Benitez v. Wallis; Crawford v. Martinez

In this immigration case, the Supreme Court once again explores the detention of non-citizens. Here, the Court will consider whether its ruling in Zadvyas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which determined on statutory grounds that permanent residents could not be held indefinitely, extends to inadmissible aliens. If Zavydas does not, such aliens as Benitez may remain indefinitely detained until they can be re-admitted to their home countries.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and Zadvyas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), compel the release of an arriving alien who was apprehended at the border of the United States, denied admission, and ordered removed from the United States.

Daniel Benitez is an inadmissible alien who has lived in the United States for over twenty years. He is one of nearly 2,300 foreign nationals who entered the country illegally and are therefore subject to deportation, but cannot be repatriated because either their countries will not accept their return, or because the U.S. does not have full diplomatic ties. See Lyle Denniston, High Court To Rule On Immigrant Detention Justice Dept. Appeal On Security Gap To Be Mulled, Boston Globe, Jan. 17, 2004, at A2.

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Bell v. Kelly

Issues

Must federal courts defer to the decisions of state courts on a constitutional claim when a criminal defendant attacks a state court decision in a federal court with a claim backed by evidence that was not developed in state court?

 

Petitioner Edward Bell claims that he is entitled to habeas relief from his death sentence for the murder of a police officer because his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. Bell’s court-appointed attorneys did not introduce mitigating evidence to show that he did not pose a threat of future violent acts. Bell sought habeas relief in the Supreme Court of Virginia, which denied both an evidentiary hearing and habeas relief. Upon Bell’s petition for habeas corpus at the federal level, the district court granted an evidentiary hearing and held that Bell’s counsel acted unreasonably but that Bell was not prejudiced by this action. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that § 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) required deference to Virginia’s summary rejection of Bell’s ineffective assistance claim, even though certain evidence supporting Bell’s claim was introduced for the first time in his federal habeas proceeding. This case could clarify the boundaries of deference toward claims “adjudicated on the merits” under the AEDPA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, and the district court found that he had diligently attempted to develop and present the factual basis of this claim in state court, on habeas, but that the state court’s fact-finding procedures were inadequate to afford a full and fair hearing. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found deficient performance but no prejudice and denied relief. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The question presented is:

Did the Fourth Circuit err when, in conflict with decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, it applied the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which is reserved for claims “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, to evaluate a claim predicated on evidence of prejudice the state court refused to consider and that was properly received for the first time in a federal evidentiary hearing?

On October 29, 1999 in Winchester, Virginia, Sergeant Ricky Timbrook and two probation officers encountered Petitioner Edward Bell and another man while searching for a wanted parolee. See Bell v. Kelly, No. 06-22 at 10 (4th Cir. Jan.

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

Issues

Is a complaint alleging that defendants engaged in parallel conduct and that they participated in a "conspiracy" sufficient to state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman act, 15 U.S.C .  § 1, even if the complaint does not assert any factual allegations that, if proven true, would necessarily establish the existence of a conspiracy?

 

Plaintiff, Twombly, brought a class action antitrust suit against local telephone and internet providers (Bell Atlantic) alleging the defendants had agreed not to compete with each other and conspired to prevent the entry of competitors within their respective territories. The District Court granted Bell Atlantic’s 12(b)6 motion to dismiss on the grounds that Twombly’s complaint failed to include a factual allegation that would “tend to exclude” independent self-interest as an explanation for defendants’ parallel conduct.  On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds that a heightened pleading standard does not apply in the context of antitrust litigation. Bell Atlantic argues that application of the “tend to exclude” standard is necessary to filter frivolous lawsuits.  Twombly responds that the “tend to exclude”  standard  is contrary to the pleading requirements  under  the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and would unfairly block meritorious antitrust suits.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a complaint states a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, if it alleges that the defendants engaged in parallel conduct and adds a bald assertion that the defendants were participants in a "conspiracy," without any allegations that, if later proved true, would establish the existence of a conspiracy under the applicable legal standard.

Plaintiff, William Twombly, brought a class action in the Southern District of New York on behalf of all individuals who purchased local telephone and internet service in the continental United States between February 8, 1996, and the present. Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F.Supp.2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin Clermont for his insights into this case.

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Begay v. United States

 

Federal law prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms, and the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) mandates increased prison sentences for violators of this provision who have three or more prior “violent felony” convictions. Petitioner Larry Begay (“Begay”) had at least three prior convictions for felony driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) when he pled guilty to federal firearms possession charges. The trial court held that felony DWI is a “violent felony,” and therefore sentenced Begay to a lengthy prison term under the ACCA. In deciding Begay’s appeal from this sentence, the Court will consider whether the ACCA’s “violent felony” definition encompasses felony DWI. A decision favoring Begay would likely limit the scope of the definition to felonies similar to those specifically listed in the ACCA: burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes using explosives. On the other hand, a decision in favor of the United States would likely extend the reach of the definition to all dangerous felonies. 

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Beard v. Kindler

 

Joseph Kindler was convicted and sentenced to death by a Pennsylvania court for murder. While Kindler’s post-conviction motions were pending, he escaped and remained at large for years. The court then decided on the basis of a discretionally applied fugitive forfeiture rule that Kindler had waived his rights to make these motions when he fled. After Kindler was returned, he moved to reinstate his motions. The Pennsylvania courts denied this motion and Kindler subsequently petitioned the federal court for habeas review, which the district court granted and the circuit court affirmed. In this case the Supreme Court will decide if a federal court may grant a habeas petition when Pennsylvania’s highest court declared that Kindler forfeited his relief claims when he fled. Pennsylvania argues that its fugitive forfeiture rule is an adequate state ground that bars federal review. Kindler, however, claims the discretionally applied fugitive forfeiture rule was not applied with sufficient consistency in Pennsylvania courts to preclude habeas review.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

After murdering a witness against him and receiving a sentence of death, respondent broke out of prison, twice. Prior to his recapture in Canada years later, the trial court exercised its discretion under state forfeiture law to dismiss respondent's post-verdict motions, resulting in default of most appellate claims. On federal habeas corpus review, the court of appeals refused to honor the state court's procedural bar, ruling that, because “the state court . . . had discretion” in applying the rule, it was not “firmly established” and was therefore “inadequate.” 

Is a state procedural rule automatically “inadequate” under the adequate-state-grounds doctrine - and therefore unenforceable on federal habeas corpus review - because the state rule is discretionary rather than mandatory?

While released on bail and facing burglary charges in 1982, Joseph Kindler murdered one of the accomplices to the burglary, David Bernstein, because he was cooperating with the police and had been granted immunity to testify against Kindler. See Kindler v.

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·         Criminal Justice Crime Blog: Critical discussion of Kindler’s basis for federal habeas review

·         ABC News: High Court to Rule in Pennsylvania Death Penalty Case

·         Capital Defense Weekly Blog: Justice Alito excuses himself from case

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Beard v. Banks

Issues

What right do prisoners have to read secular publications and display photographs while serving their sentences? To what extent can prison officials infringe on this right to serve the prison’s legitimate policy goals?

 

The Long Term Segregation Unit (“LTSU”) of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was established to house “the worst of the worst” of the prison’s population. When they first enter the LTSU, inmates cannot keep newspapers, magazines, or photographs in their cells, though they have limited access to religious and legal materials. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the prison’s regulation is “rationally related to a legitimate penological interest,” and therefore constitutional under the Court’s holding in Turner v. Safley. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines and photographs to the most difficult inmates in the prison system in an effort to promote security and good behavior violate the 1st Amendment?

The Long Term Segregation Unit (“LTSU”) in Pittsburgh’s State Correctional Institution serves as a prison within a prison, housing inmates deemed “too disruptive, violent or problematic” to reside in the general prison population. Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 136–137 (3rd Cir. 2005). Inmates may end up in the LTSU after unsuccessful escape attempts, assaults on guards or fellow prisoners, or incidents of sexual predation. Id.

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Bartlett v. Strickland

Issues

If a racial minority group constitutes less than 50% of a voting district’s population, but enough other voters tend to vote for the minority group’s preferred candidate to enable it to elect the leader of its choice, does Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, require a state to place that group within its own voting district?

 

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act declares that a state may not act in a way that impairs or dilutes, on account of race or color, a citizen’s opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of his or her choice. In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew its district lines and created House District 18 with the intention of complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The “controlling majority” of citizens in the new House District 18 consisted of thirty-nine percent African-American voters and enough non-African-American “crossover” voters to allow the African-American voters to elect a leader of their choice. This redistricting decision was challenged on the grounds that the Voting Rights Act does not require the creation of districts in which African-Americans or other ethnic minorities do not, by themselves, constitute a voting majority. The question the Supreme Court will decide is whether a racial minority group must constitute a “controlling majority” or an actual majority in order to trigger the districting requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed district’s population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

In 2003, North Carolina’s General Assembly redrew voting district lines throughout North Carolina in response to the 2000 decennial census. Pender County v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 366 (N.C.

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Barber v. Thomas

Issues

Whether the proper calculation of “good time credits” to shorten the sentence of federal prisoners, based on their good behavior, is based on actual time served or the sentence imposed, when considering both the rule of lenity and the deference due to the decisions of the Bureau of Prisons.

Petitioners Michael Barber and Tahir Jihad-Black are serving sentences in federal prison for various gun and drug charges. The Ninth Circuit allowed Petitioners to consolidate their cases with several earlier cases in order to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Petitioners are challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which allows well-behaved and compliant federal-prisoners to receive up to 54 days off their sentences for “each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Petitioners argue that “term of imprisonment” means the total sentence imposed by the court. Respondent contends that it refers to the prisoners’ actual time served. The standard of computation ends up differing because under Petitioners’ method, a prisoner receives good behavior credit for years they do not end up serving. Petitioners argue that the courts do not owe the BOP’s interpretation deference, because the statute is unambiguous and the record does not contain any reason for the BOP’s interpretation. Even if the statute is ambiguous, Petitioners argue that the rule of lenity should apply. The rule of lenity holds that when considering penal statutes, the courts should resolve any ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. Respondent agrees that the statute is unambiguous, but counters that it instead requires computation of good time credit on the basis of time served. Respondent also argues that even if the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is civil rather than penal.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

The federal good time credit (GTC) statute provides for credits ‘‘up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Throughout federal sentencing statutes, and elsewhere in the same sentence, ‘‘term of imprisonment” means the sentence imposed. However, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") interprets ‘‘term of imprisonment” as unambiguously meaning time served. For each year of a sentence imposed, the BOP interpretation results in seven fewer days of available credits. The first question presented is:

Does ‘‘term of imprisonment” in Section 212(a)(2) of the Sentencing Reform Act, enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), unambiguously require the computation of good time credits on the basis of the sentence imposed?

The circuits, using a variety of rationales, have rejected the BOP’s claim that the statute was unambiguous, but deferred to the BOP interpretation under Chevron based on “term of imprisonment” being ambiguous. In this litigation, the BOP has conceded that the regulation implementing the GTC statute, and previously accorded deference, was promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BOP rule under Skidmore. The second question presented is:

If “term of imprisonment” in the federal good time credit statute is ambiguous, does the rule of lenity and the deference appropriate to the United States Sentencing Commission require that good time credits be awarded based on the sentence imposed?

Under federal law, a federal prisoner serving a sentence of more than one year but less than life, “may receive credit toward the service of [his] sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). These good time credits (“GTCs”) are subject to a determination by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") that “the prisoner has displa

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Bank of America, NA v. Caulkett; Bank of America, NA v. Toledo-Cardona

Issues

Does 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) permit a bankruptcy court to “strip off” a junior lien on a home that is completely underwater?  

 

The Supreme Court will determine whether 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) permits bankruptcy courts to “strip off” junior liens on property if the value of the property used as collateral is less than the amount the debtor owes to the senior lienholder—in other words, the junior mortgage lien is “completely underwater.” Bank of America asserts that junior liens should not be “stripped off,” or treated as unsecured loans, because § 506 only “strips off” claims from property that are disallowed and because the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dewsnup v. Timm, disallowing “stripping down” of primary liens to the value of the underlying property, should extend to this case. Caulkett and Toledo-Cardona argue that second liens should be treated as unsecured, and hence disallowed, loans when the value of the collateral exceeds the amount owed on the first mortgage and that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dewsnup is limited to “stripping down” and should not extend to these circumstances. The Court’s ruling impacts the right of junior lienholders to collect on loans in the event of a debtor’s declaration of bankruptcy and the treatment of previously secured, but subordinate, debt in bankruptcy proceedings. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void." In Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), this Court held that section 506(d) does not permit a chapter 7 debtor to "strip down" a mortgage lien to the current value of the collateral. The question presented in this case, on which the courts of appeals are divided, is does section 506(d) permits a chapter 7 debtor to “strip off” a junior mortgage lien in its entirety when the outstanding debt owed to a senior lienholder exceeds the current value of the collateral?

In 2013, Respondents David Caulkett and Edelmiro Toledo-Cardona (collectively, “the borrowers” or “Caulkett and Toledo-Cardona”) each filed a petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida (“bankruptcy court”). 

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Bank Markazi v. Peterson et al.

Issues

Did Congress violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers by enabling plaintiffs in a single pending case to attach Iranian assets to satisfy their unpaid judgments?

 

In dozens of consolidated cases, Deborah D. Peterson and other plaintiffs (collectively, “Peterson”) representing terror victims collected billions of dollars in judgments against Iran for financing terrorist attacks. See Peterson v. Republic of Iran et al., 758 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2014). In 2010, Peterson sued Bank Markazi, the government-owned Central Bank of Iran, under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”). See id. TRIA allows plaintiffs to attach or garnish the blocked assets of terrorists or their agents. While the action was pending, President Obama issued an executive order blocking the transfer of Bank Markazi’s assets from New York-based accounts, and Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act. See id. at 188–89. The Act’s relevant portion, section 8772, authorized the Peterson plaintiffs to execute against Bank Markazi’s assets to satisfy their unpaid judgments. The law was explicitly limited to Peterson’s action, pending in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Based on section 8772, the district court granted Peterson Summary judgment, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court will decide whether Congress violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers by enacting laws that compelled a certain outcome in Peterson’s case. See Brief for Petitioner Bank Markazi, The Central Bank of Iran at i; Brief for Respondents Deborah D. Peterson, et al., at i. Bank Markazi argues that section 8772 impermissibly determines the outcome of a single pending case, which marks a Congressional expansion of power that is not supported by the Constitution or the Court’s precedent. See Brief for Petitioner at 26, 35. Peterson contends that Bank Markazi’s attack on the statute is unwarranted, because Congress has the constitutional authority to modify the governing law for pending civil litigation in in outcome-determinative ways. See Brief for Respondents at 16, 35–37. The outcome of this case will affect the balance of power between Congress and the courts, and clarify Congress’ power to affect pending litigation. See Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Courts Scholars, in Support of Petitioner at 11–13.   

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does § 8772—a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case—violate the separation of powers?Does § 8772—a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case—violate the separation of powers?

Deborah D. Peterson and several individuals (collectively, “Peterson”) represent people killed in terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran. See Peterson v. Republic of Iran et al., 758 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir.

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