Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend

Issues

Can a seaman recover punitive damages if he is injured on the job and his employer refuses to pay for his medical treatment and lost wages?

 

Edgar L. Townsend, a seaman, was injured while working aboard his ship. His employers refused to supply him with maintenance and cure, which covers medical care and wages for injured seamen, in violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general maritime law.  Townsend sought punitive damages for this refusal. Townsend's employers sought declaratory relief on the punitive damages claim, arguing that Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), prohibited all claims of punitive damages under general maritime law, because they are not specified in the Jones Act, and because punitive damages are non-pecuniary. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that while Miles's reasoning is meant to provide uniformity in the application of the Jones Act and general maritime law, the holding of Miles addressed only loss of society damages in a wrongful death suit; it did not address punitive damages in a maintenance and cure claim. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that they were still bound by their prior ruling in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987), which specifically allows for the recovery of punitive damages. There is currently a circuit split on the issue, as the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts have awarded punitive damages as a remedy for failure to provide maintenance and cure, while the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts have applied the Miles uniformity principle and awarded only pecuniary damages. The Supreme Court's holding in this case will settle the circuit split and decide whether courts may award punitive damages in maintenance and cure claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

May a seaman recover punitive damages for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure? The Eleventh Circuit's decision below holds in the affirmative, but conflicts with the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well as two state courts of last resort, the reasoning of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), and Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).

Edgar L. Townsend was a seaman and crew member on a ship called the Motor Tug Thomas. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282, 1283 (11th Cir.

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AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion

Issues

Whether a California law that conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class action dispute resolution is non-discriminatory under the Federal Arbitration Act and not subject to conflict preemption.

 

Vincent and Liza Concepcion ("the Concepcions") signed a two-year service contract with AT&T Mobility for wireless phone service and received free cell phones from AT&T as a part of their contract. AT&T charged the Concepcions a sales tax on their phones, and the Concepcions subsequently sued AT&T alleging that the company had fraudulently advertised the phones as free. The District Court for the Southern District of California consolidated the Concepcions' claim with a class action suit pending in the District Court on the same issue. The service contract that the Concepcions signed contained a clause requiring that they arbitrate disputes with AT&T directly, thus prohibiting the Concepcions from participating in class action suits. After AT&T moved to compel arbitration, the District Court denied AT&T's motion, and AT&T appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") expressly and impliedly preempted state law requiring the enforcement of the arbitration clause. The Ninth Circuit ruled against AT&T on the grounds that the arbitration provision represented an unconscionable exculpatory clause and could not be enforced. The United States Supreme Court will now determine whether the FAA preempts state law requiring the enforcement of the arbitration clause. This decision may affect consumers' ability to participate in class action suits and the extent to which they may arbitrate small claims.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts States from conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of particular procedures -- here, class-wide arbitration -- when those procedures are not necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to vindicate their claims.

In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion ("the Concepcions") signed a two-year service contract with AT&T Mobility for wireless phone service. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LCC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir.

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AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen

Issues

Does the Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978 (“PDA”), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, apply retroactively, and therefore, does an employer violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to restore service credits to female employees who took pregnancy leaves prior to Congress’ enactment of the PDA?

 

In 1987, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) to address the gap left by Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex. Prior to passage of the PDA, AT&T’s seniority system treated pregnancy leaves as different from disability leaves: women who took time off for pregnancy lost net service credit (“NCS”), which, among other things, was—and still is—the principal factor used to calculate pensions. Following passage of the PDA in 1978, AT&T immediately ceased reducing the NCS of women who had taken pregnancy leaves. However, AT&T did not restore service credits to female employees who took pregnancy leaves prior to the PDA’s enactment. Hulteen et al., all female employees who took pregnancy leaves prior to the passage of the PDA, sued AT&T. The Ninth Circuit held that AT&T violated Title VII’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination by failing to restore service credits to female employees who took pregnancy leaves prior to the PDA’s enactment. Petitioners, AT&T, argue that this reading impermissibly gives retroactive effect to the PDA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Before the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), it was lawful to award less service credit for pregnancy leaves than for other temporary disability leaves. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Accordingly, the questions presented are:

1. Whether an employer engages in a current violation of Title VII when, in making post-PDA eligibility determinations for pension and other benefits, the employer fails to restore service credit that female employees lost when they took pregnancy leaves under lawful pre-PDA leave policies.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s finding of a current violation of Title VII in such circumstances gives impermissible retroactive effect to the PDA.

Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). When enacted, however, Title VII did not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Hulteen v.

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Additional Resources

·       Wex: Law about the Civil Rights Act of 1964

·       Wex: Law about ERISA

·       The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Pregnancy Discrimination

·       SCOTUS Blog on AT&T v. Hulteen

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Astrue v. Ratliff

Issues

Whether, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, fee awards are payable to attorneys or to their clients.

 

Petitioner, Michael J. Astrue (“Astrue”), argues that an award of fees and other expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), is payable to the prevailing party in Social Security cases. Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), counters that an award of attorneys’ fees should go to the prevailing party’s attorney as compensation for services rendered. Astrue asserts that an award of attorneys’ fees is subject to an administrative offset to satisfy the prevailing party’s debt, if any, to the United States. Ratliff argues that because the award belongs to the party’s attorney and not to the party itself, the award of attorneys’ fees cannot be subject to an offset for a debt that is not his or her own. The Eighth Circuit held that Congress intended attorneys’ fees awarded under EAJA to go to the prevailing party’s attorney and not to the prevailing party. The Supreme Court must resolve whether an award of attorneys’ fees under EAJA is payable to the prevailing party rather than the party’s attorney and, therefore, is subject to an administrative offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an "award of fees and other expenses" under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), is payable to the "prevailing party" rather than to the prevailing party's attorney, and therefore is subject to an offset for a pre-existing debt owed by the prevailing party to the United States.

Respondent, Catherine G. Ratliff (“Ratliff”), an attorney, successfully represented two claimants seeking benefits from the Social Security Administration. See Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008). Ratliff then moved for an award of fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.

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Astrue v. Capato

Issues

Is a child conceived after the death of a biological parent eligible to receive survivor benefits under the Social Security Act regardless of state intestacy laws?

 

Shortly after Robert Nicholas Capato’s death, his wife Karen Capato underwent in vitro fertilization using his frozen sperm and gave birth to twins in 2003. Karen Capato applied for Social Security benefits on behalf of her twins as survivors of a deceased wage earner. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied her claim. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) affirmed, ruling that state intestacy law controls eligibility for survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children under the Social Security Act ("Act"). Therefore, the twins were ineligible for benefits under the applicable Florida law. On appeal, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s reading. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled that the plain language of the Act entitles the Capato twins, whose parentage is not in dispute, to survivor benefits. Petitioner Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the SSA, argues that the Act requires the agency to apply state intestacy law to determine whether an applicant is the child of an insured wage earner for the purpose of receiving survivor benefits. In contrast, Respondent Karen K. Capato contends that the Act unambiguously entitles undisputed biological children of married parents to survivor benefits, without referring to state intestacy laws. The Supreme Court’s decision will authoritatively interpret the Act’s mandate on the determination of survivor benefits eligibility, and possibly reflect on the balance between legislative rulemaking and unanticipated progress of science and technology.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a child who was conceived after the death of a biological parent, but who cannot inherit personal property from that biological parent under applicable state intestacy law, is eligible for child survivor benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.

Shortly after Karen and Robert Nicholas (“Nick”) Capato were married in New Jersey in 1999, Nick Capato was diagnosed with cancer. See Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3rd Cir.

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Astra USA v. Santa Clara County, CA

Issues

Where the federal government contracted with private corporations to create drug price reductions for certain organizations, may third-party beneficiaries of the agreements sue for violations of the agreements despite the lack of explicit federal statutory authority to do so?

Congress enacted Section 602 of the Veterans Health Care Act (“Act”) in 1992 in order to provide relief to certain federally funded organizations for the cost of prescription drugs. The Act requires the federal government and drug manufacturers to enter into pricing agreements which set price ceilings for the drugs. The County of Santa Clara and several other third-party beneficiaries of the pricing agreement (collectively “Santa Clara”) filed suit against several drug manufacturers (“Manufacturers”) under the Act, alleging that the Manufacturers had overcharged them for prescription drugs. The District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Santa Clara’s claim, but the Ninth Circuit reinstated the claim, holding that third-party beneficiaries of the Act have the right to sue for violations of the Act. The Manufacturers subsequently appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court on the grounds that, because there was no federal statutory right of action, Santa Clara lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect the rights of third-party beneficiaries of a federal contract, states’ rights to make decisions regarding prescription drugs, and the litigation burden of companies that contract with the federal government.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

In the absence of a private right of action to enforce a statute, do federal courts have the federal common law authority to confer a private right of action simply because the statutory requirement sought to be enforced is embodied in a contract?

In 1992, Congress enacted Section 602 of the Veterans Health Care Act (“Act”), which is entitled “Limitations on Prices of Drugs Purchased by Covered Entities.” See County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir.

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Additional Resources

· Health Resources and Services Administration: Pharmacy Affairs and 340BDrug Pricing Programs

· Wex: Third-Party Beneficiary

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Ashcroft v. Raich

 

This case raises the issue of whether Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce allows it to proscribe the use of medical marijuana. The plaintiff-appellees, Angel McClary Raich and Diane Monson, suffer from "more than serious medical conditions," including, respectively, an inoperable brain tumor and a degenerative spinal disease. Under the advice of their doctors and the auspicious of California's Compassionate Use Act, they both use California-grown marijuana to treat the symptoms of their diseases. Fearing prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act, the plaintiffs sued for declaratory relief in Federal District Court where they were denied the grant of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit overturned this decision, and the case is now before the Supreme Court. The Court will determine whether the use of California-grown medical marijuana substantially effects interstate commerce based on the four-factor balancing test established in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and refined in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Though none of the factors are particularly weighty in the present case, the majority of them point to Congress' ability to regulate this activity and the Court is likely to overturn the Ninth Circuit's preliminary injunction.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for purported personal medicinal use or to the distribution of marijuana without charge for such use.

Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. � 801 et seq.("CSA") as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub .L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. The CSA establishes five "schedules" of certain drugs and other substances designated "controlled substances." 21 U.S.C.

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Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd

Issues

1. Does the former Attorney General have either absolute or qualified immunity when making the determination of whether to apply for a material witness arrant?

2. Does the person seeking a material witness warrant have to actually intend to obtain further testimony from the subject of the warrant?

 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Respondent Abdullah al-Kidd as a material witness in a terrorism case. Al-Kidd sued the former United States Attorney General, Petitioner John Ashcroft, alleging that he used the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, as a pretext to hold and investigate al-Kidd as a terrorism suspect in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Ashcroft asserted absolute immunity, claiming that the use of a material arrest warrant constituted a prosecutorial function. He also claimed qualified immunity, on the grounds that there was no established constitutional violation for using a material arrest warrant at the time of the arrest. Al-Kidd contends that Ashcroft is not entitled to either form of immunity because the arrest had an investigative function and no reasonable official could believe that a material witness warrant would authorize the arrest of a suspect without any intent to use the suspect as a witness. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ashcroft was entitled to neither absolute nor qualified immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the protection available to government officials by resolving the issue of when the government can use material witness warrants in making arrests.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner absolute immunity from the pretext claim.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in denying petitioner qualified immunity from the pretext claim based on the conclusions that (a) the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from executing a valid material witness warrant with the subjective intent of conducting further investigation or preventively detaining the subject; and (b) this Fourth Amendment rule was clearly established at the time of respondent's arrest.

Abdullah Al-Kidd is a United States citizen. See Brief for Respondent, Abdullah Al-Kidd at 1. After September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) began investigating various terrorist activities. See Brief for Petitioner, John Ashcroft at 3.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources

 The Washington Post, Robert Barnes: Supreme Court to Decide whether Ashcroft can be Sued by Detained Citizen (Oct. 18, 2010)

· The New York Times, Adam Liptak: Justices to Hear Appeal over Liability for Detention (Oct. 18, 2010)

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Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States

 

Arthur Andersen LLP was convicted of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). The 5th Circuit upheld the conviction, despite Andersen's claims that prosecution did not enter evidence about the numerous documents Andersen did not destroy, that the judge allowed improper evidence of past SEC investigations of Andersen, and that the judge misrepresented the offense in the jury instructions with regards to actual knowledge that certain actions constituted a crime under the circumstances and timing of the commission of the actions. Andersen again challenges the conviction, this time before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Arthur Andersen LLP's conviction for witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) must be reversed because the jury instructions upheld by the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the elements of the offense, in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and D.C. Circuits.

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Arthur Andersen, LLP, et al. v. Carlisle, et al.

Issues

Whether Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act entitles parties who are not signatories to an arbitration agreement to receive a stay of trial for arbitration, and whether Section 16 of the Act entitles non-signatories to an immediate appeal if the court refuses them a Section 3 stay.

 

Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allows parties who have agreed to arbitrate to move for a stay of trial proceedings until they have had a chance to attempt arbitration. In addition, Section 16 of the FAA allows an immediate appeal of judgments denying stay under such circumstances. At issue in this case is whether these sections of the FAA extend to non-signing parties affected by an arbitration agreement. Petitioner Arthur Andersen advised Respondent Wayne Carlisle on a business transaction. As a result of this transaction, Carlisle eventually signed a contract, to which Andersen was a not party, that contained an arbitration agreement. After a dispute developed, Andersen sought a stay in the litigation proceedings in order to arbitrate with Carlisle, despite the fact that Andersen had not signed the arbitration agreement. After Andersen appealed the initial denial of its request for a stay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Andersen's appeal because Sections 3 and 16 of the FAA only apply to signatories of arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court's decision in this case may clarify the scope of the FAA's application to non-signatories, including the availability of appellate review of denials of stays.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Section 16(a)(l)(A) of the FAA provides appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from an order denying an application made under Section 3 to stay claims involving non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.

(2) Whether Section 3 of the FAA allows a district court to stay claims against non-signatories to an arbitration agreement when the non-signatories can otherwise enforce the arbitration agreement under principles of contract and agency law, including equitable estoppel.

Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution, outside litigation proceedings, in which parties submit a dispute to an impartial decision-maker for a binding decision. See American Arbitration Association, Arbitration & Mediation.

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