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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether two commonly-owned, contiguous parcels should be considered as a single parcel when determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred. The case arises after four residents of Wisconsin, the Murrs, decided to sell one of two contiguous parcels they had received from their parents. Wisconsin forbid the sale, citing a regulation under which two contiguous parcels of less with a combined area of less than one acre are considered a single parcel. The Murrs argue that the parcels are separate and distinct, as evident by the separate deed to each property. The State of Wisconsin argues that the parcels should be aggregated under the “parcel as a whole” analysis the Supreme Court devised. At stake is just compensation to landowners harmed by overreaching regulation, and the ability of the states and localities to regulate their domain and protect the environment.

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Respondent, Regal-Beloit, (“Regal”) a manufacturer of electric motors, brought suit against Petitioners, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (“K-line”), and Union Pacific Railroad (“UPRR”), the shippers of the motors. Regal alleges that goods were damaged while they were traveling on a UPRR train that derailed in Oklahoma. K-line and UPRR sought and were granted dismissal at the trial level, pursuant to a forum selection clause in the bill of lading between the parties. Regal claims that the bill of lading clause should not apply because the Carmack Amendment governs this transaction, while Petitioners claim that it does not and urge that their contract be upheld. The Ninth Circuit held that the Carmack Amendment applied and reversed the lower court. This case highlights a conflict between the forum selection clause in the bill of lading and the Carmack Amendment, which preempts state and common law claims and provides that it be the exclusive remedy for interstate shipping, and also narrowly restricts the venues in which disputes may be heard. The court must decide whether the Carmack Amendment will apply in this case, where the shipping involved not only domestic rail travel from California to Midwest destinations, but also included an international carriage by sea from China to California. The Court’s decision in this case will impact manufacturers and shippers across all industries. Petitioners additionally charge that a decision for Regal may upset the settled expectations of the international shipping industry, while Regal contends that a decision for Petitioners denying the Carmack Amendment’s applicability could potentially lead to litigation chaos.

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Petitioner Kevin Kasten sued his employer, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, Corp., alleging that Saint-Gobain terminated his employment in retaliation for his oral complaints regarding the location of the company's time clocks. Kasten alleges that Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act protects employees who make oral complaints from employer retaliation. However, Saint-Gobain asserts that Section 215(a)(3) only protects written complaints made to governmental authorities. The Seventh Circuit held that Section 215(a)(3) only protects written employee complaints. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect several aspects of the employer-employee relationship, including informal dispute resolution procedures in the workplace and employees’ abilities to raise their grievances without fear of retaliation.

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Petitioner Gilbert Hyatt initiated a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 145 against Respondent David Kappos, Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, after the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences sustained rejections for seventy-nine of Hyatt’s patent claims. The district court disregarded new evidence presented by Hyatt, because he failed to present such evidence before the PTO when it was available, and granted Kappos summary judgment. The Federal Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed the district court's ruling. Kappos argues that § 145 only affords Hyatt a review that is deferential to PTO determinations, and that new evidence can only be introduced if such evidence becomes available after the PTO proceedings. Hyatt counters that § 145 authorizes the district court to decide patent application de novo, and generally allows introduction of new evidence. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the procedure for judicial review of the patent application process.

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Around January 2004, Donnie Ray Ventris was arrested and charged with the murder, burglary, and robbery of Ernest Hicks. At his trial, the prosecution offered the testimony of Ventris's cellmate, whom the prosecution had recruited to uncover incriminating information from Ventris. This testimony was obtained in violation of Ventris's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his counsel had not been present at the time, nor had he waived his right to counsel beforehand. The trial court therefore did not allow the prosecution to use the testimony in its case-in-chief. It did, however, let the prosecution use the testimony for impeachment purposes. Eventually, Ventris was acquitted of felony murder but convicted of robbery and burglary. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, reversed because it held that Ventris's statements to his cellmate should not have been admitted for any purpose, including impeachment. The U.S. Supreme Court will now decide whether voluntary statements obtained in the absence of a waiver of one's Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be used for impeachment purposes. The Court's decision will impact the procedural fairness and truth-finding function of criminal trials.

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Michael Marsh was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1996 murders of Marry Ane Pusch and her 19-month-old daughter, M.P. Certain mitigating evidence was presented at his sentencing trial. The court weighed this mitigating evidence against the aggravating evidence and determined that the balance of the evidence was equal. Under the Kansas death penalty statute, K.S.A. 21-4624(e), in such a situation where the evidence is “in equipoise,” the tie goes to the State. Therefore, Marsh was sentenced to death. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed Marsh’s death sentence, finding that K.S.A. 21-4624(e) was, on its face, unconstitutional and a violation of the Eighth Amendment due to the fact that it did not require a jury to find that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances in order to impose the death penalty.

Marsh seeks for the Supreme Court to uphold the Kansas Supreme Court ruling. He argues that the Kansas Supreme Court was correct in holding in State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 (2001), that the Kansas equipoise provision violates the Eighth Amendment because it removes a jury’s obligation to make a sentencing decision based on the individual characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the case. Brief for Respondent at 10. According to Marsh, this contradicts the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of individualized capital sentencing. However, the State argues that a case previously decided, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)controls the outcome. In that case, the equipoise concern was raised by the petitioner, but it was of no constitutional concern to the Court. Brief for Petitioner at 5. The State further argues that Kansas’ sentencing procedure does not offend the Eighth Amendment because the law narrows the class of death eligible defendants and places no restrictions on the admission of mitigating evidence. The State asserts that nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments prevents Kansas from imposing the death penalty if aggravating evidence is not “affirmatively outweighed by mitigating evidence,” and that the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court should be reversed. Id. at 6.

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The Supreme Court will consider whether, in capital murder cases, jury  instructions given  in the penalty phase that  fail  to affirmatively state that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See Brief for Petitioner, State of Kansas at i. Gleason argues that his Eighth Amendment right was violated  because  a problematic jury instruction, which lacked an affirmative statement about the appropriate burden of proof, likely precluded individual jurors from considering relevant mitigating evidence. See Brief for Respondent, Sidley J. Gleason at 11. On the other hand, Kansas maintains that Gleason’s Eighth Amendment right was not  violated,  because the jury properly applied the mitigating circumstances without confusion during deliberations. See Brief for Petitioner at 21–22. The Court’s decision could change how states instruct juries in capital murder cases and may lead courts to reexamine prior convictions. See Brief of Amici Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (“CJLF”) et al., in Support of Petitioner at 7–8.

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Since 1902, Kansas and Colorado have been disputing the proper use of the Arkansas River. Each time a new issue arises, the Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over this type of case, has called upon a Special Master to hear the arguments and make a determination. In the most recent case, Kansas claimed that Colorado violated the Arkansas River Compact by depleting the river of water that the Compact reserves for Kansas. Extensive expert witness testimony was required in the case, and ultimately the Special Master ruled in favor of Kansas. The Special Master also decided that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), expert witness fees would be limited to $40 per day. Kansas, having spent more than $9 million dollars on expert witnesses throughout the case, disagrees with this determination, arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) does not apply to cases in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will decide whether it is bound by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) when hearing a case under its original jurisdiction or whether, as argued by Kansas, the Court is free to make its own determination regarding fees. 

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The Supreme Court will determine whether a joint capital-sentencing proceeding between two brothers and a jury instruction that does not affirmatively state mitigating circumstances “need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt” violate the Eighth Amendment. See Brief for Petitioner, the State of Kansas at i. Kansas argues that the circumstances did not require severing the penalty hearings given the jury instruction and interrelated nature of the Carrs’ upbringing, and there is no affirmative duty to instruct juries that mitigating circumstances need not meet any particular burden of proof. See id. at 25, 54. Jonathan and Reginald Carr argue that severance was required because the sentencing proceeding was prejudicial, and the jury instructions were misleading and prevented the jury from properly weighing the mitigating circumstances. See Brief for Respondent, Jonathan D. Carr at 17–18, 43; Brief for Respondent, Reginald Dexter Carr, Jr. at 16, 34. The Court’s ruling will likely affect the severance standard used in multi-defendant capital punishment cases and how jurors are instructed in such cases. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Promise of Justice Initiative (“PJI”), in Support of Respondents at 2; Brief of Amici Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (“CJLF”) et al., in Support of Petitioner at 7.

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The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to give “reasonably calculated” notice to inform an affected party of an upcoming governmental proceeding. The issue before the Court is whether, when mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, due process requires the government to take additional steps to locate the owner before taking the property. A holding that the government is required to take additional steps may subject the government to significant administrative burdens and undermine the process of transferring property rights. A holding that due process does not require the government to take additional steps may make property from tax sales more transferable, but may also deprive property owners of their constitutional right to due process.

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