Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide the proper remedy for bankruptcy debtors who were treated differently, paying higher fees under a statute enacted by Congress without constitutional authority. John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts entities filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2016 and paid $2.5 million higher fees than debtors in some federal districts, before the Judiciary and Congress resolved the disparate treatment. The U.S. Trustee argues that prospective equality in fees is a sufficient remedy, but if a retrospective remedy is required, the Court should extend the higher fees to debtors previously exempt from it. Hammons argues that the only proper remedy for fees paid under an unconstitutional statute is to refund them and that the remedies the U.S. Trustee proposes violate due process. The outcome of this case will affect how the bankruptcy system is funded—by debtors or taxpayers—and the remedial schemes for debtors who received unequal treatment.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Yonas Fikre’s (“Fikre”) removal from the No Fly List in 2016, alongside a sworn declaration indicating he would not be placed back on it “based on the currently available information,” makes moot his case against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) regarding his placement on the No Fly List. Fikre argues that although the FBI removed him from its No Fly List in 2016, the government’s guarantees are insufficient to show that he will not be put back on the list for the original reasons, and as such his claim is still valid until the government voluntarily acquiesces to his requests or repudiates its inclusion of him on the list. The FBI counters by indicating that its sworn declaration would necessarily include all information which resulted in Fikre’s inclusion on the No Fly List in 2010 and his removal from it in 2016. Therefore, the FBI argues it is sufficient to prove Fikre would not be relisted for the same reasons as before, and to demand any more would require a showing of bad faith on the part of the government and unnecessarily endanger national security. The outcome of this case has serious implications for national security and the transparency of classified government programs like the No Fly List.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government complies with the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)) (“INA”) when it provides notice of deportation proceedings in a separate document from their date and time. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), the government must provide “written notice” to undocumented immigrants who are subject to deportation. This “written notice” is provided in a document called a “notice to appear” (“NTA”) and must include the “time and place” of the proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). However, the government routinely sends two documents: one NTA to alert the immigrant about the removal proceedings, and another Notice of Hearing (“NOH”) to communicate the time and place of the hearing. Campos-Chaves argues that this scheme violates the INA because the statute requires this information to be provided in one document. The United States argues that it complies with the INA because its disjunctive language permits dual-document notice and because a curative NOH overcomes a defective NTA. This case touches on important questions regarding fair notice to immigrants in deportation proceedings and judicial economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether an employer’s decision to transfer an employee, motivated by discrimination but without a judicial finding of substantial detriment to the employee, contravenes Title VII. Petitioner Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow argues that her employer, the City of St. Louis Police Department, made a sex-based decision to reassign her from the police intelligence unit to a more peripheral position and thus violated Title VII, regardless of any judicial assessment of significant disadvantage. Respondent the City of St. Louis counters that Muldrow’s transfer was routine, and that a Title VII claim of discrimination requires demonstrable harm. The Court's decision in this matter will likely influence the scope of Title VII protections against workplace discrimination, thus distinctly affecting employment practices and operational efficiency. The Court’s decision will also impact the number of actionable employment decisions and potential lawsuits.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a taxpayer must realize income under the Sixteenth Amendment before the federal government can tax it without apportionment among the states. In 2017, as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress enacted a new, one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax on taxpayers based on their ownership stake in a controlled foreign corporation. The tax applied retroactively on all income earned by the corporation after 1986, regardless of whether the corporation distributed its earnings to its shareholders. Charles and Kathleen Moore argue that the Mandatory Repatriation Tax, which they were forced to pay, is unconstitutional because the Sixteenth Amendment imposes a realization requirement on income for the federal government to tax it without apportionment. The United States contends that no such realization requirement exists, and that Congress has long taxed individuals based on their share of undistributed corporate earnings without constitutional challenge. The outcome of this case has important ramifications for Congress’s power to impose income taxes and on the complexity and certainty of tax planning.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case concerns the interpretation of a bankruptcy court’s power under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide for release from claims by tort victims against non-debtors. OxyContin producer Purdue Pharma––owned by the Sackler Family––filed for bankruptcy in September 2019.  The bankruptcy plan provided for the Sackler Family to be released from all civil claims by third parties resulting from the acts or omissions of Purdue in exchange for the Sackler Family providing around $5.5 billion to satisfy bankruptcy claims. William K. Harrington, United States Trustee for Region 2, argues that the Code limits the bankruptcy court’s authority to manage debtor-creditor relationships. Purdue Pharma, its creditors, and the Sackler Family argue that the court’s power is limited only by “inconsisten[cy]” with the Code––which doesn’t expressly prohibit these kinds of releases. The case has significant implications for the handling of mass tort claims and potential relief for victims of the opioid crisis.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine when the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) (“ACCA”) applies to a defendant with prior state drug offenses who is facing sentencing for a Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) (“GCA”) violation. The ACCA is a “three–strikes” law which imposes a 15–year mandatory minimum imprisonment term on defendants convicted of violating the GCA and at least three prior violent felonies or “serious drug offenses.” However, a prior state drug offense only counts as a “strike” under the ACCA if the relevant state drug prohibition categorically matches its federal counterpart. Brown argues that federal and state laws must match at the time of sentencing for the GCA violation. Brown claims that his interpretation most closely aligns with the ACCA’s plain meaning and serves judicial efficiency because compliance is easier. The United States argues that federal and state laws must match at the time of the prior state drug offense. The United States claims that its interpretation most aligns with the ACCA’s legislative intent and promotes consistency in the criminal justice system. This case touches on important questions regarding fair notice to criminal defendants as well as federal controlled–substances schedules’ responsiveness to scientific and social developments.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether courts can review an agency’s determination of 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1)(D), which permits a cancellation of removal if an applicant meets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. Wilkinson contends that whether an applicant’s case meets the standard of hardship is a mixed question of fact and law that courts can review. Wilkinson argues that this procedure does not involve finding new facts but instead applies a legal standard to established facts, such as determining whether an applicant’s removal would bring extreme emotional distress to their family. The United States argues that whether an applicant’s case meets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard does not involve applying a legal standard and is therefore an agency’s discretionary determination that is unreviewable by courts. The outcome of the case may significantly impact the procedure and available remedies in removal cases.  Also, the outcome could influence judicial efficiency and the method courts use to interpret statutes in other areas of law.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a defendant from being retried on a count where he was acquitted by a jury’s verdict. Petitioner McElrath argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits defendants from being retried once they are acquitted. Petitioner also contends that the Georgia Supreme Court’s “repugnancy rule,” a rule that voids a jury’s verdicts if its findings on the record are extremely inconsistent, conflicts with the purpose and history of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In response, Respondent Georgia contends that state law, not the Double Jeopardy Clause, defines when a verdict is valid. It further asserts that Georgia’s “repugnancy rule” is consistent with the Constitution because repugnant verdicts and inconsistent verdicts are different, and the Supreme Court has never ruled on contradictory jury findings. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between judicial and jury power, as well as how far a federal court’s power can go in reversing a state court’s decision.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) power to adjudicate securities fraud claims violates the Seventh Amendment or nondelegation doctrine, and if the for-cause removal protections for Administrative Law Judges violate the Take Care Clause. The SEC argues that securities fraud actions only implicate public rights that do not require juries, that its power to choose between adjudicatory and court-based enforcement was created lawfully by Congress, and that the for-cause removal protections do not unduly interfere with the President’s power. Jarkesy counters that securities fraud claims are private rights that require juries, that the SEC’s choice of where to adjudicate enforcement actions unduly delegated legislative power, and that the for-cause protections interfere with Presidents’ ability to carry out their duties. The outcome of this case has serious implications for securities regulation, the workability of administrative enforcement actions, and public faith in federal adjudicatory institutions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Additional Resources