair Housing Act for discriminatory lending practices, and whether it can recover lost property tax revenues and funds spent addressing widespread foreclosures that the bank’s discriminatory practices allegedly caused. The City of Miami alleges, based on statistical analyses, that loans by Bank of America and Wells Fargo & Co. to minority borrowers were more than five times as likely to result in foreclosures than loans to white borrowers. The banks argue that the City of Miami falls outside the zone of interests required to obtain standing under the Fair Housing Act, and that any alleged causal relationship between the City’s financial losses and the discriminatory housing practices of the banks is too far a stretch to support a valid lawsuit. The City responds that it meets the broad standing requirements of the Fair Housing Act and should recover for its injuries because they are foreseeably and directly linked to the discriminatory lending practices of the banks. A victory by Miami could potentially overburden the courts with similar lawsuits and overextend judicial power; however, Miami’s defeat could leave the FHA under-enforced and cities underfunded to battle urban blight.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. By limiting suit to "aggrieved person[s]," did Congress require that an FHA plaintiff plead more than just Article III injury-in-fact?
  2. The FHA requires plaintiffs to plead proximate cause. Does proximate cause require more than just the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen that the remote plaintiff might ultimately lose money through some theoretical chain of contingencies?

MIAMI’S LAWSUIT AGAINST BANK OF AMERICA

Miami brought a Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) lawsuit against Bank of America, Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, and Countrywide Bank (collectively, “Bank of America” or “the Bank”) on December 13, 2013, for discriminatory mortgage lending practices and unjust enrichment at the expense of Miami. See Miami v.

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Bailey v. United States

Issues

May police officers, prior to executing a search warrant, follow and detain a person seen leaving the premises after that person leaves the immediate area?

 

Chunon L. Bailey was detained approximately a mile from his residence after two police officers observed him leave his home prior to the execution of a search warrant. The officers brought Bailey back to his home and arrested him after the search turned up drugs and a gun. Bailey seeks to vacate his conviction, arguing that the detention violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In this case, the Court must resolve a circuit split surrounding the application of Michigan v. Summers, which held that police may detain an occupant outside of the premises to be searched so long as the detention is reasonable. Bailey argues that Summers should not be extended to situations where the occupant has left the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched, as this expansion would further none of the justifications described by the Court in that case. In response, the United States argues that the reasoning underlying Summers justifies this detention and that any potential Fourth Amendment issues can be resolved by a reasonableness test. If the Supreme Court sides with the United States and affirms the decision below, the scope of police power to detain occupants prior to the execution of a search warrant will be significantly expanded. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, pursuant to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), police officers may detain an individual incident to the execution of a search warrant when the individual has left the immediate vicinity of the premises before the warrant is executed.

On July 28, 2005, two officers of the Suffolk County Police Department executed a search warrant for a basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive in Wyandanch, New York. United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.

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Ayers v. Belmontes (05-493)

Fernando Belmontes, a criminal defendant sentenced to death by a California jury, challenges the constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment of California’s jury instruction, arguing that the instruction prevents the jury from considering evidence about his future prospects as a productive member of society. The Court will assess whether there is a reasonable likelihood that this jury instruction will prevent a jury from considering the defendant’s future conduct when determining whether to mitigate the defendant’s punishment to life without parole. If the Court determines that the instruction is insufficient, it will also consider whether its ruling should apply retroactively to other criminal defendants. The case will affect how states draft their capital sentencing jury instructions and will give Justices Roberts and Alito an opportunity to articulate their opinions on the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does Boyde confirm the constitutional sufficiency of California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction where a defendant presents mitigating evidence of his background and character which relates to, or has a bearing on, his future prospects as a life prisoner?

2. Does the Ninth Circuit’s holding, that California’s "unadorned factor (k)" instruction is constitutionally inadequate to inform jurors they may consider "forward-looking" mitigation evidence constitute a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)?

The Crime and State Proceedings

On March 15, 1981, Fernando Belmontes burglarized the house of 19-year-old Steacy McConnell. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Upon finding McConnell at home, Belmontes struck her several times in the head with a metal dumbbell bar before stealing her stereo equipment. Id. at 2–3.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors Sheri Johnson, Stephen Garvey, and John Blume for their insights into this case.

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Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend

Issues

Can a seaman recover punitive damages if he is injured on the job and his employer refuses to pay for his medical treatment and lost wages?

 

Edgar L. Townsend, a seaman, was injured while working aboard his ship. His employers refused to supply him with maintenance and cure, which covers medical care and wages for injured seamen, in violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general maritime law.  Townsend sought punitive damages for this refusal. Townsend's employers sought declaratory relief on the punitive damages claim, arguing that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), prohibited all claims of punitive damages under general maritime law, because they are not specified in the Jones Act, and because punitive damages are non-pecuniary. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that while Miles's reasoning is meant to provide uniformity in the application of the Jones Act and general maritime law, the holding of Miles addressed only loss of society damages in a wrongful death suit; it did not address punitive damages in a maintenance and cure claim. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that they were still bound by their prior ruling in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987), which specifically allows for the recovery of punitive damages. There is currently a circuit split on the issue, as the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts have awarded punitive damages as a remedy for failure to provide maintenance and cure, while the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts have applied the Miles uniformity principle and awarded only pecuniary damages. The Supreme Court's holding in this case will settle the circuit split and decide whether courts may award punitive damages in maintenance and cure claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a seaman recover punitive damages for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure? The Eleventh Circuit's decision below holds in the affirmative, but conflicts with the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well as two state courts of last resort, the reasoning of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), and Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).

Edgar L. Townsend was a seaman and crew member on a ship called the Motor Tug Thomas. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282, 1283 (11th Cir.

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AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion

Issues

Whether a California law that conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class action dispute resolution is non-discriminatory under the Federal Arbitration Act and not subject to conflict preemption.

 

Vincent and Liza Concepcion ("the Concepcions") signed a two-year service contract with AT&T Mobility for wireless phone service and received free cell phones from AT&T as a part of their contract. AT&T charged the Concepcions a sales tax on their phones, and the Concepcions subsequently sued AT&T alleging that the company had fraudulently advertised the phones as free. The District Court for the Southern District of California consolidated the Concepcions' claim with a class action suit pending in the District Court on the same issue. The service contract that the Concepcions signed contained a clause requiring that they arbitrate disputes with AT&T directly, thus prohibiting the Concepcions from participating in class action suits. After AT&T moved to compel arbitration, the District Court denied AT&T's motion, and AT&T appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") expressly and impliedly preempted state law requiring the enforcement of the arbitration clause. The Ninth Circuit ruled against AT&T on the grounds that the arbitration provision represented an unconscionable exculpatory clause and could not be enforced. The United States Supreme Court will now determine whether the FAA preempts state law requiring the enforcement of the arbitration clause. This decision may affect consumers' ability to participate in class action suits and the extent to which they may arbitrate small claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts States from conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of particular procedures -- here, class-wide arbitration -- when those procedures are not necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to vindicate their claims.

In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion ("the Concepcions") signed a two-year service contract with AT&T Mobility for wireless phone service. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LCC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir.

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