Martinez v. Ryan

Issues

Does a criminal defendant have the right to effective assistance of counsel during a collateral post-conviction proceeding when that proceeding presents the defendant’s first opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim?

 

Petitioner Luis Mariano Martinez, a convicted felon serving consecutive terms of 35 years to life, filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief in federal court. Martinez alleges that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. Because his appellate counsel failed to raise that ineffective-assistance claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, an Arizona court precluded the claim on procedural grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Martinez did not have the right to counsel during his post-conviction proceeding, and concluded that he may not claim ineffective assistance at that stage in order to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, Martinez is barred from raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, regardless of whether his post-conviction counsel rendered him ineffective assistance and caused the procedural default that precluded his trial-level claim. Martinez argues that he has a constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim; he concludes that ineffective post-conviction counsel should negate the procedural default with respect to his ineffective-trial-counsel claim in this federal habeas proceeding. Respondent Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, asserts that defendants do not have a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, concluding from this that the ineffective assistance of Martinez’s post-conviction counsel cannot negate his procedural default. In this decision, the Supreme Court will have to weigh the possibility that poorly-represented defendants will lose ineffective-assistance claims due to procedural defaults against the benefits of efficient state criminal proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal any claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law right to raise such a claim in a first post-conviction proceeding, has a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of first post-conviction counsel specifically with respect to his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.

Petitioner Luis Mariano Martinez was convicted in an Arizona state trial court for sexual conduct with a person under fifteen years old and was sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms of 35 years to life. See Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 733 (9th Cir.

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Martel v. Clair

Issues

Whether a state death row inmate is entitled to receive new court-appointed counsel based on claims that his first court-appointed counsel was not investigating facts or pursuing claims that the inmate believes are material to his habeas corpus proceeding.

 

In 1987, a California jury convicted Respondent Kenneth Clair of the murder of Linda Rodgers, sentencing him to death. Clair filed a habeas corpus petition requesting new court-appointed counsel in 1995, but the district court rejected his request. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s decision, and remanded to allow Clair’s new attorney to present additional claims. Clair argues that the district court abused its discretion by not properly investigating Clair’s request for substitute counsel, and consequently that he (Clair) must be allowed to make new claims and present additional evidence in the interests of justice. The State of California, however, argues that Clair should not be permitted to circumvent the workings of the justice system by rearguing his case merely because of dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the standard courts use in granting requests from habeas petitioners for substitute counsel, as well as the finality of appellate denials of habeas petitions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a condemned state prisoner in federal habeas corpus proceedings is entitled to replace his court-appointed counsel with another court-appointed lawyer just because he expresses dissatisfaction and alleges that his counsel was failing to pursue  the potentially important evidence.

Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in 1987 for the murder of Linda Rodgers. See People v. Clair, 2 Cal.4th 629, 645 (Cal.

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Marshall v. Marshall

Issues

Does the probate exception-which ostensibly gives state courts jurisdiction over all probate cases-apply where the probate issue is part of a bankruptcy proceeding and involves a trust instead of a  will.

 

When billionaire oil tycoon J. Howard Marshall II died, he was survived by his wife of one year, Vickie Lynn Marshall-better known as Anna Nicole Smith. Mr. Marshall's son from a previous marriage, E. Pierce Marshall, became the executor of the elder Marshall's estate and the principal beneficiary of an inter vivos trust, neither of which included Mrs. Marshall. Nevertheless, a legal battle between Mrs. Marshall and E. Pierce over exactly what Mr. Marshall intended for his wife has taken place since Mr. Marshall's death. The case has bounced from a probate court in Texas, to a federal bankruptcy court in California, and now to the Supreme Court of the United States. The issue now before the Court concerns the relationship between federal and state powers, as related to the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction-namely, when can federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, decide cases involving traditionally state-directed claims in inheritance. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will affect the rights not only of state and federal judicial systems, but also the multitude of individuals throughout the nation planning, managing, and litigating their rights in estates, finances, and the future livelihoods of themselves and their loved ones.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. What is the scope of the probate exception to federal jurisdiction?

2. Did Congress intend the probate exception to apply where a federal court is not asked to probate a will, administer an estate, or otherwise assume control of property in the custody of a state probate court?

3. Did Congress intend the probate exception to apply to cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (28 U.S.C. ? 1331), including the Bankruptcy Code (28 U.S.C. ? 1334), or is it limited to cases in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship?

4. Did Congress intend the probate exception to apply to cases arising out of trusts, or is it limited to cases involving wills?

Vickie Lynn Marshall (known to most of the world as Anna Nicole Smith) married eighty-nine-year-old billionaire oil tycoon J. Howard Marshall II in 1994, shortly before his death. During their fourteen-month marriage, Mr. Marshall provided his wife with numerous cash and personal property gifts worth several million dollars, but for lack of time, desire, or otherwise, never formally provided for her in the disbursement of his estate. Mr.

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Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts

Issues

Does the court have discretion to deny a debtor’s motion to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing to another chapter if the debtor meets the technical requirements for the other chapter?

​

 

Robert Marrama sought to convert his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to a Chapter 13 after meeting the requirements for Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court denied Marrama’s motion to convert based on Marrama’s prior bad faith conduct in failing to report in his bankruptcy schedules the value of a tax refund and vacation home. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether courts have discretion to deny conversions based on an evaluation of the debtor’s conduct. The decision will hinge on the statutory language and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. While this issue may be limited to filings that occurred before Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, it will give the court the opportunity to clarify the scope of the good faith requirement in bankruptcy proceedings and the amount of discretion afforded to bankruptcy judges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the right to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case to another chapter can be denied notwithstanding the plain language of the statute and the legislative history.

Robert Marrama entered the flooring business as a teenager and grew his family’s small enterprise into a multi-million dollar company. Sonia Nezamzadeh, Medill—On the Docket: Marrama, Robert v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, et al., posted on June 13, 2006.

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Maracich v. Spears

Issues

May an attorney obtain an individual's personal information from a state's department of motor vehicles to find plaintiffs for a lawsuit that has already started?

 

In 2006, several individuals who had bought cars contacted a group of lawyers in South Carolina claiming various car dealerships overcharged them. To investigate this claim, the lawyers requested from the state department of motor vehicles the disclosure of the personal information of thousands of people who had bought from dealerships in Spartanburg County. Under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), this information is normally protected from disclosure. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the lawyers engaged in mass solicitation without the consent of the person whose information was disclosed, the litigation exception of the DPPA nonetheless protected the lawyers' activity. Petitioner Maracich argues that the DPPA provision requiring the consent of individuals to disclose their personal information imposes a consent requirement onto requests to solicit potential clients for the purpose of litigation. In contrast, Respondent Spears argues that the DPPA exception for litigation waives the consent requirement for solicitation specifically related to litigation. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on September 25,  2012  to examine the merits of the Fourth Circuit's decision. The outcome of this case may help determine how far lawyers can go to obtain personal information and how far Congress can go to reach into an area traditionally regulated by the States. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721- 2725, prohibits the obtainment, use, or disclosure of "personal information" maintained in state motor vehicle department ("DMV") databases, unless the use of such information falls within one of several discrete enumerated exceptions.

This case presents an opportunity for this Court to resolve a conflict among the circuits and even state courts as to the circumstances under which the litigation exception to the Act permits lawyers special rights of access to DPPA protected information.

In this case, the Fourth Circuit became the first court to hold that the acquisition and use by lawyers of confidential information from a DPPA-protected database solely for the purpose of soliciting clients, as opposed to searching for evidence or witnesses, qualified as a use "in connection with" litigation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4).

The Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, on the other hand, have held that the litigation exception does not permit lawyers to obtain or use DPPA-protected information to find or solicit clients. Instead, these courts have made clear that the litigation exception permits use of private information only when the information is relevant or likely to lead to discovery of evidence or witnesses. The Fourth Circuit has crossed that line, thereby inserting into the DPPA what amounts to a "for use by lawyers" exception, as opposed to a "for use in litigation" exception, and further muddling an already confusing and conflicted area of the law.

This petition asks the Court to consider two questions:

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding, contrary to every other court heretofore to have considered the issue, that lawyers who obtain, disclose, or use personal information solely to find clients to represent in an incipient lawsuit—as opposed to evidence for use in existing or potential litigation—may seek solace under the litigation exception of the Act.

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in reaching the conclusion (in conflict with prior precedent) that a lawyer who files an action that effectively amounts to a "place holder" lawsuit may thereafter use DPPA-protected personal information to solicit plaintiffs for that action through a direct mail advertising campaign on the grounds that such use is "inextricably intertwined" with "use in litigation."

In 2006, a few consumers contacted a group of attorneys ("the Lawyers") claiming that various car dealerships had overcharged them for their vehicle purchases. See Maracich v.

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Maples v. Thomas

Issues

Whether a federal court can excuse a lapsed deadline for filing a habeas corpus petition because a court clerk failed to provide notice to two of petitioner’s three counsel of record and petitioner's attorneys could no longer be said to be acting on petitioner's behalf.

 

Upon receiving a state-court-issued death sentence, petitioner Cory Maples submitted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings and petitioned for an evidentiary hearing. The court clerk took no action when two of three deliveries giving notice that the petition had been denied were returned because two of Maples’s attorneys of record had left their firm. Shortly thereafter, the deadline to submit a federal habeas claim lapsed. Maples now argues that the court clerk’s failure to notify him that his petition for an evidentiary hearing was denied caused the default and violated his due process rights. Additionally, he argues that the actions of his attorneys also constitute an external cause entitling him to federal habeas review. Respondent, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, argues that the clerk successfully notified one attorney of  record,  and that Supreme Court precedent places the risk of attorney error on the petitioner during the post-conviction phase. This decision could affect how much risk clients bear for poor attorney performance, and whether a court clerk’s failure to take additional steps to notify attorneys of record constitutes an external cause to the defendant and valid excuse for  procedural  default.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly held - in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts - that there was no “cause” to excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless for the default, the State's own conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner's attorneys of record were no longer functioning as his agents at the time of any default.

Maples was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death for killing two of his friends, each of whom he shot in the head with a .22 caliber rifle after a night of drinking. See Maples v. State, 758 So.2d 1, 14–15 (Ala. Crim. App.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

• New York Times, Sara Rimer: Questions of Death Row Justice for Poor People in Alabama (Mar. 01, 2000),

• LII: Habeas Corpus

• LII: Due Process

• LII: Fourteenth Amendment

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Magwood v. Culliver

Issues

Whether a person, having obtained federal habeas relief from a first habeas petition, may challenge the new sentencing judgment with a second petition, or if that petition is barred as “second or successive,” because its grounds could have been argued in the first petition.

 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) prohibits the filing of “second or successive” habeas petitions by state prisoners. Petitioner, Billy Joe Magwood (“Magwood”) and respondent, Warden Tony Patterson (“Patterson”), disagree as to whether Magwood, who received habeas relief from an earlier death sentence, may challenge a subsequent state issued death sentence for the same act. Magwood argues that a habeas petition challenging a new judgment for the first time cannot be “second or successive.” In response, Patterson asserts that Magwood had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the “fair warning claim” in the first habeas petition, and it would be an abuse of the writ and a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to raise the same claim in this subsequent petition. The Eleventh Circuit sided with Patterson and held that Magwood’s claim is part of a “successive” petition under § 2244(b). The Supreme Court must now decide whether a petitioner, who already obtained federal relief from an earlier sentence, may challenge a resentence in a subsequent habeas petition if that petitioner could have challenged the first sentence on the same constitutional grounds now used to challenge the second sentence.

The facts of Magwood’s offense are not in dispute. Magwood v. Culliver, 55 f.3d 968, 970 (11th Cir.

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Magner v. Gallagher

Issues

Whether owners of rental properties may claim St. Paul city officials violated the Fair Housing Act by aggressively enforcing the City’s housing codes, which increased rental costs and reduced the supply of low-income housing whose renters are disproportionately African-American.

If such a claim is allowed, whether the appropriate test is the burden-shifting test used by the Eighth Circuit.

 

Thomas J. Gallagher, together with other owners and former owners of rental properties, sued the City of St. Paul, Minnesota for violating the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discriminatory housing practices. Gallagher claimed that the City’s aggressive and targeted enforcement of city housing codes against rental units reduced the availability of low-income rentals, with a disparate impact upon African-Americans. The Eighth Circuit held that Gallagher stated a valid FHA claim under the disparate impact theory. St. Paul appeals, arguing that, because the FHA requires evidence of discriminatory intent, Gallagher’s disparate impact claim is insufficient to establish a violation under the Act. Gallagher contends that, given the Court’s prior findings regarding disparate impact claims under the similarly-worded Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII, disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA. The Supreme Court’s decision may affect the extent to which city officials can use ordinances, code enforcement actions, and other land-use regulations to regulate low-income neighborhoods.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer ... or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Respondents are owners of rental properties who argue that Petitioners violated the Fair Housing Act by "aggressively" enforcing the City of Saint Paul's housing code. According to Respondents, because a disproportionate number of renters are African-American, and Respondents rent to many African-Americans, requiring them to meet the housing code will increase their costs and decrease the number of units they make available to rent to African-American tenants. Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for Petitioners, the Eighth Circuit held that Respondents should be allowed to proceed to trial because they presented sufficient evidence of a "disparate impact" on African-Americans.

The following are the questions presented:

  1. Are disparate impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?

  2. If such claims are cognizable, should they be analyzed under the burden shifting approach used by three circuits, under the balancing test used by four circuits, under a hybrid approach used by two circuits, or by some other test?

This case concerns the proper interpretation of Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA” or “Act”). Respondents Thomas J. Gallagher, and other owners and former owners of rental properties in St. Paul, Minnesota (collectively, “Gallagher”), sued Petitioners Steve Magner and other city officials of St.

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Luis v. United States

Issues

May the US Government obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 to prohibit a defendant from spending assets unrelated to the crime charged without violating a defendant’s right to hire an attorney of choice?

 

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether the United States Government can constitutionally obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (“§ 1345”) to prohibit a defendant facing federal fraud charges from spending assets not derived directly from the charged crime. See Brief for Petitioner, Sila Luis at i. Luis argues that such a preliminary injunction violates a defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and that the language of § 1345 does not allow the Government to restrain spending of untainted assets. See id. at 17–18, 34–35. Luis also asserts that even if a preliminary injunction of untainted assets is constitutional, the district court violated Fifth Amendment Due Process by failing to determine whether the Government was entitled, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the untainted assets. See id. at 44. On the other hand, the United States argues that the Supreme Court has previously held the Government’s restraint of all assets in a defendant’s possession to be constitutional, so long as the Government can show probable cause that the assets are forfeitable even if the defendant needs those assets to pay for counsel. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 25–26. The Court’s decision could significantly impact criminal defendants’ ability to hire private counsel in cases of federal fraud and will also shape U.S. asset forfeiture law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, in Support of Petitioner at 7; see also Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., in Support of Petitioner at 5–6.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did a pretrial injunction prohibiting a defendant from spending untainted assets to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Petitioner Sila Luis provided health care to homebound patients through her two businesses, LTC Professional Consultants, Inc.

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Luis v. United States

Issues

May the US Government obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 to prohibit a defendant from spending assets unrelated to the crime charged without violating a defendant’s right to hire an attorney of choice?

 

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether the United States Government can constitutionally obtain a preliminary injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (“§ 1345”) to prohibit a defendant facing federal fraud charges from spending assets not derived directly from the charged crime. See Brief for Petitioner, Sila Luis at i. Luis argues that such a preliminary injunction violates a defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and that the language of § 1345 does not allow the Government to restrain spending of untainted assets. See id. at 17–18, 34–35. Luis also asserts that even if a preliminary injunction of untainted assets is constitutional, the district court violated Fifth Amendment Due Process by failing to determine whether the Government was entitled, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the untainted assets. See id. at 44. On the other hand, the United States argues that the Supreme Court has previously held the Government’s restraint of all assets in a defendant’s possession to be constitutional, so long as the Government can show probable cause that the assets are forfeitable even if the defendant needs those assets to pay for counsel. See Brief for Respondent, United States at 25–26. The Court’s decision could significantly impact criminal defendants’ ability to hire private counsel in cases of federal fraud and will also shape U.S. asset forfeiture law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association, in Support of Petitioner at 7; see also Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., in Support of Petitioner at 5–6.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Did a pretrial injunction prohibiting a defendant from spending untainted assets to retain counsel of choice in a criminal case violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

Petitioner Sila Luis provided health care to homebound patients through her two businesses, LTC Professional Consultants, Inc.

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