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This case presents two issues. First, the Supreme Court will determine whether a case is  moot when a plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief for his claims, even if one of the plaintiff’s claims was made on behalf of an uncertified class of litigants. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, No. 14-857, 13 (Feb. 19, 2015). If the case is not moot, the Court will consider whether the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity for government contractors is restricted to claims arising out of property damage caused by public works projects or is applicable in other cases. See Brief for Petitioner, Campbell-Ewald Co. at 36–37, 42. Government contractor Campbell-Ewald argues that an offer of complete relief renders the plaintiff’s individual and class claims moot. See id. at 26–27. But the plaintiff, Jose Gomez, contends that an unaccepted offer does not moot a claim. See Brief for Respondent, Jose Gomez at 37. Additionally, Campbell-Ewald argues that it qualifies for derivative sovereign immunity. See Brief for Petitioner at 36–37, 42. However, Gomez argues that only contractors working on public works projects are entitled to such immunity. See Brief for Respondent at 44. This case may affect the viability of class action  lawsuits,  and may define the scope of derivative sovereign immunity. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Constitutional Accountability Center, in Support of Respondent at 19; Brief of Amicus Curiae KBR, Inc., in Support of Petitioner at 23.

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As part of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") adopted a mandate requiring that employment-based health plans covered by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") include twenty contraceptive methods. Two corporations, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, sued, objecting on religious grounds to the inclusion of four of the methods because they prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg. The corporations argue that the Mandate offends their religious rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and the Free Exercise Clause. The government argues that corporations do not have these rights; and, in any case, the Mandate is statutorily and constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court will consider whether for-profit corporations can sue under RFRA or the Free Exercise  Clause,  and whether this mandate violates corporations’ right to exercise religion. The Court’s ruling may significantly impact foundational principles of corporate law and the scope of corporations’ First Amendment rights. This case will also impact the Affordable Care Act’s power to mandate health plans.

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A jury convicted Petitioner Lonnie Lee Burton of rape, robbery, and burglary. After initially choosing to run Burton’s robbery and burglary convictions concurrent with his rape conviction, the sentencing judge on remand imposed the same 562-month aggregate sentence but ran the three convictions consecutive to each other after finding that Burton’s earlier sentence was too lenient. As a result, Burton’s sentence was 258 months above the 304 month ceiling of the statutory sentencing range. Burton contends that the sentencing court acted in violation of Blakely v. Washington. Burton further contends that the rule from Blakely, decided after his sentence became final, is not a new rule, but rather a rule dictated by the earlier case Apprendi v. New Jersey. The U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the holding in Blakely is a new rule or is in fact dictated by Apprendi. If Blakely is a new rule, the Court will decide whether it applies retroactively. A decision for either side has the potential to change the amount of discretion that judges exercise when sentencing defendants.

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Throughout the 60's and 70's, a now-defunct company called Brown & Bryant stored agricultural chemical products manufactured by Shell Oil Company on parcels of land owned by Brown & Bryant, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company, and Union Pacific Transportation Company. The storage and handling of these chemicals led to leaks, and eventually a cleanup effort headed by California's Department of Toxic Substances Control ("DTSC") and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").  After Brown and & Bryant had ceased to exist, the EPA and DTSC sued the railways and Shell under The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") to recover the costs of the cleanup. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found the railways liable because they owned the land on which hazardous materials were stored and processed, and Shell liable for arranging the disposal of the materials. The District Court found the railways liable for 9% of the costs of cleanup and Shell liable for 6%.  The EPA and the DTSC appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's apportionment of liability, finding that liability should be joint and several. The Ninth Circuit also upheld Shell's liability as the "arranger" of the disposal hazardous substances. In reviewing this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether joint and several liability may be imposed upon several parties under CERCLA even where a district court finds an objectively reasonable basis for dividing the cost of cleanup. The Supreme Court will also decide what constitutes "arranger" liability under CERCLA.

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employers from retaliating against an employee who opposes discriminatory practices. However, the requisite provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), does not define what kinds of adverse employment decisions are actionable. Courts of appeal have adopted three different standards to guide this determination: the Sixth Circuit prohibits any “materially adverse change in the terms of employment;” the Ninth Circuit prohibits any adverse treatment “reasonably likely to deter” the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity; and finally, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits only prohibit an “ultimate employment decision.” In this case, the Sixth Circuit held that a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full back pay, or an inconvenient reassignment, constituted actionable adverse employment decisions. The Supreme Court must now determine which of the foregoing standards is correct.

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In 2002, a South Carolina state court convicted Keith Burgess of misdemeanor drug possession, an offense punishable by up to two years' incarceration. In 2003, a federal court convicted Burgess of conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base in violation of the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"). The court ruled that Burgess' prior state-court conviction constituted a "felony drug offense" under the CSA and thus qualified Burgess for sentence enhancement from ten to twenty years' imprisonment.� Burgess appealed, claiming that the sentence enhancement provision did not apply.� Burgess argued that court should have applied the CSA's definition of "felony" instead of "felony drug offense," under which the state-court conviction merely constituted a misdemeanor. This case highlights the role of judicial review in the application of mandatory minimum sentences.

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Following an arrest for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), Petitioner Donald Bullcoming’s blood was tested at the New Mexico Department of Health in order to determine his blood alcohol content (BAC). At trial, the laboratory’s report was admitted into evidence even though the actual analyst who performed the test was not a witness. Instead, another analyst from the Department of Health testified to the laboratory’s procedures and the machinery used to conduct the BAC test. On appeal, Bullcoming argues that the information in the report was testimonial and that, because the actual analyst was not a witness subject to cross-examination, his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated. Respondent New Mexico contends that the report is not testimonial because the testing analyst merely transcribed raw data and that, even if it is testimonial, Bullcoming’s confrontation rights were satisfied by the opportunity to retest the sample and cross-examine another analyst. To decide this case, the Supreme Court must balance a defendant’s right to confrontation against the burden that requiring the actual analyst to testify imposes on the state.

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