Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether courts should consider context outside of the narrow time when the officer’s safety was threatened when analyzing whether a law enforcement officer used excessive force. The Fifth Circuit applies the “moment of the threat” doctrine when analyzing the reasonableness of the use of deadly force by a police officer. Under the “moment of the threat” doctrine, the court can only consider the instance at which an officer deployed the deadly force in its reasonableness analysis. Barnes argues that the “moment of the threat” doctrine should be rejected because it contravenes precedents established by the Supreme Court and because it raises impossible line-drawing problems. Felix counters that the “moment of the threat” doctrine is consistent with precedent and is a straightforward analysis that does not raise line-drawing issues. The outcome of this case has strong implications for law enforcement and community relations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an employee can state a claim that their employer violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) by alleging that the employer had third parties such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers provide services for their employee retirement plan. If yes, the burden of proof lies on employer defendants to establish that such services were necessary for the operation of the plan and paid for at reasonable cost if they wish to avoid liability. If no, a plaintiff alleging only that a prohibited transaction was entered into cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Casey Cunningham and other Cornell University Employees (“Cunningham”) stress that § 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA prohibits all transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and parties in interest such as service providers, regardless of whether other sections of ERISA create exemptions, so a plaintiff should not have to plead anything more than that such a prohibited transaction took place — at least to state a claim and survive a motion to dismiss. Cornell counters that common sense and other sections of ERISA — one of which § 1106(a) itself refers to — show that ERISA cannot mean even to presumptively prohibit transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and service providers such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers. The outcome of this case will resolve a split between the Courts of Appeals and determine how easily employee beneficiaries of retirement plans will be able to sue their employers for suspected mismanagement of those plans.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a district court is required to defer to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) without reviewing the validity of the interpretation. Petitioner, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. (“McLaughlin”), argues that the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from interpreting the TCPA in private litigation. Respondents, McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. (collectively “McKesson”), counter that FCC orders are binding and can only be reviewed by a court of appeals. McLaughlin asserts that FCC orders do not bind courts because they are interpretive rules. The outcome of this case will have major implications for the authority of federal administrative agencies. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a manufacturer is allowed to file a petition for judicial review in a place besides the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where it also does not reside or have its principal place of business, because the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located there. In this case, the Food and Drug Administration denied R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.’s premarket tobacco product application, and R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. sought judicial review of this administrative order along with certain retail sellers. The Food and Drug Administration argues that filing a petition for review based on a retail seller’s residence or principal place of business is improper because retail sellers are not covered within the Tobacco Control Act’s zone of interests, the Tobacco Control Act would prohibit retailers from obtaining judicial review, and venue must be proper for all petitioners. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. counters that their petition is proper because retail sellers are covered within the Tobacco Control Act’s zone of interests, the Tobacco Control Act would allow retail sellers to obtain judicial review, and venue only needs to be proper for a single petitioner. This case has important implications for the regulation of e-cigarettes, retail sellers of tobacco products, and forum shopping.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court whether a former employee can sue over discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act after they have already left their job. Stanley argues that retirees, such as herself, have the right to sue regardless of whether they meet the definition of a qualified individual, and alternatively, that she qualifies as an eligible qualified individual even though she is suing post-employment. Sanford contends that Stanley did not previously argue that retirees have the right to sue regardless of their status as qualified individuals and has therefore waived her right to make this argument. Moreover, Sanford maintains that Stanley does not meet the definition of a qualified individual because Congress did not intend for employees to sue under the ADA post-employment. The outcome of this case has implications for disabled employees’ retirement benefits and the economic freedom of both employers and cities. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case concerns the scope of the First Step Act’s sentencing reforms regarding defendants who were sentenced before the Act’s passage but have been re-sentenced since. The Hewitt defendants and the United States argue that the First Step Act’s inclusion of sentences “not imposed” before the statute’s enactment should apply to the defendants’ sentences, since the re-evaluation of the defendants’ sentences means that the original judgements were not “imposed sentences.” However, the Hewitt defendants and the United States differ in their reasonings. The Hewitt defendants contend their re-sentencing is covered by the Act because of the general principles that courts must interpret ambiguous criminal laws in favor of defendants and that vacated sentences should be treated as not having occurred. The United States contends that the Hewitt defendants are covered by the Act because of the specific language of the Act referencing currently valid sentences, the larger statutory context, and the larger legislative goals motivating the Act. This case has implications for the application of criminal justice sentencing reforms, as well as for how the Court evaluates Congressional intent.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Court to determine if 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which criminalizes the making of a false statement to influence federal agencies, also criminalizes true but misleading statements. Petitioner contends that the statute is limited to false statements. Respondent contends that section 1014 criminalizes any “false” statement, including misleading ones. This case touches upon important questions regarding the balancing act between protecting financial institutions from fraudulent acts and overexpansive criminal liability.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if courts may relieve a party under Rule 60(b) from a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Waetzig contends that the language “final judgment, order, or proceeding” in Rule 60(b) includes a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is a step in a proceeding that terminates the case. Halliburton Energy Services counters that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is neither a proceeding nor final because the plaintiff preserves the right to refile suit. The outcome of this case affects federal courts’ ability to grant Rule 60(b) relief to plaintiffs who dismissed their case because of a mistake or fraud. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

H.B. 1181 is a Texas law seeking to regulate commercial entities that publish sexual material. When more than one-third of the entities’ published material is sexually explicit, H.B. 1181 requires those entities to implement age verification systems. Free Speech Coalition argues that H.B. 1181’s age verification provision burdens adult access to constitutionally protected speech and thus the Supreme Court should apply strict scrutiny when reviewing it. Free Speech Coalition further argues that it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of H.B. 1181’s age verification provision. Paxton, on the other hand, argues that rational basis review should apply to the age verification provision because it is not content-based or speaker-based discrimination. Paxton further counters that Coalition has not proved it meets the requirements for a preliminary injunction on the enforcement of the age verification provision. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will influence how future statutes impacting protected speech may be reviewed by courts, how state governments can regulate pornography distributors to protect minors, and how the data privacy and cybersecurity of adults who use pornography websites will be weighed by the courts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine if the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act violates the First Amendment. TikTok claims that its American subsidiary TikTok Inc. is protected by the First Amendment and that the Act is subject to strict scrutiny. TikTok argues that the government’s purported interests are facially deficient and not narrowly tailored. On the other hand, Attorney General Merrick Garland contends TikTok’s U.S. subsidiary does not grant it First Amendment protections, and even if it does the Act is not subject to heightened scrutiny. Further, Garland asserts that the Act promotes two compelling national security interests and is narrowly tailored. The outcome of this case has significant implications for foreign relations, the proper scope of Congress’s ability to regulate speech, and civil rights.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources