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Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida

Issues

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to post-employment benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether a former employee can sue over discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act after they have already left their job. Stanley argues that retirees, such as herself, have the right to sue regardless of whether they meet the definition of a qualified individual, and alternatively, that she qualifies as an eligible qualified individual even though she is suing post-employment. Sanford contends that Stanley did not previously argue that retirees have the right to sue regardless of their status as qualified individuals and has therefore waived her right to make this argument. Moreover, Sanford maintains that Stanley does not meet the definition of a qualified individual because Congress did not intend for employees to sue under the ADA post-employment. The outcome of this case has implications for disabled employees’ retirement benefits and the economic freedom of both employers and cities. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — loses her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job.

In 1999, Karyn Stanley became a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida and served for over fifteen years before being diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2016. Stanley v.

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Hewitt v. United States

Issues

Do the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant whose original sentence was judicially vacated before the Act’s enactment?

This case concerns the scope of the First Step Act’s sentencing reforms regarding defendants who were sentenced before the Act’s passage but have been re-sentenced since. The Hewitt defendants and the United States argue that the First Step Act’s inclusion of sentences “not imposed” before the statute’s enactment should apply to the defendants’ sentences, since the re-evaluation of the defendants’ sentences means that the original judgements were not “imposed sentences.” However, the Hewitt defendants and the United States differ in their reasonings. The Hewitt defendants contend their re-sentencing is covered by the Act because of the general principles that courts must interpret ambiguous criminal laws in favor of defendants and that vacated sentences should be treated as not having occurred. The United States contends that the Hewitt defendants are covered by the Act because of the specific language of the Act referencing currently valid sentences, the larger statutory context, and the larger legislative goals motivating the Act. This case has implications for the application of criminal justice sentencing reforms, as well as for how the Court evaluates Congressional intent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provisions apply to a defendant originally sentenced before the act’s enactment, when that original sentence is judicially vacated and the defendant is resentenced to a new term of imprisonment after the act’s enactment.

18 USC § 924(c) requires that a person convicted of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime must receive an additional sentence of at least five years if the person possessed a firearm during the commission of that crime.

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Thompson v. United States

Issues

Does 18 U.S.C § 1014 criminalize the making of a true but misleading statement to federal agencies such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation?

This case asks the Court to determine if 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which criminalizes the making of a false statement to influence federal agencies, also criminalizes true but misleading statements. Petitioner contends that the statute is limited to false statements. Respondent contends that section 1014 criminalizes any “false” statement, including misleading ones. This case touches upon important questions regarding the balancing act between protecting financial institutions from fraudulent acts and overexpansive criminal liability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a “false statement” for the purpose of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies, also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false.

In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 1014 criminalizes knowingly making false statements to a lending institution.

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Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

Issues

Does Rule 60(b) permit plaintiffs to reopen suits that they voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if courts may relieve a party under Rule 60(b) from a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Waetzig contends that the language “final judgment, order, or proceeding” in Rule 60(b) includes a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is a step in a proceeding that terminates the case. Halliburton Energy Services counters that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is neither a proceeding nor final because the plaintiff preserves the right to refile suit. The outcome of this case affects federal courts’ ability to grant Rule 60(b) relief to plaintiffs who dismissed their case because of a mistake or fraud. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 is a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

In February 2020, Gary Waetzig sued Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (“Halliburton”), his former employer, for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment ActWaetzig v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Alexandra Lahav for her insights into this case. 

Additional Resources

  • The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Brief of Amicus Curiae, (December 26, 2024).
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Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton

Issues

What level of judicial review is required for a court to evaluate a law that intends to protect minors from pornographic content but, as a result, burdens adults’ access to such content?

H.B. 1181 is a Texas law seeking to regulate commercial entities that publish sexual material. When more than one-third of the entities’ published material is sexually explicit, H.B. 1181 requires those entities to implement age verification systems. Free Speech Coalition argues that H.B. 1181’s age verification provision burdens adult access to constitutionally protected speech and thus the Supreme Court should apply strict scrutiny when reviewing it. Free Speech Coalition further argues that it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of H.B. 1181’s age verification provision. Paxton, on the other hand, argues that rational basis review should apply to the age verification provision because it is not content-based or speaker-based discrimination. Paxton further counters that Coalition has not proved it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of the age verification provision. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will influence how future statutes impacting protected speech may be reviewed by courts, how state governments can regulate pornography distributors to protect minors, and how the data privacy and cybersecurity of adults who use pornography websites will be weighed by the courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in applying rational-basis review, instead of strict scrutiny, to a law burdening adults’ access to protected speech.

H.B. 1181 is a Texas law intended to apply to commercial entities that publish sexual material. Free Speech Coal. v.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Nelson Tebbe for his insights into this case.

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TikTok, Inc. v. Garland

Issues

Does the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to TikTok, violate the First Amendment?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act violates the First Amendment. TikTok claims that its American subsidiary TikTok Inc. is protected by the First Amendment and that the Act is subject to strict scrutiny. TikTok argues that the government’s purported interests are facially deficient and not narrowly tailored. On the other hand, Attorney General Merrick Garland contends TikTok’s U.S. subsidiary does not grant it First Amendment protections, and even if it does the Act is not subject to heightened scrutiny. Further, Garland asserts that the Act promotes two compelling national security interests and is narrowly tailored. The outcome of this case has significant implications for foreign relations, the proper scope of Congress’s ability to regulate speech, and civil rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to petitioners, violates the First Amendment.

TikTok Inc.is a U.S. corporation that operates the social-media platform TikTok domestically. The TikTok platform is owned by ByteDance, a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands and headquartered in China. TikTok v. Garland (“D.C.

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Loi n°2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 de Modernisation de la Justice du XXI siècle (2016) (Law on the modernization of justice)

Law No. 2016-1547 simplifies the procedures for changing an individual’s first name(s) and gender in civil status records. The law also replaces the discrimination criterion of "sexual identity" by "gender identity". Medical interventions and care carried out as part of a transitional medical process can be covered by social security. Since the adoption of this law, the first name change procedure is no longer a judicial process, and any individual may request the civil registrar to change first name(s) under article 60 of the French Civil Code.

Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County

Issues

Does the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) require an agency to study environmental impacts beyond those that are reasonably foreseeable results of the agency’s action and which the agency has the authority to regulate?

This case asks the Court to determine if the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority. Seven County Infrastructure Coalition contends that NEPA only requires an agency to consider effects with a “reasonably close causal relationship” to the agency’s proposed action. Eagle County, Colorado counters that NEPA requires an agency to consider reasonably foreseeable effects of an agency’s proposed action that include effects a “prudent person” would consider when reaching a decision. This case touches upon important questions regarding the balancing act between economic and other national concerns and environmental protection.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.

Congress delegated jurisdiction over railways to the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) in 1995. Eagle County v. Surface Transportation Board at 1164. Those seeking to build railways must seek approval from the STB, which typically conducts a review and solicits public comments. Id. The board will grant the petition, oftentimes with modifications, unless it finds that building the railway would be inconsistent with the public interest.

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Kousisis v. United States

Issues

Does a private contractor cause “harm” as required for mail or wire fraud when it fraudulently misrepresents to the government that it hired a socially disadvantaged business as promised?

This case asks the Court to determine whether a private contractor’s fraudulent misrepresentation to a government agency regarding the contractor’s subcontracting duties causes harm sufficient for a conviction of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Kousisis argues that the fraudulent-inducement theory that formed the basis for his conviction expands the notion of a property interest beyond the language of § 1343. Kousisis claims that expansion would convert all purposeful breaches of contract into federal crimes with harsh sentences, increasing the size of the federal prison population. The United States argues that the fraudulent-inducement theory fits within the statute and the Court’s precedent. In any event, the United States claims that the government agency overspent on the project because of Kousisis’s misrepresentations, and the government has an interest in protecting against such harms.  The United States asserts that overcriminalization is not an issue, and that contractors should not escape prosecution for misrepresentations to obtain government contracts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme; (2) whether a sovereign’s statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services; and (3) whether all contract rights are “property.”

The federal Department of Transportation (“DOT”) funds infrastructure projects overseen by state agencies throughout the country. United States v. Kousisis at 233. DOT also operates a program to increase the participation of businesses run by the socially and economically disadvantaged—called “Disadvantaged Business Enterprises” (“DBEs”)—in federally funded projects.

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