Greene v. Fisher, Superintendent, Smithfield

Issues

Whether a court can grant federal habeas relief based on a Supreme Court decision decided after the last state court adjudication on the merits, but before the petitioner has exhausted all appeal options.

 

Petitioner Eric Greene was accused of participating in a grocery store robbery that left the storeowner dead. Greene argues that statements made by non-testifying co-defendants improperly implicated him, because the trial court redacted co-defendant statements by replacing references to Greene with blanks or neutral pronouns. While Greene awaited appeal, the Supreme Court decided Gray v. Maryland, which held that obvious redactions of the kind in Greene’s case do not sufficiently protect the accused. Based on this development, Greene petitioned for habeas relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied relief, reasoning that Section 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act does not apply because Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” during Greene’s trial. Greene argues under Teague v. Lane that habeas petitioners benefit from any Supreme Court decision handed down before their convictions become final. Respondent Jon Fisher argues that the phrase “clearly established” precludes re-litigation of issues settled by state courts unless the state’s decision was unreasonable in light of law existing when the decision was handed down. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address the meaning of “clearly established federal law,” posing broad implications for future and ongoing habeas petitions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

For purposes of adjudicating a state prisoner's petition for federal habeas relief, what is the temporal cutoff for whether a decision from this Court qualifies as "clearly established Federal law" under 28 U.S.C .  § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

In December 1993, three or four men robbed a North Philadelphia grocery store, stealing the cash register and killing the storeowner. See Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 87–88 (3d Cir.

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Green v. Brennan

Issues

Under the federal anti-discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run at the time an employee resigns, at the time an employee gives notice of her resignation, or at the time of the employer’s last discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation?

 

Federal employees wishing to file a discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must exhaust their administrative remedies before proceeding to federal court. The first step in that process is contacting an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor (“EEOC”) and reporting the charge within 45 days of the matter alleged to be discriminatory. See Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2014). Green, a United States Postal Service employee, alleges that he was constructively discharged after being forced to retire. See id. at 1137–38. Green contacted an EEOC to report the alleged discrimination within 45 days of his formal retirement. See id. at 1138. The issue before the Court is when the 45-day filing period begins to run. See Brief for Petitioner, Marvin Green at i. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the filing period begins to run when the last allegedly discriminatory act occurred, which in Green’s case was more than 45 days before Green contacted the EEOC. See Green, 760 F.3d at 1142. Green argues that the filing period begins to run when the employee actually resigns following a discriminatory act. See Brief for Petitioner at 17. Postmaster General Brennan maintains that the filing period begins to run when the employee either actually resigns or gives the employer a notice of resignation, which may occur before the actual resignation. See Brief for Respondent, Megan J. Brennan at 14. Court-Appointed Amica Catherine M.A. Carroll, Esq., agrees with the Tenth Circuit’s holding. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amica Curiae, in Support of the Judgment Below at 21. This case will impact the rule that courts use when applying Title VII and the balance between employees’ need to access the courts and employers’ need for repose from impending lawsuits. See Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. et al., in Support of Petitioner at 23; Brief of Amici Curiae The Equal Employment Advisory Council et al., in Support of Affirmance at 18.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Under federal employment discrimination law, does the filing period for a constructive discharge claim begin to run when an employee resigns, or at the time of an employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation?

In early 2008, Marvin Green, an African American United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) worker, applied for a postmaster position. Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir.

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Granite Rock Company v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Issues

Whether a federal court or an arbitrator decides in the first instance if a contract containing an arbitration provision was formed.

Whether §301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, which governs federal jurisdiction for contract violations, not only applies to contracting parties but also to entities not party to the contract that may have interfered with the contract.

 

Petitioner, Granite Rock, and respondent, Teamsters Local 287, negotiated a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) which included no-strike and arbitration clauses. A dispute arose regarding the validity of the agreement after Local 287 initiated a strike with the support of respondent, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”). Granite Rock sued Local 287 and IBT under §301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act. The district court found that the agreement including the arbitration clause was valid and, therefore, referred Granite Rock and Local 287 to arbitration. The court, however, dismissed the claim against IBT, holding that §301(a) did not apply. The Ninth Circuit upheld IBT’s dismissal but held that the district court should have also deferred the question of whether a contract was formed to arbitration. The Supreme Court must now decide if a federal court has initial jurisdiction to determine the validity of a contract containing an arbitration clause and whether §301(a) allows plaintiffs to sue others not party to the contract.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Does a federal court have jurisdiction to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement was formed when it is disputed whether any binding contract exists, but no party makes an independent challenge to the arbitration clause apart from claiming it is inoperative before the contract is established?

2. Does Section 30l(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, which generally preempts otherwise available state law causes of action, provide a cause of action against an international union that is not a direct signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, but effectively displaces its signatory local union and causes a strike breaching a collective bargaining agreement for its own benefit?

For years, petitioner, Granite Rock, a California cement company, and respondent, Teamsters Local 287 (“Local 287”) (the local chapter of respondent, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”)), had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). See 

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Additional Resources

·      Wex: Law about Collective Bargaining
 
·      Concrete Products: Granite Rock Jury Delivers Teamsters Crushing Breach of     Contract Verdict
 
·      Cornell ILR: Collective Bargaining Subject Guide

 

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Granholm v. Heald; Swedenburg v. Kelly; Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Heald

 

In the Granholm, Swedenburg, and Michigan Beer cases, the Court must consider how much power the Twenty-First Amendment grants states to regulate the importation of alcoholic beverages. The cases deal with states that bar out-of-state companies from shipping alcohol directly to in-state customers. Such states generally require liquor distribution through licensed in-state wholesalers. The Twenty-First Amendment, which explicitly declares that transporting liquor into a state "in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited," would seem to grant states wide leeway to regulate the importation of alcohol. However, the Commerce Clause specifically grants Congress, not the states, the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States." Historically, courts have read the Commerce Clause as preventing states from interfering with interstate commerce. The states claim that they are simply trying to regulate the liquor market, collect all applicable taxes and make sure alcohol stays out of minors' hands, but the plaintiffs, who include liquor interests and consumers, accuse the states of protecting their local industries, in violation of the Commerce Clause.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Does Michigan's regulation of the importation of beverage alcohol under the Twenty-first Amendment facially violate the Commerce Clause when it permits in-state licensed wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but requires out-of-state wineries to import its products through licensed in-state wholesalers and to sell its products through licensed retailers or request permission of the Liquor Control Commission to bypass this distribution system and ship directly to consumers?
 
Michigan Beer
 
Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling (in conflict with a Seventh Circuit decision upholding a similar Indiana statute against the same challenge) that the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act do not authorize Michigan to enact statutes that prohibit the importation of alcoholic beverages by unlicensed persons, and that the Commerce Clause bars such statutes.
Whether the Sixth Circuit erred in ruling (in conflict with a Fourth Circuit decision with respect to a similar North Carolina statute) that the proper remedy for the alleged discrimination was to invalidate the state's control over importation of alcoholic beverages rather than merely strike the offending exception for in-state wineries.
Swedenburg
 
Does New York's discriminatory and protectionist prohibition against direct interstate shipment of wine to consumers by out-of-state wineries while permitting in-state licensed wineries to ship directly to consumers violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and if so, is it "saved" by the Twenty-first Amendment?
Does New York's discriminatory and protectionist prohibition against direct interstate shipment of wine to consumers by out-of-state wineries while permitting in-state licensed wineries to ship directly to consumers violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Like many states, Michigan and New York regulate alcohol sales via "three-tier systems". Only licensed manufacturers may sell to licensed wholesalers, who in turn may only sell to licensed retailers, who can then sell to consumers. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2003). Both states allow wineries within their borders to ship wine directly to resident consumers, but out-of-state wineries are prevented from shipping wine directly to consumers, subject to narrow exceptions.
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Graham v. Florida; Sullivan v. Florida

Issues

Is a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole a cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense?

 

Appealed from: Florida First District Court of Appeal (Graham v. Florida, Apr. 10, 2008; Sullivan v. Florida, June 17, 2008)​Terrance Jamar Graham ("Graham") committed an armed burglary when he was sixteen years old. Joe Harris Sullivan committed sexual battery when he was thirteen years old. Both men are currently serving life sentences in the State of Florida ("Florida") with no possibility of parole. Graham and Sullivan each argue that sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Florida counters that such sentences are not constitutionally barred and reflect a state's considered legislative response to the growing problem of juvenile crime. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether juveniles may be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing non-homicide offenses.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Graham v. Florida:

1.         Whether the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits sentencing a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Sullivan v. Florida:

1.         Whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit sentencing a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide offense to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and,

2.         Whether the Supreme Court may review a recently evolved Eighth Amendment claim where a state court has refused to do so, and dismissed the post-conviction motion on independent and adequate state law grounds.

Graham v.

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Additional Resources

·      Annotated U.S. Constitution: Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishments

·      Wex: Juvenile Justice

·      New York Times: Defining “'Cruel and Unusual”' When the Offender Is 13 (Feb. 2, 2009)

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Graham County Soil v. United States

Issues

Does the Federal Claims Act jurisdictional bar apply only to publicly disclosed federal reports, audits, and investigations, or does it apply to publicly disclosed state reports, audits, and investigations as well?

 

Respondent, the United States ex rel. Karen Wilson ("Wilson"), brought a qui tam action against two North Carolinian counties, Graham and Cherokee (collectively the “Counties”), for allegedly filing fraudulent reimbursement claims with the federal government. The Counties argue that, under the False Claims Act, no court has jurisdiction over Wilson's suit, because the State of North Carolina had previously publicly disclosed the information on which Wilson relies in her suit. Wilson counters that the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar refers only to federal reports, audits, and investigations. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether, under the False Claims Act, a publicly disclosed state audit and investigation may preclude jurisdiction over a qui tam action.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether an audit and investigation performed by a State or its political subdivision constitutes an “administrative . . . report . . . audit, or investigation” within the meaning of the public disclosure jurisdictional bar of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).

In February 1995, petitioners, Graham County and Cherokee County (collectively, the “Counties”), applied for federal assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (the "EWP Program"), a United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) federal disaster assistance program. See United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 528 F.3d 292, 296 (4th Cir.

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Additional Resources

·      Legal Information Institute: Graham County Soil v. United States (I)

·      Wex: Law about False Claims Act

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Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown

Issues

Whether a court can acquire general personal jurisdiction to hear any claim against a foreign company when the company’s only connection with the forum state is the distribution of products by other entities of the parent corporation.

 
Appealed from: North Carolina Court of Appeals (Aug. 18, 2009)​Two North Carolina teenagers were killed in France when a tire, manufactured by Goodyear Luxembourg, malfunctioned and caused an accident. Their estates sued the foreign manufacturers of the defective tire for negligence in a North Carolina state court, and the state court found that it had general jurisdiction over the defendants and could hear the case. Goodyear Luxembourg argues that North Carolina does not have general jurisdiction because the company has no presence in or direct business with North Carolina. The teenagers' estates argue that the court properly found jurisdiction because Goodyear Luxembourg is part of the larger and highly integrated Goodyear enterprise, which does have significant contact with North Carolina. The Supreme Court’s  decision in this case  will determine the ease with which plaintiffs may sue foreign manufacturers in state court, and could potentially affect commercial relations between the United States and other nations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a foreign corporation is subject to  general  personal jurisdiction, on causes of action not arising out of or related to any contacts between it and the forum state, merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products placed in the stream of commerce by the defendant.

On April 18, 2004, Matthew Helms and Julian Brown died as a result of a bus accident near Paris, France. See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App.

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Additional Resources

· Washington Legal Foundation: Court Urged to Reject Expansion of Jurisdiction over Foreign Companies (Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. v. Brown) (Nov. 19, 2010)
 
· Nixon Peabody, Raymond L. Mariani: U.S. Supreme Court to Revisit Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Manufacturers (Nov. 16, 2010).
 
The Supreme Court will hear this case in tandem with J. McIntyre Machinery, LTD v. Nicastro, which concerns state personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer which generally targets the U.S. market but has no physical presence in the United States and uses an independent company as its exclusive distributor within the United States.
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Gonzalez v. United States

Issues

Can a defendant's lawyer, without personally consulting the defendant, orally agree to waive the defendant's right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?

 

A federal court convicted Gonzalez of drug charges in a trial in which a magistrate judge presided over jury selection. Though counsel for the defendant consented to the magistrate conducting voir dire (the questioning and evaluation of potential jurors) in lieu of an Article III judge, Gonzalez neither personally consented nor objected. Gonzalez argues that the right to personally choose whether an Article III judge will or will not preside over voir dire is an important constitutional right; the government argues that the rule in Peretz v. United States does not require personal consent, that the consent of counsel was adequate, and that conducting voir dire was within the scope of duties that may be delegated to magistrates. Gonzalez counters that the government misconstrues the language in Peretz.

 

    Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

    Is a federal criminal defendant's counsel's oral consent to have a United States magistrate judge preside over jury selection binding on the defendant when the record does not reflect the defendant's own knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to have an Article III judge preside over jury selection?
    A federal jury in Lorado, Texas convicted Homero Gonzalez on several criminal conspiracy and substantive counts related to possession of more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. Brief for Respondent at 1,2. Gonzalez, a 45-year old Mexican citizen residing legally in the U.S., did not speak English at the time of trial and required a court interpreter to translate the proceedings into Spanish. Brief for Petitioner at 2. Gonzalez appeared before a magistrate judge for his detention hearing and arraignment and then appeared before a district judge for four pretrial conferences. Id. at 2.
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